2026:HHC:24129 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 631 of 2026 Decided on: 23.6.2026 Rajeev Kumar …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Ajay Kochhar, Senior Advocate, with Ms Swati Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 134 of 2024, dated 1.8.2024, registered at Police Station, Manali, District Kullu, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 103(1), 61(2) and 238 read with Section 3(5) Bharatiya Nayaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24129 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, Subhash Chand, Assistant Manager in Hotel Manali Grand, was found missing on the night of 31.7.2024. He was subsequently found in the orchard with head injuries. The petitioner was implicated in the murder based on the suspicion and disclosure statements. The learned Trial Court has framed charges against the petitioner, and the matter is listed for the recording of the prosecution evidence. The petitioner has undergone a substantial part of the imprisonment. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The custody of the petitioner is not required. He would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant and Subhash Chand (since deceased) were working in Hotel Manali Grand. Subhash Chand was residing with his family members in the house of his brother-in-law, Rajeev (the petitioner). Subhash Chand left for his home on 31.07.2024 at about 10:00 p.m.; however, he did not reach home. A search was made for Subhash Chand, and his dead body was found in an orchard. The matter was reported to the police. The police 3 2026:HHC:24129 registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. The police seized the broken piece of a Baseball Bat from the spot. The police interrogated the petitioner, Rajeev, based on suspicion. It was found that the petitioner had extramarital relations with the co- accused. Subhash Chand (since deceased) discovered the relationship and started beating the co-accused. Petitioner and co- accused conspired with Birbal to kill Subhash Chand. The petitioner and Birbal killed Subhash Chand by hitting him with a baseball bat. Birbal got the bat recovered, and the petitioner got Subhash Chand's mobile recovered. The Police arrested Birbal and the petitioner. As per the result of the analysis, the Baseball Bat recovered at the instance of Birbal matched with the broken pieces lifted from the spot. 49.94 mg% ± 2.41 mg% (MU) ethyl alcohol was found in the blood of the deceased. A DNA profile could not be obtained from any of the articles recovered during the investigations. The injury suffered by Subhash Chand could have been caused by means of the Baseball Bat. The petitioner was in touch with the co-accused. All the co-accused had deleted the history of call details, SMS and internet calls. Statements of five witnesses out of 23 witnesses cited by the prosecution have been recorded. Hence, the status report. 4 2026:HHC:24129 4. I have heard Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Swati Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime. The police recorded the statement of Divyansh after the co-accused was released on bail. The investigation is not fair. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the heinous offence of murder, which is punishable with death. The petitioner should not be released on bail, considering the nature of the offence and the severity of the punishment. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5 2026:HHC:24129 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a 6 2026:HHC:24129 defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless 7 2026:HHC:24129 to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; 8 2026:HHC:24129 (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of 9 2026:HHC:24129 the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The police recorded the statement of Divyansh in which he stated that the petitioner and the co-accused had talked to each other that they would administer poison to the deceased and proclaim that he had died because of a heart attack. He further stated that the petitioner used to visit the co-accused in the 10 2026:HHC:24129 absence of the deceased. The petitioner also produced the mobile phone of the deceased, for which he has not provided any valid explanation. These circumstances, prima facie, show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime. 12. It was submitted that the statement of Divyansh was recorded after considerable delay, and there is a serious doubt that he had witnessed any incident. This submission will not help the petitioner because the Court granting the bail has to see a prima facie case. The statement of Divyansh prima facie connects the petitioner to the commission of the crime, and the petitioner cannot be released on bail simply because there is a delay in recording the statement of the witness. 13. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Thus, the punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244: “6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. 11 2026:HHC:24129 When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51] “I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point, three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.” 7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The 12 2026:HHC:24129 punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to bail considering the severity of the punishment. 15. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The status report shows that the statements of five witnesses have been recorded, and there is no delay. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 16. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial. 13 2026:HHC:24129 17. It was submitted that the co-accused has been released on bail and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. This submission will not help the petitioner. The co-accused was released on bail because she was a woman and there was no material to connect her to the commission of the crime at that stage. The police subsequently recorded the statement of Divyansh, who had specifically named the petitioner as the conspirator. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 722: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 335 that while determining the parity, the role of the accused has to be considered. It was observed at page 246 “Parity, while granting bail, must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident, and the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.” 18. This position was reiterated in Tarun Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate, AIR 2024 SC 169: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486, wherein it was observed: 14 2026:HHC:24129 “18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other co- accused, who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.” 19. The circumstances against the petitioner and the co- accused are different and the petitioner cannot claim any parity with the co-accused. 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (Chander)