1 2026:CGHC:18161 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 493 of 2025 1 - Late Nawab Khan (Died) Through His Legal Representatives- 1.1 - Smt. Zahida Begum W/o Late Nawab Khan Aged About 50 Years R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 1.2 - Naved Khan S/o Late Nawab Khan Aged About 24 Years R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 1.3 - Ku. Rehana Begum D/o Late Nawab Khan Aged About 19 Years R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 1.4 - Afroj Khan S/o Late Nawab Khan Aged About 16 Years The Minor 1 (D) Is Represented Through Legal Representative And Mother And Next Friend Smt. Zahida Begum, R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - Rukshana Begum W/o Sattar Ali Aged About 55 Years R/o Churi Line, Gol Bazar, Mungeli, Tehsil And Distt. Mungeli, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Sakhavat Ali S/o Late Ajmer Ali Aged About 32 Years R/o Musalman Para, Ward No. 7, Nawagarh, Tehsil Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Anwari Begum W/o Gafruddin Qureshi (Died) (Struck Off Her Name In The Original Suit As Plaintiff No. 03 On Account Of Her Death And Her L.R's Arrayed As Plaintiffs No. 3 (A) To 3 © 3.1 - Nawabuddin Qureshi S/o Gafaruddin Qureshi Aged About 37 Years R/o Village Siliari, Tehsil And Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3.2 - Kamaluddin Qureshi S/o Gafaruddin Qureshi Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Siliari, Tehsil And Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh. AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.04.24 17:34:54 +0530 2 3.3 - Jamal Qureshi S/o Gafaruddin Qureshi Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Musalman Para, Ward No. 7, Nawagarh, Tehsil Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Arman Khan S/o Sahban Khan (Died) (Struck Off His Name In The Original Suit As Defendant No. 02 On Account Of His Death And L.R's Are Arrayed As Defendants No. 04 (A) To 4(I) 4.1 - Ruby Khan W/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 33 Years R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 4.2 - Rehnuma Khan D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 11 Years Through Legal Representative Their Mother And Next Friend Smt. Ruby Khan, R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 4.3 - Shana Khan D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 2 Years Through Legal Representative Their Mother And Next Friend Smt. Ruby Khan, R/o Musalman Para, Nawagarh, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. 4.4 - Jamirunisha W/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Kundra, Post Dharsiva, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4.5 - Saddam Khan S/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Kundra, Post Dharsiva, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4.6 - Anjum Nisha D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Kundra, Post Dharsiva, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4.7 - Yashmin Bano D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Kundra, Post Dharsiva, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4.8 - Shabnam Bano(Wrongly Spelled As Shbnam In The Impugned Judgement) D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Kundra, Post Dharsiva, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4.9 - Tabassum Bano D/o Late Arman Khan Aged About 24 Years R/o Churi Line, Gol Bazar, Mungeli, Teh. And Distt. Mungeli, Chhattisgarh. 5 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Bemetara, Distt. Bemetara, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondents ____________________________________________________ For Appellants : Mr. Saket Pandey, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 21.04.2026 3 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants, who are the LRs of defendant No.1 challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 27/02/2025 passed by the learned 1st District Judge, Bemetara, District Bemetara, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.4A/2020 [Nawab Khan(died) through LRs Smt. Zahida Begum & Ors Vs. Rukshana Begum & Ors] arising out of the judgment and decree dated 17/12/2019 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Bemetara, C.G. in Civil Suit No.80A/2014 (Rukshana Begum & Ors Vs. Nawab Khan & Ors). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. (a) The plaintiffs preferred a suit concerning the land described in Schedule “A”, situated in Village Nawagarh, Patwari Halka No. 8, Tehsil Nawagarh, District Bemetara (Chhattisgarh), comprising Khasra Nos. 343/3, 360/2, 363, and 383/3 with respective areas of 0.060, 0.390, 0.520, and 0.180 hectares. Further, Schedule A (2) includes land in the same village bearing Khasra Nos. 345/2, 364, 369, and 374 with areas of 0.840, 0.480, 0.260, and 0.280 hectares respectively. Schedule A (3) covers additional land in Village Nawagarh under Khasra Nos. 384/3 and 920/1 with areas of 0.310 and 0.500 hectares respectively. Schedule A (4) relates to land situated in Village Madanpur, Patwari Halka No. 7, Tehsil Nawagarh, District Bemetara, bearing Khasra Nos. 307/1 and 307/2 with areas of 1.320 and 0.120 hectares respectively. Through this suit, the plaintiffs seek a declaration of title over a 1/5 share in the land described in Schedule “B” situated in 4 Village Nawagarh, along with partition according to their lawful share, separate possession, and a permanent injunction. The lands described in Schedule A (1) to A (4) and Schedule B are collectively referred to hereinafter as the suit property. It is an admitted fact in the case that the ancestors of both the plaintiffs and the defendants were Sahban Khan and Rabiya, both of whom are deceased. The plaintiffs and defendants jointly hold land in their names, which includes some portions that were purchased. The genealogical tree, as drawn in the impugned judgment and decree, is as under : 5 (b) The plaintiffs pleaded that the ancestral agricultural land jointly held in the names of the plaintiffs and defendants, as described in Schedule A (1) to A (4) and Schedule B, constitutes joint family property. The land mentioned in Schedule B is recorded in the name of Defendant No. 1; however, it was purchased by Sahban Khan, during the minority of Defendant No. 1, out of the income of the joint family. Therefore, the said land is also part of the joint family property. The plaintiffs assert that they have a right and share in all the suit properties by birth. It was further pleaded that no partition of the disputed land has ever taken place between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Apart from the disputed land, the ancestors of the plaintiffs also owned properties in Village Nawagarh, Muslim Para, Ward No. 7, consisting of separate houses measuring approximately 3000 sq. ft., 3200 sq. ft., and 2500 sq. ft., along with about 60 dismil of garden land, and other movable and immovable properties in Nawagarh, which are in the possession of Defendants No. 1 and 2. The plaintiffs hereby relinquished their respective rights in these houses and lands and do not seek partition of the said properties. After the death of Sahban Khan in the year 2013, the defendants stopped maintaining relations and communication with the plaintiffs. Thereafter, in February 2014, the plaintiffs requested the defendants to partition the property and separate their 6 respective shares, but the defendants refused. Hence, the plaintiffs have filed the suit. 3. The original defendant No.1 in his written statement stated that the parties i.e. plaintiffs and defendants, are governed by Sunni law. The land earlier received by Defendant No. 2 during his lifetime has already been sold. The land in Schedule B stands in his name, over which he has exclusive possession, and mutation has been completed without any objection from the plaintiffs or Defendant No. 2. He further states that during the lifetime of their father, at the time of family partition, Plaintiff No. 1 (his sister) was given land in Village Nawagarh in 1992, which she later sold in 1997 and built a house in Mungeli. At that time, his other sisters, Anwari Begum and Noorjahan, declined to take any share. He also claims that under Muslim law no right arises during a person’s lifetime, and that he has been openly exercising ownership over the Schedule B land since its purchase. 4. Defendants No. 2(a) to 2(d), in their written statement, stated that under Muslim law no inheritance rights arise during the lifetime of a person, and that female heirs are entitled to half the share of male heirs. Since the deceased Sahban Khan had two sons and three daughters, they contend that 2/3 of the total property devolves upon Defendant No. 1, Nawab Khan, and the legal heirs of the 7 deceased Arman Khan jointly. Accordingly, each plaintiff (being a daughter) would receive 1/9 share (i.e., one-third of one-third), while Nawab Khan would get 1/3 share, and the heirs of Arman Khan would jointly receive 1/3 share of the property. 5. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the material available on record, partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. The Court observed that under Muslim law, according to the Sunni Hanafi school, when among the heirs there are both male and female heirs, the male heir receives a share equal to twice that of a female heir. In such a situation, the heirs of the deceased, Sahban Khan, namely his two sons Nawab Khan and Arman Khan, will collectively be entitled to two- third (2/3) share of the property listed in Schedule A (1) to A (4). Similarly, the heirs of Ruksana Begum, Noorjahan, and Anwari Begum will collectively be entitled to one-third (1/3) share of the said property. In other words, each of the heirs of Ruksana Begum, Noorjahan, and Anwari Begum will receive 1/3 share each of their one-third portion, i.e., each of them will effectively receive a 1/9 share. Similarly, the defendant Nawab Khan will receive half of the two-third share, i.e., 1/3 share, and the heirs of Arman Khan will jointly receive the remaining 1/3 share. The Trial Court 8 further observed that since the plaintiffs, being the heirs of Ruksana Begum, Noorjahan, and Anwari Begum, have been found entitled to a 1/9 share each in the land described in Schedule A (1) to Schedule A (4), it is also the duty of the court to protect their interest. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have refused to give their respective shares and are also attempting to sell the property unilaterally. Therefore, the plaintiffs are permanently restrained from selling the property to the extent of their share against defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 6. Against the said judgment and decree, the LRs of original defendant No.1 filed the Civil Appeal before the learned First Appellate Court who by the judgment and decree impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/LRs of original defendant No.1. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have committed grave error in law and on facts in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, as the findings recorded are perverse and contrary to the evidence available on record. The learned Trial Court further overlooked that the same witness, in paragraph 10 of her cross-examination, admitted that the land falling to Arman’s share had already been sold, 9 which is also evident from paragraph 11 thereof. Learned counsel submits that the findings recorded by the learned both the Courts with respect to Muslim law is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Learned counsel would next submit that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned first appellate Court failed to frame proper issues in accordance with the pleadings on record. Consequently, the learned both the Courts have committed a grave error in partly allowing the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 9. According to Sunni Muslim law in India, if a deceased leaves behind two sons and three daughters, the sons will each receive a share twice the size of each daughter's share, meaning the sons would split 2/3 of the estate while the daughters would split the remaining 1/3 equally among them. In the present case, the two sons, namely Nawab Khan and the branch of Arman Khan, together constitute the male heirs and are therefore rightly held entitled to two- thirds (2/3) share of the property. Correspondingly, the three female heirs, namely Ruksana Begum, Noorjahan, and Anwari Begum, are collectively entitled to one-third (1/3) share. The Trial Court has further correctly apportioned the one-third share among the three female heirs equally, 10 thereby granting each of them a one-ninth (1/9) share in the property. Similarly, the two-third share allotted to the male heirs has been justifiably divided, with Nawab Khan receiving one-third (1/3) share and the heirs of Arman Khan collectively receiving the remaining one-third (1/3) share. This calculation is consistent with the governing principles of inheritance and does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 10. It is also evident from the record that despite the plaintiffs’ lawful entitlement to their respective shares, the defendants have refused to acknowledge or partition the same. Moreover, the defendants have attempted to alienate the suit property unilaterally, without regard to the rights of the plaintiffs. Such conduct is impermissible in law, as a co- sharer cannot deal with joint property in a manner that prejudices the rights and interests of other co-owners. In these circumstances, the both the Courts were fully justified in granting a decree of permanent injunction to safeguard the interests of the plaintiffs. Once the shares of the parties stood determined and there existed a real threat of unlawful alienation, the court was duty-bound to prevent irreparable harm by restraining the defendants from transferring the property beyond their lawful share. 11. The determination of shares is in accordance with established legal principles as prescribed under the Sunni 11 Muslim law. Hence, perusal of the impugned judgment, it is evident that that the Court has rightly allotted the double shares to the sons of what of each daughter gets in the present matter. 12. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand (1981) 2 SCC 414 had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view 12 was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. (2005) 10 SCC 553, wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others (1995) 6 SCC 213, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 13 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors. AIR (2001) SC 1273, it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case. 13. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 14. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/s failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 15. The submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants essentially require re-appreciation of evidence and 14 substitution of a different factual view, which is impermissible within the limited jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or material irregularity in the approach of the findings has been demonstrated. Accordingly, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. 16. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 17. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 18. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 15 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 19. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep