2026:JHHC:6341 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 661 of 2021 ----- Raghubansh Kumar Singh, aged 64 years, son of Late Mathura Prasad Singh, resident of F/4, Elite Tower, PNB Colony, Adarsh Nagar, PO & PS: Sonari, Town- Jamshedpur, District- East Singhbhum ....Petitioner(s). Versus 1. Food Corporation of India, a Statutory Body under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution of Government of India formed by the enactment of Food Corporation Act, 1964; Headquarters at 16-20, Barakhambha Lane, PO & PS: Barakhambha, District- New Delhi -110001 2. Chairman, Food Corporation of India, Headquarters at 16-20, Barakhambha Lane, PO & PS: Barakhambha, District- New Delhi-110001 3. Managing Director, Chairman, Food Corporation of India, Headquarters at 16-20, Barakhambha Lane, PO & PS: Barakhambha, District- New Delhi -110001 4. Executive Director, Food Corporation of India, New Collectorate Building, Block-A, 4th Floor, Kutchery Road, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District-Ranchi 5. General Manager, Food Corporation of India, New Collectorate Building, Block-A, 4th Floor, Kutchery Road, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District- Ranchi 6. Divisional Manager, Food Corporation of India, New Collectorate Building, Block-A, 4th Floor, Kutchery Road, PO: GPO, PS: Kotwali, District- Ranchi …Respondent(s). ------ CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ------ For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ashim Kumar Sahani, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate : Mr. Shubham Sinha Advocate ------ 21/09.03.2026: Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In the instant application the petitioner prays for grant of an appropriate writ in the nature of Certiorari or an order or direction for quashing- i. The Order dated 27/12/2019 whereby the review petition filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the respondent no. 2 in exercise of his powers conferred under Regulation 74 of FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (Annexure-7); ii. The Order as contained in Memo No. 1362 dated 8/9/2017 whereby the respondent no. 3 rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Regulation 72 of FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (Annexure- 4); iii. The Order as contained in Memo No. 674 dated 31/12/2014 passed by the respondent no. 4 as disciplinary authority whereby the petitioner has been imposed penalty of reduction to the initial pay in the time scale of pay to the post of AG-II (D) {Assistant Grade-II (Depot)} with cumulative effect under Regulation 56 of FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (Annexure- 3); Page No. 1 2026:JHHC:6341 iv. For an appropriate writ or order or direction commanding upon the respondents to reinstate the scale of pay of the petitioner with all consequential benefits and to pay the difference of amount as service benefit as well as retiral benefits; 3. The fact of the case in short is that the petitioner joined the Food Corporation of India on 18.04.1978. He was promoted time to time and lastly he was promoted to the post of AG-II (D). While working as Shed Assistant in Shed No. III at Dhanbad, he was served with a memorandum dated 28.09.2013 of causing shortage in RBC (Rice Boiled Common) and excess bag in RBGA and 295 empty bags of SBT, allegedly resulting in loss to FCI, Departmental Proceeding was initiated. On conclusion of the proceeding, a penalty was imposed on him along with several other employees by common order dated 31.12.2014. Departmental appeal and thereafter review petition, filed by the petitioner were dismissed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed this writ petition before this Hon’ble Court. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Shed in-charge was responsible for maintaining all records and stock. Petitioner had no direct role in stock maintenance, and the inspection conducted was faulty, as 100% weighing of the stock matched the declared quantity. He further submits that the allegations are vague and unsustainable. He also submits that the departmental appeal and review petition were dismissed without proper consideration of the petitioner’s reply. The appellate and review authorities failed to consider that the petitioner was posted at SWC, Bokaro during the relevant period, and he was not the in-charge of Shed No. III at that time. The petitioner contends that penalty order, appellate order, and review order are unlawful and unfair, leaving him no alternative but to approach the Hon’ble Court for relief. 5. Learned counsel for respondents submits that the petitioner's claims in the writ petition are misconceived and incorrect as the punishment order was legal and based on finding of proper enquiry. He further submits that during a physical verification of rice stocks, a shortage of food grains and excess empty bags was found in Shed No. III, causing a financial loss to FCI. He also submits that the Inquiry Officer found that the losses had occurred and all concerned employees were responsible according to their roles. Even if the petitioner did not directly commit the act, he had a duty to report and prevent any loss or Page No. 2 2026:JHHC:6341 misappropriation. He further submits that the inquiry was conducted properly and the punishment was reasonable and proportionate. There is no procedural lapses and the quantum of punishment commensurate with the proved misconduct. 6. After hearing both the parties and upon perusal of the records, I find that the petitioner was served with a departmental charge-sheet relating to shortage of food grains and excess empty bags detected during the physical verification of stock in Shed No. III at Dhanbad. He was given adequate opportunity to participate in the departmental enquiry to defend himself. The Enquiry Officer, after considering the documents and materials placed on record, came to the conclusion that shortage of rice stock and excess empty bags were found during the inspection, resulting in financial loss to the Food Corporation of India. The enquiry report was submitted and based on that a punishment order of reduction to the initial pay in the time scale of pay to the post of AG-II(D) was imposed. The petitioner never complained of any procedural illegality or irregularity. 7. It is well settled that the High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908, in paragraphs 21, 23 and 24 has held as under- 21. Having considered the matter, the Court finds that the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained. On a prefatory note, we would begin by quoting what the Division Bench has noted on page No. 7: ‘It is well settled preposition (sic) of law that courts will not act as an Appellate Court and re-assess the evidence led in domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of evidence or reliable nature of the evidence will be no ground for interfering with the finding in departmental enquiry. However, when the finding of fact recorded in departmental enquiry is based on no evidence or where it is clearly perverse then it will invite the intervention of the court.’ …........................... 23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3- Judge Bench stated: Page No. 3 2026:JHHC:6341 ‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ 24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557: ‘21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that Page No. 4 2026:JHHC:6341 behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corpn. v. Ajit Kumar Singh reported in (2023) 19 SCC 102, in paragraph 11 has held as under- 11. The views expressed by this Court on the scope of judicial review in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457] , are extracted below : (Ajai Kumar Srivastava case [SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457] , SCC pp. 626-27, paras 24 & 28) “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25.-27. *** 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial Page No. 5 2026:JHHC:6341 review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” (emphasis supplied) Similar view was expressed in the later judgment of this Court in Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India [Mukesh Kumar Raigar v. Union of India, (2023) 11 SCC 159] . 8. Admittedly opportunity was given to the petitoner to participate in the enquiry proceeding. The principle of natural justice was complied with, without any laches. All the procedures were followed. There is no allegaiton of procedural illegality or irregularity. The findings are not also perverse. So far as quantum of punishment is concenred, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372, at para-19, has held as hereunder:- “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the codelinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that Page No. 6 2026:JHHC:6341 the employee concerned and the codelinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge- sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” According to me the quantum of punishment is not harsh, rather commensurates with the proved misconduct. 9. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above and the facts of the case and the law laid down, I find that the punishment given to the petitioner, i.e, reduction to the initial pay in the time scale of pay to the post of AG-II (D) commensurate with the proved charge. There is no ground made in this petition, out to interfere with the impugned order of punishment, which is under challenge. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 11. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of. (ANANDA SEN, J.) March 09, 2026 Anu/- Cp2. Uploaded: 16.3.2025 Page No. 7