2026:HHC:24717 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 338 of 2007 Date of decision: 20.06.2026 Krishani Devi ...Appellant Versus Pawan Kumar & others ...Respondents Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellant : Mr. Prashant Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents : Ms. Shwetima Dogra, Advocate, vice vice Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate, for respondents No.1 to 3 and 5. Respondent No.4 is ex-parte. Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral): The instant appeal arises out of judgment and decree, as passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (Camp at Bilaspur), dated 26.03.2007, whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant/plaintiff came to be dismissed and the judgment and decree, as passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ghumarwin, dated 11.05.2004, was affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of agreement dated 07.06.1986 was ordered to be dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for specific performance of agreement in the Court of learned Civil 1Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the  judgment? -2- 2026:HHC:24717 Judge (Junior Division), Ghumarwin, on 06.09.1993. As per the case set up by the plaintiff, it was averred that on 07.06.1986, the plaintiff and the defendants entered into an agreement. According to the same, the defendants were the absolute owners of the suit property incorporated therein. The defendants, by virtue of agreement, received a sum of Rs.17,000/-. The defendants also undertook to execute the sale deed within a period of six months from the decision of the case titled as Rattan Lal vs. Krishani which was pending in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, District Bilaspur. Later on, there was another case, titled as Badri vs. Krishani, in which the plaintiffs, defendants and Rattan Lal were also parties, and the land in suit was also involved as part of the suit land. After the settlement of the civil suit, the plaintiff requested the defendants to execute the sale deed in her favour in terms of the agreement. It has been stated in the plaint that when the defendants were not ready to perform their part of agreement, the plaintiff served them with a notice in writing. Therefore, in the plaint, which was filed on 28.08.1993, the plaintiff prayed that decree for specific performance of agreement dated 07.06.1986 be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 3. The suit was contested by defendant Surender Kumar. In his written statement, he raised preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, valuation, limitation etc. On merits, all the submissions and averments made in the plaint were refuted and -3- 2026:HHC:24717 specifically denied. As per the case as set up by the defendant, he stated that he is a stranger to the facts as mentioned in the paragraphs of the plaint. He stated that he is not aware of the litigation which was going on between Rattan Lal vs. Krishani and others. He further stated that he is not aware of the pendency of case tilted Badri vs Krishani, as alleged in the plaint. Late Shri Prem Lal never received a sum of Rs.17,000/- from the plaintiff nor he ever entered into an agreement with her. The story as projected by the plaintiff is false and concocted. The defendant stated that the suit as filed by the plaintiff is based on falsehood. Therefore, the suit is liable to be rejected. 4. The plaintiff filed a replication to the written statement as filed by the defendant and all the averments as made in the plaint were reiterated. 5. Defendants No.1, 3 to 5 filed separate written statement by raising preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, non- joinder, valuation, locus standi and limitation. It was stated by the said defendants that they are not aware of any litigation going on between Rattan Lal and Krishani or the other case titled as Badri vs. Krishani. Further, it was stated that late Shri Prem Lal never received a sum of Rs.17,000/- from the plaintiff nor he entered into an agreement with the plaintiff. 6. Learned trial Court framed issues on 16.09.1997 in the following manner: -4- 2026:HHC:24717 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled a decree for specific performance of agreement dated 7-6-1986 as alleged ? ...OPP 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? ...OPP. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable? ….OPD 4. Whether the suit is bad for want of better Particulars ? ….OPD 5. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction ? ...OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? ...OPD. 7. Whether the defendant No. 2 is minor, if so its effect? ….OPD. 8. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? ….OPD. 9. Relief. 7. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Ghumarwin, directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 11.05.2004 dismissed the suit as filed by the plaintiff/appellant. 8. Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of CPC in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (Camp at Bilaspur) dated 11.06.2004. Learned first appellate Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 26.03.2007, affirmed the findings as returned by learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal as preferred by the present appellant. -5- 2026:HHC:24717 9. Still feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff has approached this Court by filing the instant regular second appeal. 10. This Court on 08.01.2009 admitted the present regular second appeal on following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Id. Courts below have erred in ignoring the fact that the requirements of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act 1963 stood satisfied? 2. Whether the courts below have fallen in error in as much as not acknowledging the substance of the plaint as well as qualitative evidence led by the plaintiff as readiness and willingness to perform her part? 11. It is contended by Mr. Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, that the judgments and decrees as passed by learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned Courts have not appreciated the point in controversy and has wrongly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and those findings were wrongly affirmed by the learned first appellate Court. He further submits that, after accepting the present regular second appeal, the suit as preferred by the plaintiff deserves to be decreed. 12. On the other hand, Ms. Shwetima Dogra, learned vice counsel for the respondents, has defended the impugned judgments and decrees. She submits that learned Courts below have rightly adjudicated and determined the point in controversy, as the plaintiff has failed to establish and prove the agreement to sell alleged to have -6- 2026:HHC:24717 been executed inter se the parties on 07.06.1986. She further submits that since there are concurrent findings of fact as returned by learned Courts below, this Court, while exercising the powers under Section 100 of CPC, will not interfere in those findings. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 14. The plaintiff/appellant approached the trial Court for seeking decree for specific performance of agreement dated 07.06.1986. The case as set up by her is that the agreement was entered into between the parties, and as per the same, the defendants received a sum of Rs.17,000/- as part payment. It is the case of the plaintiff that it was agreed upon between the parties that after the settlement of civil suits, the parties would execute the sale deed of the suit land in terms of agreement to sell entered into between the parties. It was stated in the plaint that the sale deed should be executed within a period of six months from the decision of case titled as Rattan Lal vs. Krishani pending in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Bilaspur. Further, it is the case of the plaintiff that there was another case titled Badri vs. Krishani in which the plaintiff, defendants and Rattan Lal were the parties. 15. In order to corroborate her case, the plaintiff has placed on record copy of agreement (Ext. PW-2/A), which reveals that as per the stipulation contained in the agreement to sell, defendant Prem Lal -7- 2026:HHC:24717 had agreed to sell the land bearing Khasra Nos.154/68 to the present plaintiff for a sum of Rs.30,000/-. Out of total sale consideration, Rs.17,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant Prem Lal as earnest money. In the agreement to sell, it has been stipulated that the sale deed shall be executed between the parties after the decision of the case tilted Rattan Lal vs. Krishani. Further, it has been stated that after the decision of the said case within a period of six months the sale deed shall be executed. 16. In order to corroborate her case, the plaintiff examined herself as PW-1. In her deposition, PW-1 stated that she entered into an agreement with late Shri Prem Lal on 07.06.1986. As per the agreement, the total sale consideration was agreed to be Rs.30,000/-. She stated that the share of the defendants comes to 11 bighas, and the said agreement was written by Shyma Nand Soni. She paid a sum of Rs.17,000/- to the defendants in the presence of Scribe. Further, she stated that the defendants had agreed to execute the sale deed immediately after the decision of the case titled as Badri vs. Krishani. Thereafter, the said proceedings were compromised between the parties. After the decision of the case, she served a legal notice to the defendants and copy of the same is Mark A. After the death of original defendant, Prem Lal, his legal heirs became the owners of the suit land. In her cross-examination, she denied that Prem Lal had refused to sell the land, consisting of 11 bighas, to the plaintiff. She denied that -8- 2026:HHC:24717 the defendants never came to Ghumarwin to execute the agreement. She also denied that the defendants had been in possession of the suit land from 1986 to 1993. Further, PW-1 denied that she was not party to the case tiled as Badri vs. Krishani. She admitted that the copy of said proceedings was not appended with the present suit. 17. PW-2 is the statement of Shyma Nand Soni, who in his deposition, stated that he is working as Petition Writer. He stated that the agreement to sell (Ext.PW-2/A) was written by him. He stated that the said agreement was written on the asking of defendant Prem Lal. He stated that in the agreement (Ext. PW-2/A) he had appended his signatures. The plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.17,000/- to the defendants in his presence. He stated that the agreement was duly scribed by him and the same was executed in the presence of the parties. 18. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he does not remember who was the witness at the time of execution of agreement (Ext. PW-2/A). He further stated that he does not remember whether a sum of Rs.17,000/- was given by the plaintiff to Prem Lal after counting the currency notes. 19. PW-3 is the statement of Hari Ram. He stated, in his deposition, that defendant, Prem Lal, in his presence, had agreed to sell his share of the suit land to plaintiff Krishani. He stated that in his presence the defendant had agreed to sell the suit land for a total sale -9- 2026:HHC:24717 consideration of Rs.30,000/-. Earnest money of Rs.17,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to Prem Lal. 20. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, Pawan Kumar, son of Prem Lal, entered in the witness box as DW-1. In his deposition, he stated that deceased Prem Lal was his father and Krishani Devi is the stepmother of his father. He stated that his father expired on 13.03.1995. He also stated that a false case was filed by the plaintiff in order to harass the defendants. His father never ever entered into an agreement to sell the suit land. The suit land is in the exclusive possession of the defendants. 21. In the cross-examination, he stated that he does not remember that on 07.06.1986 his father entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to sell the suit land. He stated that he does not know that his father had received an earnest money of Rs.17,000/- from the plaintiff. He stated that he does not remember that on 26.02.1992, a settlement took place between the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff could not extract anything favourable from the defendants in his cross-examination. 22. The provisions of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act read as under: “16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person“ (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx -10- 2026:HHC:24717 (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.” 23. In the present case, from a perusal of the plaint and the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove her readiness and willingness to perform her part of agreement to sell. It further clarifies that there is no averment made on behalf of the plaintiff that, after the execution of agreement to sell, she was ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement or that she is performing her part of agreement. Similarly, in the testimony and the statement, while entering the witness box, the plaintiff has failed to plead such facts. Learned trial Court has rightly pointed that in the absence of pleading and proof with respect to readiness and willingness, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff, more so in view of the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 24. The specific relief being discretionary remedy, the material questions, which are looked into are (i) existence of valid contract, (ii) readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, (iii) plaintiff performing her part of contract and its extent and manner, and whether such performance is in consonance with the terms of the contract and (iv) where it is equitable to grant relief of specific performance regarding suit property or it causes any hardship -11- 2026:HHC:24717 to the defendant and in case how and in what manner such relief can be granted, (v) entitlement of plaintiff to any other alternative remedy such as refund of earnest money with interest. 25. The requirements as envisaged under Section 16 of the act are mandatory in nature. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in the respective pleadings and it has to be validly proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then, the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts. 26. In the case at hand, this Court finds that the learned Courts below have rightly determined and adjudicated the factual matrix of the case and after perusing the pleadings rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was neither ready nor willing to perform her part of contract. Therefore, she was not entitled to claim the relief of specific performance of the contract against the defendants in relation to the suit land. In other words, learned Courts below have rightly held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract. As rightly pointed out by Ms.Shwetima Dogra, learned counsel for the respondents, the issue of readiness and willingness is the most important issue for considering the grant of specific performance of the contract. Since this issue has been decided against the plaintiff by the two Courts below based on -12- 2026:HHC:24717 appreciation of evidence, and it is essentially a question of fact, this Court is not inclined to re-appreciate the entire evidence while hearing the appeal under Section 100 of CPC. 27. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay money, in terms of the contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statement in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Man Kaur (dead) by LRs. vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512, has held as under:- “40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant - vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiff is something -13- 2026:HHC:24717 which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by defendant. But in that case, if plaintiff did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract had to be performed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by defendant, as he was not `ready and willing' to perform his obligations.” 29. It is well settled principle of law that in suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he/she is ready and willing to perform his/her part of the contract, and if the fact is proved, it is required to prove continuous, readiness and willingness from the date of contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his/her part. In the present case, the said readiness and willingness has neither been pleaded nor proved in the pleadings and evidence as led by the plaintiff. 30. In N.P. Thirugnanam (dead) by LRs vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao & others, (1995) 5 SCC 115, it has been held by the Apex Court that Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed and has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the -14- 2026:HHC:24717 contract, which was to be performed by him other than those terms, the performance of which has been granted or weighed by the defendant. In order to determine whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement, it is necessary for the Court to consider the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to filing the suit for specific performance. 31. Similarly, in Umabai & another vs. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (dead) by LRs & another, (2005) 6 SCC 243, the Apex Court has held that a finding as to whether the plaintiffs were all along and still ready and willing to perform their part of contract was mandatory requirement under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act. The Court would necessarily had arrived at the findings that the plaintiffs all along were and still ready and also willing and ready to perform their part of the contract. 32. The same principle of law has been laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4703 of 2022, titled as, U.N. Krishnamurthy (since Deceased) through LRs vs. A.M. Krishanmurthy, decided on 12.07.2022, which reads as under:- “27. In Pt. Prem Raj v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Pri- vate) Ltd. And Anr.2 cited by Mr. Venugopal, this Court speak- ing 1 (2010) 10 SCC 512 2 AIR 1968 SC 1355 through Ra- maswamy J. held that “it is well-settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract…..” and if the fact is traversed, he is required to prove a continuous readiness and -15- 2026:HHC:24717 willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. For such conclu- sion the learned Judge relied upon the opinion of Lord Blanes- burgh, in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon. 28. In D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra), in the absence of an averment on the part of the Plaintiff in the plaint, that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, it was held that the Plaintiff had no cause of action so far as the relief for Specific Performance was concerned. In this case, of course, there is an averment in the plaint that the Respondent Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract. The question is whether the Respondent Plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract. 29. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Ors. 4, this Court reiterated that Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 envisages that the Plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by him 3 55 IA 300, at pg. 372: AIR 1928 PC 208 4 (1995) 5 SCC 115 other than those terms, the perfor- mance of which has been prevented or waived by the Defen- dant. In N.P. Thirugnanam (supra) this Court said that the con- tinuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff was a condition precedent for grant of the relief of Specific Per- formance. 33. In a suit for Specific Performance of a contract, the Court is required to pose unto itself the following questions, namely:- (i) Whether there is a valid agreement of sale binding on both the vendor and the vendee and -16- 2026:HHC:24717 (ii) Whether the Plaintiff has all along been and still is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as envisaged under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 34. There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of Specific Performance. In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar cited by Mr. Venugopal, this Court said that there was a difference between readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the Plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the Plaintiff. The same view was taken by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar.” 33. The learned Courts below after taking into consideration the entire material, as placed on record, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to establish and prove the mandatory requirements of Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act. 34. Even otherwise, a the perusal of the record reveals that the case set up by the plaintiff in the agreement to sell is that the sale deed shall be executed inter se the parties after the decision of the case titled Rattan Lal vs. Krishani. It is fairly conceded by Mr. Prashant Sharma, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, that a copy of proceedings of that case has not been placed on record. This fact falsifies the case of the plaintiff and demolishes her entire case. -17- 2026:HHC:24717 35. Admittedly, the agreement to sell was entered into between the parties on 07.06.1986, whereas the suit was instituted before the learned trial Court on 06.09.1993. The limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is three years, however, in the present case, the suit was admittedly filed after elapse of more than seven years. Thus, the suit as instituted by the plaintiff, on the face of it, is time barred. Learned Courts below have rightly held that the suit as instituted is beyond the period of limitation. Therefore, on that count as well, the suit deserves to be dismissed. 36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of judgments has held that the first appellate Court is the final court of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse, but that is not case in hand. 37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with scope of interference under Section 100 in Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 has held as under: “18. It has been noted time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the -18- 2026:HHC:24717 procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section in several cases, the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. Further, a substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. "19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the -19- 2026:HHC:24717 lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence. 20. to 22 xx xx xx xx 23. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and -20- 2026:HHC:24717 impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Annamalai vs. Vasanthi, 2025 INSC 1267, has held as follows:- “16. Whether D-1 and D-2 were able to discharge the aforesaid burden is a question of fact which had to be determined by a court of fact after appreciating the evidence available on record. Under CPC, a first appellate court is the final court of fact. No doubt, a second appellate court exercising power(s) under Section 100 CPC can interfere with a finding of fact on limited grounds, such as, (a) where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it is based on misreading of evidence; and (d) where it is perverse. But that is not the case here. 17. In the case on hand, the first appellate court, in paragraph 29 of its judgment, accepted the endorsement (Exb. A-2) made on the back of a registered document (Exb. A-1) after considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant and the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark of D-1 and D-2 were not disputed, though claimed as one obtained on a blank paper. The reasoning of the first appellate court in paragraph 29 of its judgment was not addressed by the High Court. In fact, the High Court, in one line, on a flimsy defense of use of a signed blank paper, observed that genuineness of Exb. A-2 is not proved. In our view, the High Court fell in error here. While exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, it ought not to have interfered with the finding of fact returned by the first appellate court on this aspect; more so, when the first appellate court had drawn its conclusion after appreciating the evidence available on record as also the circumstance that signature(s)/thumbmark(s) appearing on the document (Exb.A2) were not disputed. Otherwise also, while disturbing -21- 2026:HHC:24717 the finding of the first appellate court, the High Court did not hold that the finding returned by the first appellate court is based on a misreading of evidence, or is in ignorance of relevant evidence, or is perverse. Thus, there existed no occasion for the High Court, exercising power under Section 100 CPC, to interfere with the finding of the first appellate court regarding payment of additional Rs. 1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 over and above the sale consideration fixed for the transaction. 18. Once the finding regarding payment of additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 to D-1 and D-2 recorded by the first appellate court is sustained, there appears no logical reason to hold that the plaintiff (Annamalai) was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract particularly when Rs. 4,70,000, out of total consideration of Rs. 4,80,000, was already paid and, over and above that, additional sum of Rs.1,95,000 was paid in lieu of demand made by D-1 & D-2. This we say so, because an opinion regarding plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform its part under the contract is to be formed on the entirety of proven facts and circumstances of a case including conduct of the parties. The test is that the person claiming performance must satisfy conscience of the court that he has treated the contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill his obligation and accept performance when the time for performance arrives.” 39. There are concurrent findings of fact, as returned by the learned Courts below, which do not call for any interference. There is no illegality or perversity in the same. In the considered view of this Court, the Courts below have rightly appreciated the controversy in hand which does not call for any interference. -22- 2026:HHC:24717 40. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 41. No other point urged by the respective counsel for the parties. 42. Consequently, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed. (Romesh Verma) Judge 20th June, 2026. (vt)