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2026 DAILYLAW 12886 (CHH)

MAYANK CHHABRA v. LOVELY SINGH

CR/273/2025 · 2026-01-05

Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:756 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 273 of 2025 1 - Mayank Chhabra S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Munrethi, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.). 2 - Gurjeet Kaur Chhabra W/o Mayank Chhabra C/o Nishant Sharma Aged About 33 Years R/o House No. E-52, Sumit City Of Dreams, Kachna, Raipur (C.G.) ... Applicant(s) versus 1 - Lovely Singh S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra Aged About 39 Years R/o Flat No. E-104, Ashoka Ratan, Khamardih, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.). 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Raipur, Office Of Collector, Ge Road, Raipur, Tehsil And District Raipur (C.G.). 3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (R) Arang, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.). 4 - Additional Tehsildar Mandir Hasaud, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2 For Applicant(s) : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 : Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Advocate along with Ms. Harneet Kaur, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 06/01/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 2/2025, which is an application for condonation of delay. 2. On due consideration and for the reasons mentioned in the application, I.A. No. 2/2025 is allowed. 3. By way of this revision, the applicant has prayed for following reliefs:- “It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 09.05.2025 (Annexure A/1) passed in Civil Suit No.: 14A/2023 by the learned Ninth District Judge, Raipur (CG) and allow the application dated 04.09.2023 filed by the present applicants thereby dismissing the civil suit filed by the non-applicant/plaintiff, in the paramount interest of justice.” 4. Brief facts of the case, is that, non-applicant No. 1/plaintiff instituted a civil suit along with an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the competent Court seeking partition of 3 the suit land situated at Village Munrethi, Khasra No. 151/1, Rakba 0.690 hectare, P.H.N. 11 (present P.H.N. 12), RNM Mandir Hasaud, Tehsil Arang, District Raipur (C.G.), claiming that he and applicant No. 1 herein, being siblings, had jointly purchased the said land by a registered sale deed dated 27.05.2008 from Smt. Manaki Bai for a consideration of Rs. 5,25,000/- and had jointly come into possession thereof; however, for the sake of convenience in management and payment of land revenue, a purported relinquishment/consent deed on a Rs. 50 non-judicial stamp paper was executed and notarized in favour of applicant No. 1, on the basis of which the mutation was effected and certified by the Tehsildar on 14.12.2012, though the said document was unregistered and insufficiently stamped. The plaintiff alleged that applicant No. 1 subsequently took the original sale deed and relinquishment deed without furnishing copies, began asserting exclusive ownership, and attempted to alienate the land, prompting the plaintiff to challenge the mutation before the revenue authorities; however, his appeal before the SDO was rejected on the ground of limitation. The plaintiff, therefore, sought declarations that the Tehsildar’s order dated 14.12.2012, the appellate order dated 16.06.2022, and the registered gift deed dated 03.06.2022 executed by applicant No. 1 in favour of applicant No. 2 were null and void, along with a decree of partition, delivery of possession of his half share through the Collector, and a permanent injunction restraining transfer of the 4 suit land. The suit was amended accordingly and accompanied by an application for temporary injunction. The applicants opposed the suit by filing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, contending inter alia that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to annul revenue orders, that the suit was barred by limitation, and, most importantly, that it was improperly valued and suffered from deficit court fee since the plaintiff, being admittedly out of possession and having his claim of co-ownership denied, was liable under Section 7(vi-a)(b) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, to pay ad valorem court fee on the full value of his alleged share. Despite these objections, the learned Trial Court rejected the application without properly addressing the issue of valuation and court fee, erroneously observing that no relief of possession was claimed, even though a specific prayer had been made for ensuring possession through the Collector, thereby leaving the statutory objection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC unresolved and giving rise to the present grievance. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the present revision has been filed on the specific ground that the learned trial Court has failed to properly consider and appreciate the fundamental aspects relating to the cause of action, the correct valuation of the suit, the adequacy of court fees, and the bar of limitation, which go to the very root of the maintainability of the suit. He further submits that these issues been examined in their true and correct perspective, the inevitable conclusion would have 5 been that the plaint suffers from inherent and incurable defects and, therefore, was liable to be rejected at the threshold under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, more particularly on account of non-payment and deficiency of the requisite court fees, rendering the continuance of the suit an abuse of the process of law. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Digamber Kumar Jain vs. Smt. Maya Bai and Others passed on 11th August, 2006, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has observed as under:- “9.In the present case, the petitioner himself has claimed the relief of possession of his share in the suit house. It is nowhere pleaded in the plaint that petitioner is in possession of the suit house. His learned Counsel has also fairly conceded during t arguments that the petitioner is, in fact, not in actual possession of the suit house. Under these circumstances, more particularly, when the respondents deny the claim of petitioner of his being a co-owner of the suit house, his ouster from that house is not to be proved and it has to be held that he is out of the possession There is no provision in the Act, which provides that a co-owner shall be either inferred or deemed to be in possession of the property for the purposes of computation of Court 6 fees in suits for partition. Thus, the petitioner cannot be inferred or deemed to be in possession of the suit house for the purpose of computation of Court-fees in the suit. The respondents, as already mentioned above, have denied the petitioner's claim of his being a co owner of the suit house. For these reasons, the Trial Court, in my considered opinion, did not commit any illegality in calling upon the petitioner to pay additional Court-fees as required under Section 7(vi- a)(b) of the Act.” 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the objections sought to be raised by the applicant/defendant by invoking the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be adjudicated at this preliminary stage, inasmuch as the questions relating to proper valuation of the suit and the adequacy of court-fee are mixed questions of law and fact, which can only be effectively examined by the learned trial Court after framing of issues and upon appreciation of the evidence led by the parties. It is further contended that even if, during the course of trial, the Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not affixed the appropriate court-fee commensurate with the reliefs claimed, the Court is empowered in law to direct the plaintiff to make good the deficit court-fee, rather than rejecting the plaint at the threshold. Learned counsel further submits that the subject-matter of the suit is agricultural land, and 7 therefore, the court-fee has been correctly assessed and duly paid in accordance with the applicable provisions of law, leaving no ground for interference under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. From a bare and careful perusal of the record, it is manifest that several substantial issues have been raised by the applicants in the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including, inter alia, the absence of a valid cause of action, the bar of limitation, and the non-payment of proper and requisite court fees, however, at this stage of the proceedings, learned counsel appearing for the applicants fairly submits that their principal and immediate grievance is confined to the aspect of valuation of the suit and payment of court fees, contending that the respondent No. 1 has neither correctly valued the suit nor affixed the appropriate court fees in accordance with law, which, according to the applicants, strikes at the very maintainability of the suit and warrants consideration at the threshold. 9. Accordingly, the suit cannot be held to be liable for rejection on this ground alone at the threshold, however, the learned trial Court is directed to duly consider the said aspect and to frame appropriate and specific issues in this regard, and thereafter to adjudicate the same in accordance with law. If, upon framing of such issues and after affording due opportunity to the parties to lead evidence, the trial Court comes to the conclusion that the 8 requisite and proper court fees have not been paid, it shall be open to the Court to direct the plaintiff to make good the deficit court fees within the time so granted. In the event of failure or non-compliance with such direction by the plaintiff, the trial Court shall be at liberty to pass such appropriate and consequential orders as may be warranted under law. 10. With this observation and direction, the revision stands disposed of. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat