2026:HHC:23642 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 272 of 2012 Reserved on: 13.05.2026 Date of Decision: 22.06.2026 Rekha Karol & Ors ...Appellants Versus Lachhmi Devi & Ors ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellants : Mr Deepak Gupta, Advocate. For respondent No.1 : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Harshit Sharma, Advocate. For respondents No. 5, 7 and 8 : Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate. Name of respondents No. 2, 11 and 12 stands deleted None for respondents No. 3, 4, 6, 9 and 10. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2012 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Shimla (learned Appellate 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:23642 Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 09.10.2007 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.2, Shimla (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a declaration that she is the owner in possession of the suit land mentioned in the headnote and para 2 of the plaint. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants No. 1 to 3 from interfering in the plaintiff’s possession over the suit land was also prayed. It was asserted that the plaintiff is a permanent resident of Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi. She settled in Village Anjhi (Patti Rehana) about 30 years ago. The plaintiff obtained the suit land from defendants No. 4 and 5 on payment of ₹100 per annum. The plaintiff constructed a house and remained in possession of the suit land. She became the owner of the suit land after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The plaintiff found in the year 1989 that her name was not entered in the revenue record. She filed an application for the correction of 3 2026:HHC:23642 the revenue record. The plaintiff also found that Vidya Prakash, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.1 to 3, had got his name entered in the column of cultivation of the suit land. Vidya Parkash was a businessman in Shimla Bazaar, and he was not cultivating any land in Village Anjhi. The entries in favour of Vidya Parkash are illegal, void, inoperative, and not binding on the plaintiff’s rights. Even the proforma defendants No.4 and 5 conceded the plaintiff's claim. However, the defendants No.1 to 3 contested the plaintiff’s claim on false and frivolous grounds. The defendants No.1 to 3 threatened the plaintiff to dispossess her from the suit land. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by the defendants No.1 to 3 by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and cause of action, the plaintiff being estopped to file the suit by her act, conduct, admissions and omissions, the suit having not been properly valued for Court fees and jurisdiction, the suit being barred by limitation, and the plaintiff having suppressed the material facts from the Court. The plaintiff’s claim was denied on the merits. It was specifically denied that the plaintiff was ever 4 2026:HHC:23642 inducted as a tenant by the pro forma defendants. The proforma defendants were not in possession of the suit land in the year 1962-63 and could not have inducted the plaintiff as a tenant. Khasra No. 2084/229 and 2085/229 never existed in the year 1962-63. Khasra No. 229, measuring 3-2 bighas, was recorded in the ownership of S/Sh. Hari Nand, Udhi Ram, Shiv Saran, Kesar Singh, Ram Krishan and Niranjan Singh and in possession of Ram Krishan and Niranjan Singh being co-sharers. Vidya Parkash purchased Khasra No. 229 from Ram Krishan and Niranjan Singh for valuable consideration. The sellers put Vidya Parkash in physical possession of the land somewhere in the year 1963. Vidya Parkash developed the area. He constructed a house and raised an orchard on the suit land. Vidya Parkash had also installed a telephone connection in his name in the year 1964. He constructed a water tank to irrigate his orchard. He also constructed an independent and separate room for the use of the servant. Megu, Kirpa Ram, Hira Lal and Twaru Ram, the husband of the plaintiff, resided in the accommodation meant for the servants. Twaru Ram was working as a servant of defendants Nos. 1 to 3. His services were terminated, and he was requested to vacate the room allotted to him. The plaintiff 5 2026:HHC:23642 instituted a false suit to preempt the action taken by defendants Nos 1 to 3. Sant Ram had filed partition proceedings against Hari Nand, Shadi Ram, Shiv Saran, Kesar Singh, Ram Krishan, Niranjan Singh, etc. and the land was partitioned by the learned Assistant Collector 1st Grade Kasumpti. Land measuring 1-11 bighas each was deducted from the share of Niranjan Singh and Ram Krishan and was allotted to Vidya Parkash. No one objected to the partition proceedings, and an instrument of partition was prepared on 14.11.1969. The proforma defendants are in collusion with the plaintiff, and the defendants No. 1 to 3 are not bound by any admission made by them. The defendants No. 1 to 3 had become the owners by way of adverse possession. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. An affidavit of Ram Krishan, defendant No.5, was filed in which it was admitted that Niranjan Singh and Ram Krishan had inducted the plaintiff, Lachhmi Devi, as tenant of the suit land which was previously shown as Khasra No. 229 measuring 3-2 bighas and is now shown as Khasra No. 2084/229 and 2085/229 on the payment of ₹100/- per annum as rent. The land was earlier joint and was separated by the revenue staff. 6 2026:HHC:23642 Ram Krishan and Niranjan Singh never sold the suit land to Vidya Parkash. They also did not deliver the possession to Vidya Parkash. Vidya Parkash was in occupation of the land measuring 15 bighas and 9 biswas in Village Anjhi, where he had constructed his house and installed a telephone. Plaintiff and her husband constructed a small Dhara on the suit land. The suit land is in possession of the plaintiff and her husband. She and her family members planted an apple orchard and constructed a water tank. The entries recording Vidya Parkash as non- occupancy tenants due to sale were incorrect and were incorporated by the revenue staff in collusion with Vidya Parkash. 5. A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 6. The following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 04.04.1991: 1. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land on October 4, 1975, as a tenant and has become the owner of the same by operation of law as alleged?OPP 2. Whether the revenue entries in respect of the suit land, in favour of Vidya Parkash, are illegal, void and are not binding upon the plaintiff, as alleged?OPP 7 2026:HHC:23642 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of a permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for?OPP 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form as alleged in preliminary objection No.1?OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the suit due to her own acts, deeds, conduct, lapses, admission and consent as alleged?OPD 6. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for Court fees and jurisdiction, if so, what is the correct valuation of the suit property?OPD 7. Whether the suit is time-barred as alleged?OPD 8. Whether the suit land was purchased by Vidya Parkash in the year 1963, as alleged?OPD 9. Relief. 7. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and plaintiff examined herself (PW1), Sukh Ram (PW2), Narotam (PW3), Gaura Devi (PW4), N.C. Sharma (PW5) and Shyam Lal (PW6). The defendants examined Ratti Ram (DW1), defendant No.1 (DW2), Ratti Ram (DW3) and Hira Lal (DW4). 8. The learned Trial Court held that the suit land was earlier recorded as Khasra No. 229 in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1963-64 (Ext.P16). The plaintiff produced the receipts in which Khasra No. 2084/229 and Khasra No. 2085/229 were described. This shows that the receipts were forged and fabricated. Plaintiff admitted that a writing was executed at the time of her induction, but no such writing was produced on 8 2026:HHC:23642 record. She had filed an application, before the revenue authorities, mentioning that she was in possession for 30 years, which means that she was inducted somewhere in the year 1959, which is contrary to her claim in the Court that she was inducted as a tenant in the year 1962-63. The evidence on record proved that a water tank existed on the suit land, which corroborated the version of defendants No. 1 to 3 that their predecessor had constructed the water tank. The plea taken by the defendants that their predecessor had purchased the suit land by way of oral sale was highly probable. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issues Nos 4 and 8 in the affirmative, the rest of the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had failed to prove the oral sale made in favour of their predecessor. The plaintiff’s claim of the tenancy was admitted by defendants No. 4 and 5. The plaintiff was found to be in possession of the suit land by 9 2026:HHC:23642 the local Commissioner appointed by this Court. The suit was within the period of limitation. Even if the receipts produced by the plaintiff were forged, it will not take away her right to file the suit. Learned Trial court erred in dismissing the suit. Hence, the appeal filed by the plaintiff was accepted, judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, the defendants filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 02.03.2015: 1. Whether the judgment of the First Appellate Court is sustainable in view of the non-consideration and mis- reading of oral as well as documentary evidence, especially the documents Ext. P1 to Ext. P11, PA, DW2/A, DW2/B, DW2/C, D-46 and D-47? 2. Whether the Appellate Court is right in ignoring the revenue entries Ext.D-37 to D-45, showing the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants and Shri Vidya Parkash simply on the ground that no rapat regarding the sale of the suit land was made to the concerned Patwari? 3. Whether the reports Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B were sufficient to hold the tenancy in favour of respondent No.1 in the absence of any other evidence regarding the same? 4. Whether the First Appellate Court is right in relying upon the affidavit Mark ‘X’ and the statements of Shri Narotam and Shri Shonkia Ram recorded by the patwari in an 10 2026:HHC:23642 application for creating of revenue entries without examining the said witness on oath before the Court? 11. I have heard Mr Deepak Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Harshit Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 and Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondents No. 5, 7 and 8. 12. Mr Deepak Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing a well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. The learned Appellate Court decided the appeal as if the suit was filed by defendants No.1 to 3. The burden to prove her claim was upon the plaintiff, and the suit could not have been decreed because the defendants No. 1 to 3 had failed to prove the oral sale made in their favour. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were in possession. Learned Appellate Court erred in relying upon the admissions made by defendant No.5 in favour of the plaintiff. No opportunity of cross- examination was provided to the defendants No. 1 to 3, and such an admission could not have been read against the defendants No. 1 to 3. The Appellate Court concluded that the receipts 11 2026:HHC:23642 produced by the plaintiff were forged and still decreed the suit. A person who relies upon falsehood is not entitled to the discretionary relief from the Court. Learned Appellate Court had also relied upon the statements of Narotam and Shonkia Ram recorded by Patwari. These persons were not examined before the Court, and the statements made by them before the Patwari were hearsay in nature and could not have been relied upon. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions. (i) Jagdish Prasad Patel (dead) through LRs & anr. Vs. Shivnath & ors. (2019) 6 SCC 82; (ii) Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra & ors 2014 (4) SCC 465; (iii) Union of India & ors. Vs. Bijoy Lal Ghosh & ors. (1998) 3 SCC 362; (iv) Malluru Mallappa (dead) through LRs Vs. Kuruvathappa & ors. (2020) 4 SCC 313; (v) Laliteshwar Prasad Singh & ors. Vs. S.P. Srivastava (dead) through LRs (2017) 2 SCC 415; 12 2026:HHC:23642 (vi) Union of India & ors. Vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. & ors. (2014) 2 SCC 269; (vii) Geeta Bhawan Vs. Balbir Singh & ors. 2018 (2) Him. L.R. 1004; (viii)Google India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Visakha Industries AIR 2020 SC 382; (ix) Mukhtiar Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1971 SC 1864; 13. Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.1, submitted that defendant No.5 was the owner of the suit land. An admission made by him that he and Niranjan Singh had inducted the plaintiff as a tenant was entitled to a great value. Revenue entries were changed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants without following the proper procedure of law, and such entries are liable to be ignored. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the defendants cannot succeed without proving an oral sale in favour of their predecessors. The evidence in support of oral sale was not satisfactory. No such sale was reported to the revenue authorities, even though other sales made in favour of Vidya Parkash were reported to the patwari. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts while deciding 13 2026:HHC:23642 the regular second appeal in the absence of any perversity. There is no perversity in the judgment of the learned Appellate Court requiring any interference from this Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions. (i) Hira Devi Vs. Kirpa Ram & ors. Latest HLJ 2022 (HP) (2) 826; (ii) M/s Gabion Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Amcon Master Builders Missarwala, Latest HLJ 2017 (HP) 1136 (iii) S. Subramanian Vs. Sramasamy & ors. (2019) 6 SCC 46; (iv) Gurdev Kaur & ors. Vs. Kaki & ors. (2007) 1 SCC 546; (v) Maro (dead) through LR Paramjeet Kaur Vs. Khillo 2012 (2) Shim. L.C. 869; (vi) Kashi Ram Vs. Harbhajan Singh Bhajji 2002 (2) SLJ 1274; (vii) Moti Ram Vs. Ram Swaroop & ors. 2012 (1) Him. L.R. 11; (viii)Surat Singh Vs. F.C. (Appeals) & anr. Latest HLJ 2008 (HP) 20; (ix) Guru Amarjit Singh Vs. Rattan Chand & ors. (1993) 4 SCC 349; 14 2026:HHC:23642 (x) Suraj Bhan & ors. Vs. Financial Commissioner & ors. (2007) 6 SCC 186; (xi) Anil Rishi Vs. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558; (xii) Kanti Lal Vs. Shanti Devi & ors. AIR 1997 Rajasthan 230; (xiii)Durga (deceased) & ors. Milkhi Ram & ors. 1969 PLJ 105 SC. (xiv) Jattu Ram Vs. Hakam Singh & ors. 1993 (4) SCC 403; 14. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 of CPC 15. The scope of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 100 of the CPC was explained by this Court in Maro (supra), wherein it was observed: 13. The Apex Court in Hari Singh v. Kanhaiya Lal (1999) 7 SCC 288, has held that “the jurisdiction of courts in first appeals, second appeals or revisions is all to the extent conferred by the legislature. No litigant possesses any natural or inherent right to appeal against any order, unless a statute confers it, and it is to the extent it is conferred. Thus, the area of challenge is also hedged by the legislature. Hence, the challenge to the impugned order has to be confined with such a limitation.” 15 2026:HHC:23642 14. The word ‘substantial’ as qualifying a question of law has been clarified by the Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546 to mean “having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable.” It is further held that “even if the first appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground. In other words, a search for truth has to be reconciled with the doctrine of finality. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant, but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury. To interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice, no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact.” 15. In Municipal Committee Hoshiarpur v. Punjab State Electricity Board, (2010) 13 SCC 216, the Apex Court has further held that “it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity, power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection.” 16. Further in Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu, (1996) 3 SCC 392, the Apex Court has held that “what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity, however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 17. However, in Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs (2001) 4 SCC 262, the Apex Court held that “technicality alone by itself ought not to permit the High 16 2026:HHC:23642 Court to decide the issue since a justice-oriented approach is the call of the day presently.” 18. But then, subsequently in Manjunath Anandappa URF Shivappa Hansi v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390, it clarified that “an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. The difference is real, though fine.” 19. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, even post amendment of the provisions of Section 100 CPC, stands reiterated by the Apex Court and in its various judicial pronouncements, it is held that it would be open for the High Court to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by the Court below only where findings of facts are vitiated by; (i) non-consideration of relevant evidence, (Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 & Ram Das v. Gandia Bai, (1997) 1 SCC 74); (ii) conclusion is based on no evidence, (Ramanuja Naidu (supra), Neelkantan v. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440). (iii) Conclusions are biased, and evidence is not sufficient to support the same; (Ramanuja Naidu (supra)); (iv) material evidence having a direct impact on the decision of the case was ignored; (Ram Das (supra) & Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483); (v) misread evidence which led to miscarriage of justice, (Rohini Prasad v. Kasturchand (2000) 3 SCC 668); (vi) Rejected the witness accepted by the trial Court, (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722); 17 2026:HHC:23642 (vii) Findings are erroneous, being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable/settled by the Apex Court, (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)); (viii) assumed jurisdiction not vested in the Court (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)); (ix) not appreciating oral and documentary evidence properly, which materially prejudices the case of the parties, rendering the findings to be perverse, (Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262, Neelkantan (supra), Ramlal v. Phagua (2006) 1 SCC 168 & Municipal Committee Hoshiarpur (supra)); (x) interpretation of documents which goes to the root of the title of a party, (Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, (2010) 12 SCC 740). (xi) where the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof, (Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi v. Rajat Vidyarthi, (2009) 3 SCC 287); 20. The Apex Court has held that the High Court cannot set aside findings of the first Appellate Court in the following circumstances; (i) No point of law pleaded before the Courts below (V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, (2001) 7 SCC 617, Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545); (ii) to arrive at a different conclusion on reappraisal of evidence, to adjudge the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conclusion of facts, (Ramanuja Naidu (supra)), (iii) mere equitable consideration, (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)); (iv) the first Appellate Court did not advert to all the reasons given by the trial Court, (Arumugham (dead) by LRs v. Sundarambal (1999) 4 SCC 350); 18 2026:HHC:23642 (v) where two inferences are possible, the one drawn by the lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court, (Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra), Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Esmail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 and Hero Vinoth (supra)); (vi) Another view is possible on re-appreciation of the same evidence (Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty (1996) 6 SCC 166). 16. It was held in Gurdev Kaur (supra) that the High Court cannot interfere with the pure finding of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court. It was observed: 68. The rationale behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having a jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, insofar as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on questions of law. 69. The analysis of cases decided by the Privy Council and this Court prior to 1976 clearly indicated the scope of interference under Section 100 CPC by this Court. Even prior to the amendment, the consistent position has been that the courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. 70. Now, after the 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction to interfere 19 2026:HHC:23642 under Section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved, and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law, and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words “substantial question of law”, which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that the legislature never wanted a second appeal to become “third trial on facts” or “one more dice in the gamble”. The effect of the amendment, mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such a question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question. 71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of 20 2026:HHC:23642 evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that justice has to be administered in accordance with the law. 72. When Section 100 CPC is critically examined, then, according to the legislative mandate, the interference by the High Court is permissible only in cases involving substantial questions of law. 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. 74. The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court. 17. This position was reiterated in S. Subramanian (supra), wherein it was observed: 7.3. As per a catena of the decisions of this Court, while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court is not required to reappreciate the entire evidence on record and to come to its own conclusion and the High Court cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below when the findings recorded by both the courts below were on appreciation of evidence. That is exactly what is done by the High Court in the present case while deciding the second appeals, which is not permissible under the law. 7.4. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per a catena of the decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 CPC, the second appeal would be maintainable only on a substantial question of law. The 21 2026:HHC:23642 second appeal does not lie on a question of fact or of law. The existence of “a substantial question of law” is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam [Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722], in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous, being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in a second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently, is not a question of law justifying interference in the second appeal. 7.5. When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, it has been dealt with and considered by this Court in Ishwar Dass Jain [Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434]. In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: (SCC p. 437) “Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law, and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of 22 2026:HHC:23642 fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered, which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence, which, if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise.” 18. A similar view was taken in Hira Devi (supra), where it was observed: (iv) Section 100 C.P.C. In (1999) 3 SCC 722 titled Kondiba Dagadu Kadam Vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact being the first appellate Court........In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal.......unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of applicable law or contrary to the law as pronounced by the apex Court or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. The above was reiterated in (2019) 6 SCC 46 titled S. Subramanian Vs. S. Ramasamy and others, wherein it was inter alia held that the High Court is not required to re- appreciate the entire evidence on record and to come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly the first appellate Court, are on appreciation of evidence. In 2012 (2) Shim. LC 869, titled Maro (dead) through L.R. Paramjeet Kaur (Smt.), wife of 23 2026:HHC:23642 Shri Om Prakash, Vs. Khillo, the wife of Tirath Ram, following the circumstances, were held not sufficient for interfering with the findings of the first appellate Court:- '20.The Apex Court has held that the High Court cannot set aside findings of the first Appellate Court in the following circumstances; (i) No point of law pleaded before the Courts below {V. Pechimuthu vs. Gowrammal,(2001) 7 SCC 617, Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545; (ii) to arrive at a different conclusion on reappraisal of evidence, to adjudge the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conclusion of facts, {Ramanuja Naidu (supra)}, (iii) mere equitable consideration, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)}; (iv) the first Appellate Court did not advert to all the reasons given by the trial Court, Arumugham (dead) by LRs & Ors. vs. Sundarambal & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC 350}; (v) where two inferences are possible, the one drawn by the lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court, {Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra), Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Anjuman-E-Esmail Madris-Un-Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343 and Hero Vinoth (supra)}; (vi) Another view is possible on re- appreciation of the same evidence, {Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty (1996) 6 SCC 166}.' In 2020(10) Scale 168, titled Nazir Mohamed Vs. Kamala and ors., Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles relating to Section 100 CPC as under: - '37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus : 24 2026:HHC:23642 (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or a wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, the answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered 5 AIR 1963 SC 302 on a material question violates the settled position of law. (iv) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below 25 2026:HHC:23642 have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence;(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to cases where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.' 19. This Court held in Geeta Bhavan (supra) that the Court can interfere with a finding of fact if relevant admissible evidence was not taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence was considered. It was observed: 29. Hon'ble Apex Court in D.R. Rathna Murthy v. Ramappa, (2011) 1 SCC 158, has specifically held that the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the second appeal, provided the findings recorded by Courts below are found to be perverse. It has further been held in the case supra that there is no absolute bar on the reappreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: — “9. Undoubtedly, the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the Second Appeal, provided the findings recorded by the courts below are found to be perverse, i.e. not being based on the evidence or contrary to the evidence on record or reasoning is based on surmises and misreading of the evidence on record or where the core issue is not decided. There is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. (Vide 26 2026:HHC:23642 Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa, (2000) 6 SCC 120; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483.)” (p. 162) 30. Hon'ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By LRs., (2001) 3 SCC 179, has held that appellate Court ought not to interfere with the findings of trial Judge on a question of fact unless the latter has overlooked some peculiar feature connected with evidence of a witness or such evidence on balance is sufficiently improbable so as to invite displacement by appellate Court. 31. Careful reading of aforesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court clearly suggests that there is no blanket bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of Courts below, especially when it emerge from the record that (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. Hon'ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs v. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs, (2013) 15 SCC 161, has held as under: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarised in para 24, which is extracted below: (SCC pp. 555-56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recital or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. The construction of a document involving 27 2026:HHC:23642 the application of any principle of law is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or a wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, the answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably 28 2026:HHC:23642 capable of supporting the finding. We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard, and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp. 174-175) 32. It is quite evident from the aforesaid exposition of law that even concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below can be interfered with/upset by the High Courts, while exercising power under Section 100 CPC, if it is convinced that findings recorded by Courts below are not based upon any evidence and the same are perverse. However, in the case at hand, this Court, having perused the entire record, finds no perversity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, and as such, there is no scope left for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts below. 20. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact without any perversity. It was observed: “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact, however erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in a second appeal, which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in the second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram v. Ameerchand (1981) 2 SCC 414 had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or 29 2026:HHC:23642 grossly inexcusable, that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of a clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs (2005) 10 SCC 553, wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram v. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram (1995) 6 SCC 213, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court, and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal, and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 21. Therefore, it is apparent that the Court can interfere with the pure finding of facts recorded by the learned First Appellate Court only if there is a perversity. The term perversity was explained by this Court in Gabion Technologies India (P) Ltd. (supra) as under: 7. What is ‘perverse’ was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu v. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor (2009) 10 SCC 206, wherein it was held as under: — 30 2026:HHC:23642 “26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma, AIR 1977 Kar. 58, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough (1878) 1 LR 1r 331, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814, the Court defined ‘perverse’ as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc. 27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition PERVERSE: - Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition PERVERSE: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition PERVERSE: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) PERVERSE: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behaviour or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition 31 2026:HHC:23642 PERVERSE: A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761, the Court observed thus : (SCC p.766, para 8 “8…We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges, as the view taken by it was a reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that an appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court, as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity.” 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, the Court, while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, observed as under : (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) “9. Normally, the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry, but if the finding of “guilt” is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable, and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, however compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse, and the findings would not be interfered with.” 32 2026:HHC:23642 30. The meaning of ‘perverse’ has been examined in H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) “7. In the present case, the stage at which and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review were raised and entertained were not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court to re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in law.” 8. What is ‘perverse’ has further been considered by this Court in RSA No. 436 of 2000, titled ‘Rubi Sood v. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner: — “25….. A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which 33 2026:HHC:23642 has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality, incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from the vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further, if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and thus, stands vitiated.” 9. What is ‘perversity’ recently came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi (2016) 3 SCC 78, wherein it was held as under: — “8. Perversity” has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 34 2026:HHC:23642 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190, it has been held at paragraph-11 that : (SCC pp. 192-93) “11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court, in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in a second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case, a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect.” 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) “10. It is settled law that in the exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court, which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of the existence of a landlord- tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and the default committed by the latter in payment of rent.” 22. Therefore, the Court has to determine whether there is any perversity in the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court or not. 35 2026:HHC:23642 Substantial Questions of Law Nos. 1 to 4: 23. These substantial questions of law are interconnected with each other and are being taken up together for consideration. 24. Defendant No.5 Ram Krishan was recorded to be the co-owner and in possession with Niranjan Singh of the land bearing Khasra No. 229 in the copy of the jamabandi for the year 1963-64 (Ext.P16). An entry in the column of remarks reads that Ram Krishan, Niranjan Singh and Hari Nand had mortgaged their land for ₹7,564.31, and their share was attached vide Rapat No. 361 dated 03.05.1968. Ram Krishan is recorded to be the owner in a copy of the jamabandi for the year 1967-68 and in possession with Niranjan Singh through Vidya Parkash. The column of remarks mentions the sale without rent. Ram Krishan is recorded to be the owner of Khasra No. 2085/229, Niranjan Singh is recorded to be the owner of Khasra No. 229/1, and Vidya Parkash is recorded to be in possession as a non-occupancy tenant in the Jamabandi for the year 1972-73 (Ext. P18). The column of rent mentions the sale without rent. Similar entries have been repeated in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1977- 36 2026:HHC:23642 78 (Ext.D41 and Ext. D42), for the year 1987-88 (Ext.D43 and Ext.D44) and the copy of Khasra Girdwari 1982-83 to 1987-88 (Ext.D45). Defendants No. 1 to 3 also claimed that Ram Krishan and Niranjan had sold the suit land to Vidya Parkash, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants No. 1 to 3. Therefore, the ownership of Ram Krishan and Niranjan is not in dispute. 25. Ram Krishan was arrayed as a defendant No.5. He filed an affidavit (Mark X) before the Court in which he acknowledged that he and Niranjan Singh had inducted the plaintiff as a tenant and had never sold the suit land to Vidya Parkash. It was submitted that the affidavit filed by Ram Krishan was marked as Mark-X and was not exhibited. This affidavit was required to be proved by examining Ram Krishan and allowing the defendants No.1 to 3 to cross-examine him. This affidavit is inadmissible because no such opportunity was granted to the defendants No. 1 to 3. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra) that mere marking of documents does not dispense with the proof of the document. Thus, the mark on the document is not material, and it has to be determined whether the document was admissible in evidence or not. It was laid 37 2026:HHC:23642 down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, (1974) 1 SCC 78: 1973 SCC OnLine SC 322 that a statement made by a party is admissible, irrespective of the fact whether the party appeared in the witness box or the admission was put to him in the cross-examination. It was observed at page 81: 8. There is no merit even in the contention that, because these three statements — Exs. G, G-2 and H had not been put to the first plaintiff when he was in the witness box or to the eighth defendant, although he had discreetly kept away from giving evidence; they cannot be used against him. Counsel drew our attention to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be discredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case, an admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfils the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act; in the latter case, a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In the former, there is no requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio vigore: in the latter case, the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to him, as required by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. This distinction has been clearly brought out in the ruling in the Bharat Singh case. [AIR 1966 SC 405: (1966) 1 SCR 606, 615-16: (1966) 2 SCJ 53] This Court disposed of a similar argument with the following observations: "Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of the opinion 38 2026:HHC:23642 that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not, and whether that party, when appearing as a witness, was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under S. 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence." (Emphasis supplied) 26. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd., (1977) 1 SCC 60: 1976 SCC OnLine SC 377, wherein it was observed at page 67: 21….There is, however, no force in the other argument that they are not admissible in evidence against Defendant 3, as he was not confronted with them in the trial court, and they were not adverse to the interest of their maker at the time when they were made. It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirath [AIR 1966 SC 405 : (1966) 1 SCR 606] that an admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and that admissions duly proved are “admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party, when appearing as witness, was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions.” In taking this view, this Court has noticed the decision in Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava 39 2026:HHC:23642 [AIR 1957 All 1: ILR (1956) 2 All 399] also. The point has been considered and answered as follows in Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IV, §1048 (at p. 3): “The theory of the hearsay rule is that an extra- judicial assertion is excluded unless there has been sufficient opportunity to test the grounds of assertion and the credit of the witness, by cross-examination by the party against whom it is offered (post, §1362); e.g. if Jones had said out of court ‘The party-opponent Smith borrowed this fifty dollars’, Smith is entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine Jones upon that assertion. But if it is Smith himself who said out of court, ‘I borrowed this fifty dollars’, certain Smith cannot complain of lack of opportunity to cross- examine himself before his assertion is admitted against him. Such a request would be absurd. Hence, the objection of the hearsay rule falls away, because the very basis of the rule is lacking, viz., the need and prudence of affording an opportunity of cross- examination.” Moreover, Defendant 3 had a full opportunity to appear and defend himself, but he did not do so, and the case proceeded against him ex parte. The plaintiff even tried to examine him as his own witness, but his appearance could not be secured in spite of the prayer for the issue of summonses and a warrant. There is therefore no force in the argument to the contrary. 22. So also, there is no force in the argument that the aforesaid admissions or statements of Defendant 3 could not be read against him, as they were not averse to his interest when made. There is no such requirement of the Evidence Act, and the argument is untenable as it unreasonably restricts the opportunity to prove the true state of affairs on the party's own showing and to demolish his subsequent claim as self-contradictory. This point has also been dealt with in Wigmore on Evidence, §1048 (at p. 4) in this way: 40 2026:HHC:23642 “It follows that the subject of an admission is not limited to facts against the party-opponent's interest at the time of making it. No doubt the weight of credit to be given to such statements is increased when the fact stated is against the person's interest at the time, but that circumstance has no bearing upon their admissibility. On principle, it is plain that the probative reason why a party-opponent's utterance is sought to be used against him is ordinarily the reason noted above, in para 1(b), viz. that it exhibits an inconsistency with his present claim, thus tending to throw doubt upon it, whether he was at the time speaking apparently in his own favour or against his own interest.” The contrary view has been characterised by Wigmore as “a fallacy, in the fullest sense”. 23. Another argument which has been advanced against the admissibility of the aforesaid admissions of Defendant 3 is that they could be evidence only in terms of Section 33 of the Evidence Act. That argument is also quite untenable because Section 33 deals with statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses, and does not restrict or override the provisions relating to admissions in the Evidence Act. The High Court also committed a similar error of law in its impugned judgment. The aforesaid admissions of Defendant 3 are therefore satisfactory evidence to prove that he himself was the owner of the house, and his son, Defendant 2, was merely a “benamidar” for him. 27. It was held in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, (1974) 1 SCC 242: 1973 SCC OnLine SC 378, that the admissions are the best proof of the facts admitted. It was observed at page 251: “27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing 41 2026:HHC:23642 of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitutes a waiver of proof. They can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are, by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” 28. It was held in S.R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 507 that an admission is the best proof of the facts admitted. It was observed at page 289: “44. It is undoubtedly correct that a true and clear admission would provide the best proof of the facts admitted. It may prove to be decisive unless successfully withdrawn or proved to be erroneous. The legal position with regard to admissions and their evidentiary value has been discussed by this Court in many cases. We may notice some of them. 45. In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi [AIR 1960 SC 100], it was observed as follows: (AIR p. 105, para 11) 42 2026:HHC:23642 “11. … An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.” 46. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam [(1974) 1 SCC 242: AIR 1974 SC 471], it has been observed: (SCC p. 252, para 27) “27. … Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitutes a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties by themselves. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence are, by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.” 47. The aforesaid two judgments, along with some other earlier judgments of this Court, were considered by this Court in Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly [(2008) 7 SCC 85], wherein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 90 & 94, paras 16 & 28) “16. A thing admitted in view of Section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved. Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that even a vague or evasive denial may be treated as an admission, in which event the court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Relying on or on the basis thereof, a suit, having regard to the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may also be decreed on admission. It is one thing to say that, without resiling from an admission, it would be permissible to explain under what circumstances the same had been made, or it was made under a mistaken belief, or to clarify one's stand inter alia in regard to the extent or effect of such 43 2026:HHC:23642 admission, but it is another thing to say that a person can be permitted to totally resile therefrom. … *** 28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from, but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering an explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other.” 29. This position was reiterated in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 528, wherein it was observed at page 166: 29. Admission is the best piece of substantive evidence that an opposite party can rely upon, though not conclusive, and is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. Admission may, in certain circumstances, operate as an estoppel. The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be attached to an admission, and for that purpose, it is necessary to find out as to whether it is clear, unambiguous and a relevant piece of evidence, and further, it is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. It would be appropriate that an opportunity be given to the person under cross- examination to tender his explanation and clear the point on the question of admission. (Vide Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi [AIR 1960 SC 100], Basant Singh v. Janki Singh [AIR 1967 SC 341], Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil [(1977) 2 SCC 49: AIR 1977 SC 1712], Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar [(2003) 8 SCC 673: AIR 2004 SC 230], United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Samir Chandra Chaudhary [(2005) 5 SCC 784], Charanjit Lal Mehra v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan [(2005) 11 SCC 279: AIR 44 2026:HHC:23642 2005 SC 2765] and Udham Singh v. Ram Singh [(2007) 15 SCC 529] .) 30. In Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593], this Court held that an admission made by a party is admissible and the best evidence, unless it is proved that it had been made under a mistaken belief. While deciding the said case, reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Slatterie v. Pooley [(1840) 6 M&W 664: 151 ER 579], wherein it had been observed, “What a party himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so.” 31. In LIC v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010) 4 SCC 491 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1072: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 191] this Court held that: (SCC p. 496, para 23) “23. … failure to prove the defence does not amount to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff….” 32. In view of the above, the law on admissions can be summarised to the effect that an admission made by a party, though not conclusive, is a decisive factor in a case unless the other party successfully withdraws the same or proves it to be erroneous. Even if the admission is not conclusive, it may operate as an estoppel. Law requires that an opportunity be given to the person who has made an admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify the point on the question of admission. Failure of a party to prove its defence does not amount to admission, nor can it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff. 34. Section 58 provides that a fact may not need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto agreed to admit at the hearing or which, before the hearing, they agreed to admit by any writing under their hands or which they admitted by their pleading, even in that case the court may, in its discretion, even if such an admission has been made by the party, require the fact admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. In fact, admission by a party may be oral or in writing. “Admissions” are governed under Sections 17 to 31 of the 45 2026:HHC:23642 Evidence Act, and such admissions can be tendered and accepted as substantive evidence. While admission for purposes of trial may dispense with proof of a particular fact. Section 58 deals with admissions during trial, i.e. at or before the hearing, which are known as judicial admissions or stipulations dispensed with proof. Admissions are not conclusive proof but may operate as an estoppel against its maker. Documents are necessarily either proved by a witness or marked on admission. 30. In the present case, the affidavit of Ram Krishan was filed before the learned Trial Court as a response to the plaintiff’s suit and would be per se admissible as a judicial admission without his examination and cross-examination, and the grievance of the defendants No. 1 to 3 that no opportunity to cross-examine defendant No.5 was afforded is not justified. 31. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan (supra), the affidavit was not executed by the party to the proceeding but by a stranger, and it was held that the affidavit would not be evidence and the case could not have been decided without allowing the party an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 32. The defendants Nos. 1 to 3 claimed that Vidya Parkash, their predecessor, had purchased the suit land from 46 2026:HHC:23642 Ram Krishan and Niranjan. A heavy reliance was placed upon the entries in the column of rent, wherein a sale, without payment of rent, was mentioned. These entries will not help the defendants No.1 to 3. Ram Krishan and Niranjan were recorded to be in possession in the Jamabandi for the year 1963-64 (Ext.P16). This entry was changed in the jamabandi for the year 1967-68 (Ext.P17), and the name of Vidya Parkash was recorded to be in possession as a non-occupancy tenant without payment of rent because of the sale. The basis for the change of the entries is not mentioned in the column of remarks. Shayam Lal (PW6) brought the record and stated that no entry was recorded regarding the change in favour of Vidya Parkash, even though the entries No. 100, 101, 102 and 283 (Ext. PW6/A to Ext. PW6/D) were made regarding various sales in favour of Vidya Parkash by different owners. He admitted in cross-examination that oral sale was permissible in the year 1970, and entry could have been changed as per the statement made by the seller. The statement of this witness shows that even though the entries of sale in favour of Vidya Parkash were recorded in the different rapat roznamchas regarding other sales in favour of Vidya Prakash, no such entry was recorded in respect of the suit land. Learned 47 2026:HHC:23642 Appellate Court was justified in holding that Vidya Parkash was careful enough to get the entries of sales recorded in the Rapat roznamcha in respect of other lands purchased by him, but could not be careless not to get such an entry recorded in respect of the suit land. Further, the entries could have been changed during Khasra Girdawari based on the statement made by the seller, but no such statement was brought on record. Thus, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the oral sale in favour of Vidya Prakash was not proved. 33. There is no evidence that the procedure required to change the entry was followed in the present case. It was laid down by this Court in Shyam Lal vs Johli 1995(1) Cur. L.J. (HP) 635, that where the revenue entry was changed without following the procedure, the presumption of correctness attached to the changed entry is rebutted. It was observed: “31. At this stage, the procedure, as envisaged under the instructions for change of entry, can safely be referred. These instructions are contained in the Himachal Pradesh Land Records manual (Revised Edition) 1992, under Chapter 6, Maintenance and Updation of Land Records. Instruction 9.8 thereof is being reproduced hereunder for the sake of convenience: "9.8 The crops will be entered in the Khasra Girdawari, as the inspection proceeds, in the 48 2026:HHC:23642 column provided for the purpose. The changes in rights, rents and possession will be noted in the appropriate column in pencil. And, where the boundaries or area of a field have changed in such a manner as to require a correction of the field map, the Patwari will make a rough measurement, sufficient for the crop entries. All changes in rights, rents and possession shall be recorded by the Patwari in pencil and by putting a cross in pencil in columns 12, 16, 20, 24 and 28 of Khasra Girdawari in accordance with Govt. instructions issued vide letter No. 10-5/73-II, dated 4-9-80. As per these instructions, the Patwari will give information of such changes to the Tehsildar/Naib-Tehsildar as the case may be. The Tehsildar/Naib Tehsildar will inquire and give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties. The Inquiry should be completed within three months, and the entries will be made in Khasra girdawari according to the orders passed by the revenue Officers after entering in his diary." 32. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the Patwari while changing the entry in the name of the plaintiff in the year 1967. So any change made without any enquiry, behind the back of the tenants, without any order from any competent authority, will not be competent in the eyes of the law and have to be ignored. 33. The change in entry in the year 1967, being without any authority, will have no legal force at all, and as a consequence thereof, the subsequent entries made on the basis of that change in favour of the plaintiff stood legally rebutted.” 34. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Amal Kumar vs. Bhupender Singh, 1976 PLJ 26, that the person who is likely to be affected by such a change is 49 2026:HHC:23642 required to be notified, and proof of such notification is required to be retained on record. It was observed: “The Financial Commissioner has prescribed the mode for effecting changes in the existing Khasra Girdawaris. According to the instructions, it is the duty of the Patwari, before making any change in the existing entry at the time of harvest inspection, to notify in writing the person or persons likely to be adversely affected by such a change of the entries and retain on record proof of the notifications. Further, the changes so made should be attested by the Lambardar or the Panch of the village. It is further stated in the instructions that entries made in violation of the said instructions shall be treated as null and void at the time of attestation of the Jamabadi or at an earlier stage. Under Section 11 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1887, the Financial Commissioner had the general power of superintendence and control over all Revenue Officers, and in that capacity, he has got a right to issue such instructions. In this view, I am supported by a decision of this Court in S. Mohan Singh V. The Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab and others, 1967 PunLR 377, wherein it has been observed that the standing orders can be issued because of the general power of superintendence granted to the Financial Commissioners under Section 11 of the Land Revenue Act. These instructions have been issued to put a curb on the unrestricted owners of the Patwaris to manipulate the Khasra Girdawaris in the way they desire. It was the duty of the Patwari before changing the Khasra Girdawari and making an entry in favour of the appellants to have informed the landowners so that they could come and contest the new entry, which was to be made by him if they so desired.” 35. This judgment was followed in Parmanand vs. Sucha Singh 1997(1) PLJ 474, wherein it was held: 50 2026:HHC:23642 “As per para 9.9 of the Punjab Land Records Manual, a duty has been imposed upon the revenue authorities to notify the proposed change to adversely affected parties. In case no notice has been issued, such a change in entry cannot bind the affected person. This matter came up for consideration in the case reported as Ram Sarup v. Balwant Sing and Ors., 1991 P.L.J. 278, and the Court relied upon para-No. 9.9. of the Punjab Land Records Manual held it is incumbent upon the concerned revenue authorities to inform the affected person before effecting any change in the revenue entries.” 36. This question was considered by this Court in Harbans Singh vs. 1991(2) Shim. L. C.222, and it was held: 8. It is well settled that where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries the change was effected without any mutation and there was no order of the Revenue Authorities showing how the change was made, although the presumption ordinarily would be in favour of the later entries, yet that presumption is rebuttable one and it would be deemed to have been rebutted by the fact that the alterations in the later entries are found to have been made unauthorisedly or mistakenly, there being no material to justify the change of entries. This is what has been found to have been done in the instant case, while the entries recording the plaintiffs to be the owners in possession of the suit land have been recorded in the later Khasra Girdawari. In fact, the Financial Commissioner has prescribed the mode for effecting changes in the existing Khasra Girdawaries. According to the instructions, it is the duty of the Patwari before making any change in the existing entry at the time of harvest inspection, to notify in writing the person or persons likely to be adversely affected by such a change of the entries and retain on record proof of the notifications Further, the changes so made, should be attested by the Lumberdar or the Panch 51 2026:HHC:23642 of the village. It is further stated in the instructions that entries made in violation of the said instructions shall be treated as null and void at the time of attestation of the Jamabandi or at an earlier stage. 37. This position was reiterated in Lal Chand & Ors. Vs. Pala 1999(2) Cur. L.J. (HP) 415, and it was held: 23. It may not be out of place to mention here that there is a legal presumption of truth attached to the latest entries in the record of rights, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. In the present case, in the latest record rights, as discussed above, Pala has been recorded in actual occupation of the suit land as a tenant. His simple case, as pleaded, has been that about 40 years back, when Prem Singh, father of the plaintiff and proforma defendants No. 2 and 3, died, he was inducted as a tenant by the land owners. This only reflected that prior to the death of Prem Singh, that is, Prem Singh was in actual occupation of the suit land, which fact is otherwise reflected from the entries in the record of rights, referred to above. There is no dispute to the proposition that the late entries in the record of rights to which a legal presumption of truth is attached were the result of the change made in Kharif 1979 pertaining to the suit land. In case this change was made in Kharif 1979 in favour of Pala, the defendant is held to be a legal one definitely, the later entries made on the basis of the same would be held to be a legal one. In case this change is not held to be legal, and the change made in Kharif 1979 is avoided, the later entries in favour of the Pala defendant shall automatically fall. There is again no dispute to this proposition. *** 26. The entries were changed in the name of the Pala defendant vide Ex.DW3/A, referred to earlier. There is nothing in this document that the present plaintiff and defendants No.2 and 3 were present when this entry was 52 2026:HHC:23642 changed. There is nothing on record to suggest even remotely that any enquiry was conducted by the Patwari before making this entry, and in that enquiry, the present plaintiff and proforma defendants No.2 and 3 were associated. This report is silent that Pala was inducted as a tenant on payment of rent by the land owners. There is no evidence that, before recording this entry in October 1979, the earlier tenants who were recorded in this record of rights were evicted in accordance with law, or that they had relinquished their tenancy rights. Thus, at the very face of it, so far as the documents are concerned, which have been discussed above, the change in an entry in the name of the Pala defendant was made without any authority and against law and procedure in this behalf. In case this entry is ignored, the subsequent entries made in favour of Pala automatically lose their legal entity. 38. This position was reiterated in Kashi Ram v. Harbhajan Singh Bhajji, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 13: AIR 2002 HP 154, wherein it was observed at page 157: 15. Therefore, in the absence of any admission on the part of the plaintiff conceding the possession of the plaintiff so as to enable the Revenue Authorities to change the entries on this basis, or in the absence of any legal order from either a Revenue or Civil Court, presumption of truth attached to the entries contained in Ex. PW-1/E is not available to the defendant. Though Ms Mehta submitted that the presumption is still available. To the specific query of the Court as to how the entries were changed as observed hereinabove for the first time in the year 1978-1979, no explanation could be given by her. In these circumstances, how the matter needs to be looked into is no longer res integra. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Durga v. Milkhi Ram, 1969 PLJ 105. What was observed in this case and squarely covers the present case is extracted herein below: — 53 2026:HHC:23642 “…….Where the earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change was effected without any mutation and there was no order of the revenue authorities showing how the change was made, held, although the presumption (under S. 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act would be in favour of the later entries but that presumption was a rebuttable one and it would stand rebutted by the fact that the alteration in the later entries was made unauthorisedly or mistakably, there being no material to justify the change of entries………” 17. At the risk of repetition, it may be observed that there is no lawful order on record authorising the change in entry, as such, no benefit can be derived by the defendant either from the entries contained in Jamabandi for the years 1978-1979 Ex. PW-1/E, or Ex. PW-4/K supra. 39. A similar view was taken in Moti Ram (supra), wherein it was observed: “22….There is no evidence on record to establish that the entry in Rapat Roznamacha was recorded in the presence of the owner of the suit land. PW-2 Chander Shekhar Patwari has categorically testified that, as per Ex.PW-2/A, the owners were not present at the time of making entries. Defendant has also not placed on record any order of the competent authority for recording the name of the defendant in the column of possession over the suit land. The defendant claims himself to be the owner of the suit land, but, as discussed herein above, in column No. 4 of the jamabandi, he is shown in possession of the suit land, as a tenant. There is no tangible material placed on record by the defendant to establish that the possession was handed over to him by plaintiff Lachhmi Singh….” 54 2026:HHC:23642 40. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the entries in favour of Vidya Parkash showing that the sale was made in his favour were liable to be ignored. 41. Sukh Ram (PW2) brought the record and proved the reports (Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B). It was submitted that the reports produced by him were inadmissible in evidence and could not have been relied upon by the learned Appellate Court. This submission will not help the defendants No. 1 to 3. The reports (Ext.PW2/A and Ext.PW2/B) were made by Patwari and Field Kanugo in the discharge of their official duties and are admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly relied upon these reports. 42. The report (Ext.PW2/A) mentions that no affidavit or rapat roznamcha was found showing how the name of Vidya Parkash was incorporated in the revenue record. The copy of Khasra Girdwari for the years 1967-68 was not available. The plaintiff was in possession of the suit land, and she was cultivating the land for 27/28 years. Vidya Parkash was recorded to be in possession, but he never cultivated the land. These 55 2026:HHC:23642 reports corroborate the plaintiff’s version regarding her possession. 43. This Court had appointed local Commissioners in Contempt Petition No. 47 of 1995 titled Lalit Kumar versus Lachhmi Devi and others, who submitted their report dated 03.08.1995. A certified copy of the report mentions that the local Commissioners were of the opinion that presently and even before 21.12.1994, the respondent Lachhmi Devi and others are and were in possession of the suit land, and they had cultivated it. This report also corroborates the plaintiff’s version that she was in possession of the suit land. 44. It was submitted that the Local Commissioners were not appointed in the present suit, they were not examined before the Court, and the report submitted by them was inadmissible. This submission will not help the defendants. Order 26 Rule 10 of the CPC deals with the procedure of the commissioner. Rule 10 (2) provides that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. An option has been given to the parties to call the local Commissioner to cross- 56 2026:HHC:23642 examine him. Therefore, the rule itself provides that the report is admissible in evidence. It was laid down by this Court in Rajinder Parsad vs. Lachhman Dass 2001 (2) Shim. LC 21 that the report of the local Commissioner in other proceedings is not inadmissible in evidence. It was observed: 15….The report Ext. DW2/A cannot be said to be vitiated or inadmissible in evidence simply because the Local Commissioner was appointed in some earlier proceedings between the same parties, particularly when the Local Commissioner has been examined in the Court in respect of the report submitted by him. This report, however, can only be used for the limited purpose of appreciating the evidence that the parties have led. The report indeed cannot be made the sole basis and foundation for the judgment in disregard of the evidence on record. In this case, as noticed earlier, the report has been used for the purpose of appreciating the evidence on record and, therefore, suffers from no vice. The question is accordingly answered. 45. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in M. Rama Naidu & Anr Vs. B. Srinivasulu Naidu 1993 STPL 3397 AP, that the certified copy of the report of the local commissioner is admissible in evidence. It was observed: “4….The learned Judge further observed that the admission of certified copies of the plaint and written statement is universally adopted for the purpose of contradicting the witness on his earlier statement. Therefore, when a certified copy of the plaint and written statement is held admissible, there should not be any 57 2026:HHC:23642 difficulty in holding that the report filed by the Commissioner in an earlier suit is also admissible. 5. The admissibility of a document as evidencing a transaction is different from admitting the document to prove the contents thereof. So far as the admissibility of a document as evidence of a transaction is concerned, anybody who obtained the certified copy of the said document can produce the same for the purpose of showing the said transaction, and the document is admissible for that purpose. But, if the party wants to prove the contents, they can be proved by the author of the document. Therefore, if the Commissioner is not examined, the document would not become inadmissible as contended by the learned Counsel, but the probative value of the report would be very weak. 6. Justice Kodandaramayya, in another decision reported in V. Satyavathi v. P. Venkataratnam, 1988 (1) ALT 915, observed as follows:- "Hence, it is seen that if the truth of the contents itself is in issue, the proof of the document, viz., proving the genuineness and contents by producing the same, would not be sufficient to prove the truth of the contents of the document unless the writer of the document is examined. In the absence of such evidence, the contents only constitute hearsay evidence. However, it is not correct to say that the document is inadmissible in evidence. It may be relevant. Its probative value is very weak in the absence of the evidence of the author who wrote it." 7. In view of the decisions referred to above, I have no hesitation in holding that the report of the Commissioner is certainly admissible in evidence. 46. Therefore, the report submitted by the Local Commissioners before this Court was admissible in evidence 58 2026:HHC:23642 without the examination of the Commissioners, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly relied upon the report. 47. Lalit Kumar (DW2) stated that an apple orchard was raised, a servant quarter was constructed, and a water tank was constructed after the purchase. The water, electricity and telephone connections were taken for the house constructed on the suit land. He relied upon the bills and receipts regarding the payment of the water, electricity and telephone bills. However, the Khasra number has not been mentioned in any of the receipts/bills. Lalit Kumar admitted in his cross-examination that his father had purchased about 18-19 bighas of land. The house was constructed in Khasra No. 329. Thus, as per the admission made by Lalit Kumar, the house was not constructed on the suit land but on Khasra No. 329. Further, the fact that Vidya Parkash had purchased 18-19 bighas of land would make it necessary to lead satisfactory evidence to show that the water connection, telephone connection and electricity connection were taken regarding the structure raised on the suit land and not on any other land. In the absence of any such evidence, the learned Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the statement of Lalit Kumar (DW2). 59 2026:HHC:23642 48. Hira Lal (DW4) stated that he had worked as a Mali and Chowkidar in the orchard of Vidya Parkash. He stated in his cross-examination that Vidya Parkash owned 20-22 bighas of land, and the land was demarcated multiple times. The demarcation was carried out in the years 1965, 1968, 1971 and 1991. The copy of any demarcation was not placed on record to establish that the structures stated to have been raised by Vidya Parkash were, in fact, raised on the suit land and not on any other land. Thus, the testimony of this witness in the absence of better evidence cannot be relied upon. 49. A heavy reliance was placed upon the statements of Tawaru (Ext. D46) and Laxmi Devi (Ext.D47), in which Twaru had stated that he was serving with Vidya Parkash as a Mali for 15 years. He used to cut the grass from the land measuring 8 bigha 13 biswa along with his wife. Similarly, Laxmi Devi stated that she and her husband had been cutting the grass for the last 15 years, and no other person had cut the grass. These statements will not disprove the plaintiff's claim because it is perfectly permissible for the plaintiff to own the land and supplement her income by working as a servant with Vidya Parkash. The statements were made regarding 8 bigha 13 biswa 60 2026:HHC:23642 of land and not regarding the suit land. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from these statements. 50. The list of partition (Ext.DW2/A) shows that the land was divided between Sant Ram and Hari Nand. Vidya Parkash is not shown to be a party in it. Had Vidya Prakash been an owner, he would have participated in the partition, and this document does not prove the defence version that Vidya Prakash was an owner. 51. A heavy reliance was placed upon the receipts (Ext.P5, Ext.P6, Ext. P7 and Ext. P10) in which Khasra No. 2084/229 was mentioned to submit that this Khasra number came into existence only in the year 1972-73 and could not have been recorded before that. This submission will not help the defendants No. 1 to 3 because the defendant No.5, Ram Krishan, acknowledged the status of the plaintiff as a tenant. The defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have failed to prove that their predecessor Vidya Parkash had purchased the land, and they would be third- party and incompetent to challenge the status of the plaintiff, especially when it was acknowledged by the owner. 61 2026:HHC:23642 52. A reliance was also placed upon the copies of Khataunies (Ext.DW2/B and Ext.DW2/C) in which Vidya Parkash is shown to be in possession of Khasra No. 229 measuring 1-11 bighas and Khasra No. 229/1 measuring 1-11 bighas. These Khataunies mentioned the names of Niranjan Singh and Ram Krishan. The name of Vidya Parkash has been mentioned because it was reflected in the earlier jamabandi, which has been found to be without the proper procedure of law. Therefore, these Khataunies will not assist the claim of the defendants No.1 to 3. 53. Kanti Lal (supra) was a suit for recovery of possession and is not relevant. Anil Rishi (supra) holds that the burden of proof remains fixed, but the onus keeps on shifting. Suraj Bhan (supra) holds that the revenue entries carry a presumption of correctness and are entitled to great weight, but they do not confer any title upon any person. Similar prepositions were laid down in Guru Amarjit Singh (supra), Jattu Ram (supra) and Surat Singh (supra). 1998(3) SCC 366 (wrongly cited) deals with the service law. AIR 2020 SC 350 (wrongly cited) deals with the IPC and the Information Technology Act. Malluru Mallappa (supra), Jagdish Parsad (supra), Laliteshwar Prasad Singh (supra) and 62 2026:HHC:23642 Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. (supra) deal with the powers or duties of the First Appellate Court. In the present case, the learned First Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence, and these judgments do not apply to the present case. 54. Thus, the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court that defendants No. 1 to 3 had failed to prove that Vidya Parkash had purchased the suit land were supported by the evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse, requiring an interference in the second appeal. 50. In view of the above, the judgment of the learned Appellate Court does not suffer from non-consideration and misreading of oral and documentary evidence. The revenue entries in favour of Vidya Prakash were made without following the proper procedure and could not have been relied upon. The reports were made by the public officials in the discharge of their official duties and are duly corroborated by the report of the Local Commissioners. The affidavit executed by Ram Krishan, filed in the suit, was admissible without examining him. Therefore, these substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 63 2026:HHC:23642 Final Order: 51. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. 52. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 53. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd June, 2026 (Nikita)