BISHWANATH SINGHAROY v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND THROUGH THE CHIEF SECRETARY
WPC/5692/2025 · 2026-05-15
Deepak Roshan
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 12667 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 12667 (JHR) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 5692 of 2025
….…..
1. Bishwanth Singharoy, aged about 57 years Son of Krishan Nath Singharoy, resident of Village Khajuri, P.O. - Kundhit, P.S. - Kundait, District Jamtara.
2. Sanjeet Gorai, aged about 56 years Son of Lolin Gorai, resident of Village Mohalpahari, P.O. Mohalpahari, P.S. Sikaripara, District Dumka.
…. Petitioners VERSUS
1. The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, Govt. of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Distrcit- Ranchi.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi;
3. The Secretary, Department of Agriculture and Sugarcane Development, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Nepal House, P.O. Doranda, P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi;
4. The Director, Department of Agriculture and Sugarcane Development, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Krishi Bhawan, Laxmi Niwas, P.O. Ranchi University Post Office, P.S. Gonda, District Ranchi
5. The Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, P.O. Dumka, P.S. Dumka, District Dumka
6. Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, P.O. Dumka, P.S. Dumka, District Dumka. ..... Respondent(s)
with
W.P.(S) No. 1182 of 2026
….…..
1. Suraj Kumar, aged about 49 years, son of Late Arjun Prasad Mahto, resident of Village Kechuwasoli, P.O. Bamandiha, P.S. Palojori, District Deoghar, Jharkhand.
2. Kumari Manju, aged about 50 years, wife of Late Janardan Mandal, resident of Purana Dumka, P.O. Dumka, P.S. Dumka, District-Dumka, Jharkhand.
…. Petitioners VERSUS
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. The Secretary, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Department, Government of Jharkhand,
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having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagannathpur, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. The Director, Agriculture and Sugarcane Development Department, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagannathpur, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. The Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, P.O. and P.S. Dumka, District Dumka, Jharkhand.
5. The Deputy Development Commissioner cum Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka, P.O. and P.S. Dumka, District Dumka, Jharkhand.
6. The District Accounts Officer, Dumka, P.O. and P.S. Dumka, District Dumka, Jharkhand.
..... Respondent(s)
….…..
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
….…
For the Petitioner(s) : Ms. Aprajita Bhardwaj, Advocate
Mr. Akash Ajit Kumar, Advocate
Mrs. Satakchhi Priya Verma, Advocate
[in W.P.(S) No. 5692 of 2025]
Mr. D.C. Mishra, Advocate
[in W.P.(S) No. 1182 of 2026] For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Krishna Murari, Advocate
[in W.P.(S) No. 5692 of 2025]
Ms. Nirupama, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II
[ in W.P.(S) No. 1182 of 2026]
….…..
C.A.V. ON: 05/05/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:15/05/2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Both these writ applications raise identical questions of law and facts, as such the same have been heard together and are decided by this common
judgment with consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties. The lead case is W.P.(S) No.5692 of 2025 and the facts of this case would be sufficient to decide both these writ petitions filed under Article-226 of the Constitution of India. 2026:JHHC:15318 3
3. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 5692 of 2025 for the following reliefs: i. For issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, including a writ in the nature of mandamus, declaring and directing that the petitioners, having been appointed pursuant to Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987 (Annexure–2) and the merit list prepared in 1988, form part of the very same recruitment process as other similarly situated candidates appointed in 1990 and 1996, and hence cannot be treated as “new recruits” within the meaning of Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999 (Annexure–6); and for a consequential direction upon the respondents to extend to the petitioners the replacement pay scale of ₹4000–6000 under the 5th Pay Revision, as was duly granted to the similarly situated candidates, instead of the lower scale of ₹3200–4900 wrongly reflected in corrigendum contained in Order No. 297/99, Memo No. 1718 dated 16.12.1999 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka (Annexure–7); and further to hold that the denial of such parity to the petitioners is arbitrary, discriminatory, and violative of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” and the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. ii. For issuing a writ particularly in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents to grant the petitioners parity in pay scale, pay band, grade pay and all consequential benefits, including, arrears, increments, seniority at par with their counterparts appointed in 1990 and 1996 pursuant to the same recruitment process initiated by Advertisement No. 26/87 dated
08.07.1987. iii. For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) particularly in the nature of “certiorari” quashing and setting aside the order contained in Memo no.
289 dated 01.03.2025 issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka, whereby and whereunder, the grade pay has been reduced retrospectively from 2800 to 2400 w.e.f. the date of 1st MACP and from 4200 to 2800 w.e.f. the date of their 2nd MACP in an arbitrary and unlawful manner in complete contravention of the recommendations of the Pay Commission, leading to stoppage of salaries of the petitioners subject to re-fixation or payment of salaries at a lower grade pay, in complete violation to their legitimate expectation and fundamental rights enshrined in Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. iv. That during the pendency of the instant writ application, the operation, implementation and execution of the order contained in Memo no. 289 dated 01.03.2025 issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka, may be stayed.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
4. The petitioners are working as Village Level Workers/Jan Sewaks and were appointed pursuant to the Jansewak and Village Level Worker (Appointment and Service Condition) Rules, 1987. In furtherance of the said
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Rules, Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987 was issued for appointment of Jan Sewaks/VLWs in different districts, including Dumka. The petitioners participated in the same selection process, were included in the merit list/panel prepared in 1988 and were called for training in 1996. Appointments from the same recruitment process were made in phases in the years 1990, 1996 and 1999, all initially in the pay scale of Rs. 1200-30-
1800.
5. However, after implementation of the 5th Pay Revision, vide Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999, the petitioners were wrongly treated as “new recruits” and, by corrigendum dated 16.12.1999, their pay scale was reduced from the replacement scale of Rs. 4000-6000 to Rs. 3200-4900, whereas similarly situated candidates appointed from the same 1987 recruitment process in 1990 and 1996 continued to receive the higher scale.
After bifurcation, the said incorrect pay fixation continued to adversely affect the petitioners under the 6th Pay Revision, including their grade pay, increments, MACP benefits and pensionary entitlements. Though the petitioners were initially granted MACP benefits, the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka, vide impugned Memo No.
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289 dated 01.03.2025, retrospectively reduced their grade pay under MACP, thereby causing serious financial prejudice. The petitioners’ grievance is that they were first illegally denied the replacement pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000 and thereafter deprived of vested MACP benefits, despite being similarly situated with candidates selected through the same 1987 recruitment process. Their representations dated 16.04.2025 and 11.07.2025 remained unredressed, compelling them to file the present writ application. Contention of the Petitioners
6.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the act of the respondents is discriminatory on two counts, firstly, the reduction of pay scale of the petitioner considering them as “new recruits” by the corrigendum contained in order no. 297/99 contained in Memo no. 1718 dated 16.12.1999 and secondly, the down-gradation of the grade-pay order contained in Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025.
It was further submitted that the issue of reduction of pay scale in an identical factual situation has already been considered by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Satyendra Kumar & Another v. State of Bihar &
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Ors.1 wherein it was categorically held that appointments made pursuant to a recruitment process initiated prior to Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999 cannot be treated as
“future/new recruitment” merely because appointment letters were issued later.
7.
Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment in Tej Prakash Pathak and Others v. Rajasthan High Court and Others2 particularly paragraph 22, to submit that the process of recruitment begins with issuance of advertisement and concludes only upon filling up of the notified vacancies. Since the petitioners were appointed pursuant to the same Advertisement No. 26/87 under which candidates were appointed in 1990 and 1996, they form part of the same recruitment process and cannot be discriminated against in the matter of pay scale by treating them as “new recruits”.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the respondents have illegally downgraded the grade pay earlier granted to the petitioners under the MACP scheme, namely Grade Pay Rs. 2800 under the 1st MACP in favour of both petitioners and Grade Pay Rs. 4200 under the 2nd MACP in favour of petitioner no. 2.
1 2007 SCC OnLine Pat 1233, 2 (2025) 2 SCC 1
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9.
Learned counsel finally submitted that the respondents had no authority in law to retrospectively alter or reduce the pay scale/grade pay of the petitioners, as such action causes serious civil and financial consequences. The retrospective curtailment of benefits already granted is arbitrary, violative of settled service jurisprudence and infringes Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Contention of the Respondents
10. Per Contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka vide his Order No. 297/99 Memo No. 1718/vi Dumka dated 16.12.1999, revised the pay-scale of the Jansewaks from 1200-30-1800 to 3200-4900 as per Order No. 3, M 2-5 वी० ई०-पी०यू०, 01/99-660 एफ० ई०/2 िदनांक 08.02.1999 of Finance Department, Bihar. Further, it has been contended that the pay scale and ACP/MACP benefits of the petitioners have been fixed strictly in accordance with the applicable Government circulars and Finance Department instructions. Vide Letter Memo No. 601 dated 25.02.2010, the pay scale of Jansewaks was clarified separately for those appointed prior to 08.02.1999 and those appointed after 08.02.1999. As per the said clarification, Jansewaks appointed prior to 08.02.1999
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were entitled to 1st ACP in the pay scale of Rs. 4500- 7000 and 2nd MACP in the pay scale of Rs. 5000-8000, whereas Jansewaks appointed after 08.02.1999 were entitled to 1st ACP in the pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000 and 2nd MACP in the pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000. The petitioners, having been appointed after 08.02.1999, fall in the latter category and therefore cannot claim parity with Jansewaks appointed prior to the said date.
It has been further submitted that in light of Memo No. 2981/vi, Ranchi dated 01.09.2009 issued by the Department of Finance, the matter was considered in the Establishment Committee Meeting under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka, and thereafter Order Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025 was issued granting the admissible MACP benefits in accordance with law. By the said order, the petitioners were granted 20 years’ 2nd MACP benefit in the scale of Rs. 5200-20200 with Grade Pay of Rs. 2400 with effect from 12.11.2009, and 30 years’ 3rd MACP benefit in the scale of Rs. 5200-20200 with Grade Pay of Rs. 2800 with effect from the applicable date. Thus, the fixation made by the respondents is neither arbitrary; nor illegal, but is based upon the governing
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circulars.
Analysis
11. Having heard the Learned Counsels for the parties and after going through the documents available on record, the following issues arise for adjudication before this Court:
1. Whether the petitioners, who were appointed as Jan Sewaks pursuant to Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987 and the merit list/panel prepared in the year 1988, can be treated as “new recruits” merely because their appointment order was issued on 11.11.1999, for the purpose of denying them the replacement pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000 and placing them in the lower pay scale of Rs. 3200-4900 under Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999 and corrigendum dated 16.12.1999 ?
2. Whether the respondents were justified in retrospectively reducing/re-fixing the ACP/MACP benefits and grade pay of the petitioners by applying the category of employees appointed after 08.02.1999, particularly when the petitioners claim parity with similarly situated Jan Sewaks appointed from the same 1987 recruitment process in the years 1990 and 1996, and whether such reduction violates Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India ?
12. From the facts of the case, it is evident that the process for appointment of the petitioners started in the year 1987 itself, when Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987 was issued for appointment of Jan Sewaks/Village Level Workers in different districts of the erstwhile State of Bihar, including Dumka. The petitioners participated in the said selection process, were called for verification/interview, and their names were included in the merit list/panel prepared in the year
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1988. Thereafter, they were also called for training vide Letter No. 188 in the year 1996.
13. Thus, the appointment of the petitioners was not an independent or fresh recruitment initiated after issuance of Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999, but was in continuation of the very same recruitment process which had commenced pursuant to Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987.
14. It is further evident that appointments from the same recruitment process were made in different phases. The first set of candidates was appointed vide Order No. 135/1990 dated 30.09.1990 and the second set vide
Order No. 18/1996 dated 10.01.1996, both in the pay scale of Rs. 1200-30-1800. The petitioners were appointed in the third phase vide Order No. 263/99 dated 11.11.1999, also in the same pay scale of Rs. 1200-30-1800. Therefore, merely because the appointment letters of the petitioners came to be issued later, they cannot be severed from the original recruitment process of 1987 and treated as “new recruits” within the meaning of Resolution No. 660 dated
08.02.1999. 2026:JHHC:15318 11
15. The submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners having been appointed after 08.02.1999 are liable to be treated as new recruits and placed in the lower pay scale of Rs. 3200-4900 is not acceptable to this Court. The relevant consideration is not merely the date of issuance of appointment order; but the recruitment process pursuant to which such appointment was made. The petitioners were selected from the same panel/merit list prepared in pursuance of Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987, and similarly situated persons from the same selection process were appointed in 1990 and 1996 in the pay scale of Rs. 1200-1800, the replacement scale whereof under the 5th Pay Revision was Rs. 4000-6000. 16. At this stage, reliance placed by the petitioners on the judgment of the Patna High Court in Satyendra Kumar & Another (Supra) appears to be well founded. In an identical factual situation, the Patna High Court held that where the recruitment process had commenced prior to the issuance of Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999 and the candidates were selected under the earlier rules, such appointments could not be treated as future/new recruitment merely because the formal
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appointment letters were issued later. The said reasoning squarely applies to the present case. 17. The law laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak (Supra) also supports the stand of the petitioners that recruitment is not to be viewed in isolation from the advertisement and selection process. Once the process commenced with Advertisement No. 26/87 and culminated in appointments from the same merit list/panel in different phases, the petitioners cannot be placed in an inferior pay scale only on the ground that their appointment letters were issued in the year 1999. 18. Further, the action of the respondents has also resulted in hostile discrimination.
Candidates selected along with the petitioners from the same advertisement and merit list, but appointed earlier in 1990 and 1996, have been extended the replacement pay scale of Rs. 4000-6000; whereas the petitioners have been denied the same only because their appointment orders were issued later. Such distinction is artificial and has no rational nexus with the object of pay fixation. The petitioners cannot be penalised for administrative delay in issuing appointment orders, particularly when the delay was not attributable to them. 2026:JHHC:15318 13
19. In these circumstances, I find that the petitioners cannot be treated as “new recruits” under Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999. Their appointment having arisen from the same recruitment process initiated in 1987; they are entitled to parity with the similarly situated Jan Sewaks appointed in 1990 and 1996 from the same selection process. Consequently, the corrigendum contained in Order No. 297/99, Memo No. 1718 dated 16.12.1999, to the extent it places the petitioners in the lower pay scale of Rs. 3200-4900 instead of extending the replacement scale of Rs. 4000-6000, cannot be sustained. 20. Accordingly, the first issue is answered in favour of the petitioners. 21. So far as the second issue is concerned, it appears from the records that the petitioners were granted MACP benefits after due consideration by the competent authorities. Petitioner No. 1 was granted 1st MACP in Grade Pay of Rs. 2800 with effect from 18.11.2009 vide
Order No. 71/11 dated 08.07.2011; whereas petitioner No. 2 was also granted 1st MACP with effect from 12.11.2009 and thereafter 2nd MACP in Pay Level–6 vide Memo No. 935 dated 06.09.2021. These benefits
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continued in favour of the petitioners for years together and, therefore, cannot be treated as mere contingent benefits liable to be withdrawn at any time. Once the benefit of MACP and corresponding grade pay was granted and acted upon for a long period, the same crystallised into a vested right in favour of the petitioners. 22. It is also pertinent to mention that such grade pay was not a contingent right but a vested right. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish Kumar v. Union of India3, wherein the distinction between vested and contingent rights has been clearly explained. A vested right arises when all facts necessary for its conferment have occurred. In the present case, the petitioners fulfilled the requisite conditions, were granted MACP benefits by competent orders, and continued to receive the same for years. Therefore, the respondents could not have taken away such benefit retrospectively by merely describing the earlier fixation as erroneous. 23. Further, the service conditions of the petitioners, once determined and acted upon, could not be altered to
3 (2021) 5 SCC 1
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their detriment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Grid Corporation of Orissa v. Rasananda Das4, has held that service conditions cannot be changed retrospectively so as to prejudice employees. Similarly, in State of Bihar v. Bihar State Workshop Superintendents Federation5, it has been held that the State cannot arbitrarily alter pay or service conditions to the disadvantage of its employees. 24. The action of the respondents is also bad from another angle. The petitioners were granted grade pay under the MACP scheme and the same continued for several years. Thereafter, by the impugned Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025, the respondents retrospectively reduced the 1st MACP grade pay from Rs. 2800 to Rs. 2400 and the 2nd MACP grade pay from Rs. 4200 to Rs. 2800. Such retrospective curtailment of financial benefits, without any fault or misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners, is arbitrary and impermissible.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bihar State Beverages Corporation Limited v. Naresh Kumar Mishra6, has held that to pay salary/pay scale lesser than what was
4 (2003) 10 SCC 297 5 1993 Supp (2) SCC 368 6 (2019) 5 SCC 110
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offered and continued would amount to changing the conditions of service, which is not permissible. 25. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, I find that the respondents were not justified in retrospectively reducing/re-fixing the ACP/MACP benefits and grade pay of the petitioners by applying the category of employees appointed after 08.02.1999. The impugned Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025, to the extent it reduces the grade pay already granted to the petitioners, is arbitrary, illegal and non est in the eye of law. Accordingly, Issue No. 2 is also answered in favour of the petitioners. 26. In view of the above, this Court holds and declares that the petitioners, having been appointed pursuant to Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987 and the merit list prepared in 1988, form part of the very same recruitment process as other similarly situated candidates appointed in 1990 and 1996, and hence cannot be treated as “new recruits” within the meaning of Resolution No. 660 dated 08.02.1999. 27. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to extend to the petitioners the replacement pay scale of ₹4000– 6000 under the 5th Pay Revision, as was duly granted to the similarly situated candidates, instead of the lower
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scale of ₹3200–4900 wrongly reflected in corrigendum contained in Order No. 297/99, Memo No. 1718 dated 16.12.1999 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, as the denial of the same would amount to and violative of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work” and the constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 28.
28. The respondents are, hence, directed to grant the petitioners parity in pay scale, pay band, grade pay and all other consequential benefits, at par with their counterparts appointed in 1990 and 1996 pursuant to the same recruitment process initiated by Advertisement No. 26/87 dated 08.07.1987. 29. Further, this Court holds that the order contained in Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025, issued by the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Dumka (Respondent No. 6), is illegal and arbitrary to the extent it reduces the grade pay granted to the petitioners under MACP. By the said order, the grade pay of the petitioners under the 1st MACP has been reduced from Rs. 2800/- to Rs. 2400/-, and the grade pay of petitioners under the 2nd MACP has been reduced from Rs. 4200/- to Rs. 2800/-. 2026:JHHC:15318 18
30. Thus, the petitioner No. 1 (in W.P. (S) No. 5692 of 2025) has been granted the very same grade pay of Rs. 2800/- under the 2nd MACP, which he was already receiving under the 1st MACP, thereby defeating the very object of financial upgradation. Such action is contrary to the recommendations of the Pay Commission and has resulted in stoppage of salary subject to re-fixation, or payment of salary at a lower grade pay. 31. Accordingly, Memo No. 289 dated 01.03.2025 is quashed to the extent of the aforesaid illegality and the respondent nos. 5 & 6 are directed to grant 1st and 2nd MACP to the petitioners in the grade-pay of Rs. 2800 and Rs. 4200 respectively and if the petitioners are entitled to other consequential benefits, the same shall also be given to them. 32. Accordingly, both these instant writ applications stand allowed. Pending I.A., if any, are closed. No cost. (Deepak Roshan, J.) Dated:15/05/2026 Amardeep/ A.F.R
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