PRABIN CHANDRA KALITA v. THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA and 3 ORS.
WP(C)/2652/2016 · 2026-03-25
N Unni Krishnan Nair
Writ Petition (Civil)body2026
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1261 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
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[ 2026 DAILYLAW 1261 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
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Page No.# 1/14 GAHC010110892016
2026:GAU-AS:5203
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/2652/2016 PRABIN CHANDRA KALITA S/O. LT. S. NATH KALITA, VILL. MAINAJULI, DHEKIAJULI, P.O.
DHEKIAJULI, P.S. DHEKIAJULI, DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM. PIN-784110. VERSUS THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA and 3 ORS.
REP. BY ITS CHAIRMAN CHANDER MUKHI, NARIMAN POINT, MUMBAI-
400021.
2:THE CHAIRMAN CENTAL BANK OF INDIA CHANDER MIKHI NARIMAN POINT MUMBAI-400021 INDIA.
3:THE ZONAL MANAGER CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA CENTRAL BANK BUILDING BHANGAGARH DIST. KAMRUP PIN-781005.
4:THE REGIONAL MANAGER CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA CENTRAL BANK BUILDING BHANGAGARH DIST. KAMRUP PIN-781005
Page No.# 2/14 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR.S BORTHAKUR, MR.A BORGOHAIN Advocate for the Respondent : MR.B HALDAR R- 1-4, MR M SARMA (R-1 to 4),MR.A C SARMA(R- 1-4),MR.G BHARADWAJ(R- 1-4)
BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
ORDER
26/03/2026 Heard Mr. U. S. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M Sarma,
learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present writ petition has presented a challenge to an order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner, imposing upon the petitioner the penalty of compulsory retirement, invoking the provisions of Regulation 4(h) of the Central Bank of India Officers Employees’ (Discipline & Appeal) Regulation, 1976, as amended, on conclusion of a departmental proceeding instituted against him. 3. The petitioner was initially recruited as a Clerk in the Central Bank of India on 18.07.1983 and posted to its Tezpur Branch. The petitioner, while working as a Branch Manager at the Nathkuchi Branch of the respondent Bank, certain allegations had come to the forefront against him. Accordingly, a Charge-Sheet dated 04.07.2014 was issued to the petitioner, leveling against him 16 (sixteen) charges. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said Charge-Sheet, denying the charges leveled against him. The reply submitted by the petitioner not being found to be satisfactory, the Disciplinary Authority directed for an enquiry in the
Page No.# 3/14 matter into the charges framed against the petitioner and accordingly, appointed an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer for conducting of the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer entered into the enquiry and the petitioner also participated, therein. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report, holding the charges, other than the charge No. 10 and Charge No. 16, to be proved. Charge No. 10 was held to be partially proved, while Charge No. 16 was held to be not proved. The enquiry report, having been furnished to the petitioner and he having submitted his representation, thereto, the Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proceeded after drawing his own conclusions thereon, which is found to be in tune with the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer, proceeded to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner, w.e.f. 31.07.2015. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority on 08.09.2015. The said appeal is found to have been considered by the Appellate Authority and the said appeal was rejected vide a detailed order dated 07.11.2015, thereby, affirming the penalty imposed by the Appellate Authority. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition. 4. Mr.
Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, during his tenure as Branch Manager at Nathkuchi Branch was the only officer with one single clerk and the pre and post sanctioned inspection reports, were mostly conducted by the Head Cashier as the 2nd man at the Branch and were counter singed on faith by the petitioner. He further projected that the loan proposals were processed and sanctioned by the petitioner as the Branch Manager of the Branch. He submits that the said position was not
Page No.# 4/14 appreciated by the Enquiry Officer, although, the said fact had come into record during the enquiry. 4.1 Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner, has further submitted that the Enquiry Officer had relied upon the deposition of the Head Clerk, who had deposed as MW2, wherein, he had stated that he was forced to sign on the inspection reports by the petitioner. 4.2 Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the inspection reports were actually furnished by the Head Cashier, i.e., MW2 and the written communication in this connection was brought on record by the MW2 at a later stage and accordingly, the Enquiry Officer could not have relied upon the same for drawing his conclusions in the matter. He further submits that the materials brought on record would reveal that the petitioner had processed the matter with regard to the loans sanctioned by him strictly in accordance with the procedure mandated in the matter. Accordingly, he submits that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are drawn with a pre-determined mind to hold the petitioner guilty and accordingly, the same would mandate an interference from this Court. He further submits that the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner, is clearly disproportionate to the allegations leveled against the petitioner. 4.3 In the above premises, Mr. Bora, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority would mandate an interference from this Court. 5. Per contra, Mr.
Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent Bank has submitted that during the enquiry, it was established that the petitioner had violated the loan policy of the Bank. He submits that the projection that the
Page No.# 5/14 petitioner was the single officer of the Branch is of no consequence, inasmuch as, it was established that the petitioner for the purpose of sanctioning of the loans, had utilized undue influence over his Head Cashier for obtaining pre and post inspection reports in order to cover up the illegality committed by him in the matter. He submits that on a perusal of the Enquiry Officer’s findings, it would be revealed that all relevant factors were taken into consideration for the purpose of arriving at a final conclusion with regard to each of the charges leveled against the petitioner. 5.1 Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent Bank has further submitted that the petitioner has not brought on record any contention with regard to any prejudice, being caused to him, during the conduct of the enquiry. Accordingly, he submits that this Court, while reviewing the order of penalty would be pleased not to appreciate the evidences as coming on record, more so, when there is no plea of perversity raised by the petitioner in the matter. 5.2 In view of the above submissions, Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent Bank submits that the penalty imposed upon the petitioner would not mandate an interference from this Court. 6. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 7. The allegations leveled against the petitioner pertains to the manner in which, he had disbursed loans and violation of the loan policy by him, while disbursing the loans, so involved in the charges framed against the petitioner. 8.
As has been noted, hereinabove, the Disciplinary Authority having drawn conclusions in the matter, basing on materials coming on record in the inquiry,
Page No.# 6/14 this Court would not re-evaluate the same by assuming the role of an Appellate Authority, more so, in absence of any material brought on record by the petitioner to demonstrate that such conclusions were perverse. 9. This Court also notices that the petitioner has not urged that the enquiry was conducted in a manner that has caused prejudice to him. It is also not contended that the petitioner was in any manner restrained from defending the charges framed against him. Accordingly, it is to be held that the enquiry was held in the manner required and the evidences coming on record are legal evidences basing on which it was permissible for the Enquiry Officer to draw his conclusions. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of hearing of the present proceeding, had not highlighted any inconsistency with regard to the conclusions so drawn by the Disciplinary Authority in the order, dated
31.07.2015. Having examined the order, dated 31.07.2015, and this Court finds that the conclusions reached therein, pertaining to the article of charges so leveled against the petitioner, was so arrived at, basing on the evidences available on record and the same would not call for any interference. 11. It is also to be noticed and emphasized that in banking business, absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every Bank employee and if this is not observed; the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. 12. In this connection, this Court would refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & ors.
v. P. C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4
Page No.# 7/14 SCC 364, wherein, it was noted that a Bank Officer/employee is required to exercise higher standard of honesty and integrity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this connection, had proceeded to draw the following conclusions:
“14. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank Officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996 (9) SCC 69). It is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.”
13. In the case on hand, it is seen that the manner in which the petitioner had discharged his duties as evident from the allegations so leveled against him in the charge-sheet, in question; it is seen that the Bank had lost confidence on him and the materials that had come on record in the inquiry as well as the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority in the matter, had affirmed such loss of confidence upon him.
In this connection, a reference is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional
Page No.# 8/14 Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M. G. Vittal Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442. The conclusions in this connection pertaining to loss of confidence by the employee and the employer, is extracted hereinbelow:
“Loss of confidence. 25. Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be
directed. 26. In Kanhaiyalal Agrawal v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. 32 this Court laid down Page No.# 18/24 the test for loss of confidence to find out as to whether there was bona fide loss of confidence in the employee, observing that, (SCC p. 614, para 9) (i) the workman is holding the position of trust and confidence; (ii) by abusing such position, he commits an act which results in forfeiting the same; and (iii) to continue him in service/establishment would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer, or would be detrimental to the discipline or security of the establishment. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management, regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved. 27. In SBI v. Bela Bagchi this Court repelled the contention that even if by the misconduct of the employee the employer does not suffer any financial loss, he can be removed from service in a case of loss of confidence. While deciding the said case, reliance has been placed upon its earlier judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik. 28. An employer is not bound to keep an employee in service with whom relations have reached the point of complete loss of confidence/faith between the two. 29. In Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan, while dealing with the similar issue this Court held that: (SCC p. 90, para 56)
Page No.# 9/14
"56. ...loss of confidence cannot be subjective but there must be objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the employer regarding trustworthiness of the employee and which must be alleged and proved."
30. In case of theft, the quantum of theft is not important and what is important is the loss of confidence of employer in employee. (Vide A.P. SRTC v. Raghuda Siva Sankar Prasad 43.)
31. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition and keeping in view that judicial review is concerned primarily with the decision-making process and not the decision itself. More so, it is a settled legal proposition that in a case of misconduct of grave nature like corruption or theft, no punishment other than the dismissal may be appropriate.”
14.
It is also required to take notice of a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bijoy Rajkhowa v. State Bank of India & ors., reported in (2013) 2 GLR 6 wherein, in a matter pertaining to a misconduct committed by a Bank employee, this Court had recorded the following conclusion:
“24. Conduct of a bank employee must be above board. He is required to maintain absolute integrity, which is of paramount consideration. On his conduct rests the confidence of the customers of the bank. Compromise with doubtful integrity will not only erode the faith of the people using the bank's facilities but also in the functioning of the bank itself. In such matters, quantum of misappropriation is immaterial the factum of misappropriation itself would justify the disciplinary action taken. Considering the above, in the present case, we do not find any good and sufficient ground to interfere with the punishment imposed.”
15. In view of the position of law as brought to light by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and of this Court, as noticed hereinabove, it has to be held that the petitioner had lost the confidence of his employer on account of the misconduct as committed by him in the matter and accordingly, the penalty
Page No.# 10/14 of dismissal from service as imposed upon the petitioner, does not warrant any interference. 16. However, this Court would also like to deal the contention raised by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the penalty of dismissal from service as imposed upon the petitioner, is grossly disproportionate to the allegations as leveled against him and accordingly, the same requires to be interfered with. 17. This Court, in this context, would like to again refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. C. Kakkar (supra), wherein in this connection, the following conclusions were drawn by the Court:
“15. It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971 (1) All E.R. 1148] observed
"The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the
"inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, be its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in
1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings,
Page No.# 11/14 notwithstanding acquittal in criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings.
At the most the factum of acquittal may be circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application.”
18. The allegations as leveled against the petitioner, on being established in the inquiry held and the same having demonstrated a misconduct being committed in the matter by the petitioner, who admittedly was a responsible employee of the respondent Bank; it is to be noted that the petitioner cannot, in any manner, be extended with any sympathy. The allegations leveled against the petitioner having been held to have been established and the misconduct as committed by him, being apparent, the penalty as imposed upon him, cannot be stated to be disproportionate to the proved misconduct. It is a settled position of law that the penalty that is to be imposed upon the petitioner is the discretion of the disciplinary authority. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of the charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. A host of factors go into the decision making process while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the establishment where he so works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any. Accordingly, the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner in the case in hand, in the considered view of this Court; is proportionate to the allegations leveled against him and established in the inquiry. 19. It is also a settled position of law that if the appellate authority is of the
Page No.# 12/14 opinion that the case warrants a lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority.
Such a power which vests with the departmental appellate authority, is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of the facts. In exercise of power of judicial review, however, this Court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of this Court, lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. This Court, in the present proceeding, has not found any special circumstance warranting interference with the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner. 20. It is only when the punishment is found by this Court to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of the allegations leveled against the delinquent that the principle of proportionality would come into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine of Wednesbury rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. 21. The principle of proportionality was first propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service in the following words:(AC p. 410 D-E)
Page No.# 13/14
“........
Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality'."
22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had approved the aforesaid principle in the case of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, reported in (1987) 4 SCC 611, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by emphasising that "all powers have legal limits" invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words in paragraph No.
25. Paragraph No. 25 of the said judgment being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: (SCC p. 620, para 25)
"25. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review."
23. In view of the pronouncement, as noticed above in the matters of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as of this Court, it is clear that it is not for the writ Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, which is a matter within the domain and the jurisdiction of the said authority.
If the Bank has lost its confidence on the petitioner, herein, it is within its competence and jurisdiction to impose the penalty as it may consider adequate commensurating to the misconduct attributed and proved. It is not for
Page No.# 14/14 the writ Court to prescribe another penalty in lieu of the penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority. It will have to be borne in mind that the job entrusted to the petitioner, herein, being of a responsible employee, in a financial institution like a Bank is that of faith and confidence and once it is lost, it is for the bank to decide what penalty is to be imposed. The amount involved is immaterial, what matters much, is tarnishing the image of the Bank in the eyes of the valued customers and public. The petitioner being a Bank employee ought to have maintained utmost integrity, devotion, diligence and honesty, which, he admittedly, has failed to do so. 24. Accordingly, in view of the above discussions and conclusions, this Court is of the considered view that, given the facts and circumstances as existing in the matter; it has to be held that the penalty as imposed upon the petitioner commensurates to the misconduct as established against him in the matter and the same does not call for any interference from this Court. 25. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant