IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.570 of 2026 Date of Decision: 16.06.2026 _______________________________________________________ Abhishek Sharma & Ors. …….Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & Anr. … Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioners: Mr. Ashok Kumar Verma, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for respondent No.1- State. Mr. Piyush Chandel, Advocate, for respondent No.2. ASI Parkash Chand, PS Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, present in person. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNS”), prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners-accused (in short “accused”) for quashing of FIR No.145 of 2020, dated 22.07.2020, under Sections 323, 325 and 341 read with Section 34 of IPC, registered at Police Station Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, as well as consequent judgment in Police Challan No.38-II-2020 dated 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 27.11.2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, on the basis of compromise arrived inter se parties. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record are that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings came to be lodged at the behest of respondent No.2, Mr. Vipin Sharma (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘complainant’), who alleged that on 22.07.2020 at about 06:45 p.m., while he was sitting outside his shop, an unknown person approached him and inquired about his name. He alleged that while he was talking to the said person, a motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-21-A-9691 stopped in front of his shop and two persons sitting in the same started giving him beatings. He alleged that on account of merciless beatings given by three persons, whose identities were subsequently revealed as Abhishek Sharma, Santosh Kumar, and Pankaj Sharma, he sustained multiple injuries. 3. After completion of investigation police presented Challan in the competent court of law i.e. learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, which on the basis of the evidence led on record by the prosecution, held the accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 & 341 of Indian Penal Code read with 34 of Indian Penal Code and accordingly convicted and sentenced them as under: 3 Section Sentence Fine Default sentence 323 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC 3 months simple imprisonment Rs.1,000/- Simple imprisonment for 10 days 325 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC 6 months simple imprisonment Rs.2,000/- Simple imprisonment for 10 days 341 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC MV Act 3 months simple imprisonment Rs.1,000/- Simple imprisonment for 10 days 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, HP, but before the same could be taken to its logical end, parties have entered into compromise, whereby they have resolved to settle the dispute amicably inter se them. In afore background, accused have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the competent court of law. 5. Pursuant to order dated 03.06.2026, respondent-State has filed status report issued under the signatures of Superintendent of Police, District Hamirpur, wherein factum of compromise has been duly acknowledged. Along with status report, police has also placed on record statements given by the complainant as well as victim, wherein they have acknowledged factum of their having arrived at amicable settlement. 6. Complainant, who has come present in person and is represented by Mr. Piyush Chandel, Advocate, states on oath that he 4 of his own volition and without any external pressure has entered into compromise with the accused, whereby both the parties have resolved to settle dispute amicably inter se them. He states that since accused have already apologized for their misbehaviour and have undertaken not to repeat such act in future, he does not wish to prosecute the case further and shall have no objection in case prayer made on behalf of the accused for compounding of the offence and for quashing of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court is accepted and they are acquitted of the charges framed against them. While admitting contents of compromise placed on record to be correct, he also admits his signatures thereupon. His statement is taken on record. 7. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, fairly states that though parties have entered into compromise as is evident from the statement made on oath by the complainant as well as compromise placed on record, but this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that accused stand convicted under Sections 323, 325, and 341 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. The question which now needs consideration is whether FIR in question can be ordered to be quashed when Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466 has specifically held that power under S. 482 CrPC is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous 5 and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 9. At this stage, it would be relevant to take note of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh (supra), whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred to above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon’ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable and where the parties have settled the matter between themselves, however, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution. Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 6 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre- dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected 7 sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime”. 8 10. Careful perusal of para 29.3 of the judgment suggests that such a power is not to be exercised in the cases which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Apart from this, offences committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes may be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High Court in quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent power of quashment under Section 482 Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for quashing 9 proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497 has also held as under:- “7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of the offences were non-compoundable. A two Judges’ Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench. The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61) 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour 10 stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” (emphasis supplied) 8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26.10.2006 registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial Court are hereby quashed.” 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder 11 Singh’s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein: “13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482: “…In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved." 14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman “who was following the command of her husband” and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: “... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us 12 unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score…” “…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…” 15. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions: (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court; (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether 13 the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power; (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated; vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute; (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the 14 continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.” 13. Now another question which arises for consideration is whether this Court can order compounding of offence post-conviction. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr. Appeal No. 1393 of 2011, decided on 25th October, 2021 [2021 SCC OnLine SC 966], has held as under:- "9. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at some length, we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the present appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a 'non-compoundable offence? If yes, then whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act? 10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh , wherein, a two Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice. 15 Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers. 14. The Apex Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck post- conviction, the Courts should, inter alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held: "19... Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations." [Emphasis Applied] 15. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court coupled with the fact that both the parties have resolved to settle the matter amicably and further the complainant has no objection in acceding to the prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, 16 this court finds no impediment in accepting the prayer for compounding of the offence post-conviction. 16. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No.145 of 2020, dated 22.07.2020, under Sections 323, 325 and 341 read with Section 34 of IPC, registered at Police Station Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh as also the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.11.2025 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh, in Police Challan No.38-II-2020, are quashed and set aside. Petitioners are acquitted of the charges framed against them in the said FIR/proceedings. 17. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge June 16, 2026 (sunil)