1 2026:HHC:24058 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No.1819 of 2010 Decided on:20.06.2026 Dhan Bahadur (since deceased) through his L.Rs Lok Bahadur and others …..Petitioners Versus Union of India ..Respondent ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Ajay Kumar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Rohit Kumar, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Nand Lal Thakur, Senior Panel Counsel. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge The Estate Officer, Pathankot on 28.05.2004 ordered eviction of the petitioners under provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971. Petitioners’ appeal against the aforesaid order was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala on 09.03.2010. These orders have given occasion to the petitioners to institute this writ petition on 03.05.2010. Pursuant to the interim order passed in this writ petition on 05.05.2010, the petitioners are continuing to possess the premises. 1Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24058 2. Heard learned counsel for the both sides and considered the case file. 3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioners were licensee over the land that was owned by Government of India, Ministry of Defence. Petitioners were in possession over the land in question granted to them on “old grant” basis. Over period of time, spanning decades, they were permitted to raise construction over the land. Petitioners could not be evicted from the land as they had the status of licensees over the land. Being licensees, provisions of Section 60 of Easement Act, 1882 got attracted. The said Section reads as under:- “60. License when revocable.-.A license may be revoked by the grantor, unless- (a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force; (b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution.” Learned Senior counsel submits that since the license was granted to the petitioners by the Union of India, Ministry of Defence and pursuant to the same, they had executed works of permanent character over the land after incurring expenses, the license has become 3 2026:HHC:24058 irrevocable by the grantor i.e. Union of India, Ministry of Defence. This plea was opposed by learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondent while defending the impugned order. 4. Consideration 4(i). The plea that petitioners were granted license over the land in question cannot be accepted. All throughout, the case of the petitioners had been that they were tenants of 1/1 G.R.; That 1/1 G.R. had created tenancies in their favour; 1/1 G.R had created tenancies in favour of the petitioners in view of lease executed in 1/1 G.R’s favour by Union of India, Ministry of Defence. Petitioners had never claimed the status of licensee before the learned Courts below. Their defence had been that 1/1 G.R was lessee of Union of India, with freedom to induct tenants for their services; That they cannot be evicted from the land as long as they were paying rents to 1/1 G.R. The Estate Officer held that occupation of government land by 1/1 G.R itself was on “old grant” basis. The terms and conditions of “old grant” were promulgated vide Governor General Order dated 12.09.1836. There was no document like lease that was visualized in the “old grant” framework. Neither there was 4 2026:HHC:24058 any scope of drafted lease nor there was any document on record to show existence of any lease in favour of 1/1 G.R. The entry in General Land Register of DEO is an authenticated entry for praying that 1/1 G.R came into occupation of the land by way of “old grant”. The status of 1/1 G.R over the land was that of licensee. Placing reliance upon C.M.Beena and another versus P.N.Ramachandra Rao2, observations were made that Licensee cannot transfer or sub let license. Rights and interests could not be transferred by licensee to tenants. That even assuming it could be done, such transfer would come to an end as the main grantee i.e. 1/1 G.R would cease to possess such occupation rights on resumption of the land by revocation of grant by Government of India in 1976. The Estate Officer on 28.05.2004 ordered for eviction of the petitioners. While dismissing the appeal against the above order passed by the Estate Officer, learned Additional District Judge held that: (i) Petitioners were in possession of premises owned by Union of India. The premises therefore are public premises as defined under the Public Premises Act. 2(2004) 3 SCC 595 5 2026:HHC:24058 Union of India being the owner of premises in dispute had the right to take back the possession from the petitioners. (ii) Petitioners could protect their possession only on establishing their legal right to remain in possession. Petitioners failed to establish such right in land. (iii) The only right projected by the petitioners was that they were in possession of the premises under 1/1 G.R in the capacity of tenants of 1/1 G.R., who was the lessee over the premises. According to the petitioners, 1/1 G.R. in its capacity as lessee had inducted them as tenants over the land. Taking note of C.M.Beena and another2, the learned Appellate Court distinguished the features of lease and licence. It was held that there was no evidence on record to show creation of lease by the Government of India in favour of 1/1 G.R and on that basis to assume creation of tenancies by the 1/1 G.R in favour of the petitioners. Reference in this regard was also made to the proceedings conducted before the Estate Officer wherein inspite of directing production of documents, no such document was produced as there was none in existence. In the given facts and circumstances, learned Appellate Court justifiably held that 1/1 G.R being wing of Indian Army could not be treated as lessee over the 6 2026:HHC:24058 premises owned by Government of India. The jamabandis were also referred to whereunder status of 1/1 G.R was not that of lessee over the land in question. In the attending facts and circumstances, the inference drawn by learned Appellate Court about possession of 1/1 G.R over the premises in dispute being with consent and permission of Union of India is justiciable. Status of 1/1 G.R over the land in dispute cannot be assumed to be in the capacity of lessee as was contended by the petitioners. It was at best as a licensee. Further, conclusion drawn by the First Appellate Court is also in order that being licensee over the premises in dispute, G.R. did not have the authority or competence to create tenancy in favour of the petitioners. In support of plea of tenancy put-forth by the petitioners, one document was placed on record before the learned Courts below executed by one Sh. Bishan to show that rent had been collected from the petitioners on behalf of G.R and it was deposited in the bank. Learned Appellate Court correctly declined to give any credence to said fact as there was no agreement on record for creation of tenancy on behalf of Competent/Authorized Officer of G.R and the petitioners. Therefore, even assumption of payment of some amount 7 2026:HHC:24058 by the petitioners to one Sh. Bishan, could not be termed as rent in absence of any legal tenancy. Though as observed earlier, G.R. had no right to create tenancy, existence of which even otherwise was not established on record. Tenancy could not have been created without approval/consent of Union of India who is admittedly owner of the premises. Significantly, the appellants had not pleaded any right flowing to them directly under Union of India. It is well settled transferor cannot transfer better title than it has. G.R. at best a licensee, could not have created tenancy rights in favour of the petitioners. At this stage, it will also be appropriate to refer to Union of India and another versus Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and others3. Union of India acting through Pune Cantonment Board had sought to resume specific plot which by Governor General order dated 06.01.1827 had been granted to the occupants. The occupants had claimed permanent rights to the property and prayed that government resumption notice was invalid. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that where land is leased out by way of grant by the government to occupants, the government has unfettered power to resume the land. The occupants 3(2014) 14 SCC 204. 8 2026:HHC:24058 of such property are mere licensees having no title over the land and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee are governed only by the terms of grant itself. Relevant portion from the decision is as under:- “35. The Government of India from Ministry of Defence by notice dated 11.6.1971 intimated Dinshaw Shapurji Anklesaria and two others that the land belongs to the President of India i.e. the Government and is held on Old Grant terms under which the Government is entitled to resume the same. It was informed that the Government has resumed the said property under the terms of the aforesaid Old Grant for its use and therefore, in exercise of power conferred under the provisions of the Act agreed to offer a sum of Rs.31,537/- as the value of the authorized erection standing on the said land. It was further intimated that in case if the amount of compensation offered was not acceptable to the respondent, a committee of arbitration will be convened to assess the value of the erection on the land. A cheque for the amount was also attached along with the said notice. 36. The Government Grants Act, 1895 as would be evident from the preamble and Section 2 therein, seeks to clarify the doubts with regard to the extended operation of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 2 of the Act reads as follows: “2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government grants.-Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or in favour of, any person whosoever; but every such grant and transfer shall be 9 2026:HHC:24058 construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed.” 37. Not only the Transfer of Property Act is made inapplicable to the Government grants but Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 further makes it clear that the Government grants is to take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary. Section 3 lays down as follows:- “3. Government grants to take effect according to their tenor.- All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and the effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.” 38. This Court in Azim Ahmad Kazmi and Others. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4, has held that the Government grant of lease of land is governed entirely by the terms of the grant. The Court took note of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 which is to take effect according to its tenor notwithstanding any other law to the contrary. 39. In Chief Executive Officer v. Surendra Kumar Vakil and Others5, this Court has held that the grantee under the old grant terms is a mere occupier/licensee having no title over the land so as to entitle him to transfer the land or to another person without prior consent of the authorities concerned. The Court further held that the regulations as well as the General Land Register which are old documents maintained in the regular course and coming from proper custody clearly indicate that the land was held on old grant basis and this was sufficient for the Government to resume the land in accordance with law. 4(2012)7 SCC 278:(2012)4 SCC (Civ) 214 5(1999)3 SCC 555 10 2026:HHC:24058 40 . In Union of India and others v. Kamla Verma6 this Court has held that it is always open to the Union of India to resume the land held on old grant terms and that the Union of India cannot be prevented from resuming the said land. 41. Therefore, it is clear that the Government has unfettered discretion and under Section 3 impose any condition, limitation or restriction in its grants and the rights, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated only according to the terms of the grant itself though they may be inconsistent with the provisions of any Statute or Common Law. 42. The grants of lands situated in cantonment area under Old Grants form a self-contained provision prescribing the procedure as to the grant and resumption of the land and hence recourse to the Civil Procedure Code or the Specific Relief Act will not be applicable. 51. The land of the suit premises belong to the Union of India- appellants herein. Therefore, they cannot be held to be tenants of the suit premises comprising of an area of 0.90 acres together with structure consisting of main Bungalow, Servant Quarter and Garage. The respondent-plaintiffs have only right with regard to the structure built on the suit premises. The Union of India-appellants have a right for resumption of the suit premises, as evident from evidence on record as discussed above. This issue was not properly appreciated by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court and the High Court which also failed to notice the appellants’ right under Section 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895.” 6(2010) 13 SCC 511:(2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 802 11 2026:HHC:24058 4(ii). In so far as submissions made by learned Senior Counsel revolving around Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (in short, the Act) are concerned, suffice to observe that such plea does not appear to have been specifically pleaded by the petitioners either before the Court of Estate Officer or even before the learned Appellate Court. In Allahabad University versus Geetanjali Tiwari7, Hon’ble Apex Court was considering the issue whether relief can be granted in absence of requisite pleadings? It was held while deciding a writ petition on the basis of affidavits, the writ court’s enquiry ought to be restricted to the case pleaded by the parties and the evidence that they have placed on record as part of the writ petition or the counter/reply affidavit, as the case may be. Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings and the evidence produced before it by the parties. It is well-nigh impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments advanced in course of hearing. Hon’ble Apex Court inter alia relied upon two precedents which arose purely out of 7(2024) 20 SCC 23 12 2026:HHC:24058 civil proceedings. Relevant portion of decision is as under:- “Whether, relief can be granted in the absence of requisite pleadings? 46. The necessity for appropriate pleadings in a writ petition cannot be overemphasized, particularly when such petitions are mainly decided on affidavit evidence and not witness action. 47. Without a doubt, a court cannot in the absence of the requisite pleadings grant relief claimed by a party. We first propose to notice two decisions which arose out of pure civil proceedings and then two decisions arising out of writ proceedings. 48. In Shamboo Nath Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh8, this Court held as follows (SCC p.275, para 20: “20. No doubt, the finding recorded by the learned third Judge (Farooqi, J.) that two rooms of Dharamshalla had been granted by Maharaja Partap Singh in favour of the Sikh community-defendants, accords with the finding of another learned Judge (Jalal-ud-Din, J.). But, that finding, in our view, becomes wholly unsustainable being altogether a new case made out for the defendants by him, in that, such case is not in any way traceable to the pleas of defence of the defendants set out in their written statements against their ejectment from the said two rooms.” 49. Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal9 is a decision where one finds a neat discussion on the object and purpose of pleadings. The relevant passages read as follows: (SCC p.496, paras 12-13) “12. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds 81995 Supp(3) SCC 266 9(2008) 17 SCC 491:(2009)5 SCC (Civ) 927 13 2026:HHC:24058 being shifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised or considered so that they may have an opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court for its consideration. This Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any deviation from the course which litigation on particular causes must take. 13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on 14 2026:HHC:24058 a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief.” 50. In Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor10, this Court noted the settled legal position and interfered with the impugned decision11 by ruling as follows: (SCC pp.475-76, para 8) “8. … It is too well settled that the petitioner who approaches the court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 must fully aver and establish his rights flowing from the bundle of facts thereby requiring the respondent to indicate its stand either by denial or by positive assertions. But in the absence of any averments in the writ petition or even in the rejoinder-affidavit, it is not permissible for a court to arrive at a conclusion on a factual position merely on the basis of submissions made in the course of hearing. The High Court, therefore, in our view committed serious error in coming to the conclusion that there existed vacancies in the post of Field Supervisor on the materials produced before it. In fact the respondents herein who were the petitioners in the High Court had not produced any material in support of their stand that vacancies existed and yet appointments have not been made. We are of the considered opinion that the conclusion of the High Court that there existed vacancies is unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside.” (emphasis supplied) 51. The difference in pleading in respect of civil proceedings and a writ petition was succinctly noticed in Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana12and expressed in the following words: (SCC p.543, para 130 “13. …, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by 10(1998) 7 SCC 469:1998 SCC (L & S) 1824 11Chand Behari Kapoor v. Rani laxmibai Grameen Bank Kuchehry, 1992 SCC Online All 813 12(1988) 4 SCC 534 15 2026:HHC:24058 facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter- affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. …” 52. Based on the aforesaid authorities, we hold that while deciding a writ petition on the basis of affidavits, the writ court’s enquiry ought to be restricted to the case pleaded by the parties and the evidence that they have placed on record as part of the writ petition or the counter/reply affidavit, as the case may be. Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings and the evidence produced before it by the parties. It is well-nigh impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments advanced in course of hearing.” Further, for seeking applicability of Section 60 of the Act, submission now being urged is that petitioners are licensees over the land in question, hence, Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act comes to their rescue. This is factually incorrect & contradictory plea as all throughout plea of the petitioners before the learned Courts below 16 2026:HHC:24058 has been that 1/1 G.R had the status of lessee under the Union Government and that 1/1 G.R had created tenancies in petitioners favour. That they are tenants of G.R. Plea of petitioners being licensees over the land was never raised. Therefore, petitioner cannot be permitted to take contradictory pleas at their whims and fancies. It may be noticed here that learned Senior Panel Counsel for the respondent even on facts has disputed raising of any constructions by the petitioners over the subject land. According to learned counsel, construction in form of old vintage British era building at First Bazar (subject property) is in ruins & dilapidated condition; it is crumbling on account of its old vintage; It is not habitable & is unfit for any use. 5. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any ground to interfere with the concurrent orders passed by the learned Courts below. This writ petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Jyotsna Rewal Dua June 20, 2026 Judge yogesh