1 2026:CGHC:19460 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 313 of 2023 1 - Krishna Kumar Jaiswal S/o Late Kunjram Jaiswal Aged About 62 Years R/o Near Madwarani Temple, Village Madwarani, Tehsil Kartala, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Narayan Prasad S/o Lt. I.P. Jaiswal Aged About 45 Years R/o Near Madwarani Temple, Village Madwarani, Tehsil Kartala, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Pramod Jaiswal S/o K.K. Jaiswal Aged About 35 Years R/o Near Madwarani Temple, Village Madwarani, Tehsil Kartala, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Pawan Jaiswal S/o K.K. Jaiswal Aged About 34 Years R/o Near Madwarani Temple, Village Madwarani, Tehsil Kartala, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus 1 - National Highway Authority Of India Through Chairperson, G 5 And 6, Dabri, Gurgaon Rd. Sector 10, Dwarka, Dwarka, Delhi. 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Land Acquisition, Mahanadi Bhavan, Naya Raipur, Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Collector Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Sub Divisional Officer (Land Acquisition Officer) Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 5 - Superintendent Of Police Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 6 - S.H.O. Police Station Urga, Kotwali, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.04.28 10:23:36 +0530 2 For Petitioners : Mr. Awadh Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate For State/Respondents No.2 to 6 : Mr. Abhishek Gupta, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 27.04.2026 1 By filing the present petition, the petitioners have challenged the arbitrary and illegal action of the respondents in demolishing, without following any process of land acquisition or due procedure of law, his duly constructed residential house and boundary wall situated in Khasra No. 429/2, Rakba 0.51 acre, and in simultaneously proceeding with widening of the road as a National Highway. The petitioners have prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to the case of petitioner. 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the writ petition and direct the respondent till proper notification according to the rule for land acquisition relating to land bearing kharsa no. 101/4, 102, 104/2 and 429/2 stop the work for widening of the road (Korba to Champa Main road). 10.3 That, the respondent may kindly be directed first to calculate the compensation amount to the petitioner on the commercial rate 3 dully accessing the compensation for acquiring the land of the petitioner and suitably punish the respondent for their illegal act of demolition of the constructed house of the petitioner and also provide the damages for demolition of duly constructed house of the petitioner. 10.4 Any other relief, which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be allowed.” 2 Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioner No. 2 is the recorded owner of Khasra No. 429/2, which was purchased in the year 2003 through a registered sale deed dated 14.11.2003 (Annexure P/1), and in the said land a duly constructed residential house and boundary wall existed, wherein all basic amenities for livelihood were available. The relevant revenue records have also been placed on record as Annexure P/2. 3 It is further submitted that Khasra Nos. 101/4, 102 and 104/2 belong to petitioner Nos. 3 and 4, and as early as in the year 2018, the concerned Patwari of the revenue circle had informed the land acquisition authority regarding the proposed acquisition for widening of the road forming part of National Highway (Korba– Champa), however, no formal acquisition proceedings were ever initiated in respect of the said lands, as reflected from the Patwari report dated 26.09.2018 (Annexure P/3) and subsequent spot inspection/panchnama dated 26.11.2020 (Annexure P/4). 4 4 It is further contended that despite repeated representation dated 09.10.2020 (Annexure P/5) requesting initiation of land acquisition proceedings, the respondents failed to take any action in accordance with law. Instead, the respondents, without any notice or authority of law, forcibly entered upon the petitioners’ land in the intervening night of 20/21.12.2022 at about 2:30–3:00 A.M. and demolished the petitioner’s residential house and boundary wall with the help of Poclain machines. 5 Learned counsel further submits that the said illegal demolition was carried out in a completely arbitrary and high-handed manner, without any acquisition proceedings, and even thereafter when the petitioner approached the authorities, the respondents admitted the action to be a “mistake” and are allegedly pressurizing the petitioner to execute a sale deed in favour of the respondents, which is wholly illegal and violative of the petitioners’ constitutional and property rights. 6 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable in view of the fact that the dispute raised by the petitioners pertains essentially to determination and/or re- determination of compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short, ‘Act of 1956’), for which an efficacious statutory remedy has already been provided under Section 3-G(5) of the 5 Act of 1956. It is further submitted that once the competent authority has determined the compensation and an award has been passed under Section 3-G, remedy of an aggrieved party, if any, is to seek reference for re-determination before the arbitrator in accordance with Section 3-G(5) read with Section 3-G(6) of Act of 1956, and the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked for adjudication of disputed questions relating to quantum of compensation. 7 In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Project Director, National Highways No. 45E and 220 National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem and Another, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 473, wherein it has been held that disputes relating to compensation under the National Highways Act are to be resolved strictly through the mechanism of arbitration as provided under the statute. It is further submitted that the statutory scheme under the Act is a complete code in itself, and once the acquisition proceedings have attained finality by issuance of notification and award, the only surviving issue, if any, relates to compensation, which cannot be reopened in writ proceedings. The petitioners, therefore, have an alternative and efficacious remedy under Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956, which they are at liberty to avail. 8 Accordingly, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that no interference is called for in the present writ petition and the same 6 deserves to be dismissed, however, with liberty to the petitioners to approach the competent authority under Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956, if so advised. 9 Learned State counsel concurs with the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and submits that the statutory scheme under the Act of 1956 provides an adequate and efficacious remedy for redetermination of compensation under Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956. It is further submitted that in view of the availability of such statutory remedy and the settled legal position that disputes relating to quantum of compensation are not amenable to writ jurisdiction, no interference is warranted in the present writ petition. Accordingly, learned State counsel also submits that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to avail the remedy as provided under law. 10 I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents, and other material available on record. 11 In order to appreciate the issue on hand it would be apposite to first extract the provisions of Section 3-G(5) and 3-G(6) of the National Highways Act and Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. “Section 3-G(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) 7 or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. Section 3-G(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub- section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- (a) the party making the application 1 [establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that)- (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication. thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or 8 (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that- (1) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India [Explanation 1. For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if- (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81: or 9 (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or Justice. Explanation 2.-For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. [(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.) (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. 10 (4) On receipt of an application under sub- section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. ((5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only alter issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.)” 12 A reading of Section 3-G(6) of the National Highways Act clearly provides that, in respect of every arbitration under the Highways Act, the provisions of the Arbitration Act would apply. The language of Section 3-G is unambiguous. Therefore, it is clear that against the award passed under Section 3-G(5) it is only an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to set aside the same can be filed. 11 13 The provisions of Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956, vis-a-vis Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was called into question in a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in National Highways Authority of India v Sayedabad Tea Company Limited, (2020) 15 SCC 161 . The question that arose for consideration was whether the application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 was maintainable in view of Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act which provides for appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal. In the said case, the land owner being dissatisfied with the award of compensation determined by the competent authority under Section 3-G(1) of the Act of 1956, had filed an application for appointment of an Arbitrator in terms of Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956 to the Central Government. Since there was no response from the Central Government, the applicant had filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Thereafter, an Arbitrator was appointed. The High Court had observed that since the Central Government had refused to comply with the request of the applicant, their right to appoint an Arbitrator stood forfeited. A review application was thereafter filed bringing to the notice of the Court that as per the Highways Act the procedure for appointment of an Arbitrator exclusively vested with the Central Government under Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956 and that the application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not maintainable. 12 14 The Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon the earlier judgment in National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Pradhan, (2020) 15 SCC 533 had observed as follows:- “18. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed that the legislature intended the 1956 Act to act as a complete code in itself for the purpose of acquisition until culmination including disbursement and for settlement of disputes and this conclusion is further strengthened in view of Section 3-J of the Act which eliminates the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to an acquisition under the 1956 Act. 19. It is settled principles of law that when the special law sets out a self-contained code, the application of general law would impliedly be excluded. In the instant case, the scheme of the 1956 Act being a special law enacted for the purpose and for appointment of an arbitrator by the Central Government under Section 3-G(5) of the 1956 Act and sub-section (6) of Section 3-G itself clarifies that subject to the provisions of the 1956 Act, the provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply to every arbitration obviously to the extent where the 1956 Act is silent, the arbitrator may take recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisions of the 1996 Act for the limited purpose. But so far as the appointment of an arbitrator is concerned. the power being exclusively vested 13 with the Central Government as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act. Section 11 of the 1996 Act has no application." 15 In National Highways Authority of India v. Sheetal Jaidev Vade, (2022) 16 SCC 391, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a issue as to whether the High Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was competent to execute an award passed by the Arbitrator. The learned Judges had held as follows in paragraph Nos. 11 and 12:- ‘11. Therefore, once the original writ petitioner was having an efficacious, alternative remedy to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, by initiating an appropriate execution proceeding before the competent executing court, the High Court ought to have relegated the original writ petitioners to avail the said remedy instead of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was filed to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court. If the High Courts convert itself to the executing court and entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the High Courts would be flooded with the writ petitions to execute awards passed by the learned arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitral Court. 14 12. We disapprove the entertaining of such writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, without relegating the judgment creditor in whose favour the award is passed to file an execution proceeding before the competent executing Court." 16 Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the settled legal position, it is evident that the grievance raised by the petitioners primarily relates to non-grant of compensation in respect of their residential house and godown, which are stated to have been affected during the execution of road widening work undertaken by the respondents. The petitioners contend that despite alleged demolition and deprivation of their constructed structures situated over the subject land, no compensation has been paid to them in accordance with law. 17 However, it is equally clear that the Act of 1956 provides a complete and efficacious statutory mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating to compensation under Section 3-G thereof. In particular, Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956 provides a specific remedy to any aggrieved person to seek re-determination of the amount determined by the competent authority, and the matter is to be adjudicated in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1956. The said statutory framework constitutes a 15 self-contained code governing not only determination of compensation but also resolution of disputes arising therefrom. 18 In view of the aforesaid statutory scheme, and considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the grievance of the petitioners with regard to non- grant of compensation for their house and godown essentially involves disputed questions falling within the domain of the statutory authority under Section 3-G(5) of Act of 1956. Therefore, it would be appropriate and in the interest of justice that the petitioners avail the remedy provided under the statute instead of invoking writ jurisdiction at this stage. 19 Accordingly, while disposing of the present writ petition, it is observed that the petitioners shall be at liberty to file an appropriate application under Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 before the competent authority concerned for redetermination of compensation in respect of their house and godown. Such application, if filed, shall be preferred by the petitioners within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 20 It is further directed that upon receipt of such application, the competent authority shall consider and decide the same strictly in accordance with law, as prescribed under the National Highways Act, 1956, expeditiously and preferably within a reasonable time frame. 16 21 With the aforesaid observations and directions, the instant writ petition stands disposed of. 22 There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh