Page No.# 1/12 GAHC010262052025 2026:GAU-AS:11513-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WA/165/2026 THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY AND COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM, HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI - 781006 2: THE DIRECTOR OF HIGHER EDUCATION ASSAM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI - 781019 VERSUS BANESWAR BEZBARUAH AND 3 ORS. S/O - LATE PRANESWAR BEZBARUAH, R/O - VILLAGE BELBARI, P.O - BARKHAPALA, DISTRICT - BARPETA, ASSAM, PIN-781-307. 2:UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY BAHADUR SHAH ZAFAR MARG NEW DELHI PIN - 110-002. 3:GOVERNING BODY OF MADHYA KAMRUP COLLEGE SUBHA REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT P.O - CHENGA DISTRICT - BARPETA ASSAM PIN -781- 305 4:THE PRINCIPAL CUM SECRETARY MADHYA KAMRUP COLLEGE SUBHA P.O - CHENGA Page No.# 2/12 DISTRICT - BARPETA ASSAM PIN - 781-30 BEFORE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY For the Appellants : Mr. K. Gogoi, Standing Counsel, Higher Education Department, For the Respondent(s) : Mr. P. Mahanta, counsel for respondent No.1 Dr. P. Agarwal, SC, UGC Date on which Judgment is Reserved : 10.08.2026 Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 14.08.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the Judgment : NA. Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced : Yes. JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) (A.D.Choudhury, J) 1. Heard Mr. K. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. Also heard Mr. P. Mahanta, learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner No. 1, and Dr. P. Agarwal, learned Standing counsel, University Grants Commission (UGC), for the respondent No. 2. 2. This intra-court appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order (Oral) dated 23.10.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in Page No.# 3/12 WP(C) No. 3820/2023, whereby the writ petition preferred by the respondent No.1/ writ petitioner was allowed and the appellants were directed to extend the benefit of UGC Scale of Pay to the writ petitioner from the date of his appointment, i.e., 08.07.1994. 3. The relevant facts may first be noticed. 4. The respondent No. 1 had applied for the post of Lecturer in Political Science at Madhya Kamrup College pursuant to an advertisement dated 23.12.1992. His service was subsequently approved by the competent authority in the Higher Education Department vide order dated 08.07.1994. His appointment order dated 08.07.1994, contained, inter alia, the following two conditions. (i) That the incumbent would be entitled to incremental benefit in UGC Scale of Pay of Rs. 2200-4400 per month only after obtaining M.Phil or Ph.D within 8 years, failing which his service would not be continued, and, (ii) That the incumbent would not be eligible for Senior Scale/ Selection Grade Scale of Pay till he fulfills the conditions laid down in the UGC scheme. 5. The respondent No.1 did not challenge the aforesaid conditions at the relevant time. He subsequently earned an M.Phil in 2008. Thereafter, the authorities granted him the UGC Scale of Pay with effect from 01.04.2008 under an order dated 03.12.2011. 6. The respondent No. 1 thereafter made a representation only on 08.01.2019 claiming UGC Scale of Pay from the date of his appointment. Though the authorities granted certain benefits by way of notional fixation/pay protection, they did not grant the UGC scale from 08.07.1994. 7. In 2023, the respondent No. 1 approached this Court by Page No.# 4/12 filing the aforesaid writ petition, assailing, firstly, the very condition of his appointment order, as well as seeking the grant of the UGC Scale of Pay with effect from 08.07.1994, i.e., his initial date of appointment. 8. The learned Single Judge, under the judgment impugned, allowed the writ petition, holding that the minimum UGC qualification for appointment as a Lecturer in Deficit Grants-in-Aid college as on 08.07.1994 was 55% marks in Master's Degree and the respondent No.1 possessed the said qualification. The learned Single Judge consequently held that the two conditions incorporated in the appointment order were illegal and arbitrary. 9. Mr. K Gogoi, the learned counsel for the appellants, argues that the learned Single Judge has not correctly appreciated the distinction between the qualification required for appointment and the condition governing the entitlement to benefit in the UGC Scale of Pay. 10. It is argued that the case of the State is not that M.Phil was the minimum qualification prescribed by the UGC for appointment as a Lecturer in 1994 but that the UGC norms governing appointment were required to be fulfilled and that while approving the appointment of the respondent No.1, the competent authority imposed a condition that the benefit of increments in UGC scale would accrue upon the incumbent on acquisition of M.Phil or Ph.D. 11. The learned counsel further submits that the respondent No. 1 had not even acquired the eligibility test qualification prescribed under the UGC Notification applicable to the relevant period. Nevertheless, his appointment was approved by the competent authority subject to the aforesaid conditions. The respondent No. 1 accepted the appointment and the conditions attached thereto and, upon subsequently acquiring an M.Phil, was granted UGC scale of pay with effect from 01.04.2008. Page No.# 5/12 12. Per contra, Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, argues that an M.Phil was not a prescribed qualification for appointment under the UGC regulations applicable at the relevant time and, therefore, the two conditions incorporated in the appointment order were illegal and arbitrary. 13. It is also submitted that the respondent No. 1 possessed 55% marks in the Master's Degree and was therefore entitled to the UGC scale from the date of his appointment. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. K. V. Jeyaraj & Ors., reported in AIR 2015 SC 1875 and P. J. Dharmaraj Vs. Church of South India& Ors. reported in 2024 INSC 938. 14. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 15. The relevant UGC Notification prescribing qualifications for Lecturer is the Notification dated 19.09.1991, which prescribed the qualification for appointment as Lecturer, a good academic record with at least 55% marks at the Master's degree level, and, in addition, required the candidate to have cleared the eligibility test conducted by the UGC/CSIR or a similar test accredited by the UGC. Such a requirement is also specifically noticed in the impugned judgment under appeal. 16. The additional affidavit filed by the Higher Education Department also reproduced the said qualification. Thus, the UGC qualification framework relied upon by respondent No. 1 did not consist merely of having 55% marks in Master's Degree; it also required clearing the eligibility test. It is significant that respondent No.1 has not acquired the said eligibility test qualification. 17. The UGC itself had taken the stand before the learned Single Page No.# 6/12 Judge that the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Notification dated 19.09.1991 were mandatory. 18. We do not, however, consider it necessary, at this stage, to hold that the appointment of the respondent No.1 itself was invalid on account of non-fulfillment of the eligibility test requirement at the time of his appointment or thereafter at any point of time during his service career. The relevance of this fact is in considering that whether the respondent No. 1’s contention, because he possessed 55% marks in the Master's Degree, he acquired an unconditional right to the UGC scale from the date of appointment. 19. In our considered view, the argument that UGC did not prescribe M.Phil as a qualification for appointment and, therefore, the conditions in the appointment order requiring acquisition of M.Phil/Ph.D. were beyond the permissible framework of such prescription, overlooks the distinction between the qualification for appointment and the conditions governing the accrual of a financial benefit under the UGC scale. Further the respondent No.1 did not clear the eligibility test for lecturers conducted by the UGC, CSIR or similar test accredited by the UGC in terms of the UGC notification dated 19.09.1991 on 08.07.1994. 20. The Condition No. (i) incorporated in the appointment order did not state that the respondent No. 1 was ineligible to be appointed as a Lecturer merely because he did not possess an M.Phil. The condition provided that he would get an incremental benefit in the UGC scale only after obtaining an M.Phil or PhD within the stipulated period. Similarly, the Condition No. (ii) is linked to the Senior Scale Selection Grade to the fulfillment of the conditions laid down in the UGC scheme. Thus, the conditions were directed toward the accrual of financial benefit Page No.# 7/12 under the UGC scale, not merely to initial eligibility for appointment. 21. In the present case, respondent No. 1 accepted the appointment order subject to the conditions incorporated therein. He did not challenge those conditions at the relevant time, continued in service under the terms of such appointment, and subsequently acquired an M.Phil. Thereafter, the authorities granted him the UGC scale of pay with effect from 01.04.2008, in terms of the very condition incorporated in the appointment order. In such circumstances, the respondent No.1 cannot now succeed merely by contending that the condition was arbitrary because an M.Phil was not an essential qualification for initial appointment. 22. The real issue before us, therefore, is whether the condition linking the accrual of incremental benefit in the UGC scale to the acquisition of M.Phil/Ph.D. was wholly foreign to, or inconsistent with, the governing UGC framework and was thereby arbitrary. 23. On the material available before us, we find no such basis. 24. It is not in dispute that under the communication dated 02.11.1982, the Director of Public Instruction, Assam, addressed to the Principal/Secretary of all Aided College, specifically referred to the conditions imposed by the UGC and approved by the State Government that where a person was selected under good academic record but was not an M.Phil degree holder, he/she would have to obtain M.Phil or a recognised degree beyond Master level within eight years, failing which, future increments would not be earned until such qualification was obtained or equivalent published work was produced. 25. 25. We are not required, in the present appeal, to determine whether the communication dated 02.11.1982, by itself, constituted the source of power for the particular condition incorporated in the Page No.# 8/12 appointment letter of respondent No. 1. Its significance lies elsewhere. It demonstrates that a condition requiring acquisition of an M.Phil or an equivalent qualification within a stipulated period, earning the scale of pay, was not an innovation devised by the appointing authority in the individual case of the respondent No.1. The said communication dated 02.11.1982 expressly records that such condition had been imposed by UGC and approved by the State Government. 26. The respondent No.1, therefore, cannot succeed merely by contending that M.Phil was not the minimum qualification prescribed for initial appointment. That circumstance, by itself, does not render illegal a condition regulating subsequent accrual of scale of pay/increments or other financial benefits under the UGC scale. 27. The learned Single Judge, in our view, therefore, erred in proceeding on the basis that once the respondent had obtained 55% marks in the Master's degree, the condition requiring an M.Phil/Ph.D. for earning an incremental benefit in the UGC scale necessarily became illegal and arbitrary. 28. There is yet another aspect which reinforces the conclusion that possession of 55% marks in the Master’s Degree could not, by itself, confer an unconditional right to the UGC scale of pay from the date of appointment. 29. The UGC notification dated 19.09.1991 prescribed, in addition to a Master’s degree qualification, clearance of the National Eligibility Test. The respondent No.1 admittedly did not possess such a qualification. We are conscious that his appointment had been approved by the competent authority, and we are not holding that his appointment was invalid on that account. Page No.# 9/12 The point is only that the respondent cannot selectively rely upon one component of the UGC qualification framework, namely, the 55% requirement, to contend that he acquires an unconditional right to every financial benefit under the UGC scale. The State had approved his appointment subject to certain conditions. However, respondent No. 1 cannot selectively rely on one part of the UGC qualification framework to claim the benefit of the UGC scale, while disregarding the other requirement within the same framework. The fact that the respondent possessed 55% marks, therefore, cannot by itself establish that he had an unconditional right to the UGC scale from 08.07.1994. 30. The learned Single Judge has also relied on the fact that two similar incumbents, namely Sri Bhairab Chandra Das and Sri Kailash Das, who were also appointed as lecturers in the same college, were not subjected to the same conditions, and has held that the respondent was treated differently. 31. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition that similarly situated employees should ordinarily be treated alike. However, the mere fact that a similar condition was not imposed upon another employee cannot, by itself, establish that the condition imposed upon the respondent No.1 was arbitrary. Before the principle of equality is invoked, it must be established that the condition relied upon was similarly extended in all material particulars and that the benefit allegedly extended to them was itself legally valid. In the present case, the condition imposed upon the respondent had a rational nexus with the scale of pay/accrual of incremental benefit in the UGC scale and was linked to the acquisition of a recognized higher qualification. The contemporaneous material noticed hereinabove also Page No.# 10/12 demonstrates that such a condition was not foreign to the UGC pay framework. 32. The principle of equality cannot, in any event, be invoked to compel the state to disregard a condition which, for the reasons stated above, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or legally unsustainable, merely for the reason that another employee may not have been subjected to the same condition. Article 14 does not operate in isolation from the governing rules and the terms upon which the respective appointments were made. 33. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Kalyani Mathivanan (supra). There can be no dispute with the proposition that UGC regulations, where applicable, have binding effect upon the institution to which they apply. The said proposition, however, does not answer the controversy before us. It is not a question before us whether the state can disregard a binding UGC prescription; rather, it is whether the condition incorporated in the appointment order is inconsistent with the governing UGC framework. Kalyani Mathivanan (supra) does not lay down that a condition regulating accrual of benefit accepted at the time of appointment and acted upon thereafter, becomes invalid, merely because the condition is not itself prescribed as a minimum qualification for initial appointment, more particularly, when the respondent himself did not acquire all the prescribed qualifications under such regulation. 34. The decision in P.J. Dharmaraj (supra), in our opinion, does not advance the case of respondent No. 1 any further. In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the applicability of the subsequent amendment to the UGC/AICTE regulation within the institutions' governing framework. The decision does not hold that an Page No.# 11/12 express condition governing an employee's entitlement to a financial benefit, accepted at the time of appointment and subsequently acted upon, must be ignored merely because the condition is not reproduced verbatim in the UGC Regulations. 35. We may also note the conduct of respondent No. 1. He accepted the appointment in 1994, subject to the conditions incorporated therein. He continued in service under those conditions, subsequently acquired an M.Phil, and accepted the UGC scale of pay with effect from 01.04.2008 when the authorities treated the condition as fulfilled. It was only in 2019, after a considerable lapse of time, that he sought to reopen the terms of his appointment and claimed the benefit retrospectively from the date of initial appointment. We do not consider it necessary to dispose of the appeal solely on the ground of delay and laches. Nevertheless, the aforesaid conduct is a relevant circumstance in considering whether the condition, which was accepted and acted upon for years, can now be challenged as arbitrary. 36. The learned Single Judge has also relied upon the communication (U/O) No. G(B) UGC 28/2002/9 dated 18-11-2002 to conclude that the minimum UGC qualification in 1994 was 55% marks in a Master's degree only. In our view, the aforesaid communication, being a note addressed to the Personal Secretary to the Minister of Education, cannot by itself be treated as a source or incorporation of the UGC regulatory framework applicable in 1994. More importantly, one cannot ignore the contemporaneous departmental communications noted hereinabove, including the UGC notification dated 19.09.1991 and the communication dated 02.11.1982, but they have to be considered while determining the nature of the condition imposed in Page No.# 12/12 the appointment order of the respondent No.1. 37. For the discussion made and reasons recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge erred in treating possession of 55% marks in the Master's degree as sufficient, by itself, to confer upon the respondent No.1 an unconditional right to UGC scale of pay from 08.07.1994. The learned Single Judge further erred in treating the conditions requiring an M.Phil./Ph.D. to earn the benefits as illegal and arbitrary merely because an M.Phil. was not the minimum qualification for initial appointment. We repeat, the contemporaneous material shows that an M.Phil or an equivalent higher qualification for earning the benefits in question was a condition recognized within the UGC pay framework and approved by the State Government. The respondent No. 1 accepted that condition, acted under it, and was subsequently granted the UGC scale of pay with effect from 01.04.2008 upon acquiring an M.Phil. 38. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to sustain the judgment and order (oral) dated 23.10.2025 passed in WP(C) 3820/2023. Accordingly, the same is interfered with by allowing the present appeal. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by respondent No.1 stands dismissed. 39. There shall be no order as to costs. JUDGE JUDGE Nmani/Smita Comparing Assistant