APHC010351372019 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] TUESDAY, THE 29th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1136/2019 Between: MANDRU PAPAMMA, D/O.PUNNAIAH, AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, R/O.14TH WARD, NIDUBROLU VILLAGE, PONNUR MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER AND 1. YATATI BHAGYA RAJU, S/O.ANKINEEDU, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O.14TH WARD, NIDUBROLU VILLAGE, PONNUR MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT. 2. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATHI. ...RESPONDENT(S): Counsel for the Petitioner: MD SALEEM Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. VENKATA DURGA RAO ANANTHA 2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) 2 The Court made the following: ORDER: The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.‟) challenging the Judgment dated 26.06.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.260 of 2004 on the file of the learned VI Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur, whereby and whereunderthe Appellate Court allowed the Criminal Appeal, setting aside the conviction and sentence passed in the Judgment dated 01.07.2004 in S.C.No.751 of 2003 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Bapatla and acquitted the respondent No.1/accused of the charge under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, „the I.P.C.‟). 2. The charge sheet was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 451, 376 and 417 of „the I.P.C.‟.The learned Trial Court, videits Judgment dated 01.07.2004 in S.C.No.751 of 2003 found respondent No.1/accused guilty of the charge under Section 417 of „the I.P.C.‟ and convicted and sentenced him with rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months, while acquitting him of the other charges. 3. Heard the learned counsel for petitioner, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 4. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 3 5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the Judgment dated 26.06.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.260 of 2004 on the file of the learned VI Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur, whereby and whereunder the respondent No.1/accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity, „the I.P.C.‟) by setting- aside the Judgment dated 01.07.2004 in S.C.No. 751 of 2003 on the file of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Bapatla, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? and to what relief?” 6. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar1at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 held as under: “. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub- section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens v. Nosibolla [1951 SCC 184 : AIR 1951 SC 196 : 1951 Cri LJ 510] ,K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. [AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 8] ,AkaluAhir v. Ramdeo Ram [(1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 903] 1(2002) 6 SCC 650 4 ,PakalapatiNarayanaGajapathiRaju v. BonapalliPedaAppadu [(1975) 4 SCC 477 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 1975 SC 1854] and MahendraPratap Singh v. Sarju Singh [AIR 1968 SC 707 : 1968 Cri LJ 665] .) 7. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP2, at Paragraph No.7 held as under: “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 8. In JagannathChowdhary v. Ramayan Singh3, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while elaborating upon the ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ lucidly articulated that such power is inherently discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised judiciously, never arbitrarily. 2AIR 1962 SC 1788 3AIR 2002 SC 2229 5 Judicial discretion, as the Court emphasized, must be “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system,” thereby,confining its invocation to circumstances of glaring procedural defects, manifest errors of law, or flagrant miscarriage of justice. The revisional forum is not an appellate tribunal for re-scrutiny of evidence or substitution of possible alternative views, its application is restrictive, reserved for exceptional situations where correction of illegality or prevention of gross injustice is imperative. The Court further clarified that while the High Court retains supervisory authority over subordinate courts, both administratively and judicially, the jurisdictional sweep under Section 401 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ remains circumscribed. In the facts under consideration, the High Court was held to have transgressed its revisional limits by setting aside an acquittal and directing a fresh judgment, which constituted a significant departure from the normal course of revisional adjudication. 9. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case without there being any iota of re-appreciation of evidence by sitting like a second appellate court. This Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ cannot invoke it‟s revisional power as a Second Appellate Court and re-appreciation of evidence is not possible in the revision case as laid down in the decisions in Bindeshwari Prasad Singhand JagannathChowdharysupra. However, this Court is not denuded of its powers to examine whether judgments impugned are correct, legal and proper 6 with respect to their findings, sentence or even judgment and there are any material irregularities. If there are manifest illegalities and interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of those manifest illegalities or to prevent a great miscarriage of justice, this Court is empowered to evaluate the evidence and analyze it and come to a just conclusion. 10. It is also apposite to refer the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court inAmol Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra4wherein at paragraph No.9 it is held as under: “9...In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a folly³ to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC”. 11. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Naim Ahmed v. State of (NCT) of Delhi5 at paragraph Nos.21 and 22 held as under: “”21... The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts before the court. 4 MANU/SC/0787/2025 5(2023) SCC Online SC 89 7 In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a married woman having three children, could not be said to have acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have sexual relationship with the appellant. Undisputedly, she continued to have such relationship with him at least for about five years till she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made by her in her deposition before the court, are taken on their face value, then also to construe such allegations as “rape” by the appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix being a married woman and the mother of three children was matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was consenting to. Even otherwise, if her entire conduct during the course of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year 2012 and came to know that he was a married man having children also, still she continued to live with the accused at another premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some disputes must have taken place between them, that she filed the present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313CrPC had stated that she had filed the complaint as he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375IPC”. 12. In Prithivirajan v. State6 at paragraph Nos.6 and 7 it is held as under: “6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied : first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage. 7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted”. 62025 SCC OnLine SC 696 8 13. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra7 at paragraph Nos.12, 18, and 21 it is held under: “12... This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 21. The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant's failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant's promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant's statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 IPC has occurred”. 14. In Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand8 at paragraph Nos.10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 it is held as under: “10...The appellant belonged to the Scheduled Tribe while the prosecutrix belonged to the Christian community. They professed different religious beliefs in a traditional society. They both resided in the same Village Basjadi and were known to each other. The nature and manner of allegations, coupled with the letters exchanged between them, marked as exhibits during the trial, make it apparent that their love for each other grew and matured over a sufficient period of time. They were both smitten by each other and passions of youth ruled over their minds and emotions. The physical relations that followed was not isolated or sporadic in nature, but regular over the years. The prosecutrix had even gone and resided in the house of the appellant. In our opinion, the delay of four years 7(2019) 9 SCC 608 8(2020) 10 SCC 108 9 in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serious doubt in view of the admission of the prosecutrix in cross-examination that no incident had occurred on 9-4-1999. 12. The prosecutrix acknowledged that an engagement ceremony had also been performed. She further deposed that the marriage between them could not be solemnised because they belonged to different religions. She was therefore conscious of this obstacle all along, even while she continued to establish physical relations with the appellant. If the appellant had married her, she would not have lodged the case. She denied having written any letters to the appellant, contrary to the evidence placed on record by the defence. The amorous language used by both in the letters exchanged reflect that the appellant was serious about the relationship desiring to culminate the same into marriage. But unfortunately for societal reasons, the marriage could not materialise as they belonged to different communities. 13. The question for our consideration is whether the prosecutrix consented to the physical relationship under any misconception of fact with regard to the promise of marriage by the appellant or was her consent based on a fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage which the appellant never intended to keep since the very inception of the relationship. If we reach the conclusion that he intentionally made a fraudulent misrepresentation from the very inception and the prosecutrix gave her consent on a misconception of fact, the offence of rape under Section 375 IPC is clearly made out. It is not possible to hold in the nature of evidence on record that the appellant obtained her consent at the inception by putting her under any fear. Under Section 90 IPC a consent given under fear of injury is not a consent in the eye of the law. In the facts of the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the solitary statement of the prosecutrix that at the time of the first alleged offence her consent was obtained under fear of injury. 14. Under Section 90 IPC, a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. It hardly needs any elaboration that the consent by the appellant was a conscious and informed choice made by her after due deliberation, it being spread over a long period of time coupled with a conscious positive action not to protest. The prosecutrix in her letters to the appellant also mentions that there would often be quarrels at her home with her family members with regard to the relationship, and beatings given to her. 18. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the present case and are of the considered opinion that the appellant did not make any false promise or intentional misrepresentation of marriage leading to establishment of physical relationship between the parties. The prosecutrix was herself aware of the obstacles in their relationship because of different religious beliefs. An engagement ceremony was also held in the solemn belief that the societal obstacles would be overcome, but unfortunately differences also arose whether the marriage was to solemnised in the church or in a temple and ultimately failed. It is not possible to hold on the evidence available that the appellant right from the inception did not intend to marry the prosecutrix ever and had fraudulently misrepresented only in order to establish physical relation with 10 her. The prosecutrix in her letters acknowledged that the appellant's family was always very nice to her”. 15. The police, after thorough investigation in Crime No. 99 of 2001 of Ponnuru Town Police Station, filed charge-sheet. Learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Bapatla, after the matter was committed by the Jurisdictional Magistrate, took the case, conducted the trial and convicted the respondent No.1/accused as mentioned supra. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the respondent No.1/accused preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Court as mentioned supra. 16. It can be seen from the record that the learned Appellate Court accorded cogent and convincing reasons by re-appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and acquitted the respondent No.1/accused of the charge under Section 417 of „the I.P.C.‟ in the impugned Judgment. 17. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in catena of decisions held that promise to marriage and subsequent physical relationship between the two, with consent, would not amount to rape.TheHon‟ble ApexCourt in Prithivirajansupra observed that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that merely because physical relations were established on a promise to marry, it would not, by itself, amount to rape.Furthermore, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Amol Bhagawan Nehulsupra observed that a consensual relationship that later turns sour, or partners subsequently becoming distant, cannot by itself justify invoking the criminal machinery of the State. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised several grounds in the present Criminal Revision Case that the Judgment of the learned Appellate 11 Court is not sound and convincing.In the present case on hand, there was a consensual relationship between the respondent No.1 and the petitioner.Indeed, the victim was major by the time of commission of the alleged offence and she was a fully grown lady.Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Prithivirajan,Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, Naim Ahmed, and Maheshwar Tiggasupra, the evidence on record, the respondent No.1/accused, is entitled for acquittal. On perusal of the Judgment of the learned Appellate Court, there is no miscarriage of justice and there are no material irregularities. The judgment of the learned Appellate Court cannot be found at fault on any account. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the reasons assigned by the learned Appellate Court in acquitting the respondent No.1/accused are cogent and convincing, and upon proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 19. There are no merits in the present Criminal Revision Case as the learned Appellate Court has rightly appreciated and examined the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution, and reversed the Judgment of conviction of the learned Trial Court, to acquittal. The grounds of revision are unsustainable, as there are no material irregularities in the Judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, and it is not in flagrant violation of justice.Therefore, the Criminal Revision Case is liable to be dismissed. 20. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed, confirming the Judgment dated 26.06.2019 in Criminal Appeal No.260 of 2004 on the file of the learned VI Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur. 12 21. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.There shall be no order as to costs. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 29.09.2026 DRNR 13 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1136 of 2019 Date:29.09.2026 DRNR