1 2026:CGHC:19575-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1051 of 2026 Sanjay Ratre S/o Shri Ganga Prasad Ratre, Aged About 28 Years R/o Ward No. 7, Patanwar Colony, Yadunandan Nagar Tifra, P.S. Sirgitti District- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Mahila Thana, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) 2 - Xyz ... Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Sunil Otwani, Senior Advocate along with Ms. M. Asha, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Shaleen Singh Baghel, Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board Per Ram esh Sinha, C.J. 28/04/2026 1. Having considered the pleadings made in the writ petition, the written complaint of respondent No. 2, and the affidavit filed by the State pursuant to the order dated 23.04.2026, this Court is not inclined to issue notice to respondent No. 2/complainant, as the FIR, as presently registered, does not invoke the appropriate provisions of the Bharatiya VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.05.07 11:14:50 +0530 2 Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 in relation to the allegations made. The Additional Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, in compliance with the said order, has fairly conceded in the affidavit that the FIR has not been registered under the proper statutory provisions, indicating that the defect is one of improper legal classification rather than lack of allegations. In these circumstances, this Court finds that no prejudice would be caused to the complainant by not issuing notice, as the course adopted ensures that her allegations are examined under the correct legal framework. No adverse order is being passed against her, nor are her rights or remedies affected. On the contrary, correction of the statutory provisions would facilitate a lawful and effective investigation. Accordingly, issuance of notice to the complainant is not considered necessary, being a mere formality without substantive purpose. 2. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed seeking quashment of FIR No. 64/2025 dated 10.12.2025 registered at Mahila Thana, District Bilaspur for the offence under Section 81 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the consequent Final Report No. 05/2026 dated 04.02.2026, and the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur in Criminal Case No. 904/2026 whereby cognizance has been taken against the petitioner. 3. The contents of affidavit filed by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur in complaince of the order dated 23.04.2026, explaining the circumstances, under which the aforesaid offence came to be registered and investigated is reproduced hereinbelow:- 3 “1. That, the instant criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed by the petitioner claiming relief to quash First Information Report bearing FIR No. 64/2025 dated 10.12.2025 registered by Mahila Thana District Bilaspur for the offence punishable under Section 81 of Bhartiya Nagrik Sanhita, to quash the Final Report No. 05/2026 dated 04.02.2026 registered at Mahila Thana, Bilaspur and to quash the order dated 09.02.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur by which cognizance of the chargesheet and criminal proceeding has been initiated. 2. That, the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 23.04.2026 was pleased to direct the Director General of Police to call for an explanation from the concerned Police Station as well as from the Investigating Officer as to how the allegations which have been levelled by the complainant in the impugned FIR against the petitioner, the offence under Section 81 of BNS has been registered and the charge-sheet has also been filed for the very same offence and submit his report on or before the next date of hearing. 3. It is most humbly submitted that in compliance of the Hon’ble Court's order dated 23.04.2026 the Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., Police Headquarter, Raipur directed the Senior Superintendent of Police Bilaspur to call explanation from the Station House Officer, Mahila Thana Bilaspur and Investigating Officer of Crime No. 64/2025 with regard to registering the offence U/s 81 of Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita and also directed to take disciplinary action after due 4 enquiry. Copy of order dated 24.04.2026 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/1. 4. That, in compliance of the order dated 24.04.2026, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur appointed Enquiry Officer Sushri Anita Prabha Minj, Dy. Superintendent of Police (IUCAW), Bilaspur and directed to submitted the enquiry report before 27.04.2026. Copy of order dated 26.04.2026 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/2. 5. It is humbly submitted that the Enquiry Officer vide letter dated 24.04.2026 called explanation from Inspector Mankunwar Sidar, Station House Officer, Mahila Thana Bilaspur, who is also the Investigating Officer in the case, regarding registering the offence under Section 81 of Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita. Copy of letter calling explanation dated 24.04.2026 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/3. 6. That, Station House Officer, Mahila Thana Bilaspur submitted her reply to the explanation stating that the contents of the complaint of the complainant attracted Section 69 and Section 81 of BNS, therefore and during the investigation complete procedures (like Medical Examination of the complainant, statement U/s 183 of BNSS, FSL examination of seized Slide etc.) have been carried out keeping in consideration Section 69 of BNS. She stated that she accepts by mistake she has not applied Section 69 of BNS along with Section 81 of BNS. Copy of explanation dated 25.04.2026 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/4. 5 7. That, after due enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted the report before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur stating that Station House Officer Mahila Thana should have applied U/s 69 of BNS keeping in consideration all the facts that appeared through the application of the complainant which as stated by Station House Officer, Mahila Thana she did not apply as a bonafide mistake. Copy of enquiry report dated 25.04.2026 is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/5. 8. That, in pursuance to the Enquiry Report dated 25.04.2206, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur submitted his report to the Inspector General of Police, Bilaspur clearly stating in his report that the contents of the complaint of the complainant attracted Section 69 and Section 81 of BNS, therefore and during the investigation complete procedures (like Medical Examination of the complainant, statement U/s 183 of BNSS, FSL examination of seized Slide etc.) have been carried out by the Station House Officer, Mahila Thana, Bilaspur which procedures are not necessary to be carried out while applying Section 81 of BNS, as it is a non-cognizable offence. Further he also stated that though Station House Officer, Mahila Thana being in a responsible rank and post should apply the Sections carefully which however were not applied in the case as a mistake and so a disciplinary action has been taken and punishment of Censure has been imposed in her service book. Copy of report dated 25.04.2026 and punishment order dated 25.04.2026 are filed herewith ANNEXURE D/6 & D/7. 6 9. That, in pursuance of the order, the Inspector General of Police, Bilaspur has also submitted the report to the Inspector General C.I.D. Police Headquarter, Raipur regarding the same on 26.04.2026, which is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/8. 10. That, in compliance of the Hon’ble Court's order dated 23.04.2026 the Director General of Police Chhattisgarh has submitted his report on 27.04.2026, which is filed herewith as ANNEXURE D/9.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a bare perusal of the impugned FIR, the written complaint of respondent No.2 and the subsequent Final Report would clearly demonstrate that the essential ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 81 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 are not made out. It is contended that the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose any element of deception leading to a belief of lawful marriage, which is sine qua non for invoking Section 81 BNS. It is further submitted that the registration of the FIR under Section 81 BNS is ex facie erroneous and reflects complete non-application of mind by the investigating agency, which has also been admitted in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State, wherein it is stated that the allegations, if any, would fall within the ambit of Section 69 BNS and not Section 81 BNS. ******* It is further argued that despite such patent illegality, the police authorities proceeded with the investigation, submitted the charge- sheet and the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance, thereby 7 causing serious prejudice to the petitioner and resulting in abuse of process of law. Learned counsel submits that once it is evident from the record itself that the offence under Section 81 BNS is not attracted, the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom deserves to be quashed. However, it is fairly submitted that the petitioner shall have no objection if liberty is reserved in favour of the police authorities to proceed in accordance with law for any appropriate offence, if so made out from the allegations, and the petitioner may be granted liberty to avail appropriate legal remedies in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the State, while referring to the affidavit filed in compliance of the order dated 23.04.2026, submits that upon due enquiry it has been found that the allegations made in the written complaint of respondent No.2, prima facie, attract the ingredients of an offence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; however, due to a bona fide mistake on the part of the Station House Officer, the FIR came to be registered under Section 81 of BNS. It is submitted that the said error has been duly enquired into by the competent authorities and disciplinary action has already been taken against the officer concerned, which demonstrates that the State has acted promptly to rectify the lapse. ******* It is further submitted that in view of the aforesaid factual position, the State has no objection if this Hon’ble Court is pleased to quash the impugned FIR, the consequential investigation and the cognizance order, with liberty to the police authorities to proceed afresh in accordance with law for the appropriate offence as may be 8 made out from the allegations in the complaint. Learned counsel further submits that such a course would subserve the ends of justice, as it would correct the procedural irregularity while preserving the right of the prosecutrix to have her grievance examined in accordance with law. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 7. The prosecutrix, in her written complaint, states that she became acquainted with the accused, Sanjay Ratre, and thereafter they remained in regular telephonic contact. The accused expressed his intention to marry her and continued to meet her despite being informed of her past circumstances. On 08.06.2025, he allegedly took her to his residence on the pretext of introducing her to his family members; however, finding no one present, he assured her of marriage and, notwithstanding her resistance, established physical relations with her, as a consequence of which she became pregnant. Upon being apprised of the pregnancy, he purportedly consented to marry her and, on 24.07.2025, took her to a Shiva temple at Pali, where he performed a ceremony by applying sindoor and making her wear a mangalsutra before a priest, in the presence of certain witnesses, thereby representing that a valid marriage had been solemnized between them. Thereafter, he took her to his residence, introduced her as his wife, and cohabited with her for about a week. During this period, his family members also allegedly assured her that a formal marriage would be conducted in accordance with social 9 customs. However, it is stated that he and his family members subsequently exerted pressure upon her to terminate the pregnancy on the assurance that a proper marriage would be solemnized thereafter and that they could have a child in future. Despite her initial reluctance, she was allegedly administered medication during the night, which resulted in miscarriage. Thereafter, she was sent back to her parental home on the pretext that his family would initiate discussions regarding marriage, but he allegedly began to avoid her, denied her entry into his residence, and ultimately refused to marry her. 8. The allegations, as set out in the complaint, disclose a prima facie case of inducement to establish physical relations on the false promise of marriage, followed by deception and coercion leading to termination of pregnancy. Such assertions, if taken at face value, attract the ingredients of offences where consent is vitiated by misconception of fact and where fraudulent intent exists from the inception of the relationship. However, the registration of the FIR under Section 81 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, appears to be wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, as the said provision does not correspond to the nature of allegations involving sexual exploitation, deceitful inducement, and forced termination of pregnancy. Section 81 of the Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023, provides that cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage. It is relevant here to notice Section 81 of the Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023, which reads as under:- 10 “81. Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing belief of lawful marriage.- Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 9. It is a settled principle that the substance of the complaint must guide the application of penal provisions, and any mechanical or improper invocation of a penal section defeats the very purpose of criminal law. The mismatch between the allegations and the invoked provision reflects non-application of mind on the part of the police authorities at the stage of registration of FIR. 10. In this context, this Court draws guidance from the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak and Others”, 2013 (5) SCC 762, wherein it has been categorically held that fair and proper investigation is the backbone of the criminal justice system, and the Court is empowered to issue appropriate directions to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the object of investigation is to discover the truth and that any lapse or error at the threshold, including improper registration of offences, can be corrected to uphold the ends of justice. In paragraphs 20 to 24, 28, 31, 33, 43 to 46, 48 and 54, it has been held that:- 11 “20. Having noticed the provisions and relevant part of the scheme of the Code, now we must examine the powers of the Court to direct investigation. Investigation can be ordered in varied forms and at different stages. Right at the initial stage of receiving the FIR or a complaint, the Court can direct investigation in accordance with the provisions of Section 156(1) in exercise of its powers under Section 156(3) of the Code. Investigation can be of the following kinds : (i) Initial Investigation. (ii) Further Investigation. (iii) Fresh or de novo or re-investigation. 21. The initial investigation is the one which the empowered police officer shall conduct in furtherance to registration of an FIR. Such investigation itself can lead to filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code and shall take within its ambit the investigation which the empowered officer shall conduct in furtherance of an order for investigation passed by the court of competent jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3) of the Code. 22. ‘Further investigation’ is where the Investigating Officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the Court in terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the Executive. It is the continuation of a previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as a ‘further investigation’. Scope of such investigation 12 is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the Court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as ‘supplementary report’. ‘Supplementary report’ would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in complete contradistinction to a ‘reinvestigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation. 23. However, in the case of a ‘fresh investigation’, ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo investigation’ there has to be a definite order of the court. The order of the Court unambiguously should state as to whether the previous investigation, for reasons to be recorded, is incapable of being acted upon. Neither the Investigating agency nor the Magistrate has any power to order or conduct ‘fresh investigation’. This is primarily for the reason that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code. It is essential that even an order of ‘fresh’/’de novo’ investigation passed by the higher judiciary should always be coupled with a 13 specific direction as to the fate of the investigation already conducted. The cases where such direction can be issued are few and far between. This is based upon a fundamental principle of our criminal jurisprudence which is that it is the right of a suspect or an accused to have a just and fair investigation and trial. This principle flows from the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. Where the investigation ex facie is unfair, tainted, mala fide and smacks of foul play, the courts would set aside such an investigation and direct fresh or de novo investigation and, if necessary, even by another independent investigating agency. As already noticed, this is a power of wide plenitude and, therefore, has to be exercised sparingly. The principle of rarest of rare cases would squarely apply to such cases. Unless the unfairness of the investigation is such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court, the Court should be reluctant to interfere in such matters to the extent of quashing an investigation and directing a ‘fresh investigation’. 24. In the case of Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 6 SCC 1], the Court stated that it is not only the responsibility of the investigating agency, but also that of the courts to ensure that investigation is fair and does not in any way hamper the freedom of an individual except in accordance with law. An equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that high responsibility lies upon the investigating agency not to conduct an investigation in a tainted or unfair manner. The investigation should not prima 14 facie be indicative of a biased mind and every effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law de hors his position and influence in the society. The maxim contra veritatem lex nunquam aliquid permittit applies to exercise of powers by the courts while granting approval or declining to accept the report. 28. Next question that comes up for consideration of this Court is whether the empowered Magistrate has the jurisdiction to direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘fresh investigation’. As far as the latter is concerned, the law declared by this Court consistently is that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to direct ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ investigation. However, once the report is filed, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to accept the report or reject the same right at the threshold. Even after accepting the report, it has the jurisdiction to discharge the accused or frame the charge and put him to trial. But there are no provisions in the Code which empower the Magistrate to disturb the status of an accused pending investigation or when report is, filed to wipe out the report and its effects in law. Reference in this regard can be made to K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala [(1998) 5 SCC 223]; Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar [(2008) 5 SCC 413], Nirmal Singh Kahlon v State of Punjab & Ors. [(2009) 1 SCC 441]; Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 6 SCC 332]; and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 12 SCC 254]. 31. Referring to the provisions of Section 173 of the Code, the Court observed that the police has the power to conduct further investigation in terms 15 of Section 173(8) of the Code but also opined that even the Trial Court can direct further investigation in contradistinction to fresh investigation, even where the report has been filed. It will be useful to refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment wherein the Court while referring to the case of Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (supra) held as under: “23. ….. ‘13. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’ and ‘reinvestigation’ stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a ‘State’ to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction. Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar (2008) 5 SCC 513 opined as under: (SCC p. 415, para 7) ‘7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above section it is evident that even after completion of investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, the police has right to further investigate under sub- section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation.’ 16 A distinction, therefore, exists between a reinvestigation and further investigation. XXX XXX XXX 15. The investigating agency and/or a court exercise their jurisdiction conferred on them only in terms of the provisions of the Code. The courts subordinate to the High Court even do not have any inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or otherwise. The precognizance jurisdiction to remand vested in the subordinate courts, therefore, must be exercised within the four corners of the Code.” 33. This judgment, thus, clearly shows that the Court of Magistrate has a clear power to direct further investigation when a report is filed under Section 173(2) and may also exercise such powers with the aid of Section 156(3) of the Code. The lurking doubt, if any, that remained in giving wider interpretation to Section 173(8) was removed and controversy put to an end by the judgment of this Court in the case of Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI, [(2001) 7 SCC 536] where the Court held that although the said order does not, in specific terms, mention the power of the court to order further investigation, the power of the police to conduct further investigation envisaged therein can be triggered into motion at the instance of the court. When any such order is passed by the court, which has the jurisdiction to do so, then such order should not even be interfered with in exercise of a higher court’s 17 revisional jurisdiction. Such orders would normally be of an advantage to achieve the ends of justice. It was clarified, without ambiguity, that the magistrate, in exercise of powers under Section 173(8) of the Code can direct the CBI to further investigate the case and collect further evidence keeping in view the objections raised by the appellant to the investigation and the new report to be submitted by the Investigating Officer, would be governed by sub-Section (2) to sub-Section (6) of Section 173 of the Code. There is no occasion for the court to interpret Section 173(8) of the Code restrictively. After filing of the final report, the learned Magistrate can also take cognizance on the basis of the material placed on record by the investigating agency and it is permissible for him to direct further investigation. Conduct of proper and fair investigation is the hallmark of any criminal investigation. 43. At this stage, we may also state another well- settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct ‘further investigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ and even ‘reinvestigation’. ‘Fresh’, ‘de novo’, and ‘reinvestigation’ are synonymous expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by 18 the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection. 44. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code do not control or limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge sheet has been submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen the investigation, especially by entrusting the same to a specialised agency. It can safely be stated and concluded that in an appropriate case, when the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and that in order to do complete justice and where the facts of the case demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the investigation to a specialised agency. These principles have been reiterated with approval in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2011) 13 SCC 337]. Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.[(1998) 1 SCC 226], Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar Modi & Ors. [1996 (6) SCC 500] and Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2010) 2 SCC 200]. 45. The power to order/direct ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo’ investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). Even such a report is subject to acceptance by 19 the learned Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct ‘further investigation’, or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused. 46. The Code does not contain any provision which deals with the court competent to direct ‘fresh investigation’, the situation in which such investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the manner in which the report so obtained shall be dealt with. The superior courts can direct conduct of a ‘fresh’/‘de novo’ investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to be part of the record. Once it is part of the record, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from the record of the case. In other words, but for a specific order by the superior court, the reports, whether a primary report or a report upon ‘further investigation’ or a report upon ‘fresh investigation’, shall have to be construed and read conjointly. Where there is a specific order made by the court for reasons like the investigation being entirely unfair, tainted, undesirable or being based upon no truth, the court would have to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand cancelled and will not form part of the record for consideration by the Court of competent jurisdiction. 20 48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression ‘fair and proper investigation’ in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose. Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law. Secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of investigative canons. 54. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a ‘fresh’, ‘de novo’ or ‘re-investigation’ in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is only upon the orders of the higher courts empowered to pass such orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the court of the learned Magistrate.” 21 11. In view of the aforesaid legal position, and considering that the present FIR does not reflect the true nature of the allegations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned FIR deserves to be quashed. Under the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, (Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.), this Court is empowered to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process. If the FIR is registered under wholly inappropriate provisions or demonstrates clear non-application of mind, the Court may intervene. The defect as observed hereinabove goes to the root of the FIR and impairs the investigation. The guiding principle remains that procedure should not defeat justice, and any direction, whether quashing with liberty to register a fresh FIR or ordering further investigation, must ultimately serve a fair and lawful inquiry into the allegations. 12. Consequently, existing FIR of Crime No. 64/2025, registered at police station Mahila Thana, Bilaspur, for the offence under Section 81 of the BNS, 2023, and the Charge sheet No. 05/2026 dated 04-02-2026, and also the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 904/2026 pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, are hereby quashed. The police authorities are directed to register a fresh FIR, strictly in accordance with the allegations made in the complaint, by invoking appropriate provisions of law, and thereafter proceed with a fair, impartial, and expeditious investigation. 13. It is made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to avail such remedies as may be available to him under the law, if aggrieved by any 22 action taken pursuant to the fresh proceeding. Accordingly, the petition stands allowed. 14. A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Bilaspur, for necessary compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved