2026:HHC:24382 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No.561 of 2012 Reserved on: 29.04.2026 Date of Decision: 23.06.2026 State of H.P. .... Appellant Versus Man Singh & others .... Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Appellant/ State. : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.08.2012, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. II, Dehra, District Kangra, (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, 1972 and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties 2 2026:HHC:24382 shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 42 read with Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act and Section 120-B of IPC. It was asserted that ASI Ramanand (PW-11), HC Anjan Pal (PW-9), HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-2), HHC Amarjit Singh and HHG Sunil Kumar were on patrolling duty on 02.04.2007. A truck bearing registration No. HP-37-3559 came from Dolla Kharyana. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) signalled the driver to stop the truck. The driver identified himself as Deshraj (accused No.2). The person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Man Singh (accused No.1). ASI Ramanand (PW-11) checked the truck and found fuel wood and timber loaded in it. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) called Subhash Chand (PW-1). He checked the truck in the presence of Subhash Chand (PW-1), Partap Singh and Mohinder Singh (PW-2). He found 67 scants of timber and 130 pieces of fuel wood. The driver of the truck could not produce any permit for transporting the timber. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) seized the fuel 3 2026:HHC:24382 wood, timber and the vehicle vide memo (Ext.PW-2/A). He prepared the rukka (Ext.PW-11/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW11/B) was registered. ASI Ramanand investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-11/D). The accused pointed out the place from where the timber was loaded in the vehicle. Memo (Ext.PW-4/A) and site plan (Ext.PW11/H) were prepared. The accused No. 3, Ran Singh, was arrested. He pointed out the place from where the trees were cut. Memo (Ext.PW-11/J) and Site Plan (Ext.PW-11/K) were prepared. Ran Singh (accused No.3) produced the documents of private sale and permission to install a kiln, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW11/L). An application (Ext.PW8/A) was filed for conducting the demarcation. Report (Ext.PW8/B) and documents (Ext.PW-8/C to Ext.PW8/G) were obtained from Sushil Kumar (PW-8). ASI Ramanand (PW-11) filed an application (Ext.PW-11/L) for assessing the cost of the wood. Report (Ext.PW-11/O) was prepared. The timber was sold by the Forest department, and the documents (Ext.PW11/AC to Ext.PW11/AE) were obtained. The statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of 4 2026:HHC:24382 the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to frame charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, read with Sections 34 and 120-B of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Subhash Chand (PW-1), Daroga Ram (PW-3), Arjun Kumar (PW-5), Narayan Dass (PW-6) and Ranjit (PW-7) did not support the prosecution's case. HHC Mohinder Singh (PW- 2) was a member of the patrolling party. HHC Sunil Dutt (PW- 4) is the witness to the disclosure. Sushil Kumar (PW-8) demarcated the land. Anjan Paul (PW-9) was present during the demarcation. Amarjit (PW-10) issued the damage report. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 5 2026:HHC:24382 6. Learned Trial Court held that Arjun Kumar, Narayan Dass and Ranjit had not supported the prosecution's case. There was no evidence that Ran Singh had purchased the case property from the father of Arjun Kumar and Narayan Dass. Further, there was no evidence to connect the wood recovered by the police to the wood sold by the father of Arjun Kumar and Narayan Dass. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The entry in the daily diary regarding the departure of the police party to the spot was not produced. Offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act are non-cognizable. Therefore, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the prosecution witnesses proved the prosecution's version. There was nothing on record to show that witnesses had any enmity with the accused. HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-2) and ASI Ramanand proved that the police had recovered fuel wood and timber from the vehicle. Their statements were consistent, and no reason was assigned to 6 2026:HHC:24382 discard their testimonies. It was wrongly held that the offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Forest Act are non- cognizable; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for appellant/State and Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-2) and ASI Ramanand (PW-11) proved that the accused was transporting the fuel wood and timber in the vehicle. They failed to produce any permit for the transportation, and the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act were duly satisfied. The prosecution's case cannot be doubted because independent witnesses have not supported it. 7 2026:HHC:24382 Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, and the Learned Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material 8 2026:HHC:24382 evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 9 2026:HHC:24382 14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 10 2026:HHC:24382 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Learned trial Court held that the offences punishable under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act are non- cognizable. This finding cannot be sustained. Hon’ble Division bench of this Court held in State of H.P. v Prem Chand (deceased) and Anr. Reference in Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 2014 decided on 05.01.2026 that the offence punishable under Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act read with Rule 11 and 20 of H.P. Transit Rules, is bailable, but cognizable. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court could not have taken cognisance and tried the accused cannot be sustained. 17. HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-2) admitted in his cross- examination that the timber produced in the Court did not have the F.I.R number or the seizure hammer. Thus, the timber produced before the Court is not connected to the timber recovered from the spot, and it is doubtful that the case property recovered on the spot was produced before the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2019) 4 SCC 182: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 39: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 11 2026:HHC:24382 359 that when the seized wood and the vehicle were not produced, and only one sample was produced, the accused cannot be convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 379 of the IPC and Section 42 of the Forest Act. It was observed at page 183: - “4. We have heard the learned counsel for the respondent in opposition to the appeal and considered the nature of the evidence available. Non-production of the seized wood and the vehicle, the primary evidence of the offence, renders the prosecution's case fragile and unsustainable. Mere production of the seizure memo does not tantamount to the production of the seized woods and the lorry. Unless the seized wood was produced, mere production of a sample, and there is no material in support that the sample was out of the same 22 logs, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellants.” 18. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the prosecution's case would become doubtful because of the non-production of the case property before the Court. 19. HHC Mohinder Singh (PW-2) stated that the vehicle was intercepted at 1:00 p.m. Partap Singh and Subhash Chand were called after half an hour. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) investigated the matter and mentioned the details of the timber, their measurement and weight in Rukka (Ext.PW-11/A), 12 2026:HHC:24382 which was prepared by him at 1:30 p.m. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that it was impossible to measure the timber, weigh the fuel wood, prepare the memo, wait for the independent witnesses and complete the Rukka within thirty minutes. This corroborates the statement of Subhash Chand (PW-1) that the police had obtained his signature on the memo by visiting his shop. This would cast a doubt regarding the prosecution's case. 20. ASI Ramanand (PW-11) arrested the accused Desh Raj and Man Singh on 02.04.2007 at Dhaar at 5:15 p.m. He had sent the Rukka at 1:30 p.m. No explanation has been provided as to why he waited till 5:15 p.m. to arrest the accused. This would also cast a suspicion on the prosecution's case. 21. The independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution's case, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case in these circumstances. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned trial Court, even if another view is possible. 13 2026:HHC:24382 22 In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 23. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 24. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (ravinder)