[2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil First Appeal No. 1110/2026 CNR: RJHC020684232026 | URN: CFA / 1774U / 2026 M/s Royal Enterprises, Through Proprietor Shri Bhanwar Singh Choudhary, Office Situated At 19-B, Vinayak Vihar, Jaipur Road, Bhunabai, Ajmer. ----Appellant Versus Nagar Parishad, Kishangarh Through Commissioner. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Dr. Ganesh Parihar, Adv. Mr. Santosh Kumar Sharma, Adv. For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Order(Oral) Reportable 03/08/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J. 1. Appellant herein seeks quashing of the Judgment and Decree dated 10.06.2026 passed by the learned Commercial Court, Ajmer, whereby the appellant–plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 5,96,850/- against the respondent–defendants was dismissed, principally on the finding that it was barred by limitation. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows. The work of cleaning, collection, lifting and transportation of garbage in 30 wards of the Kishangarh area was awarded to the appellant–plaintiff vide Work Order dated 19.12.2014 for the period 01.01.2015 to 31.03.2015, later extended up to 30.04.2015, on a [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (2 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] monthly contract value of Rs. 21,21,121/-, under an agreement executed on 30.12.2014. 2.1 According to the plaintiff, the contractual work was satisfactorily completed. Nonetheless, while the bill for January 2015 was paid in full, the defendants withheld Rs. 3,00,000/- from each of the bills for February, March and April 2015 Rs. 9,00,000/- in the aggregate citing a pending departmental enquiry. The plaintiff claims that, upon its representation dated 01.06.2015, it was orally informed at the end of June 2015 that, the allegations not having been established prima facie, release of 50% of the withheld amount had been ordered, the balance to abide the outcome of the enquiry. No payment, however, followed. 2.2 The plaintiff thereafter submitted applications under the Right to Information Act dated 27.07.2017 and 27.09.2018 seeking the enquiry record, which, it alleges, was withheld. On 19.06.2017, a sum of Rs. 5,02,075/- approximately 50% of the outstanding amount was credited to the plaintiff's bank account, which the plaintiff treats as part- payment of its dues. The balance of Rs. 4,00,000/-, together with interest at 6% per annum, remaining unpaid despite representations and exchange of legal notices, the suit was instituted on 05.03.2021 for recovery of Rs. 5,96,850/-. 3. The defendants contested the suit. Their case, in substance, was threefold: (i) The credit of Rs. 5,02,075/- made on 19.06.2017 was not a payment towards the plaintiff's dues at all. It was a payment due to M/s Keen Environmental Sanstha which was inadvertently transferred to the plaintiff's account; no bill or voucher in the plaintiff's favour was ever prepared for that date. The defendants have, in fact, instituted Civil Suit No. 7/2020 (Nagar Parishad, Kishangarh & Ors. v. M/s Royal Enterprises [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (3 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] & Ors.) before the Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 1, Kishangarh, for recovery of that very amount, and the said suit is pending; (ii) The deductions of Rs. 9,00,000/- were lawful. The plaintiff failed to perform the sanitation work in accordance with the contractual terms; the work was verified through the defendants' employees before payment, and deductions were made strictly under the contract, the particulars whereof were set out in the written statement. The plaintiff had, moreover, already received back its security deposit of Rs. 3,18,200/- vide Bill No. 853 dated 30.07.2015; and (iii) The suit is barred by limitation. 4. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder reiterating the plaint and denying the written statement. On the pleadings, the learned Commercial Court framed six issues, including the issues of limitation and of relief. The plaintiff examined PW-1 Bhanwar Singh Choudhary i.e. the proprietor and produced Exhibits 1 to 15; the defendants examined DW-1 Mahendra Jain and DW-2 Bhagchand Daga and exhibited documents Exhibits A-1 to A-46. 5. Upon appreciation of the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence, the learned Commercial Court, by the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 10.06.2026, dismissed the suit, holding, inter alia, that the deductions had been made under the terms of the contract upon verification reports, that the credit of Rs. 5,02,075/- on 19.06.2017 stood proved to be a mistaken transfer of the amount payable to M/s Keen Environmental Sanstha, and, decisively, that the suit was barred by limitation. 6. Hence the instant appeal by the plaintiff. [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (4 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Learned counsel for the appellant, inter alia, contends that ; (a) the credit of 19.06.2017 was a part-payment of the withheld dues furnishing a fresh period of limitation; (b) that the cause of action stood deferred by the pendency of the departmental enquiry and (c) the assurances held out by the respondents and that the material obtained under the RTI Act, particularly the note-sheet (Exhibit 10), extended limitation period qua the plaintiff's claim. 7.1 Learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgment for the reasons given therein and seeks dismissal of appeal. 8. In light of the aforesaid, the decisive question in this appeal is whether the suit was within limitation. 9. The findings of the learned Commercial Court on limitation are contained in paragraphs 22 and 26 of the impugned judgment, the translation whereof is reproduced hereinbelow: "22. It is also appropriate to clarify here that when the plaintiff had already received the security amount in July, 2015, whether the plaintiff firm had is- sued any notice to the defendant firm during that period demanding the out- standing amount, which has been stated by the plaintiff in the plaint to be a total sum of Rs.9,00,000/-, has not been stated in the plaint. Since the term of the plaintiff firm's work had expired on 30.04.2015 and the security amount had also been paid to it on 31.07.2015, the notice demanding pay- ment of the said amount was issued by the plaintiff only on 24.11.2020, be- ing Exhibit 12. Thus, the demand for the amount in dispute was made through notice dated 24.11.2020, which was issued after a period of about five years. After receipt of the security amount in July, 2015, the demand for the outstanding amount was made by the notice dated 24.11.2020. During the said period of five years, there is no averment in the plaint that the plaintiff had taken any action for demanding the said amount. The plaintiff has averred in the plaint that the said proceedings were initiated after ob- taining information under the Right to Information Act. However, it is ap- propriate to clarify that the said proceedings were initiated only after the amount had been mistakenly deposited into the plaintiff's account on 19.06.2017, but even after obtaining the copy of the said note-sheet, the present action was taken after a period of about four years. Failure to de- mand the said amount during such a long period creates doubt regarding the plaintiff's case. x-x-x-x-x [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (5 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] 26. This issue relates to whether the plaintiff's suit has not been filed within the period of limitation, the burden of proving which lies upon the plaintiff. While deciding Issue Nos. 1 and 2, it has already been discussed that the plaintiff had received the security amount in July, 2015. The plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the outstanding amount was a total sum of Rs.9,00,000/-, but no notice was issued by the plaintiff firm to the defendant during that period demanding the said amount. Since the term of the plain- tiff firm's work had expired on 30.04.2015 and the security amount had also been paid to it in July, 2015, receipt of the security amount implied that no amount remained outstanding with the defendant. After receiving the secu- rity amount, the plaintiff issued notice dated 24.11.2020, Exhibit 12, de- manding the outstanding amount, which was issued after a period of about five years. Therefore, the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff from the date when the security amount was received, which implied that no amount remained outstanding, but during the said period no demand was made in respect of the deducted amount, and the cause of action pleaded by issuing a notice after five years is not credible because the cause of action had al- ready accrued in July, 2015, and the plaintiff ought to have demanded the remaining amount at that very time. In matters relating to recovery of money, once the right to sue accrues, the suit is required to be instituted within three years thereof. The plaintiff has averred in the plaint that the present proceedings were initiated after obtaining information under the Right to Information Act. However, it is appropriate to clarify that the plain- tiff initiated the said proceedings only after the amount had been deposited into the plaintiff's account by mistake on 19.06.2017, and the present suit was instituted on 05.03.2021, which was after a period of about four years from the receipt of the copy of the note-sheet. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the suit has been filed within limitation. Accordingly, this issue is decided against the plaintiff." 10. In our opinion, the learned Commercial Court has rightly answered the question of limitation against the plaintiff. Let us see how. We proceed to record our reasons here in after. 10.1 The claim in suit is one for money due under a contract of work, recovery of amounts withheld from running bills. Such a claim is governed by Article 18 (for the price of work done) or, in any event, by Article 55 (compensation for breach of contract) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The prescribed limitation period for such a claim under both the Articles is three years. The cause of action arose when the deductions were made from the bills for February, March and April 2015, that is, at the latest, upon payment of the April 2015 bill, or, taking the plaintiff's own case at its highest, on 01.06.2015 / end of June 2015, when the plaintiff represented against the withholding and was allegedly informed of the order releasing 50% of the withheld [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (6 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] amount. The release of the security deposit to the plaintiff on 30/31.07.2015, presupposes that no dues remain outstanding as far as defendant is concerned. Computed from any of these dates, the period of three years expired, at the very latest, by the end of July 2018. (A) Even taking the plaint as gospel, the suit is ex facie barred 10.2 It is trite that, for the purpose of examining the bar of limitation, the averments in the plaint must be read as a whole and taken to be correct. Applying that very standard, that is, even if every fact pleaded by the appellant–plaintiff and every piece of evidence adduced by it is taken as gospel truth, the suit is, ex facie, barred by limitation. 10.3 The plaintiff's own pleaded case is : (a) the contract expired on 30.04.2015; (b) Rs. 9,00,000/- stood withheld from the bills for February to April 2015; (c) the plaintiff represented against the withholding on 01.06.2015 and was informed at the end of June 2015 that 50% of the amount had been ordered to be released; and (d) no payment followed. The wrongful withholding of the bill amounts, the very grievance sued upon, was thus complete, known to the plaintiff, and protested against by it, by June 2015 at the latest. The right to sue for the withheld amount accrued then and there. Three years therefrom expired by mid- 2018. The suit was instituted only on 05.03.2021, nearly six years after the accrual of the cause of action, and the bar of limitation is writ large on the face of the plaint itself, without the Court having to travel beyond the plaintiff's own pleadings and the admissions of PW-1, who accepted that the term of the contract expired on 30.04.2015, that the security [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (7 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] amount was received on 30.07.2015, and that the first legal notice was issued only in November/December 2019. 10.4 It may also be pertinent to note here that the suo motu orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court excluding the period 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 in computation of limitation, occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic, can lend no assistance to the plaintiff, for the prescribed period had expired long before 15.03.2020, and a claim already dead before the excluded period commenced cannot be resurrected by it. (B) The credit of 19.06.2017 does not extend Limitation 10.5 The sheet-anchor of the plaintiff's case on limitation is that the credit of Rs. 5,02,075/- on 19.06.2017 was a part-payment of its dues, so as to attract Section 19 of the Limitation Act and furnish a fresh starting point. The argument does not bear scrutiny, for more than one reason. 10.6 First, let us see Section 19, Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as under:- "19. Effect of payment on account of debt or of interest on legacy.— Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made: Provided that, save in the case of payment of interest made before the 1st day of January, 1928, an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making the payment. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section,— (a) where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the rent or produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment; (b) “debt” does not include money payable under a decree or order of a court." Section 19 thus applies only where payment "on account of a debt" is made by the debtor and an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making it. The provision is not an empty formality. In the present case, [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (8 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] there is no writing whatsoever, no bill, no voucher, no covering communication, by which the defendants acknowledged the credit of 19.06.2017 as a payment towards the plaintiff's dues. The essential ingredient of Section 19 is, therefore, wholly absent. This is so, even if the plaintiff's entire narrative is accepted as gospel, for the plaint itself pleads no such writing. 10.7 Second, the very character of the credit is in dispute, and the material on record squarely negates the plaintiff's theory. The defendants' consistent and contemporaneous defense is supported by the absence of any bill or voucher in the plaintiff's favour of that date. Coupled with the HDFC Bank communication dated 25.05.2018 informing the plaintiff of the wrongful RTGS transfer by the legal notice dated 22.11.2019. Also, by the institution of Civil Suit No. 7/2020 for recovery of that very sum. It is stated that the amount was, in fact, payable to M/s Keen Environmental Sanstha under bills Exhibits A-36 to A-41 aggregating precisely to Rs. 5,02,075/-, and was remitted in the plaintiff's account by mistake. DW-2 Bhagchand Daga having candidly owned the error. A payment which the payer asserts, contemporaneously and consistently, to have been made in error towards a third party's bills cannot be treated as a conscious payment "on account of" the plaintiff's debt. Tellingly, the figure itself belies the plaintiff's case, i.e., 50% of the withheld amount Rs. 9,00,000/- is Rs. 4,50,000/-. Whereas, the credit was of Rs. 5,02,075/-, which tallies with the third party's bills and not with the plaintiff's claim. 10.8 Third, it deserves emphasis that a part-payment under Section 19, operates within the framework of a conscious admission of subsisting liability by the debtor. Whether the credit of 19.06.2017 was in truth a mistaken transfer is the very subject-matter of the [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (9 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] defendants' pending Civil Suit No. 7/2020. We express no opinion thereon. It suffices for the purpose of adjudication of instant appeal to hold that the credit, unaccompanied by any signed writing and disputed in its very character from the outset, cannot and does not in law furnish a fresh period of limitation to the plaintiff. (C) Representations and RTI proceedings do not extend limitation 10.9 Nor do the plaintiff's remaining circumstances advance its case. The pendency of a departmental enquiry, oral assurances of release of the withheld amount, repeated representations, and applications under the Right to Information Act do not, in law, arrest or extend limitation. Once time has begun to run, no subsequent event can stop or restart it save as provided by the Limitation Act itself. In the present case, only an acknowledgment in writing signed before the expiry of limitation (Section 18) or a qualifying part-payment (Section 19) could have extended the period of limitation. Both these provisions insist upon writing by the debtor party. As already held above, neither exists here. Oral assurances, by their very nature, satisfy neither of the provisions of Limitation Act. It is well settled that mere correspondence, negotiation or the pursuit of dues by representations does not postpone the accrual of the cause of action or confer a fresh period of limitation. 10.10 Equally, information obtained under the Right to Information Act is merely a disclosure of existing facts. It neither creates a right and nor adjudicates one. Nor it furnishes a fresh cause of action. The internal note-sheet entries at paragraphs 181 to 193 of Exhibit 10, relied upon by the plaintiff, are more inter-departmental notings. A mere recommendation of an officer on a file, neither addressed nor communicated to the creditor as an admission of liability, does not [2026:RJ-JP:29918-DB] (10 of 10) [CFA-1110/2026] amount to an acknowledgment of debt within the meaning of Section 18. Indeed, on the learned trial Court's reading of the note-sheet, which we find no reason to disturb, no order for release of 50% of the withheld amount was ever passed. The competent authority merely directed that action be taken in accordance with the applicable Rules and the terms of the contract. 10.11 Furthermore, having received back its security deposit on 30.07.2015, the plaintiff issued its first demand notice only on 24.11.2020 (Exhibit 12), i.e., after a lapse of over five years. It instituted the suit on 05.03.2021, nearly six years after the accrual of the cause of action. All this is clearly after the defendants had themselves sued it in Civil Suit No. 7/2020 for refund of the mistaken credit. 11. To conclude, the finding of the learned Commercial Court that the suit was barred by limitation rests on a correct appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence. Indeed, even if the facts pleaded by the appellant–plaintiff and the evidence adduced by it are taken as gospel, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, having been instituted nearly six years after the accrual of the cause of action. 12. The Judgment and Decree dated 10.06.2026 of the learned Commercial Court, Ajmer thus warrants no interference. The appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (ARUN MONGA),J 18/Ashwani-Tanisha