1 2026:CGHC:11146 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 157 of 2010 Judgment reserved on 03/12/2025 Judgment delivered on 03/03/2026 Beniram Sahu, S/o Shri Devi Prasad Sahu, aged about 51 yrs, Cultivator, R/o Vill. Panhada, Tah. Berala, Dist. Durg, C.G. At Present R/o Q. No. 4/B, Street 25, Sector 4, Bhilai (wrongly written as Bhilai Nagar), Tah. & Dist. Durg, C.G. … Appellant Versus 1. Virendra Kumar Thakur, S/o Nathu Singh Thakur, aged about 45 yrs, R/o Vill. Panhada, Tah. Berala, Dist. Durg, C.G. At present R/o Sonkar Para, Near Ganjmandi, Navapara (Rajim), Dist. Raipur (C.G.) 2. State of C.G., Through Collector, Durg, C.G. ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. B.P. Gupta, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Raj Kumar Pali, Advocate For Respondent No.2/State : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal C.A.V. Judgment 1. The instant first appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the impugned VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.03.03 20:45:39 +0530 2 judgment and decree dated 16-09-2010, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, FTC, Bemetara, District Durg, in Civil Suit No. 06-A/2009, whereby the civil suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of the contract is dismissed. 2. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties is to be taken as per their status in the civil suit. 3. The plaintiff has instituted the present suit in respect of agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 2/2, 42/2, 833/2, 968/2 and 2039/2, total admeasuring 2.30 hectares, situated at Village Pahanda, Tahsil Berla, District Durg (hereinafter referred to as the “suit land”), which was admittedly owned by Defendant No. 1. The case of the plaintiff is that on 24/03/2007, Defendant No. 1 agreed to sell the suit land to him for a total consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-. It is pleaded that the entire sale consideration was paid in cash on the same day in the presence of witnesses, and that Defendant No. 1 delivered possession of the suit land along with the Rin-Pustika to the plaintiff. On that date, an agreement to sell was executed by Defendant No. 1, acknowledging receipt of the full consideration and stating that the plaintiff would be at liberty to have the sale deed registered at his convenience. The plaintiff asserts that since 24/03/2007, he has been in continuous, peaceful possession and cultivation of the suit land. 4. According to the plaintiff, although Defendant No. 1 assured that he would execute and register the sale deed whenever required, he subsequently began to avoid the matter on one pretext or another. The 3 plaintiff issued a legal notice dated 22/05/2009 calling upon Defendant No. 1 to execute the sale deed, but the same was refused. A further notice dated 25/08/2009 was also sent, which was again not accepted. Apprehending that Defendant No. 1 might obtain a duplicate revenue record and alienate the suit land to a third party, the plaintiff approached the Tahsildar seeking restraint on the issuance of copies of revenue records. It is further pleaded that when proceedings were initiated before the Tahsildar, Defendant No. 1 appeared on 31/08/2009 and denied the transaction. The plaintiff thereafter initiated proceedings under Section 31 of the Indian Stamp Act, before the competent authority for adjudication of proper stamp duty on the agreement dated 24/03/2007. The Collector of Stamps determined the market value and directed payment of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 49,450/-, which the plaintiff duly deposited on 26/10/2009. Endorsement regarding payment of the requisite stamp duty was made on the back side of the agreement. The plaintiff contends that he has thus complied with all legal requirements and has always been ready and willing to get the sale deed registered in his favour. 5. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that Defendant No. 1, with dishonest intention, is denying execution of the agreement and is attempting to sell the suit land to some other person despite having received the entire sale consideration and delivered possession. The plaintiff submits that he has a prima facie strong case, that the balance of convenience lies in his favour as he has been in settled possession since 24/03/2007, and that he would suffer irreparable loss if the suit land is 4 alienated to a third party. On these grounds, the plaintiff has filed the present suit seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 24/03/2007 and a decree of permanent injunction restraining Defendant No. 1 from transferring or alienating the suit land to any other person. 6. The defendant No. 1 has filed his written statement, denying the material averments of the plaint. While admitting that the total area of the land is 2.30 acres and that certain proceedings were pending before the Tehsildar, the defendant has categorically denied execution of any agreement, promise, or contract in favour of the plaintiff. He has specifically denied having delivered possession of the suit property at any point in time and has asserted that he continues to remain in possession and cultivation of the land, partly through a cultivator engaged on Adhiya. The defendant No. 1 has further pleaded that the document relied upon by the plaintiff is an unregistered instrument which, even if duly stamped, cannot operate as a transfer of title nor confer any enforceable right in immovable property requiring compulsory registration. He has also disputed the service and validity of notices alleged to have been issued by the plaintiff and has denied any intention to alienate the property to third parties. Preliminary objections regarding improper valuation of the suit, insufficiency of court fees, and lack of maintainability under the governing law relating to specific performance have also been raised. 7. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 5 “1) क्या वादी ቛኋरा वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को ्ቅया कोराने को सौदी ्ቚतित.्ቅ . 1 सौ दिदी. 24.03.07 को तिकोया गया ? 2) क्या वादी ቛኋरा ्ቚतित.्ቅ.1 को वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को तिवा्ቅया  ल्या 2,50,000/- रू. ्ቅया दिदी. 24.03.2007 को अदी कोरा दिदीया गया था ? 3) क्या ्ቚ्቞गत दीस्तवाज वाचने प्ቔ / इकोराराने दिदी. 24.03.3007 ्ቚभूवाशी'ल नेीሻ* ीሻ+। 4) क्या ्ቚतित.्ቅ . 1 ቛኋरा वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को आमि.पत्या एवा1  ल ऋण प4ቜኌस्तको ्ቅको 2063080 तिवा्ቅया दिदी. 24.03.2007 को वादी को ्ቚदीने तिकोया गया? 5) क्या वादी्ቇस्त भू मि परा वादी को आमि.पत्या ीሻ+ ? 6) क्या वादी्ቇस्त भू मि परा ्ቚतित.्ቅ . 1 को आमि.पत्या ीሻ+ ? 7) क्या ्ቚ्቞गत वाचनेप्ቔ दिदी. 24.03.2007 को अने4सौरा वादी ्ቚतित.्ቅ. 1 सौ जब चीሻ पज'याने को7 कोया8वाीሻ' कोरा पने को अमि.कोरा' राीሻ ीሻ+। 8) क्या ्ቚतित.्ቅ . 1 ቛኋरा ्ቚ्቞गत सौदी अने4सौरा पज'याने सौब.' कोया8वाीሻ' नेीሻ* को7 गई ीሻ+ ? 9) क्या वादी ्ቚतित.्ቅ . 1 सौ ्ቚ्቞गत सौदी दिदी. 24.03.2007 को अने4सौरा वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को सौब. : तिवा्ቅया प्ቔ को तिनेष्पदीने कोरा पने को अमि.कोरा' ीሻ+? 10) क्या वादी वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को पज'याने कोरा पने को अमि.कोरा' ीሻ+ ? 11) क्या वादी वादी्ቇस्त भू मि को एको्ቔ स्वात्वामि.कोरा' ीሻ+ ? 12) क्या वादी ቛኋरा अपने दीवा को उचिचत रूप सौ  ल्याकोने कोरा पया8प्त न्यायाशी4ल्को अदी नेीሻ* तिकोया गया ीሻ+। 13) क्या वादी ቛኋरा ्ቚस्त4त वादी ्ቚचलनेयाग्या नेीሻ* ीሻ+। 14) क्या वादी ्ቚतित.्ቅ. 1 को तिवारू्ቍ वादी भू मि को सौब. : तिनेषे.ሺኋ को अने4तषे ्ቚप्त कोराने को अमि.कोरा' ीሻ+ ? 15) ” सौीሻयात एवा ्ቤया 8. In support of his claim, the plaintiff Beni Ram examined himself as P.W. 1, Dinesh Kumar Thakur P.W. 2, Jagrakhan Sahu P.W. 3, Lakhan Lal Nishad P.W. 4, Shiv Kumar Sahu P.W. 5, Harish Kumar Thakur P.W. 6. 6 He relied upon the documents Agreement dated 24-03-2007 Ex. P-1, B- 1 Kishtabandi Ex. P-2, Khasara Panchsala Ex. P-3, Khasara Panchsala Ex. P-4, Rin-Pustika Ex. P-5, Order dated 24-10-2009, Copy of notice dated 22-05-2009 Ex. P-7, Registered Postal envelope Ex. P-8, Copy of notice dated 25-08-2009 Ex. P-9, postal receipt Ex. P-10, Registered postal envelope Ex. P-11, General notice published in the daily newspaper Ex. P-12, Objection to the Deputy Registrar and its receipt Ex. P-13 and P-14, Objection to Registrar and its receipt Ex. P-15 and P-16, Objection to the Tahsildar Berla Ex. P-17, Complaint to the police Ex. P-18, reply filed by the defendant before the Tahsildar, Berla Ex. P- 19. 9. The defendant examined in support of his case, Shrawan Singh D.W. 1, Girwar Sahu D.W. 2. The defendant No. 1 has not relied on any document in his favour. 10. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff, but dismissed the suit by holding that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and is not entitled for decree of specific performance. Hence, this first appeal. 11. In the present appeal, the defendant No. 1 has filed his cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 of the C.P.C. on 14-03-2011, challenging the finding of issue No. 4 recorded by the learned trial Court in its judgment dated 16-09-2010. The said issue is with respect to the delivery of possession of the suit land to the plaintiff by the defendant No. 1 and 7 also the handing of the Rin-Pustika to him, which has been answered by the learned trial Court in favour of the plaintiff. The delay in filing the cross-objection is condoned by the order dated 01-03-2016. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the impugned judgment is legally unsustainable since the learned trial Court, after recording categorical findings on all material issues in favour of the appellant, paradoxically refused the relief of specific performance. The Court has held that the agreement to sell dated 24/03/2007 (Ex. P-1) was duly executed by the respondent; that the entire sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid on the date of execution of the agreement; and that possession of the suit land along with the original Rin-Pustika was delivered to the appellant. These findings, based on consistent testimony of P.W. 1 to P.W. 6 and corroborated by documentary evidence, including adjudication of stamp duty under Section 31 of the Indian Stamp Act, conclusively establish a concluded and enforceable contract. The objection regarding non-registration of the agreement is misconceived, as an agreement to sell does not itself create title and is admissible in evidence for seeking specific performance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram, 2010 (5) SCC 401, has authoritatively held that even an unregistered agreement can be received in evidence for the purpose of enforcing specific performance. Likewise, in Nathulal v. Phoolchand, 1969 (3) SCC 120, it was held that where the plaintiff proves execution of a valid agreement and payment of consideration, and there is no default on his part, equity demands enforcement of the contract. In the present case, 8 the respondent neither produced any documentary evidence nor discharged the burden of disproving execution; mere denial cannot override positive evidence. Having accepted the foundational facts in favour of the appellant, the trial Court could not have denied the consequential relief, as such refusal amounts to an arbitrary exercise of discretion contrary to settled principles governing suits for specific performance. ******* He would further submit that the finding that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is contrary to both pleadings and the unimpeached evidence on record. Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, readiness and willingness must be pleaded and proved through conduct, and it is not a ritualistic formula but a matter of substance. The appellant specifically pleaded continuous readiness and willingness; he issued legal notices dated 22/05/2009 and 25/08/2009 calling upon the respondent to execute the sale deed; he initiated proceedings before the competent authority for adjudication of proper stamp duty; he deposited Rs. 49,450/- as determined; and he instituted the suit well within limitation immediately upon categorical denial by the respondent. These acts demonstrate persistent assertion of contractual rights and bona fide intention to complete the transaction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) By Lrs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, 1995 (5) SCC 115, held that readiness and willingness must be determined from the entirety of circumstances and conduct of the plaintiff, while in Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani, 2009 (17) SCC 27, it 9 was reiterated that where substantial compliance and genuine intent are established, denial of specific performance would defeat equity. In the present case, the entire consideration was paid at inception, possession was delivered, and the appellant consistently pursued registration; hence, financial readiness was no longer in question. There is no evidence of abandonment, delay attributable to the appellant, or refusal to perform. The trial Court’s conclusion on readiness is therefore perverse and contrary to law, warranting interference in the appeal and grant of a decree for specific performance along with the permanent injunction. ******* Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the respondent No. 1 has filed a cross-objection with respect to the finding of issue No. 4 only, which is the issue of delivery of possession. The said cross-objection is not in format, and no proper court fee has been paid for it. The said cross-objection is also beyond the limitation period. Therefore, the cross-objection is not maintainable in the present case. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 opposes the submissions and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly exercised its judicial discretion in refusing the equitable relief of specific performance, as the appellant failed to discharge the mandatory burden under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act of proving continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. Mere pleading or issuance of notices does not suffice; the plaintiff must establish through cogent and convincing evidence that he was always ready with the means and intention to complete the transaction. In N.P. 10 Thirugnanam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that readiness and willingness must be proved as a continuous requirement from the date of the agreement till the date of the decree, and that absence thereof is fatal to the suit. Similarly, in Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, 2010 (10) SCC 512, it was reiterated that the plaintiff must establish his financial capacity and bona fide conduct beyond doubt. In the present case, despite alleging payment of the entire consideration in cash without independent documentary proof, the appellant failed to produce reliable evidence of such payment or demonstrate that he took timely steps for registration for nearly two years. The unexplained delay between 2007 and 2009 itself casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the transaction and disentitles the appellant to equitable relief. ******* He would further submit that the agreement relied upon by the appellant is an unregistered and initially insufficiently stamped document, which does not create any right, title, or interest in immovable property. The respondent has consistently denied execution and delivery of possession, and no independent revenue record was produced to conclusively establish the change of possession. Specific performance being a discretionary relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (as it then stood), the Court is not bound to grant it merely because execution is alleged; the conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances must inspire confidence. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997 (3) SCC 1, he would submit that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that delay and inequitable conduct are relevant 11 considerations for refusing specific performance, even if the suit is within limitation. it is further submitted that the defendant No. 1 has only challenged the finding of issue No. 4 and not challenged the decree; therefore, he is not required to pay the court fee as required to file the regular appeal. The delay in filing the cross-objection has already been condoned by the order dated 01-03-2016. Even if no specific ground is mentioned in the cross-objection, the respondent No. 1 can challenge the adverse finding against him as provided under Order 41 Rule 22 of the C.P.C. and the Court is also empowered to decide the issue in accordance with law and under the facts and circumstances of the case while invoking the powers under Order 41 Rule 33 of the C.P.C. In view of the serious dispute regarding execution, the absence of credible proof of payment, and the appellant’s failure to establish continuous readiness and willingness, the dismissal of the suit is legally justified and calls for no interference in the appeal. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost circumspection. 15. In the present first appeal, the point for consideration is whether the plaintiff, Beni Ram, having proved the execution of a valid agreement to sell dated 24/03/2007, payment of the full sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-, and delivery of possession along with the original Rin- Pustika by Defendant No. 1, has sufficiently established continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, such that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit for specific performance and 12 permanent injunction despite recording favourable findings on all other material issues. 16. The learned trial Court found several issues in favour of the plaintiff, Beni Ram. The trial court assessed both oral and documentary evidence presented during the trial. The plaintiff himself (P.W. 1) gave a detailed account of the agreement dated 24/03/2007, explaining that the full sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/- was paid in cash to Defendant No. 1 in the presence of witnesses. This testimony was corroborated by P.W. 2 to P.W. 6, who confirmed witnessing the transaction and the delivery of possession. The plaintiff also produced the original Rin- Pustika (Ex. P-5) and related Khasra and Kishtabandi records (Ex. P-2, P-3, P-4), which showed his possession and cultivation of the suit land. The trial court noted that the defendant failed to produce any documents or receipts contradicting the plaintiff’s claim of payment of sale consideration or possession. 17. Upon consideration of the pleadings, documentary evidence, and oral testimonies adduced on record, this Court finds that the plaintiff has successfully discharged the burden of proof in respect of Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The plaintiff has produced the original agreement dated 24/03/2007, wherein the defendant agreed to sell the suit land for a total consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-, and has categorically deposed that the entire sale consideration was paid at the time of execution of the agreement. The execution of the agreement has been duly supported by the attesting witnesses, namely Dinesh Thakur, P.W. 2, and Shivkumar P.W. 5, who have deposed that the transaction was 13 concluded in their presence, that the defendant signed the document after receiving the full consideration amount, and that possession of the suit property along with the original Rin-Pustika was handed over to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has further established that stamp duty amounting to Rs. 49,450/- was paid on the said document, thereby lending further assurance as to its genuineness and intended legal effect. The documentary and oral evidence, read conjointly, establishes the existence of a concluded contract supported by consideration and accompanied by delivery of possession. 18. On the contrary, the defence set up by the defendant is found to be evasive and unsupported by cogent evidence. In the written statement, the defendant has merely denied the execution of the agreement without specifically pleading that the document is forged, fabricated, or obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. No expert evidence has been led to dispute the signatures appearing on the document, nor has any independent documentary material been produced to substantiate the plea that the defendant ordinarily signs in English and, therefore, could not have executed the impugned document in the manner alleged. Significantly, the defendant chose not to enter the witness box to deny the plaintiff’s averments on oath or to subject himself to cross- examination, although the material facts relating to execution and receipt of consideration were within his special knowledge. In view of the settled legal position enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidyadhar v. Manikrao, AIR 1999 SC 1441, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against a party who abstains from entering the 14 witness box to rebut allegations directly concerning him. The explanation furnished by the defence that the Rin-Pustika had been taken away by his brother appears inherently improbable, particularly in the absence of any complaint, notice, or legal action seeking its return. 19. Considering the cumulative effect of the oral evidence, documentary proof, conduct of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the agreement dated 24/03/2007 was duly executed by the defendant after receipt of sale consideration and that possession of the suit property, along with the relevant documents, was lawfully delivered to the plaintiff. 20. Now the question arises as to whether the plaintiff, Beni Ram, has sufficiently established continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, which is a prerequisite for obtaining the equitable relief of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. While the trial court had accepted the existence of a valid agreement to sell dated 24/03/2007, the payment of the full sale consideration of Rs. 2,50,000/-, and delivery of possession along with the original Rin-Pustika, it declined to grant specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven that he was ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations in a manner sufficient to justify the relief sought. 21. In the case of “N.P. Thirugnanam” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 5 of its judgment that:- 15 “5. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under s.20 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, 'the Act'). Under s.20, the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.” 22. Examination of the record reveals that the plaintiff, in his pleadings and oral testimony, did assert that he had been continuously ready and willing to complete the transaction. He highlighted that he had issued legal notices dated 22/05/2009 and 25/08/2009 requesting the defendant to execute the sale deed, had approached the Tahsildar to 16 prevent the issuance of duplicate revenue records, and had deposited the stamp duty amounting to Rs. 49,450/- as determined under Section 31 of the Indian Stamp Act. These acts, if considered in isolation, prima facie demonstrate an effort to comply with the legal formalities necessary for execution and registration of the sale deed. However, upon scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the plaintiff did not specifically aver certain substantive aspects that are integral to establishing “readiness and willingness” under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. First, the plaintiff did not demonstrate in his pleadings or testimony that he had made arrangements to effectuate the execution of the sale deed. There is no indication that the plaintiff had made provisions for the incidental expenses related to drafting, notarization, or registration of the sale deed. The mere statement of readiness without evidencing practical or financial preparedness is insufficient, particularly when the transaction involves immovable property where substantial costs may be incurred during registration. While the plaintiff asserted possession of the property, he did not substantiate that he was prepared to execute the sale deed immediately, which would have demonstrated actionable willingness beyond the procedural steps already taken. The trial court, therefore, rightly observed that although the foundational facts, i.e. execution of the agreement, payment of consideration, and delivery of possession, are in favour of the plaintiff, the element of continuous readiness and willingness remained unproven in its entirety. Specific performance being a discretionary remedy, courts require evidence that the plaintiff is not merely asserting a claim but is also substantively prepared to perform his part of the 17 contract without delay or contingency. In the absence of such evidence, the plaintiff cannot compel the defendant to execute a sale deed, even if the contract is otherwise valid and partially performed. The judgment emphasizes that readiness and willingness under the law are not mere assertions; they must be demonstrated through the remaining obligations under the contract. 23. Consequently, while the trial court correctly recognised the validity of the agreement and acts of part performance, its refusal to grant specific performance aligns with established legal principles. The judgment underscores that equitable relief will not be granted merely on the basis of execution of a contract and delivery of possession; it requires proof of actionable preparedness to fulfil contractual obligations. In the present case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of such preparedness for the execution and registration of the sale deed, and the trial court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing the suit on these grounds cannot be interfered with lightly. The judgment thus reflects a careful balance between recognizing contractual rights and upholding the equitable requirement that a claimant seeking specific performance must demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform. 24. Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, in the case of “Ramashankar Rao and Another v. Nandlal Occhwani and Others” decided on 08-08- 2025, in F.A. No. 88/2022, has considered the readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract of the respective parties and the requirement to plead and prove by the plaintiff. It has been held that:- 18 “10. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) of the Act of 1963, which bars the specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) prior to its amendment dated 01.10.2018, states as under:- “16. Personal bars to relief. – Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person – (a) and (b) (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. – For the purpose of clause (c), – (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 11. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) suffered amendment w.e.f. 01.10.2018. In the amendment word 10 FA No. 88 of 2022 “aver” has been deleted. Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) after amendment, states as under:- “16. Personal bars to relief. – Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person – (a) and (b) (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which 19 has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. – For the purpose of clause (c), – (i) xxx xxx xxx (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.” 12. The amended Section 16(c) and Explanation (ii) of the Act of 1963 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup and Others, AIR 2023 SC (Civil) 949; AIR Online 2023 SC 64 in which it has been held that the deletion of words “who fails to aver” in Section 16 of the Act of 1963 does not bring about any real change in position of law as it stood prior to the amendment. 13. 13. Thus, in terms of Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) as unamended in a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff should not only plead and prove the terms of the contract, but also plead and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract, in terms of the contract. 14. Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC prescribe the manner in which the averments are required to be made by the plaintiff. For ready reference Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the CPC have been reproduced as under:- No. 47 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.1) A. B., the above–named plaintiff, states as follows:– 1. By an agreement dated the ……… day of …….. and signed by the defendant, he contracted to buy of [or sell to] the plaintiff certain immovable property therein described and referred to, for the sum of …… rupees. 20 2. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement on is part, but the defendant has not done so. 3. The plaintiff has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant has had notice. [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 6. The plaintiff claims that the Court will order the defendant specifically to perform the agreement and to do all acts necessary to put the plaintiff in full possession of the said property [or to accept a transfer and possession of the said property] and to pay the costs of the suit. ----------------------------------------------------------------- No. 48 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (No.2) A. B., the above – named plaintiff, states as follows :– 1. On the ……… day of ……. 19…../20……., the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement, in writing, and the original document is hereto annexed. The defendant, was absolutely entitled to the immovable property described in the agreement. 2. On the …….. day of ……. 19…. /20……, the plaintiff tendered ……… rupees to the defendant, and demanded a transfer of the said property by a sufficient instrument. 3. On the …… day of …….. 19….. /20…., the plaintiff again demanded such transfer. [Or the defendant refused to transfer the same to the plaintiff.] 4. The defendant has not executed any instrument of transfer. 5. The plaintiff is still ready and willing to pay the purchase–money of the said property to the defendants 21 [As in paras 4 and 5 of Form No.1.] 8. The plaintiff claims– (1) that the defendant transfers the said property to the plaintiff by a sufficient instrument [following the terms of the agreement]; (2) …… rupees compensation for withholding the same. 15. The mandatory provisions of Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the matter of Ouseph Varghese v. Joseph Aley, (1969) 2 SCC 539 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirement prescribed in Forms 47 & 48 of the 1st Schedule in the CPC and observed as under:- “9. ……...The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement of defendant. A suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of the First Schedule in the Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for specific performance it is incumbent on the plaintiff not only to set out agreement on the basis of which he sues in all its details, he must go further and plead that he has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agreement pleaded by him but the defendant has not done so. He must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement. Neither in the plaint nor at any subsequent stage of the suit the plaintiff has taken those pleas. As observed by this Court in Prem Rai v. D.L.F. Housing and Construction (P) (Ltd.) [1968 SCC OnLine SC 151] that it is well- settled that in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation the suit is not maintainable.” 22 16. Taking into consideration the principles of law laid down in Ouseph Varghese (supra) the Supreme Court in the matter of Manjunath Anandappa urf Shivappa v. Tammanasa and others, (2003) 10 SCC 390 has held that the plaintiff should not only plead that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from date of filing of the suit, but also prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract and held as under:- “27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leave no manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract not only must raise a plea that he had all along been and even on the date of filing of suit was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but also prove the same. Only in certain exceptional situation where although in letter and spirit, the exact words had not been used but readiness and willingness can be culled out from reading all the averments made by the plaintiff as a whole coupled with the materials brought on record at the trial of the suit, to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have been complied with.” 17. Recently, in the matter of P. Ravindranath and another v. Sasikala and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749, the Supreme Court has held that the suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleading must necessarily be rejected. It was further held by their Lordships that Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract and said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. Relying upon the earlier decisions, it has been held that it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract by adducing evidence and this crucial facet has to be determined by adducing all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in the plaint of readiness and willingness would not suffice, and held as under:- 23 22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(c) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (a) xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 SCC OnLine 840, following was held in paragraph 46:- “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” (c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, 24 (1196) 4 SCC 526 it was held under paragraph 2:- “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. (ii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iii) xxx xxx xxx xxx (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. 18. Furthermore, in the matter of Janardan Das v. Durga Prasad Agrawal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2937 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering Section 16(c) of the Act of 1963 have held as under:- 25 “8. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, mandates that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. The importance of readiness and willingness for enforcement of specific performance has been summarized by this Court in U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11 SCC 775 as follows: “23. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars the relief of specific performance of a contract in favour of a person, who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In view of Explanation (i) to clause (c) of Section 16, it may not be essential for the plaintiff to actually tender money to the defendant or to deposit money in court, except when so directed by the Court, to prove readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of a contract, which involves payment of money. However, Explanation (ii) says the plaintiff must aver performance or readiness and willingness to perform the contract according to its true construction. 24. To aver and prove readiness and willingness to perform an obligation to pay 26 money, in terms of a contract, the plaintiff would have to make specific statements in the plaint and adduce evidence to show availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time. In other words, the plaintiff would have to plead that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or was in a position to raise funds in time to discharge his obligation under the contract. If the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds with him to discharge his obligations in terms of a contract, which requires payment of money, the plaintiff would have to specifically plead how the funds would be available to him. To cite an example, the plaintiff may aver and prove, by adducing evidence, an arrangement with a financier for disbursement of adequate funds for timely compliance with the terms and conditions of a contract involving payment of money. xxxxxxxxx 45. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” 9. The Trial Court rightly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate continuous readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract. The agreement dated 06.06.1993 explicitly required the plaintiffs to ensure that Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 would come to Baripada within three months to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs, however, did not take any concrete steps to secure the consent or presence of the sisters within the stipulated period. They relied solely on Defendant No. 1 and late Soumendra to procure the sisters, despite knowing that 27 the sisters were not signatories to the agreement and held a significant share in the property. The Trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not issue any notices or correspondence to Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 during the three-month period, nor did they make any efforts to communicate with them directly to expedite the execution of the sale deed. This inaction on the part of the plaintiffs indicated a lack of diligence and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs continued to operate their petrol pump on the suit land without taking proactive steps to complete the purchase, suggesting complacency and a lack of urgency. 10. The High Court, in contrast, summarily concluded that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It stated that there was an abundance of evidence on record to establish the plaintiffs' financial capacity and willingness. However, the High Court did not delve into the specifics of the plaintiffs' conduct or address the Trial Court's findings regarding their inaction. The High Court's assessment on this crucial aspect was cursory and lacked a thorough examination of the evidence and circumstances that demonstrated the plaintiffs' lack of readiness and willingness.” 19. In the matter of Abdul Khader Rowther v. P.K. Sara Bai, (1989) 4 SCC 313 the Supreme Court in paragraph No.11 has held as under:- “11. ….. His plaint does not contain the requisite pleadings necessary to obtain a decree for specific performance. This equitable remedy recognised by the Specific Relief Act cannot be had on the basis of such pleadings and evidence.” 20. In light of principles of law flowing from the aforesaid judgments (supra) of the Supreme Court, there is distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract 28 which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration, whereas, “willingness” is the conduct of the party. The plaintiff must plead and establish that he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract from the date of agreement to sale till the date of decision in the suit. 25. In order to consider the “readiness” on the part of the plaintiff, we will first notice plaint averments in this regard of which paragraph No. 4 of state as under:- (4) याीሻ तिको दिदीनेको- 24/03/2007 को ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 ቛኋरा वादी भू मि को सौदी शी4दी सौप ण8 राको ्ቚप्त कोरा लने पቐኋत1 वादी भू मि को तिवा्ቅया पज'याने वादी जब चीሻ तब कोराने: को कोथाने कोरात हुया इसौ बत को उल्लख इकोराराने । वाचने प्ቔ दिदीनेको- 24/03/2007 : भू' तिकोया गया परान्त4 वादी ቛኋरा ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 सौ तिवा्ቅया प्ቔ पज'याने ीሻत4 तिनेवादीने तिकोया जने परा ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 तिवा्ቅया प्ቔ पज'याने कोराने : टाल टाल कोरात हुया आज कोल तिवा्ቅया पज'याने कोराने को कोथाने कोरात हुया ीሻशी वादी सौ ्ቔ सौया को7 याचने को7 जत' राीሻ' तब वादी को ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 ቛኋरा तिवा्ቅया पज'याने तिनेष्पदिदीत कोराने बरा- बरा टाल टाल कोराने सौ ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 को तिनेयात परा आशीको ीሻने लग' तिको कोीሻ' ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको- 01 वादी भू मि को ऋण प4ቜኌस्तको को7 तिቛኋत'या ्ቚतित तीሻसौ'लदीरा बराल सौ ्ቚप्त कोरा वादी भू मि तिकोसौ' अन्या ्ቤሹኌक्त को तिवा्ቅया ने कोरा दी तब वादी ने अपने अमि.वाक्त को ध्या सौ ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको 01 को पज'कोK त डाको सौ नेदिटासौ दिदीनेको 22/05/2009 ्ቚतिषेत कोरा वादी भू मि को तिवा्ቅया प्ቔ पज'याने वादी को प्ቌ : कोरा दीने को तिनेवादीने तिकोया। वादी अमि.वाक्त ቛኋरा पज'कोK त डाको सौ ्ቚतिषेत नेदिटासौ को ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅको- 01 ” ቛኋरा लने सौ इकोरा कोरा दिदीया गया । 26. The Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramashankar Rao (supra) further held that:- “23. A careful perusal of the plaint averments would show that the pleading with regard to “readiness” on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract is not in conformity with Section 16(c) read with Forms 47 & 48 of Appendix A of the CPC. There is no pleading on behalf of the plaintiff that he is still ready and willing to perform his part of contract and to make payment of remaining balance sale consideration or he has sufficient funds in his possession or is in position to raise funds in time to discharge his 29 obligations under the contract. He has only pleaded that he has been ready to perform his part of the contract from the beginning but did not aver and proved that he is still ready to perform the part of the contract and did not specify any date on which he tendered the amount and asked the defendants to execute the sale deed in his favour and also he did specifically said that on which date or dates he contacted the defendants for demarcating the land as promised in the sale agreement. He also did not specify the date on which he demanded the documents as per agreement to sale that are Nazul records, maintenance Khasra and other documents for execution of the sale deed. Even no date has been given by the plaintiff on which he tendered the amount with request to execute the sale deed to show his “continuous readiness”. As such, the plaintiff has miserably failed to specifically plead and prove that he was ready to perform his part of contract by showing that he was financially able and sound to make payment of the balance sale consideration. 25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Pydi Ramana @ Ramulu v. Davarasety Manmadha Rao, (2024) 7 SCC 515 while considering the question of continuous “readiness” and “willingness” relying upon the decision of Vijay Kumar v. Om Prakash, (2019) 17 SCC 429 held that the continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant specific relief and held that the steps taken by the plaintiff during the date of agreement till the date of filing of suit will have to be explained in the plaint and proved in the evidence, and held in paragraph No.20 as under:- 20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of 30 limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar [Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981] and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18). 27. With respect to Clause-B of the relief column of the plaint, which is the claim of relief of declaration of title based on the agreement dated 24- 03-2007, is concerned, this Court finds that the agreement contains the averments of delivery of possession of the suit land, and the plaintiff has averred that the possession of the suit land was delivered to him at the time of execution of agreement. When the document contained the payment of sale consideration and delivery of possession, it amounts to a Conveyance, as defined under Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. It is necessary to notice here Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, which is as under:- “2. Definitions. — In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, — (10) “Conveyance”. — “conveyance” includes a conveyance on sale every instrument by which property, whether moveable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by schedule I:” 28. Article 23 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Stamp Act provided the leviable fee on the document/instrument of Conveyance, which is also necessary to be reproduced here, which is as under:- Description of Instrument Proper Stamp- duty 23. CONVEYANCE [as defined by section 2 (10)] not 31 being a Transfer charged or exempted under No. 62 — where the amount or value of the consideration for such conveyance as set forth therein does not exceed Rs. 50: Eight annas. where it exceeds Rs. 50 but does not exceed Rs. 100. One rupees. Ditto 100 ditto 200 Two rupees. Ditto 200 ditto 300 Three rupees. Ditto 300 ditto 400 Four rupees. Ditto 400 ditto 500 Five rupees. Ditto 500 ditto 600 Six rupees. Ditto 600 ditto 700 Seven rupees. Ditto 700 ditto 800 Eight rupees. Ditto 800 ditto 900 Nine rupees. Ditto 900 ditto 1,000 Ten rupees. and for every Rs. 500 or part thereof in excess of Rs. 1,000 Five rupees. Exemption (a) Assignment of copyright by entry made under the Indian Copyright Act, 1847 (20 of 1847) section 5. (b) for the purpose of this article, the portion of duty paid in respect of a document falling under article No. 23A shall be excluded while computing the duty payable in respect of a corresponding document relating to the completion of the transaction in any Union territory under this article. CO-PARTNERSHIP-DEED. See Partnership (No. 46.) 23A. CONVEYANCE IN THE NATURE OF PART PERFORMANCE—Contracts for the transfer of Ninety per cent. of the duty as a 32 immovable property in the nature of part performance in any Union territory under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882). Conveyance (No. 23) 29. When the deed is considered to be a Conveyance, it requires registration for transfer of a valid title as provided under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act reads as follows:- “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.—(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely:— (a) instruments of gift of immovable property; (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property; (c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and (d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent; (e) non-testamentary instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award when such decree or order or award purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, 33 any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property: Provided that the 2[State Government] may, by order published in the 3[Official Gazette], exempt from the operation of this sub-section any lease executed in any district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed fifty rupees. (1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 (48 of 2001) and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A.] (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to— (i) any composition deed; or (ii) any instrument relating to shares in a joint stock Company, notwithstanding that the assets of such Company consist in whole or in part of immovable property; or (iii) any debenture issued by any such Company and not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in immovable property except in so far as it entitles the holder to the security afforded by a registered instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged, conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of its immovable property or any interest therein to trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such debentures; or (iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture issued by any such Company; or (v) any document other than the documents specified in sub-section (1A) not itself creating, 34 declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to or in immovable property, but merely creating a right to obtain another document which will, when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any such right, title or interest; or (vi) any decree or order of a Court 2[except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding]; or (vii) any grant of immovable property by Government; or (viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue-Officer; or (ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of collateral security granted under the Land Improvement Act, 1871, or the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883; or (x) any order granting a loan under the Agriculturists, Loans Act, 1884, or instrument for securing the repayment of a loan made under that Act; or (xa) any order made under the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890 (6 of 1890), vesting any property in a Treasurer of Charitable Endowments or divesting any such Treasurer of any property; or (xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of the mortgage-money, and any other receipt for payment of money due under a mortgage when the receipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or (xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue-Officer. Explanation.—A document purporting or operating to effect a contract for the sale of immovable property shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required registration by reason only of the fact that such document contains a recital of the payment of any earnest money or of the whole or any part of the purchase money. 35 (3) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st day of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will, shall also be registered.” 30. The agreement dated 24-03-2007, though styled as an agreement for sale, recites payment of the entire sale consideration and delivery of possession of the suit property. A document which evidences transfer of property inter vivos for consideration and records delivery of possession squarely falls within the definition of “conveyance” under Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, since it operates to transfer rights in immovable property and is not otherwise specifically provided for. Once the instrument answers the description of a conveyance, it necessarily attracts stamp duty under Article 23 of Schedule I and, more importantly, becomes compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908, as it purports to create or declare right, title and interest in immovable property of value exceeding one hundred rupees. It is a settled principle of law that title to immovable property can pass only through a registered instrument where registration is mandatory. In Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2012 (1) SCC 656, the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that transfer of immovable property by way of agreement to sell coupled with possession does not convey title and that ownership can be legally and lawfully transferred only by a registered deed of conveyance. In paragraphs 16, 19 and 24 of the judgment, it has been held that:- “16. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: 36 A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra [1967]1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein." In India, the word `transfer' is defined with reference to the word `convey'. The word `conveys' in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership... ...that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another...." 19. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of sections 54 and 55 of TP Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of TP Act). According to TP Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of TP Act enacts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter. 24. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither 37 convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.” 31. Similarly, in Narandas Karsandas v. S.A. Kamtam, 1977 (3) SCC 247, it was held that an agreement of sale does not, by itself, create any interest in or charge on the property, and title does not pass until a registered sale deed is executed. In para 32, it has been held that:- “32. A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazz The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognised in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.” 32. In view of Section 49 of the Registration Act, an unregistered document required to be registered cannot affect immovable property nor be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property, except for limited collateral purposes. Therefore, the unregistered agreement dated 24-03-2007, even if it recites payment of consideration and delivery of possession, cannot operate to convey title, and 38 consequently, no declaration of title can be granted in favour of the plaintiff based on such an unregistered instrument. 33. Defendant No. 1, though he has filed the written statement disputing delivery of possession under the agreement dated 24-03-2007, has not entered the witness box to substantiate the pleadings taken by him. It is a trite law that pleadings are not proof, and a party who asserts a fact must step into the witness box to depose to such facts and subject himself to cross-examination. In Vidhyadhar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that where a party to the suit does not enter the witness box and does not offer himself for cross- examination, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct. Applying the said principle, the adverse inference necessarily follows against Defendant No. 1 for withholding himself from the witness box, particularly when the issue pertains to the delivery of possession. In the absence of any substantive evidence from Defendant No. 1 to rebut the plaintiff’s case, the finding recorded on Issue No. 4 regarding delivery of possession does not warrant interference. Consequently, the cross-objection filed by Defendant No. 1 challenging the said finding is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. 34. Specific performance is an equitable remedy and discretionary in nature. While the plaintiff’s acts, payment of consideration, taking possession, and statutory compliance provide strong support for his contractual right, the discretionary relief cannot be granted solely on these facts without demonstrating practical preparedness to perform 39 remaining obligations. The absence of evidence on the plaintiff’s readiness to execute and register the sale deed, and to bear the associated costs, creates a legitimate basis for the trial court’s refusal to grant specific performance. Consequently, while the plaintiff’s claim has merit on the contractual and part-performance aspects, the dismissal of the suit for specific performance on the ground of unproven readiness and willingness is legally sustainable. The appeal, therefore, does not warrant interference, and the judgment of the trial court is upheld with respect to the discretionary relief sought. Since the decree of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief, and depends upon the facts of each case, no benefit could be extended to the plaintiff based on the judgments of “Nathulal” and “Azhar Sultana” cases (supra). 35. Accordingly, the first appeal filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. 36. Parties shall bear their own costs. 37. An appellate decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved