IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 459 of 2026 Reserved on: 15.05.2026 Date of Decision: 23.06.2026 Jyoti Devi ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr H.S. Rana, Advocate. For the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 27 of 2025, dated 23.09.2025, registered at Police Station New Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and consequential proceedings arising out of it. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant had gone to the police Station on 18.09.2025 to report the matter to the police. He waited for 1-1½ hours, but no one attended to him. He made an enquiry from the MC, who replied that there was no Investigating Officer in the Police Station. The Station House Officer called the informant to her room and gave him beatings. He sustained multiple injuries. The informant went to the hospital and was told that his ear was damaged due to the beatings. The matter was reported to the police, and the police registered the F.I.R. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The informant made vague allegations that the petitioner and other police officials had assaulted him; however, no specific act, role, weapon or manner of assault was described. The informant was restrained and escorted outside the Police Station for creating a disturbance inside the Police Station. The statements 3 of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry revealed that the informant had visited the Police Station in an agitated state, and he was behaving aggressively. The police officials had only asked the informant to maintain discipline and not to create any disturbance in the Police Station. A preliminary enquiry was conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police (Headquarters), who found that the informant was creating disturbance inside the Police Station, and a minimal restraint was used to control the situation and maintain discipline inside the Police Station. The statements of the witnesses also corroborated this version. The incident had occurred on 17.09.2025, and the matter was reported to the police on 23.09. 2025. The delay in reporting the matter to the police is fatal. The entries in the daily diary show that the allegations made by the informant were under consideration, and medical verification was being awaited before taking any action. The informant had a history of misbehaving with other public officials. The allegations are false and have been made with an ulterior motive to harass the petitioner and tarnish her professional reputation. These allegations are inherently improbable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 4. I have heard Mr H.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No.1 and 2/State. 5. Mr H.S. Rana, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that she has been falsely implicated. The informant was creating a disturbance inside the police station, and the police had used minimal restraint to diffuse the situation. No person had misbehaved with the informant or given any beating to him. He filed a false F.I.R to save himself from the charge of creating a disturbance inside the Police Station. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction cannot evaluate the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. The allegations in the F.I.R disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, and the F.I.R. was rightly registered in the present case. The present petition has been 5 filed without any basis. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their 6 face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and 7 with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines 8 that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The contents of the F.I.R. specifically disclose that the informant was beaten by SHO and was thrown out of the police station. He sustained multiple injuries, and his ear started bleeding. These allegations, prima facie, disclose the commission of offences punishable under Sections 115 (2)and 126 (2) of the BNS. 12. It was submitted that the allegations are vague, and the weapon of offence was not mentioned. This is a clear misreading of the FIR, because it was specifically mentioned in the F.I.R that the informant was given kick and fist blows. Thus, the weapon of offence was mentioned in the FIR. 13. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and levelled with an allegation to tarnish the petitioner’s 9 reputation. This submission will not help the petitioner. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations while exercising inherent jurisdiction because it is a matter of investigation and trial. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of 10 FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 11 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 15. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed:- “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 16. A heavy reliance was placed upon the departmental enquiry, conducted by the Additional Superintendent of Police (Headquarters), in which it was found that minimal restraint was used. This report will not assist the petitioner. Firstly, the enquiry report prepared by the Department official will not bind the Court. Secondly, it was recommended in the Preliminary Enquiry Report that the F.I.R. be registered and the investigation be conducted to verify the correctness of the allegations. Therefore, the enquiry 12 report also shows that a further probe was required to determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made by the informant. 17. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed due to the delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala (supra) that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed: 37. It is settled law that a delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation, and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…” (Emphasis supplied) 18. The investigation is continuing, and if the police do not find the commission of any cognizable offence, the police are free to file a charge-sheet/cancellation report before the Court; however, an FIR cannot be quashed at this stage to scuttle the investigation. 13 19. No other point was urged. 20. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd June, 2026 (ravinder)