2026:HHC:24126 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 694 of 2026 Decided on: 23.06.2026 Hira Lal …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Anirudh Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral) The petitioner has filed the present petition for regular bail in FIR No. 86 of 2023, dated 29.07.2023, registered at Police Station Dharampur, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested on 29.07.2023. He was sent to judicial custody after the 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:24126 completion of the investigation. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition before this Court, which was dismissed on 04.11.2025. The petitioner has been in judicial custody since 29.07.2023. The prosecution has only examined two witnesses out of 18 cited in the main challan and 10 witnesses cited in the supplementary challan. The trial is not likely to conclude soon. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had received a call on 29.07.2023 that one person was lying near the Yug Homestay. The police went to the spot and found one person lying dead, whose name was found to be Kashmir s/o Ishar. He had suffered multiple injuries, and his clothes were blood-stained. Informant, Yugal Thakur, made a statement to the police that he is running Yug Homestay. He had stayed in the Homestay on 28.07.2023. He heard some noise at about 01:00-01:30 am. He came out and saw that Hira Lal (petitioner) and Puran Chand were beating Kashmir with sticks. Kashmir stated that his arm was fractured. He rescued Kashmir from Hira Lal (petitioner) and the co-accused. Puran 3 2026:HHC:24126 Chand revealed that Kashmir was teasing his mother and wife. They dragged Kashmir towards Subathu. He found in the morning that someone was lying unconscious at 300 meters from the Homestay. He went to the spot and identified the person as Kashmir. Virender informed the police. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner and the co-accused produced the sticks with which the beatings were given to Kashmir. The samples were collected and sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga. As per the result of analysis, human blood stains were found on the stones/concrete picked up from the spot, Nail clippings, Shirt, Pyjama, T-shirt and lower of Kashmir Chand. The result of the DNA analysis is awaited. The charge-sheet was filed before the Court on 16.08.2024. The prosecution has cited 16 witnesses, out of whom two have been examined and the matter was listed on 30.05.2026 for recording the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses. No other FIR has been lodged against the petitioner. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous crime. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2026:HHC:24126 4. I have heard Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner was arrested on 29.07.2023, and the prosecution has not completed the evidence. The trial is not likely to conclude soon, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by the Court after holding that the petitioner had stalled the framing of charges till 02.07.2025, and he cannot take advantage of his own wrong. The prosecution should be granted some time to complete the evidence, and less than one year is insufficient to conclude the evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:24126 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2045 of 2025 and was dismissed on 04.11.2025. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that a subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is 6 2026:HHC:24126 necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to 7 2026:HHC:24126 bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at 8 2026:HHC:24126 the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. The Court had earlier held that there was sufficient material to prima facie connect the petitioner with the commission of the crime. The offence alleged against the petitioner was heinous, and the petitioner was not entitled to bail because of the gravity of the offence and the severity of the punishment. These considerations have not changed. 14. It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a 9 2026:HHC:24126 speedy trial. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court had found, while deciding the earlier bail petition, that the petitioner had stalled the framing of charges till 02.07.2025. This finding has attained finality. Hence, the petitioner was responsible for the delay, and he cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 15. The status report shows that the statements of two witnesses, out of 16 witnesses, cited by the prosecution have been recorded. The copies of the order sheets were placed on record, which show that the witnesses are summoned for 29.07.2026. There is a force in the submissions made on behalf of the State that some reasonable time should be granted to the State to conclude the evidence. Less than one year has elapsed since the framing of the charges, and the prosecution cannot be expected to complete the evidence within the period of one year. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141: 10 2026:HHC:24126 “24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688” 16. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail because of the delay. 17. No other point was urged. 18. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 19. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (Nikita)