2026:HHC:24060 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4122 of 2013 Reserved on: 29.4.2026 Date of Decision: 23.6.2026 Balram Kumar ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. For the Appellant : M/s Anshul Jairath and Neha Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 22.8.2013 and order of sentence dated 24.8.2013, passed by the learned Special Judge, Una, District Una, H.P., (learned Trial Court) vide which the appellant (the accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted and sentenced as under: 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24060 Under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act To suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹2,000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act To suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹5,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). It was asserted that the informant Jagdev Chand (PW1) wanted to get the birth certificate of his son Sham Sunder for his admission to the Army and preparation of a passport. He visited the accused Bal Ram, Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, 2-3 times. However, the accused prevaricated and subsequently demanded ₹3,000/- for the preparation of the birth 3 2026:HHC:24060 certificate. The informant expressed his inability to pay the amount, and the accused demanded ₹2,500/-. The informant and Kishori Lal (PW2) visited the house of the accused on 4.10.2010 in the morning. The informant demanded the birth certificate of his son, and the accused asked the informant to pay ₹2,500/-. The informant replied that he had not brought the money with him, and he would pay the money during the daytime. The accused asked the informant to bring ₹2,000/- to the Haroli block. The informant filed an application (Ex.PW1/A) before the police, and the police registered the FIR (Ex.PW10/A). Vijay Kumari Saklani (PW11) wrote a letter (Ex.PW3/A) to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner (ETC) for deputing a witness. Constable Jitender Kumar (PW9) was sent with a letter to bring the witness. Jitender Kumar returned with ATI Jagadish Ram (PW3) at about 1:30 p.m. Vijay Kumar Saklani briefed Jagdish Ram about the facts of the case and introduced Jagdev Chand, Kishori Lal, and Jagdish Ram. Vijay Kumar Saklani took out two separate bottles containing sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein powder. He prepared two separate solutions with water, and the water did not change its colour. When two solutions were mixed, the water changed its colour to pink. The 4 2026:HHC:24060 witnesses were informed about the reaction of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein powder. The solution was sealed in a nip with seal ‘H’. Specimen seal impression (Ex.PW1/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Jagadish Chand after use. The demonstration nip was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). Informant Jagdev Chand produced four currency notes, which were treated with phenolphthalein powder. The currency notes were put in the front pocket of the informant’s shirt after noting their serial numbers. The informant was instructed to hand over the currency notes on demand by the Panchayat Secretary and not to shake hands with anybody. Memo (Ex.PW1/D) was prepared. The demonstration solution and phenolphthalein powder were handed over to MHC. The trap party moved from the Police Station at about 2.30 p.m. They reached Haroli block at about 3.00 p.m. and found that a meeting was going on in the office of the Block Development Officer (BDO). The meeting came to an end at about 3.15 p.m. Informant Kishori Lal and Jagdev Chand went to the accused Balram. The informant demanded the birth certificate of his son. The accused enquired whether the informant had brought the money as demanded. The accused invited the informant to a tea 5 2026:HHC:24060 stall for a cup of tea. Kishori Lal accompanied them. The accused demanded the money after taking the tea. The informant handed over the currency notes of ₹2000/. The accused counted the currency notes and put them in the left front pocket of his pants. The informant signalled the trap party by moving his hand over his head. Constable Jitender and Kuldeep caught hold of the informant from his wrists and brought him outside the tea stall. The accused was made to sit on the bench. Vijay Saklani reached the spot and asked his driver to call BDO to the spot. BDO was not present in the office, and SEPO came to the spot. Vijay Kumar Saklani gave his personal search and the search of the other members of the trap party to the accused. Vijay Kumar Saklani found a jug of water lying in the tea stall. He added sodium carbonate to the glass of water and got the hands of the accused washed in the steel plate. The handwash turned pink. The hand wash was put in a bottle, and the bottle was sealed with seal ‘H’. Vijay Kumar Saklani demanded the money received by the accused, and the accused took out the money from the left pocket of his pants. Vijay Kumar Saklani checked the serial numbers of the currency notes and tallied them with the serial numbers noticed earlier and found that they tallied each other. The 6 2026:HHC:24060 currency notes were put in an envelope (Ex. P1). Vijay Kumar Saklani sealed the envelope with seal impression ‘H’. Seal impression (Ex.PW1/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. Currency notes were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/E). Vijay Kumar Saklani investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW11/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses and arrested the accused vide memo (Ex.PW11/D). The case property was deposited with MHC Sushma (PW10), who made an entry in the register of Malkhana and sent two nips, specimen seal, copy of seizure memo, copy of FIR and docket to Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL), Dharamshala through Constable Pradeep Singh vide RC No. 17/10. Constable Kuldeep deposited all the articles in safe condition at RFSL, Dharamshala and handed over the receipt to MHC Sushma Rani on his return. The result of the analysis (Ex.PW11/E) was issued, in which it was mentioned that phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate were detected in the handwash. Police applied for the prosecution sanction. Deputy Commissioner K.R. Bharti went through the case file and accorded the prosecution sanction (Ex.PW6/C), which was forwarded to Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Dharamshala. The appointment order (Ex.PW6/A) and posting order 7 2026:HHC:24060 (Ex.PW6/B) of the accused were seized vide memo (Ex.PW6/E). Statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Jagdev Chand (PW1) is the informant. Kishori Lal (PW2), is the shadow witness. Jagdish Ram (PW3), Jitender Kumar (PW9) and Kuldeep Singh (PW12) were members of the raiding party. Piara Singh (PW4) produced the job chart of the Panchayat Secretary. Gurnam Chand (PW5) issued the birth certificate (Ex.PW5/A). Jagdish Chand (PW6) produced the appointment and posting order of the accused and also proved the prosecution sanction. Dalip Chand (PW7) is the owner of the dhaba where the bribe money was given. Jagir Singh (PW8) was called to the spot after the accused was apprehended. MHC Sushma Rani (PW10) 8 2026:HHC:24060 was working as an MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Vijay Kumar Saklani (PW11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC), admitted that he was posted as a Secretary, Gram Panchayat, Beetan, Tehsil Haroli. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He stated that he had issued the birth certificate. He claimed that the hand wash did not change its colour. He stated that Jagdev Chand (PW1) and Kishori Lal (PW2) deposed against him due to the enmity. The informant, Jagdev Chand, had a dispute with his neighbour, who had put a heap of dung near the informant’s house. The accused had submitted a report to the learned SDM regarding this fact. He examined Chanchla Devi (DW1), Payal Beetan (DW2) and Subhash Chand (DW3) to prove his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The accused had demanded money for issuing a birth certificate of the informant’s son. The informant had paid ₹2,000/- to the accused pursuant to the demand made by the accused. This was duly corroborated by the hand wash, which had turned pink. The statements of official witnesses were reliable, and these were 9 2026:HHC:24060 corroborated by the informant’s statement and the statement of the shadow witness. The statement made by Gurnam Chand (PW5) that the birth certificate was already issued will not help the accused because there was no proof of delivery of the birth certificate. Mere preparation of the certificate was not sufficient. The accused had demanded the bribe for delivering the certificate. The mere fact that the owner of the dhaba had not supported the prosecution's case was not sufficient to doubt it. The defence taken by the accused that the informant had a grudge against the accused because he had not removed the heap of cow dung lying near the informant’s house was not probable. The person who is forced to give a bribe to a public servant cannot be called an accomplice, and his testimony cannot be doubted. Prosecution sanction was given after applying the mind. Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case, especially when the witnesses were deposing after a considerable period. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal 10 2026:HHC:24060 asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material placed before it. The charges were vague, and the accused was prejudiced in his defence. The informant had obtained the birth certificates on 26.9.2010 and 01.01.2010. Kishori Lal (PW2) was inimical to the accused because the accused had not entered the date of birth of Kishori Lal’s son. Hence, he and the informant conspired together to make a false case against the accused. Learned Trial Court ignored the major contradictions by terming them to be minor contradictions. Mere recovery of the money was not sufficient. The pants from which the bribe money was also not recovered, which makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. There was no proof of demand or acceptance, and the ingredients of Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act were not satisfied. The sanction was not proper, and K.R. Bharti, who had granted the sanction, did not step into the witness box. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard M/s Anshul Jairath and Neha Thakur, learned counsel for the appellants/accused, and Mr Jitender 11 2026:HHC:24060 Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 9. Mr Anshul Jairath, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the material on record. The informant had not made any complaint to the Panchayat or any other person before filing a complaint with the police. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that the age of his son was 17 years, and a person cannot get admission to the Army unless he has attained the age of 18 years. This falsifies the prosecution's version that the informant wanted the birth certificate for the admission of his son to the Army. The birth certificate was supplied to the informant on two occasions, as per the statement of Gurnam Singh. There was a dispute between Tarsem and the informant regarding the dung heap. The accused had visited the spot and submitted his report to the SDM. This report did not favour the informant who threatened the accused that such an action would cost him dearly. This was duly proved by the documents produced on record, and this defence was ignored by the learned Trial Court. The police had not sent the tainted money to FSL to determine whether it contained phenolphthalein or not. The 12 2026:HHC:24060 pants of the accused, in which he had kept the money, was also not seized. Dalip Chand (PW7), the tea stall owner, did not support the prosecution's case. The communication for summoning the witness was addressed to ETC and not AETC, which made the prosecution's case doubtful. The prosecution's evidence failed to prove the demand, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments titled State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere Vs. C.B. Nagraj 2025 INSC 736, Har Swarup Verma Vs. State of Delhi 2025:DHC:10405 and P. Sathyanarayana Murthy Vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2015) 10 SCC in support of his submissions. 10. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had examined the evidence minutely and found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The defence propounded by the accused that he had not prepared a favourable report to the informant and that he was falsely implicated was highly unbelievable and was rightly rejected by 13 2026:HHC:24060 the learned Trial Court. The mere fact that the owner of the dhaba has not supported the prosecution's case cannot lead to an inference that the prosecution's case is false. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that this witness was contradicted with reference to his previous testimony, and his credibility was thoroughly impeached. The shadow witness also corroborated the informant’s version regarding the demand, and the demand was duly proved on record. The statement of Gurnam Chand (PW5) only shows that the birth certificates were prepared, but there is no evidence that the certificates were also delivered to the informant. Learned Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence on record, and no interference is required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The police have presented the present challan for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The ingredients of Section 7 were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devinder Kumar 14 2026:HHC:24060 Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 at page 498: 11. Thus, in an offence under Section 7 of the 1988 Act, the points requiring proof are: (i) that the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to be, a public servant; (ii) that he accepted or retained or agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain from some person a gratification; (iii) that such gratification was not a legal remunera- tion due to him; (iv) that he accepted such gratification as a motive or reward, proof of which is essential for (a) doing or forbearing to do an official act, or (b) showing or forbearing to show favour or dis- favour to someone in the exercise of his official functions, or (c) rendering or attempting to render any service, or disservice to someone, with the legislative or execu- tive government, or with any public servant. 13. The informant Jagdev Chand (PW1) stated that he and Kishori Lal (PW2) had gone to the house of the accused on 4.10.2010, at about 8-9 AM, to obtain the date of birth certificate of Sham Sunder. He had earlier visited the accused to get the certificate, but the accused had not issued the certificate. Subsequently, the accused demanded ₹3,000/- for issuing the certificate. He told the accused that he was a poor person and was unable to arrange ₹3,000/-. The accused demanded ₹2,500/- out of which ₹2,000/- were to be paid on that day and ₹500/- was to 15 2026:HHC:24060 be paid subsequently. The informant told the accused that he did not have the money, and he would bring the money during the daytime. The accused told the informant that he would be attending a meeting at the BDO Office, Una. He discussed the matter with Kishori Lal and told him that he did not want to pay the bribe. He reported the matter to the police. The police demonstrated the use of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein powder. He produced the currency notes that were treated, and their serial numbers were noticed. The currency notes were handed over to him with a direction not to touch them till their delivery to the accused. He was told to signal the police by moving his hand over his head after the payment of the money. He and Kishori Lal went to the office of the BDO. A meeting was going on, and the accused came out of the office at about 3.15 p.m. The accused inquired whether the informant had received the money as demanded. He invited the informant for a cup of tea at a nearby dhaba. Kishori Lal accompanied him. The informant handed over ₹2,000/- to the accused. The accused kept the currency notes in the left pocket of his pants. He (the informant) signalled the police. The police reached the spot and caught hold of the wrists of the informant. SPO Jageer Singh was brought to 16 2026:HHC:24060 the spot. The hands of the accused were washed. The water did not change its colour, but when sodium carbonate was added to the hand wash, the colour became pink. The police seized the currency notes and the hand wash. He duly identified the currency notes and the hand wash. 14. He stated in his cross-examination that he had complained to the Panchayat against the accused for not issuing the certificate, but had not mentioned this fact in the application filed by him. He had applied for the birth certificate because his son wanted to seek employment in the Army. He admitted that the age of entry to the Army is 18 years. He had not filed any complaint against the accused to BDO. Many people gathered after the accused was apprehended by the police. He denied that he had asked the accused to get the dung heap lifted from the spot, and when the accused showed his inability, he falsely implicated the accused. He denied that all the demonstrations, etc., were carried out at Haroli. He denied that he had shaken hands with the accused and immediately returned. 15. It was submitted that the informant’s testimony is inherently suspect because he had paid the bribe. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble 17 2026:HHC:24060 Supreme Court in M.O. Shamsudhin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351: 1995 SCC (Cri) 509 that the courts have to distinguish between a person who makes a complaint before giving a bribe and the person who makes a complaint after giving the bribe. It was observed at page 358: “12. Now, confining ourselves to the case of bribery, it is generally accepted that the person offering a bribe to a public officer is in the nature of an accomplice in the offence of accepting illegal gratification, but the nature of corroboration required in such a case should not be subjected to the same rigorous tests which are generally applied to a case of an approver. Though bribe-givers are generally treated to be in the nature of accomplices, among them, there are various types and gradations. In cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the complainant is the person who gives the bribe in a technical and legal sense, because in every trap case, wherever the complaint is filed, there must be a person who has to give money to the accused, which in fact is the bribe money that is demanded and without such a giving, the trap cannot succeed. When there is such a demand by the public servant from a person who is unwilling, and if, to do public good, approaches the authorities and lodges a complaint, then in order that the trap succeeds, he has to give the money. There could be another type of bribe- giver who is always willing to give money in order to get his work done, and having got the work done, he may send a complaint. Here, he is a particeps criminis in respect of the crime committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus, there are grades and grades of accomplices and therefore a distinction could as well be drawn between cases where a person offers a bribe to achieve his own purpose and where one is forced to offer a bribe under a threat of loss or harm, that is to say, under coercion. A person who falls into this category and who becomes a party to laying a trap stands on a different footing because he is only a victim of threat or coercion to which he 18 2026:HHC:24060 was subjected. Where such witnesses fall under the category of ‘accomplices’ by reason of their being bribe- givers, in the first instance, the court has to consider the degree of complicity and then look for corroboration, if necessary, as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration that may be needed in a case may vary, having regard to the facts and circumstances. xxxxxx 16. We shall now refer to some of the judgments wherein the rule of corroboration has been considered in respect of the bribery cases. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [1954 SCR 1098: AIR 1954 SC 322], there are observations to the effect that the evidence of the trap witnesses cannot be taken on its face value, thereby indicating that their evidence cannot be relied upon without independent corroboration. In State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195], a Bench of five Judges considered this “corroboration requirement” and, after referring to the observations made in the Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh case [1954 SCR 1098: AIR 1954 SC 322], explained them in the following manner: “If the witnesses are not accomplices, what then is their position? In Shiv Bahadur Singh case [1954 SCR 1098: AIR 1954 SC 322] (A) it was observed, with regard to Nagindas and Pannalal, that they were partisan witnesses who were out to entrap the appellant in that case, and it was further observed: ‘A perusal of the evidence … leaves in the mind the impression that they were not witnesses whose evidence could be taken as its face value.’ We have taken the observations quoted above from a full report of the decision, as the authorised report does not contain the discussion with regard to evidence. It is thus clear that the decision did not lay down any universal or inflexible rule of rejection, even with regard to the evidence of witnesses who may be called partisan or interested witnesses. It is plain and obvious that no such rule can be laid down; for the value of the testimony of a witness depends on diverse factors, such as the character of the witness, to 19 2026:HHC:24060 what extent and in what manner he is interested, how he has fared in cross-examination, etc. There is no doubt that the testimony of partisan or interested witnesses must be scrutinised with care, and there may be cases, as in Shiv Bahadur Singh case [1954 SCR 1098: AIR 1954 SC 322] (A), where the Court will, as a matter of prudence, look for independent corroboration. It is wrong, however, to deduce from that decision any universal or inflexible rule that the evidence of the witnesses of the raiding party must be discarded unless independent corroboration is available.” (emphasis supplied) This Court in the above case concluded thus: “The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of diverse considerations which must vary from case to case, and in a proper case, the Court may even look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person.” (emphasis supplied) It was further concluded thus: “As was observed by Lord Reading in Baskerville [(1916) 2 KB 658: (1916-17) All ER Rep 38] (C) even in respect of the evidence of an accomplice, all that is required is that there must be ‘some additional evidence rendering it probable that the story of the accomplice is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it’. In Rameshwar [1951 SCC 1213: 1952 SCR 377: AIR 1952 SC 54] at p. 385 (B), to which we have referred in an earlier paragraph, the nature and extent of corroboration required when it is not considered safe to dispense with it, have been clearly explained and it is merely necessary to reiterate that corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient even 20 2026:HHC:24060 though it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.” 17. In a later case namely Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828: (1962) 2 SCR 195] it was held by this Court that though a trap witness is not an approver he is certainly an interested witness in that he is interested to see that the trap laid by him succeeds and he could at the most be equated with the partisan witnesses which need corroboration. Relying on the ratio laid down in Basawan Singh case [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195], a Bench of three Judges in Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1968 SC 1323: 1968 Cri LJ 1505] held thus: “Now coming back to the contention that the appellants could not have been convicted solely on the basis of the evidence of Ramanlal and the police witnesses, we are of the opinion that it is an untenable contention. The utmost that can be said against Ramanlal, the Dy SP, Erulker and Santramji is that they are partisan witnesses as they were interested in the success of the trap laid by them. It cannot be said — and it was not said — that they were accomplices. Therefore, the law does not require that their evidence should be corroborated before being accepted as sufficient to find a conviction. This position is placed beyond controversy by the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195] wherein this Court laid down, overruling the decision in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [1954 SCR 1098: AIR 1954 SC 322] that where the witnesses are not accomplices but are merely partisan or interested witnesses who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other interested evidence is tested and in a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. We are unable to agree that any different rule was laid down in E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828: (1962) 2 SCR 195]. It must be remembered that 21 2026:HHC:24060 the decision in the Basawan Singh case [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195] was given by a Bench of five Judges and that decision was binding on the Bench that decided the Barsay case [AIR 1961 SC 1762: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828 : (1962) 2 SCR 195]. Some of the observations in the Barsay case [AIR 1961 SC 1762: (1961) 2 Cri LJ 828 : (1962) 2 SCR 195] no doubt support the contention of the appellants. But those observations must be confined to the peculiar facts of that case. It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that while in the case of evidence of an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars but as regards the evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict an accused person solely on the basis of that evidence, if it is satisfied that that evidence is reliable. But it may, in appropriate cases, look for corroboration. In the instant case, the trial court and the High Court have fully accepted the evidence of Ramanlal, the Dy SP, Erulker and Santramji. That being so, it was open to them to convict the appellants solely on the basis of their evidence. That apart, their evidence is substantially corroborated by the evidence of Dahyabhai, Sanghvi and Sendhalal. In the case of partisan witnesses, the corroboration that may be looked for is corroboration in a general way and not material corroboration as in the case of the evidence of accomplices.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1969 SC 17: (1968) 3 SCR 189: 1969 Cri LJ 262], this Court, after referring to the Basawan Singh case [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195], observed thus: “We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and other prosecution witnesses to whose evidence we shall presently refer, should be considered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars before being accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be considered as accomplices, 22 2026:HHC:24060 as the same was extorted from them. Though PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be considered interested witnesses as regards their evidence relating to the trap, as a matter of law, it is not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration. See State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195] .” (emphasis supplied) 19. In Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1976) 1 SCC 644: 1976 SCC (Cri) 135: AIR 1976 SC 449] this Court held thus: (SCC p. 652, paras 33 and 34) “This also leads to the question whether all witnesses, who are called upon to assist in the detection of a bribery case by laying a trap, should be considered unreliable as accomplices or, at any rate, partisan witnesses. There is no rule of law that even if a witness is otherwise reliable and independent, his association in a pre-arranged raid about which he had become acquainted makes him an accomplice or a partisan witness. In the absence of anything to warrant a contrary conclusion, conviction is not untenable merely because it is based on the testimony of such a witness. We are also not prepared to dub every witness of a raiding party to be an accomplice, per se or even as an interested witness in a total absence of materials justifying such an inference. While PW 4 will be a highly partisan witness in this case, in his own interest to oblige the police, nothing was shown against PW 3. PW 7, the Inspector, cannot be considered as an absolutely partisan witness because he is a police officer who took immediate action on the complaint. Nothing unusual is suggested against him. We have no hesitation in accepting the testimony of PWs 3 and 7 on their own. They do corroborate the complainant.” 20. In Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 390: 1980 SCC (Cri) 458: AIR 1980 SC 873], Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench, while repelling the contention that the evidence of a trap witness namely the police 23 2026:HHC:24060 officer should not be accepted unless corroborated, observed thus: (SCC p. 395, para 9) “We, however, wish to say that the evidence of PW 8 is entirely trustworthy and there is no need to seek any corroboration. We are not prepared to accept the submission of Shri Frank Anthony that he is the very police officer who laid the trap should be sufficient for us to insist upon corroboration. We do wish to say that there is no rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law, nor indeed any rule of prudence, which requires that the evidence of such officers should be treated on the same footing as evidence of accomplices, and there should be insistence on corroboration. In the facts and circumstances of a particular case, a court may be disinclined to act upon the evidence of such an officer without corroboration, but, equally, in the facts and circumstances of another case, the Court may unhesitatingly accept the evidence of such an officer. It is all a matter of appreciation of evidence, and on such matters, there can be no hard and fast rule, nor can there be any precedential guidance. We are forced to say this because, of late, we have come across several judgments of Courts of Session and sometimes even of High Courts where reference is made to decisions of this Court on matters of appreciation of evidence and decisions of pure questions of fact.” 21. From the above resume of various decisions, the following principles are deducible. Section 133 of the Evidence Act lays down that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person. The conviction based on such evidence is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However, there is a rider in Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Act which provides that the court may presume that the accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. This presumption is in the nature of a precautionary provision incorporating the rule of prudence, which is ingrained in the appreciation of an accomplice's evidence. Therefore, the 24 2026:HHC:24060 courts should be guarded before accepting the accomplice's evidence and look for corroborating evidence. The discretion of the court upon which the rule of corroboration rests must be exercised in a sound and reasonable manner. Normally, the courts may not act on an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but whether in a particular case it has to be accepted without corroboration or not would depend on an overall consideration of the accomplice's evidence and the facts and circumstances. However, if, on being so satisfied, the court considers that the sole testimony of the accomplice is safe to be acted upon, the conviction can be based thereon. Even if corroboration as a matter of prudence is needed, it is not for curing any defect in the testimony of the accomplice or to give validity to it, but it is only in the nature of supporting evidence, making the other evidence more probable to enable the court to satisfy itself to act upon it.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. It was held in State of U.P. v. G.K. Ghosh, (1984) 1 SCC 254: 1984 SCC (Cri) 46, that ordinarily a citizen does not make a complaint to the Vigilance Department unless he has compelling reasons to do so, and his testimony should not be lightly brushed aside. It was observed: “9. By and large, a citizen is somewhat reluctant, rather than anxious, to complain to the Vigilance Department and to have a trap arranged even if illegal gratification is demanded by a government servant. There are numerous reasons for the reluctance. In the first place, he has to make a number of visits to the office of the Vigilance Department and to wait on a number of officers. He has to provide his own currency notes to arrange a trap. He has to comply with several formalities and sign several statements. He has to accompany the officers and participants of the raiding party and play the main role. All the while, he has to remain away from his job, work, or avocation. He has to sacrifice his time and effort while doing so. Thereafter, he 25 2026:HHC:24060 has to attend the court at the time of the trial from day to day. He has to withstand the searching cross-examination by the defence counsel as if he himself is guilty of some fault. In the result, a citizen who has been harassed by a government officer has to face all these hazards. And if the explanation offered by the Accused is accepted by the court, he has to face the humiliation of being considered as a person who tried to falsely implicate a government servant, not to speak of facing the wrath of the Government servants of the department concerned, in his future dealings with the department. No one would therefore be too keen or too anxious to face such an ordeal. Ordinarily, it is only when a citizen feels oppressed by a feeling of being wronged and finds the situation to be beyond endurance that he adopts the course of approaching the Vigilance Department for laying a trap. His evidence cannot, therefore, be easily or lightly brushed aside. Of course, it cannot be gainsaid that it does not mean that the court should be oblivious to the need for caution and circumspection bearing in mind that one can conceive of cases where an honest or strict Government official may be falsely implicated by a vindictive person to whose demand, for showing favours, or for according to a special treatment by giving a go-bye to the rules, the official refuses to yield. 10. It is now time to deal with the criticism urged as a matter of course in the context of the police officer leading the raiding party — namely that he is an interested witness. This is true, but only to an extent — a very limited extent. He is interested in the success of the trap to ensure that a citizen, who complains of harassment by a government officer making a demand for illegal gratification, is protected, and the role of his department in the protection of such citizens is vindicated. Perhaps it can be contended that he is interested in the success of the trap so that his ego is satisfied, or that he earns a feather in his cap. At the same time, it must be realised that it is not frequently that a police officer, himself being a government servant, would resort to perjury and concoct evidence in order to rope in an innocent Government 26 2026:HHC:24060 servant. In the event of the Government servant concerned refusing to accept the currency notes offered by the complainant, it would not be reasonable to expect the police officer to go to the length of concocting a false seizure memo for prosecuting and humiliating him merely in order to save the face of the complainant, thereby compromising his own conscience. The court may, therefore, depending on the circumstances of a case, feel safe in accepting the prosecution's version on the basis of the oral evidence of the complainant and the police officers, even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When, therefore, besides such evidence, there is circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding the prosecution's case. The present case appears to be a case of that nature. If the circumstantial evidence is of such a nature that it affords adequate corroboration to the prosecution's case, as held by the learned Special Judge, the appeal must succeed. If, on the other hand, the circumstantial evidence is considered to be inadequate to buttress the oral testimony, the appeal necessarily must fail.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. This position was reiterated in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1340, wherein it was observed at page 7: “14. Mr Rai then submits that the conviction of the appellant is not fit to be sustained only on the evidence of the contractor without any corroboration. He submits that the contractor is an accomplice and, therefore, before sustaining the appellant's conviction, it is essential that his evidence is corroborated by evidence of other witnesses. Reference has been made in this connection to a decision of this Court in Panalal Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra [(1979) 4 SCC 526: 1980 SCC (Cri) 121], and our attention has been drawn to para 9 thereof which reads as follows: (SCC pp. 528-29) 27 2026:HHC:24060 “9. It will be seen that the version of the complainant that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had brought the money and that the complainant told him that he had, and that the appellant asked him to pay the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the panch witness PW 3. According to the panch witness on the complainant asking the appellant whether his work would be achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative, and the appellant told the complainant what was to be given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3 does not mention about the appellant asking the complainant whether he had brought the money, the complainant, replying in the affirmative, asking the complainant to pay the money to the second accused. Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by the appellant would show that there is no corroboration of the testimony of the complainant regarding the demand for money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect, therefore, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied on.” 15. Yet another decision on which reliance is placed is the decision of this Court in Meena v. State of Maharashtra [(2000) 5 SCC 21: 2000 SCC (Cri) 878] in which it held as follows: (SCC p. 28, para 10) “10. … The corroboration is essential in a case like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence, and acceptance of a bribe is very much wanting in this case. Even the other panch witness, PW 5, categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of Police, PW 6, arrived, the appellant gave the same version that PW 1 tried to force into her hands the currency notes, which she turned down by pushing them away, and his evidence also does not lend credibility to the case of the prosecution. The contradictory version of PW 1 of the very incident when earlier examined in departmental proceedings renders his testimony in this case untrustworthy. PW 3, the 28 2026:HHC:24060 Head Copyist, seems to be the brain behind all this and PW 1, as well as Jagdish Bokade, appear to be working as a group in this affair, and despite the blunt denial by PW 3, his closeness to PW 1 and Jagdish Bokade stands well substantiated. All these relevant aspects of the case seem to have been completely overlooked by the courts below.” 17. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this Court in Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1969 SC 17: 1969 Cri LJ 262] in which it has been held as follows: (AIR p. 20, para 5) “5. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17 and other prosecution witnesses to whose evidence we shall presently refer, should be considered as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required to be corroborated in material particulars before being accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be considered as accomplices, as the same was extorted from them. Though PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be considered as interested witnesses as regards their evidence relating to the trap, as a matter of law, it is not correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [AIR 1958 SC 500: 1958 Cri LJ 976: 1959 SCR 195]. (emphasis supplied) 18. Further, corroboration of the evidence of a witness is required when his evidence is not wholly reliable. On appreciation of evidence, witnesses can be broadly categorised into three categories, viz. unreliable, partly reliable and wholly reliable. In the case of a partly reliable witness, the court seeks corroboration in material particulars from other evidence. However, in a case in which a witness is wholly reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Seeking corroboration in all circumstances of the evidence of a witness forced to give a bribe may lead to absurd results. A bribe is not taken in public view and, therefore, there may not be any person who could see the giving and taking of a bribe. As in the present case, a shadow witness did 29 2026:HHC:24060 accompany the contractor, but the appellant did not allow him to be present in the chamber. Acceptance of this submission in the abstract will encourage the bribe-taker to receive illegal gratification in privacy and then insist on corroboration in case of prosecution. The law cannot countenance such a situation.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Therefore, the informant’s testimony cannot be rejected because he was forced to pay the bribe. 19. It was submitted that the age of entry into the Army is 18 years, and the informant’s son was aged 17 years. Therefore, the informant would not have required the birth certificate of his son for entry into the Army. This submission cannot be accepted. A person does not usually wait for an event to happen to make the preparation, but makes the preparation beforehand. When the age of entry is 18, the informant would not have waited for his son to become 18 before getting the birth certificate, but would have collected all the documents so that his son was able to secure the entry at the earliest. Therefore, the fact that the informant’s son was aged 17 years will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. 20. Gurnam Chand (PW5) stated in his cross- examination that the birth certificate was issued to the informant by the Secretary on 26.09.2010 and 1.1.2010. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that there was no proof of the 30 2026:HHC:24060 delivery of the birth certificate. This witness has not stated that the certificates were handed over to the informant. The register, the contents of which are being sought to be proved by his testimony, was not produced before the Court. Therefore, the statement of this witness cannot be used to conclude that the birth certificate had already been issued to the informant. 21. Significantly, no question was asked of the informant about whether he had received the birth certificate on 1.1.2010 and 26.9.2010. The informant would have been the best person to state whether he had in fact received the birth certificate or not, and in the absence of his statement, the plea taken by the accused that birth certificates were issued to the informant and he had no justification to demand the birth certificate is not acceptable. 22. In C.B. Nagraj (supra), it was held that when no work is pending with the Government servant, the demand for a bribe was not believable. In the present case, there is no proof that no work was pending with the accused, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 23. Kihsori Lal (PW2) corroborated the informant’s version. He stated that he and the informant went to the house of 31 2026:HHC:24060 the accused on 4.10.2010 to obtain the birth certificate of the informant’s son. The accused demanded ₹3,000/- for issuing the birth certificate. The informant requested the accused to reduce the amount, and the accused demanded ₹2,000/ forthwith. The informant told the accused that he was unable to arrange the money and would arrange it during the daytime. The accused told the informant to meet him at Haroli, where he had a meeting. The informant made a complaint to the police, and the police formed a trap party and demonstrated the functioning of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate. The informant produced four currency notes of ₹500/- each. These were treated with powder and handed over to the informant. The informant was told to put the currency notes in the front pocket of his shirt and give them to the accused only on demand. The informant was also told to signal the Vigilance Official by moving his hand at the back of his head after handing over the currency notes to the accused. He and the informant went to the accused, who asked whether they had brought the money, and the informant replied in the affirmative. The accused asked them to move towards the tea shop near the bank. The accused demanded the money from the informant after the tea, and the informant handed over the 32 2026:HHC:24060 currency notes to the accused after taking them out of his pocket. The accused kept the currency notes in the left front pocket of his pants. The informant signalled the police by moving his hand behind his head. Vigilance Officials caught hold of the arms of the accused and took him outside the shop. One vigilance official was sent to bring BDO, but BDO was away in a meeting, and SEPO came to the spot. The hands of the accused were washed in a plate, and the colour of the hand wash turned pink. Police recovered four currency notes of ₹500/- from the accused. He stated in his cross-examination that the informant is his co- villager. The informant had not talked to him before the incident about obtaining a birth certificate. He had not visited the house of the accused before 04.10.2010. He denied that he had a strained relationship with the accused. He was not aware whether the informant had extra money with him. He was not aware that the informant had a dispute with Tarsem, etc., regarding a dung heap. He was not aware that the accused had visited the spot pursuant to the order of the SDM. His signatures were obtained on 4-5 papers at Jhalera. He denied that he was deposing falsely. 24. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness to show that he was making a false statement. It was 33 2026:HHC:24060 suggested to him that he had a dispute with the accused regarding the entry of the date of birth of his children. However, he denied this fact. No material was brought on record to show any enmity between the accused and this witness. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon his testimony. 25. The accused examined Chanchla Devi (DW1) and Pawan Beetan (DW2), who deposed that the informant and Jagdev Chand (PW1) had a dispute. Pawan Beetan (DW2) stated that he and Panchayat Secretary, Balram (accused), went to the disputed spot. The accused prepared the map (Ex. D7). The informant asked the accused to get the dung heap removed, but the accused replied that it was not within his competence. The informant said that it would cost the accused dearly. The informant had visited the Panchayat on 26.9.2010 and demanded a birth certificate. The accused handed over the birth certificate. He stated in his cross-examination that the map was prepared by the accused as per the spot position. He admitted that a report was called by the SDM from the Panchayat. He had not reported the threats advanced by the informant to the accused. He denied that he was to give a false statement. 34 2026:HHC:24060 26. The statement of this witness does not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The copy of the letter written by SDM (Urban) to Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Pawan (DW2) Beetan, shows that the informant had made a complaint regarding the removal of the heap of cow dung. The Gram Panchayat submitted a report that efforts were made to reconcile the matter. The Secretary had prepared the spot position. Tarsem Lal was ready to remove the heap of cow dung, but he apprehended that the area would be encroached by the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the police be sent to implement the order passed by the Court. 27. These documents do not support the defence version that the accused had submitted an unfavourable report to the learned SDM. The report of the Gram Panchayat specifically recommends the removal of the heap of cow dung. The informant had made a complaint to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, and he would have been aware of the fact that the accused was not competent to act upon it. Therefore, the plea taken by the defence that the informant had a grudge with the accused because the accused had not removed the heap of cow dung cannot be accepted. 35 2026:HHC:24060 28. The accused had prepared the spot map (Ex. D7) in which the position of cow dung was depicted. It was admitted by Pawan Beeten (DW2) in his cross-examination that the map was prepared as per the spot position. Therefore, the informant could not have any grudge regarding the preparation of the map and the defence version that the informant had a grudge with the accused because of the dispute related to the cow dung was rightly rejected by the learned Courts below. 29. The informant and the shadow witness specifically stated that the accused had demanded the bribe, and the informant had paid the bribe afterwards. This is duly proved by the recovery of the currency notes from the possession of the accused. 30. Jagdish Ram, Excise and Taxation Inspector, stated that he had accompanied the Vigilance Party to Haroli. The accused was participating in a meeting. Jagdev and Kishori Lal went to the accused. All of them went to a tea shop near the hospital. The trap party waited for the tea shop in a scattered position. The informant signalled the reading party, and two vigilance officials caught the accused from his wrists. The accused was brought out of the shop and made to sit on a bench. 36 2026:HHC:24060 Constable was sent to bring the BDO. A person came who identified himself as Jageer Singh and stated that he was holding the charge of BDO at that time. The hands of the accused were washed with a solution of water and sodium carbonate in a steel plate, and the water changed its colour to pink. The police seized the hand wash. The accused took out four currency notes of ₹500/- from the left pocket of his pants. The police tallied the serial numbers, and they were found to be the same as those recorded in the seizure memo. He admitted in his cross- examination that the letter was addressed to ETC, and the post of ETC was not available at Una. He admitted that he was not deputed in writing. He had gone to Jhalera in the van of the Vigilance Department. He admitted that his visit to Haroli was not recorded anywhere because he had not claimed any TA/DA from the Government. He denied that he was not a part of the raiding party. 31. Nothing was suggested to this witness as to why he would be deposing falsely against the accused. He belongs to the Excise and Taxation Department, which is an entirely different department, and has to be treated as an independent person. 37 2026:HHC:24060 32. Jagir Singh (PW8) stated that he was present in his office at Haroli on 4.10.2010. A vigilance official came to him at about 4.00 p.m. and told him that Dy.SP (Vigilance) had called him. He went to the spot and found Dy.SP with staff members. The Vigilance officials showed four currency notes of ₹500/- and revealed that these were recovered from the accused. The serial numbers tallied with the serial numbers noted on the seizure memo. He stated in his cross-examination that he was known to the accused because of the official dealings. He admitted that he had put the signatures at the instance of the police. 33. The statement of this witness is duly corroborated by the statement of Constable Jitender Kumar (PW9), who stated that he and Kuldeep were directed by Dy.SP to remain close to the informant and apprehend the accused after getting a signal from the informant. The informant signalled the trap party. The members of the trap party ran towards the accused and apprehended him. He caught hold of his right arm, and Baldev caught hold of the left arm of the accused. The hands of the accused were washed, and the hand wash turned pink. The hand wash was preserved in a bottle/nip. The accused took out four currency notes of ₹500/- and handed them over to the Vigilance 38 2026:HHC:24060 Police. He stated in his cross-examination that proceedings continued in the Vigilance Police Station for 2-3 hours. He admitted that the informant had not narrated the contents of the complaint to Dy.SP in his presence. Driver Virender had gone to call the BDO at about 3.35 p.m. He denied that the prosecution's case was false and that he was deposing falsely against the accused. 34. He is a public official and has no reason to depose in favour of the informant or against the accused. He has categorically stated that the hand wash turned pink, and the accused had produced the currency notes, the serial numbers of which tallied with the serial number recorded on the memo. 35. Vijay Kumar Saklani (PW11) also supported the prosecution's case. He deposed almost on similar lines as the other witnesses. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not recorded the statement of the informant when the incident was narrated to him. He admitted that the letter (Ex.PW3/A) was addressed to ETC and not to AETC. He had not taken the pants of the accused into his possession. He admitted that he had not sent the currency notes for examination to RFSL Dharamshala to 39 2026:HHC:24060 determine whether these were treated with phenolphthalein or not. He denied that a false case was brought against the accused. 36. It was submitted that the investigation in the present case is not fair. The Investigating Officer had not seized the pants of the accused. This submission is only stated to be rejected. There is no evidence that the accused was having any other pants with him to enable the police to seize the pants being worn by the accused. 37. It was submitted that the currency notes were not sent to RFSL Dharamshala for determining whether they were treated with phenolphthalein powder or not. This submission will not help the accused. The police had given a demonstration of the procedure adopted under the PC Act and preserved the resultant combination of the mixtures. The police had also preserved the hand wash. Both of them were sent to the FSL, and traces of sodium carbonate and phenolphthalein were found in the nips. Since phenolphthalein powder was left in the Police Station, the only way for the accused to get the phenolphthalein powder on his hands was by touching the money being carried by him in his pocket. Therefore, there was no requirement to send the currency notes to the RFSL for analysis. 40 2026:HHC:24060 38. The accused has not provided any explanation for his hand wash turning pink. He stated in reply to Question No.23 that his hands were washed in a plate, but the colour of the hand wash had not changed, and the hand wash was thrown away. This is contrary to the statements of the witnesses. This version was also not suggested to any of the prosecution witnesses, and the learned Courts below had rightly discarded this version. 39. The statements of the prosecution witnesses duly proved that the accused had demanded the bribe of ₹2,500/- for issuing the birth certificate of the informant’s son, and he had received the bribe from the accused; therefore, all the ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act were duly satisfied. The judgment in Harswaroop (supra) and P. Satyanarayna Murti (supra), holding that mere acceptance of the money is not sufficient, does not apply to the present case. 40. Jagdeish Chand, Senior Assistant, stated that Deputy Commissioner K.R. Bharti had read the case file and accorded the prosecution sanction to the accused Bal Ram. He identified the signatures of K.R. Bharti. It was submitted that K.R. Bharti was not examined, and there is no proof of the application of the 41 2026:HHC:24060 mind. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Jiyalal, (2009) 15 SCC 72: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 272: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1414, that there is no requirement under the PC Act to examine the authority granting the sanction. It was observed at page 75: “8. It was also not justified for the learned Single Judge to hold that the District Magistrate who had passed the sanc- tion order should have been subsequently examined as a witness by the prosecution in order to prove the same. The sanction order was clearly passed in discharge of routine official functions, and hence, there is a presumption that the same was done in a bona fide manner. It was, of course, open to the respondent to question the genuine- ness or validity of the sanction order before the Special Judge, but there was no requirement for the District Mag- istrate to be examined as a witness by the prosecution.” 41. In the present case, the recital in the sanction letter (Ex.PW6/C) mentions that the accused was caught red-handed with bribe money of ₹2,000/- and an expert opinion was obtained from RFSL, Dharamshala. These acts were unbecoming of a public official; therefore, the sanction order was passed. 42. These recitals show that the sanctioning authority had gone through the case file, and that is why the facts have been reproduced. The official acts are presumed to have been done normally; it is to be presumed that the sanction was validly 42 2026:HHC:24060 granted, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. 43. The accused has not stated anything about the sanction, and the conclusion drawn by the learned Trial Court that the sanction was proper cannot be faulted. 44. Thus, the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 and 13(2) each. The corruption is damaging the fabric of society, and the detention of one year was fully justified. 45. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court do not require any interference from this Court. 46. No other point was urged. 47. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 43 2026:HHC:24060 48. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (Chander)