1 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. FAO  (MV) No. 141 of 2014 Reserved on  :  30.05.2026 Decided on    : 20.06.2026 Uploaded on  : 20.06.2026 Smt. Kamla .....Appellant Versus Himachal Road Transport Corporation Ltd.    ...Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1  Yes _______________________________________________________________ For the appellant: Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate. For the respondent: Mr. Raman Jamalta, Advocate. Virender Singh, Judge Appellant Smt. Kamla, being dissatisfied with the award dated 18.04.20213, passed by the learned Motor Accident   Claims   Tribunal,   Shimla,   H.P.   (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) in MACT No. 73­S/2 of 2011, titled  as   “Smt.   Kamla   Versus   Himachal   Road   Transport Corporation”,   has   preferred   the   present   appeal,   under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the M.V.Act’). 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 2. By way of award dated 18.04.2013, the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim petition, by awarding a sum of Rs. 4,36,911/­, as compensation, along with interest @ 9% per annum, from the date of filing of the petition, till deposit, from the respondent. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present  lis  are,   hereinafter,   referred   to,   in   the   same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned Tribunal. 4. Brief   facts,   leading   to   filing   of   the   present appeal, before this Court, as borne out from the record may be summed up, as under:­ Petitioner   Kamla   has   filed   the   petition   under Section 166 of M.V. Act, against the respondent, seeking compensation on account of the injuries sustained by her in   a   road   side   accident,   which   had   taken   place   on 16.11.2009,   involving   vehicle   bearing   No.   HP42­0747 (hereinafter   referred   to   as   ‘the   offending   vehicle’). The claim   petition   has   been   filed   against   the   owner   of   the offending   vehicle. The   driver   of   the   offending   vehicle, unfortunately, expired in the said accident. 3 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 4.1 Elaborating her stand, she has pleaded that on 16.11.2009, she had boarded the offending vehicle, which was on its way from Shimla to Reoghati, from Chhaila, along   with   her   husband   Sh. Ramesh   Chand,   and   were going to their native village Nera Ghati. The driver of the offending   vehicle   was   driving   the   bus   in   a   rash   and negligent manner and when the offending vehicle reached near Rukhultu, Tehsil Kotkhai, District Shimla, H.P., at about 4:15 PM, the driver could not negotiate the curve and vehicle went out of the road and fell into a deep gorge. 4.2. Due to the said fact, the petitioner sustained multiple injuries. After the accident, she was taken to CHC Kotkhai, from where, she was referred to IGMC Shimla. In IGMC   Shimla,   she   remained   admit   in   Orthopedics Department   from   17.11.2009   to   24.12.2009. After   the discharge, she was directed to visit hospital for follow ups. 4.3 The petitioner, according to the stand taken by her, also suffered the permanent disability, which, as per the certificate, is 41%, in relation to lower limb. 4.4 Information regarding the accident was given to police of Police Station Kotkhai, where FIR No. 83/2009, 4 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) dated 16.11.2009, under Sections 279, 337, 304­A of IPC, was registered. Since, the accident in question has solely been attributed to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the driver, the petitioner has sought compensation   to   the   tune   of   Rs. 12,00,000/­   alongwith interest @ 12% per annum, from the date of accident, till the realization of the compensation, from the respondent. 5. When put to notice, the claim petition has been contested   by   the   respondent,   by   denying   the   factual position,   mainly   on   the   ground   of   want   of   knowledge. However, the factum of accident and registration of FIR, as mentioned in paras No. 8 and 9, of the claim petition, have been admitted. 6. The claim petition has further been contested on the ground that the respondent had paid a sum of Rs. 51,079/­, as interim relief and medical expenses. 7. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made by the respondent to dismiss the claim petition. 8. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed, by the learned Tribunal, vide order dated  22.03.2012:­ 5 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 1. Whether the petitioner had suffered injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of vehicle No. HP42­0747, by its driver? OPP 2. If issue No. 1 is proved, to what amount of compensation   and   from   whom   is   the   petitioner entitled to? OPP 3. Relief. 9. Thereafter, the parties to the lis were directed to adduce evidence and after hearing learned counsel for the parties,   the   claim   petition   was   allowed,   as   referred   to above. 10. Being   dissatisfied   with   the   said   award,   the present appeal has been preferred before this Court, with a prayer to enhance the awarded amount, on the ground, that adequate compensation has not been awarded to her. The amount of compensation is stated to be on lower side. According to the petitioner, the evidence, so adduced by the petitioner, has also not been rightly considered by the learned Tribunal. 11. On   the   basis   of   the   ground   of   appeal,   Mr. Janesh   Gupta,   Advocate,   appearing   for   the   appellant­ petitioner   has   prayed   that   the   appeal   may   kindly   be allowed and the amount of compensation may kindly be enhanced, so that the same would fall within the definition of ‘just compensation’. 6 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 12. Per   contra,   Mr. Raman   Jamalta,   Advocate, appearing for the respondent, has submitted that just and adequate compensation has been awarded by the learned Tribunal,   and   prayed   that   the   appeal   may   kindly   be dismissed. 13. It   is   worthwhile   to   mention   here   that   the appellant­petitioner   has   assailed   the   award   only   on account of quantum. In such situation, the only question, which arises for determination, before this Court, is with regard   to   the   fact,   as   to   whether,   the   amount   of compensation, which has been awarded to the petitioner, by the learned Tribunal, falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not? 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Mohd. Nasir and another, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 987 has held that the provisions of M.V. Act are beneficial piece of legislation and the endeavour of the Court/Tribunal should be to provide “just compensation”. The   relevant   paras   23   and   24   of   the   judgment   are reproduced as under:­ “23. Both, the 1923 Act and 1988 Act are beneficent legislation  insofar  as they  provide  for  payment  of 7 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) compensation   to   the   workmen   employed   by   the employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the insurer to the petitioners suffering   permanent   disability. The   amount   of compensation is to be determined in terms of the provisions of the respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the Commissioner who is a quasi judicial authority, is bound to apply the principles and the factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act enjoins the   Tribunal   to   make   an   award   determining   the amount of compensation which appears to be just. 24. Both the Acts aim at providing for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. In these cases, the accidents   took   place   by   reason   of   use   of   motor vehicles. Both the statutes are beneficial ones for the workmen   as   also   the   third   parties. The   benefits thereof are available only to the persons specified under   the   Act   besides   under   the   Contract   of Insurance. The   statutes,   therefore,   deserve   liberal construction. The legislative intent contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.” (self emphasis supplied) 15. This view has again been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex   Court   in  Govind   Yadav   versus   The   New   India Assurance   Co. Ltd.,   reported   in  2012   ACJ   28   (SC). Relevant   paragraphs   12   to   15   of   the   judgment   are reproduced as under: 12. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan (2009) 13 SCC 422, this Court reiterated that the compensation awarded under   the   Act   should   be   just   and   also   identified   the factors which should be kept in mind while determining the amount of compensation. The relevant portions of the judgment are extracted below: "The compensation which is required to be determined must be just. While the petitioners are required to be compensated   for   the   loss   of   their   dependency,   the 8 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) same   should   not   be   considered   to   be   a   windfall. Unjust enrichment should be discouraged. This Court cannot also lose sight of the fact that in given cases, as for example death of the only son to a mother, she can never be compensated in monetary terms. The question as to the methodology required to be applied for   determination   of   compensation   as   regards prospective loss of future earnings, however, as far as possible   should   be   based   on   certain   principles.   A person may have a bright future prospect; he might have become eligible to promotion immediately; there might   have   been   chances   of   an   immediate   pay revision, whereas in another (sic situation) the nature of   employment   was   such   that   he   might   not   have continued in service; his chance of promotion, having regard to the nature of employment may be distant or remote. It is, therefore, difficult for any court to lay down   rigid   tests   which   should   be   applied   in   all situations. There are divergent views. In some cases it has been suggested that some sort of hypotheses or guess work may be inevitable. That may be so. In the Indian context several other factors should be taken   into   consideration   including   education   of   the dependants and the nature of job. In the wake of changed   societal   conditions   and   global   scenario, future   prospects   may   have   to   be   taken   into consideration not only having regard to the status of the employee, his educational qualification; his past performance but also other relevant factors, namely, the higher salaries and perks which are being offered by the private companies these days. In fact while determining the m ultiplicand this Court in O riental Insurance   Co.   Ltd.   v.   Jas   huben   held   that   even dearness  allowance and perks  with  regard  thereto from which the family would have derived monthly benefit, must be taken into consideration. One of the incidental issues which has also to be taken into consideration is inflation. Is the practice of taking   inflation   into   consideration   wholly   incorrect? Unfortunately,   unlike   other   developed   countries   in India there has been no scientific study. It is expected that with the rising inflation the rate of interest would go up. In India it does not happen. It, therefore, may be   a   relevant   factor   which   may   be   taken   into consideration   for   determining   the   actual   ground 9 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) reality. No hard­and­fast rule, however, can be laid down therefor." (emphasis supplied) 13. In Arvind   Kumar   Mishra   v.   New   India   Assurance Company   Limited (2010)   10   SCC   254,   the   Court considered   the   plea   for   enhancement   of   compensation made by the appellant, who was a student of final year of engineering and had suffered 70% disablement in a motor accident. After noticing factual matrix of the case, the Court observed: "We   do   not   intend   to   review   in   detail   state   of authorities in relation to assessment of all damages for personal injury. Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment   of   all   damages   for   personal   injury   is compensation. The whole idea is to put the petitioner in the same position as he was insofar as money can. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court   must   take   care   to   give   him   full   and   fair compensation for that he had suffered." (emphasis supplied) 14. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343, the Court considered some of the precedents and held: "The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("the Act", for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extent   possible,   fully   and   adequately   restore   the petitioner  to the position   prior   to  the  accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of  wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any   speculation   or   fancy,   though   some   conjecture with   reference   to   the   nature   of   disability   and   its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead  a full  life,  his  inability  to  enjoy  those  normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. 10 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) The   heads   under   which   compensation   is   awarded   in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i)   Expenses   relating   to   treatment,   hospitalisation, medicines,   transportation,   nourishing   food,   and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii)   Loss   of   earnings   (and   other   gains)   which   the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non­pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv)   Damages   for   pain,   suffering   and   trauma   as   a consequence of the injuries. (v)   Loss   of   amenities   (and/or   loss   of   prospects   of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in   serious   cases   of   injury,   where   there   is   specific medical   evidence   corroborating   the   evidence   of   the petitioner, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future  medical  expenses,   loss  of  amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life." (emphasis supplied) 15. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra) and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra) must be followed by all the   Tribunals   and   the   High   Courts   in   determining   the quantum   of   compensation   payable   to   the   victims   of accident,   who   are   disabled   either   permanently   or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent 11 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have   enjoyed   but   for   the   disability   caused   due   to   the accident. 16. It would also be profitable to reproduce relevant paragraphs 29 to 34 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme   Court   in   the   case   titled   as,  Sidram     versus Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited   &   anr.,  reported   in  (2023)   3   Supreme   Court Cases 439, as under: 29. The process of determining the compensation by the court is essentially a very difficult task and can never be an exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, more   so   in   claims   of   injury   and   disability. As   rightly pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958­65 ACJ 504 (HL, England): “…money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered.” 30. The principle consistently followed by this court in assessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of amenities and other payments. These general principles have   been   stated   and   reiterated   in   several   decisions. [Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683.] 31. It is now a well settled position of law that even in cases of permanent disablement incurred as a result of a motor­accident,   the   petitioner   can   seek,   apart   from compensation for future loss of income, amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many orders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High  Courts,   taking  the view   that  the  petitioner   is  not entitled to compensation for future prospects in accident cases   involving   serious   injuries   resulting   in   permanent disablement. That is not a correct position of law. There is 12 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) no justification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries   resulting   in   permanent   disablement. Such   a narrow reading is illogical because it denies altogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life in accident  cases  –   and  admits  such   possibility   of  future prospects, in case of the victim’s death. (Self emphasis supplied) 32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “just compensation” should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious   accident,   (or   replace   the   loss   of   a   loved   one), monetary   compensation   is   the   manner   known   to   law, whereby society assures some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to face their lives. 33. In Santosh   Devi   v.   National   Insurance   Company Limited and Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that: “14. We   find   it   extremely   difficult   to   fathom   any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] that where the deceased was self­employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self­employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. 15. The   rise  in   the  cost  of  living   affects  everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self­employed or who   get   fixed   income/emoluments. They   are   the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra 13 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and   State   Governments   and   their   agencies/ instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of   those   employed   in   private   sectors   have   also increased   manifold. Till   about   two   decades   ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh. 17. Although the wages/income of those employed in unorganised   sectors   has   not   registered   a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the   increase   in   the   salaries   of   the   government employees and those employed in private sectors, but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self­ employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla Verma   [Sarla   Verma   v.   DTC,   (2009)   6   SCC   121] judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self­employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self­employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30% increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes the   victim   of   an   accident   then   the   same   formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation.” 14 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571,   the   victim,   a   carpenter,   suffered   permanent disablement,   and   his   claim   for   compensation including for loss of future prospects was considered by a three­Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the   judges   who   had   decided National   Insurance Company (supra). This Court held that: “13. In   the   judgment   of   the   Constitution   Bench in Pranay   Sethi   [National   Insurance   Co. Ltd.   v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680], this Court has held that the benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who have a permanent job and would   extend   to   self­employed   individuals. In   the case of a self­employed person, an addition of 40% of the established income should be made where the age of  the victim  at the  time  of  the accident  was below   40   years. Hence,   in   the   present   case,   the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future prospects. 14. In making the computation in the present case, the   court   must   be   mindful   of   the   fact   that   the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing   —at   least   in   the   facts   of   this   case—can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the   dignity   of   the   being. Our   yardsticks   of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it   does,   as   it   must,   it   must   provide   a   realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards   of   compensation   are   not   law's doles. In   a   discourse   of   rights,   they   constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to  an  assertion  of  enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity. 15. The   Tribunal   has   noted   that   the   appellant   is unable to even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without   the   assistance   of   an   attendant. In   this background,   it   would   be   a   denial   of   justice   to compute   the   disability   at   90%. The   disability   is indeed total. 15 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) Having   regard   to   the   age   of   the   appellant,   the Tribunal   applied   a   multiplier   of   18. In   the circumstances,   the   compensation   payable   to   the appellant on account of the loss of income, including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400. In addition to this amount, the appellant should be granted an amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towards medical expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra  nourishment (Rs  25,000)  and for  attendant's expenses (Rs 1 lakh) is maintained. The Tribunal has declined   to   award   any   amount   towards   future treatment. The   appellant   should   be   allowed   an amount   of   Rs   3   lakhs   towards   future   medical expenses. The appellant is thus awarded a total sum of   Rs   25,38,308   by   way   of   compensation. The appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation from the date of the filing   of   the   claim   petition. The   liability   to   pay compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper identification.” 17. The   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  Sushila   & Others  versus  Sudhakar   &   Another,   2026   Live   Law (SC) 343, has held that the cardinal principle of awarding compensation in the cases of motor accidents is to provide ‘just   compensation’   to   the   victim   and/or   the   distressed dependents of the deceased. Relevant paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:­ “19. In our considered opinion, although the High Court had enhanced the compensation, it was on the lower   side. The   cardinal   principle   of   awarding compensation in the cases of motor accidents is to provide a “just compensation” to the victim and/or the distressed   dependents   of   the   deceased. The   term “just”   implies   that   the   compensation   must   be   fair, 16 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) reasonable, and equitable as per the applicable legal standards. The   compensation   should   not   be   too meagre,   nor   should   it   be   excessive. The   sole foundation of providing monetary compensation is to make efforts to put the dependents of the deceased at the same financial position that they were in, had the accident not occurred. [See also: Reshma Kumari and others   vs.   Madan   Mohan   and   another,   reported   in (2013)   9   SCC   65;  National   Insurance   Co. Ltd.   vs. Indira Srivastava & Ors, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 763; and Divisional Controller, KSRTC vs. Mahadeva Shetty and another, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 197] 20) Thus, in the light of the settled principle that the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988  (hereinafter referred to as   “M.V.   Act”)   is   a   beneficial   legislation   and   the compensation   should   be   just   and   equitable,   let   us deal with the issues for determination in the present appeal.” 18. Being   guided   by   the   above   decisions   of   the Hon’ble Supreme Court, now, this Court would proceed further   to   determine,   as   to   whether,   the   amount   of compensation   awarded   by   the   learned   Tribunal   to   the petitioner falls within the definition of ‘just compensation’ or not? 19. Learned   Tribunal,   in   the   present   case,   has awarded amount of compensation under only four heads i.e.   ‘future   prospects’,   ‘pain   and   sufferings’,   ‘attendant charges’ and ‘medical expenses’, whereas, according to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govind Yadav’s case 17 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) (supra), the same should have been awarded under various heads. 20. In such situation, this Court has to discuss the evidence,   so   adduced   by   the   petitioner,   so   that   ‘just compensation’ could be assessed. 21. After framing of the issues, petitioner stepped into the witness box as PW­2 and deposed about the fact that after the accident, she was taken to CHC Kotkhai, from where, she was referred to IGMC Shimla, where she remained admit from 17.11.2009 to 24.12.2009. She has proved   the   discharge   slip   Ext. PW­2/A.   During   her admission, she underwent surgery twice for backbone and plate was implanted. After discharge from the hospital, petitioner had been attended in IGMC Shimla, on various occasions. She has also tendered in evidence the disability certificate Ext. PW­2/H. 22. PW­4   Dr. J.L.   Sharma,   has   assessed   the disability on the person of the petitioner, vide disability certificate  Ext. PW­2/H,  with  the  report  that   the  Board found   41%   permanent   disability   in   relation   to   bilateral lower limb of the petitioner. 18 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 23. Dr. Dhruv (PW­5), has conducted the medico legal examination, on the person of petitioner, when she was taken to CHC Kotkhai and he has proved the same as Ext. PW­5/A. 24. In view of the above evidence, the entitlement of the   petitioner   for   compensation   under   various   heads   is adjudicated as under: NON PECUNIARY DAMAGES Pain and Sufferings: 25. The accident in question had taken place on 16.11.2009,   in   which,   the   petitioner   sustained   injuries. Firstly, she was taken to CHC Kotkhai, where, her medico legal examination was conducted by PW­5, who has proved the same as Ext. PW5/A.  Thereafter, she was referred to IGMC Shimla, where she remained admit w.e.f. 17.11.2009 to   24.12.2009. Meaning   thereby,   the   total   period   of hospitalization, thus, comes to 38 days. The said period must have been traumatic and painful for the petitioner, for which she is held entitled for a sum of Rs. 2000 x 38 = Rs. 76,000/­. Loss of Enjoyment of Life: 19 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 26. Period of hospitalization is held to be 38 days and   considering   the   fact   that   the   petitioner   underwent surgery for her backbone, while admitted in hospital, this Court is of the view that she might have taken four months for convalescence. The disability was found by the Board as 41%, however, the said disability is not liable to be considered   under   this   head,   as   same   is   required   to   be taken into consideration at the time of ascertaining the compensation under the head ‘Loss of Earning Capacity’, considering  the  disability,  under  both the  heads,  would amount to double enrichment, which is prohibited under the law. 27. Considering   the   period   of   hospitalization,   as well as, convalescence, this Court is of the view that for the period of about five months, she could not have enjoyed the life of normal human being, for which she is entitled for a sum of Rs. 50,000/­, under the head ‘Loss of Enjoyment of Life’. Shorten Expectancy of Life: 28. There is nothing on the record to demonstrate that   on   account   of   the   injuries/disability,   sustained/ 20 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) suffered by the petitioner, the life span of the petitioner has been shortened. As such, no amount of compensation is being awarded, under this head. PECUNIARY DAMAGES Loss of Earning and Earning Capacity: 29. As per the petition, petitioner was homemaker and in addition to this, according to her, she also used to work in the orchard of Ravinder Chauhan and Ami Chand of   Village   Nehra­Ghati. As   such,   she   had   pleaded   her income as Rs. 12,000/­ per month. She has pleaded her age as 41 years, at the time of accident. 30. The petitioner, while appearing in the witness box, as PW­2, deposed on the similar lines. By examining PW­6 Ami Chand, efforts have been made to demonstrate that the petitioner used to work in the orchard of Ami Chand and he used to pay Rs. 30,000/­ per annum for doing the multifarious activities in the orchard, such as, removing grass, carrying manure to the orchard. 31. Learned   Tribunal   has   taken   the   income   of petitioner as Rs. 5000/­ per month. However, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Shishu Pal @ 21 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) Shish Ram & Ors. Versus Surjeet & Ors., reported in 2026   INSC   634,   the   value   of   the   domestic   care   of   a homemaker   is   liable   to   be   taken   as   Rs. 30,000/­   per month. Relevant   paragraphs   15   to   20,   of   the   said judgment, are reproduced, as under: “Quantifying   The   Contribution­of   a   Nation Builder 15. In   usual   circumstances   this   Court   would   not have ventured further than taking note of the fact that   the   incident   and   judgment   in   Lata   Wadhwa (supra)   was   contemporaneous   to   the   unfortunate accident   in   this   case   and   as   such   compensation could be calculated using the Rs.3000/­ per month metric  applied  therein  however,  in  our  considered view   that   would   not   be   justified. It   has   to   be observed   that   to   measure   the   contributions   of   a homemaker and mother as in this case in strictly monetary terms is a task of considerable difficulty for each and every aspect of the day, month and year   of   such   a   homemaker’s   family   members   is informed, shaped by her sometimes acknowledged, but most often unacknowledged or taken for granted, efforts. If  compensation is  to  be calculated  in the present   day   while   accounting   for   the   egregious delay, to do so in terms that were frozen on the day of   the   death   of   the   deceased   would   be   grossly undervaluing the silent strength of homemakers. 16. That   being   said,   even   when   it   comes   to computation   for   damages   under   non­pecuniary heads, the loss still does require the recognition of such heads before compensation can be awarded. The first of them being the loss of the homemaker’s dexterous   ability   to   manage   all   the   chores   of   the household. Granted, that in the increasingly modern urban centres of the country it may not be the case that a homemaker stands in front of the gas stove bright and early in the morning or late at night or even that she walks around, slouched, running the broom   throughout   the   house,   but,   the   fact   of   the 22 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) matter is that in smaller cities, towns and villages, even today, such tasks assumedly and invariably fall on the homemaker, without as much as a second thought. The second head pertain to the children of the house. They have lost their mother, the source of never­ending love, comfort and affection, the person who   they   could   run   to   with   all   their   problems, questions and concerns and heartbreaks. She is also their first point of contact with the ways of the world, silently and subtly teaching them skills of survival, perseverance and excellence shaping them into well rounded human beings capable of being functioning contributors to the economy of the nation. This, in our view, is somewhat different from emotional support or   dependence   for   primary   skills   necessary   for everyday   functioning   that   are   imbibed   by   the children   from   their   mother. This   has   a   distinctly economic angle while also being partly an emotional aspect   perfectly   fitting   into   the   non­categorizable roles played by homemaker. How does one calculate this? The third is equally troubling. A husband has, no longer, the support of his life partner, someone he depends on entirely to run smoothly, an entire part of his life, his home, family, children, relatives. Even in   conservative   settings   where   patriarchy   looms large, the sense of dependency that obtains, if taken away,   greatly   challenges   the   man   for   he   is   now directionless and suddenly responsible for a lot more than   he   is   used   to. When   the   efforts   of   the homemaker towards the husband and children are taken   on   the   whole   it   cannot   be   disputed   that although her labour be at emotional or physical is within the four walls of the home, its impact is much wider. In enabling the direct contribution today of their husbands and tomorrow of their children, they are   the   building   blocks   for   the   nation’s   road   to holistic progress.[See:  Kalukutty v. P.M. John12, Bhuvaneswari   v.   Mani13]   We   may   also   observe that in a recent order of this Court in Arvind Kumar Pandey   v.   Girish   Pandey14,   also   made   similar observations to the following effect: “7. It goes without saying that the role of a homemaker is as important as that of a family 23 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) member whose income is tangible as a source of   livelihood   for   the   family. The   activities performed by a homemaker, if counted one by one, there will hardly be any doubt that the contribution of a homemaker is of a high order and invaluable. In fact, it is difficult to assess such a contribution in monetary terms.” Any computation made as a result of injury suffered or death, should be aware of this larger role and not be myopic in its view. The   loss   of   a   homemaker   however   is   not limited   to   husband   and   children. It   also   directly impacts the women’s own parents who have been deprived of the love and company of their child, who have lost the support and comfort of this person and are left alone with this boundless grief. Still further, the loss is acutely felt by her in­laws who are more often than not members of the same household and therefore   are   dependent   on   the   love,   labour   and dedication of this person, for food for medicines and doctor’s visit or for even the regular company over a morning   tea. Strict   arithmetic  calculation  does   not lend its services to any of these scenarios. 17. It is settled law by virtue of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi15, , that in all cases that have resulted in death, loss of consortium is to be paid to the petitioners at the rate of Rs.40,000/­ per dependant   along   with   10%   increase   on   the   said amount   every   three   years,   so   in   2026   the compensation   awarded   under   this   head   is Rs.48,400/­. This   we   may   note   is   irrespective   of whether   the   deceased   is   a   male/   female/   child/ retired/working   or   whatever   else. We   are   of   the considered view, in such situations the computation of   compensation   upon   the   death   of   a   homemaker suffers from an inherent  disadvantage. The amount awarded under the same is over and above what is calculated on the basis of the earnings/ salaries/ pension/notional   income   for   certain   categories   of petitioners. In   view   of   the   fact   that   there   is   no standard income on the basis of which compensation can   be   calculated   and   a   figure   is   taken   for   the purposes of calculation on guesswork, the true worth 24 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) of the homemaker is missed out, in as much as it is amenable to calculation in monetary terms. 18. Future prospects when calculated on the basis of the above judgment in Lata Wadhwa (supra) would also be calculated on the comparative lower notional income (Rs.3000/­per month) given that, both the fire incident and the accident forming the basis of this appeal are from the year 2001. 19. When such conservative figures are used to build up compensation, the amount arrived at is paltry, and not even close, as much as monetary terms can be, to the loss endured by the petitioners. Notional income   is   intended   to   approximate   the   economic value of in the case of homemaker, services rendered by   them. However,   for   whatever   reason,   judicial notice of this issue is usually overly conservative, without due acknowledgment of the fact that the role of the homemaker is neither entirely economic nor entirely   non­economic   and   blends   the   factors   of economy   with   emotional   and   managerial contributions   and   as   such   fixed   compensation   in terms of loss of consortium does not cover the entire gamut of their contribution. Loss Of Domestic Care: An Additional Head 20. It is in these circumstances, that we deem it appropriate to direct that when a Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal or the High Court or this Court is concerned with or a case involving the death of a homemaker,   in   order   to   overcome   the   inherent disadvantage accrued against the homemaker on a calculation   of   compensation   on   the   basis   of conservatively computed notional income and while being acutely aware of the dictum in Pranay Sethi (supra)   regarding   loss   of   consortium   as   also   the disposition   towards   uniformity,   that   for   the   three major heads (the homemaker’s contribution towards smooth   functioning   of   the   household,   the   loss   of maternal support for children and loss of spousal support/the support and care of their child who is an adult, for the parents of the deceased) discussed in the   foregoing   paragraphs,   a   composite   sum   of Rs.30,000/­ shall be added under the head of ‘loss of domestic care’, provided that all three of these heads are met in the given case. This determination 25 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) shall be revised by 10%, cumulatively, every three years. It may be clearly stated that this amount of Rs.30,000/­ i.e., loss of domestic care is to be taken as a ‘stand­ in’ (basic minimum monthly income) for monthly   income   in   those   cases   where   the homemaker does not have an input into the house, in strictly conventional, monetary terms. In those cases where the homemaker is part of the workforce, the component   of   loss   of   domestic   care   shall   be   in addition to the monthly income as may be proved before the Tribunal/Courts.” 32. Due to the accident, the petitioner could not contribute anything for the family, for about five months. Thus,   the   petitioner   is   held   entitled   for   a   sum   of   Rs. 30,000/­ x 5 = Rs. 1,50,000/­. 33. So   far   as   the   loss   of   earning   capacity   is concerned,   disability   has  been  assessed   as  41%   by  the Medical Board. The said disability is in relation to bilateral lower limb. The petitioner is homemaker and considering the activities, which are being done by the homemaker, this Court is of the view that the disability, which, has been assessed by the Medical Board as 41%, can be taken as 20% functional disability. 34. In view  of  the  law  laid  down  by  the  Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sidram’s case (supra), some addition is required   to   be   made   in   the   monthly   contribution   of petitioner Kamla, on account of her future prospects. In 26 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) view of the law laid down by Hon’ble Suprme Court in Sarla  Verma  versus   Delhi   Transport  Corporation   and Another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, as well as, keeping in view the age of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that 25% is required to be added in the income of the petitioner, on account of future prospects. 35. Thus, the established income of the petitioner for the purpose of ascertaining  the loss of earning and earning capacity, comes to Rs. 37,500/­ (Rs. 30,000/­ + 25%) and her functional disability is held to be 20%, as such, loss of earning capacity per month, thus comes to Rs. 37,500/­ x 20% = Rs. 7,500/­. 36. Keeping in view the age of the petitioner, the multiplier of ‘14’ is required to be applied, in the present case. Thus, the entitlement of the petitioner under the head ‘Loss of Earning Capacity’ comes to Rs. 7,500/­ x 12 x 14 = Rs. 12,60,000/­. Medical Expenses 37. The learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 21,911/­ under the head ‘Medical  Expenses’. The said findings do not require any interference by this Court. 27 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) Transportation Charges 38. Considering   the   nature   of   the   injuries/ disability, as well as, the fact that the petitioner might have hired the taxi in order to visit IGMC Shimla, for follow ups, it would be just and appropriate to grant Rs. 50,000/­, on account of transportation charges. Special Diet and Attendant Charges 39. Period of hospitalization has been held to be 38 days   and   period   of   convalescence   is   held   to   be   four months, meaning thereby, during the period of about 158 days. The petitioner might have taken the special diet and must have required the services of an attendant/helper to follow her daily pursuits, as she had suffered injury in her backbone. As such, this Court is of the view that petitioner is held entitled to a sum of Rs. 158 x 200 = Rs. 31,600/­, under the head ‘Special Diet and Attendant Charges’. 40. Considering   all   these   facts,   the   petitioner   is held entitled to a sum of Rs. Rs. 76,000 + Rs. 50,000/­ + Rs. 1,50,000/­ + Rs. 12,60,000/­ + Rs. 21,911/­ + Rs. 50,000/­ + Rs. 31,600/­ = Rs. 16,39,511/­. 28 ( 2026:HHC:23606-DB ) 41. However,   rate   of   interest,   which   has   been awarded by the learned Tribunal, at the rate of 9% per annum,   is   liable   to   be   reduced,   keeping   in   view   the prevailing rate of interest of the nationalized banks and the same is assessed   @ 7.5% per annum, from the date of filing   of   the   petition,   till   the   realization   of   the   whole amount. 42. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The award passed by the learned Tribunal is modified and the amount of compensation is enhanced from Rs. 4.36,911/­ to Rs. 16,39,511/­, and the rate of interest   is   reduced   from   9%   per   annum   to   7.5%   per annum. 43. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order so as to costs. 44. Memo of costs be prepared. 45. Pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of. 46. Record be sent back. (Virender Singh) Judge 20th June, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)