2026:HHC:23163 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 153 of 2011 Reserved on: 25.5.2026 Date of Decision: 19.6.2026 Brij Lal ...Appellant Versus Ram Nath and others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr R.K. Gautam, Senior Advocate, with Mr Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent Nos. 1 to 6 : Mr Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, with Mr Harshit Sharma, Advocate, for respondents No.1 to 6. Names of respondents no.7 and 8 stand deleted vide order dated 23.8.2024. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2010, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment and decree dated 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:23163 23.5.2008, passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.2, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a declaration that he and proforma defendants are the owners-in-possession of the suit land, mentioned in head note of the plaint, and the entry in favour of defendant No.1 showing him to be in possession of part of the suit land is wrong and illegal. A consequential relief of Permanent Prohibitory Injunction for restraining the defendant No.1 from raising any construction over the suit land or interfering in the possession of the plaintiff and proforma defendants was also prayed. It was asserted that the plaintiff and pro forma defendants are owners in possession of the suit land. Defendant No.1 has been wrongly recorded to be in possession with the remarks ‘Ba Wajah Bai’ (because of sale). The plaintiff and proforma defendants never sold the suit land to defendant 3 2026:HHC:23163 No.1. The defendants started interfering with the suit land, hence the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by defendant No.1 by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability, the plaintiff being estopped to file the present suit by his act and conduct and the suit being barred by limitation. The contents of the plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the defendant was turned out of his home. He had no place to live. He resided with the family of the plaintiff and pro forma defendants for about six months. Plaintiff and proforma defendants gave 07 biswas of the suit land to defendant No.1 for constructing a house. The defendant paid money to the plaintiff and constructed a residential house along with the cowshed in the year 1961. The defendant has been in possession of the suit land since then. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A separate written statement was filed by defendant No.2 admitting the claim of the plaintiff and praying that the suit be decreed. 4 2026:HHC:23163 5. A replication denying the contents of the written statement filed by defendant No.1 and affirming those of the plaint was filed. 6. Learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 20.9.2007:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration as prayed? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed? OPP. 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped to file the present suit by his own act and conduct as alleged? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of the court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD. 7. Relief. 7. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiff examined himself (PW1). Defendant No.1 examined himself (DW1), Paras Ram (DW2), Gopi Ram (DW3), Chaman Lal (DW4) and Ramesh Chand (DW5). 8. The learned Trial Court held that the plea taken by defendant No.1 that he had purchased the suit land was duly corroborated by the copy of the entry in the Rapat Rojnamcha, which is a public document and per se admissible. The defendant 5 2026:HHC:23163 No.1 was continuously recorded to be in possession in the revenue record, which carried with it a presumption of correctness. The defendant remained in possession of the suit land. His possession was confirmed in a demarcation conducted by Kanungo. Hence, the learned trial court answered Issues No.1 and 2 in negative, Issues No. 3 to 5 in affirmative, Issue No.6 as not pressed, and dismissed the suit. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the plea taken by defendant No.1 that he had purchased the suit land was duly proved by the copy of Rapat Roznamcha. Oral sale was permissible in Himachal in 1961, and defendant No.1 would acquire a valid title by way of an oral sale. The plaintiff was out of possession, and he could not have filed a simple suit for declaration without seeking possession. Hence, the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 6 2026:HHC:23163 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 28.6.2011: - 1. Whether the Courts below have failed to interpret rightly the legal position regarding the presumption of truth attached to the revenue entries and rebuttable thereof? 2. Whether the Courts below have failed to interpret in its legal and right sense that the entries made in the revenue record without any appropriate authority are not admissible in evidence and cannot be taken into consideration? 3. Whether the findings of the Courts below are totally perverse to the evidence on record and are not sustainable in the eyes of the law? 4. Whether the action of the Trial Court taking on record documents even after framing the issues without as per prescribed procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure has vitiated the findings of the judgment of the trial Court and since this ground was duly taken before the lower Appellate Court but the lower Appellate Court has also failed to give findings on this issue, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court is also vitiated? 11. I have heard Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Jai Ram Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant and Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Harshit Sharma, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 6. 7 2026:HHC:23163 12. Mr R.K. Gautam, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in relying upon the report of the demarcation. This report was not filed along with the plaint and could not have been admitted. An objection was raised before the learned Trial Court and learned Appellate Court, but they wrongly overruled the objection. The oral sale could not have been proved by the copy of Rapat Rojnamcha. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 13. Mr Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for respondents No.1 to 6, submitted that oral sale was permissible in the State of H.P. in the year 1961. An entry in the Rapat Roznamcha is made by a Patwari in discharge of his official duties and was rightly relied upon by the learned Courts below. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 8 2026:HHC:23163 14. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial Questions of Law No.1 to 4: 15. These substantial questions of law are interconnected and are being taken up together for consideration. 16. Defendant No.1 Niku Ram stated in his proof affidavit (Ex.DW1/A) that he had purchased the land from Brij Lal, Paras Ram, Jagdish Chand and Ram Prakash for ₹80/-in the year 1960, and he was put in possession. His statement is duly corroborated by the entry (Ex.D2), in which it was mentioned that a Girdwari was carried out on 14 Falgun Shaka 1883 in the presence of the owners and the tenants, and a change was found in Khasra No.67. It was laid down by this Court in Umardin vs. Jamna Dass 2003(2) Shim. L. C.522 that an entry made in the Rapat Rojnamcha recorded by Patwari is admissible without examining the Patwari. It was observed: 13. Ext. P 5 is a copy of the 'Rojnamcha Wakiati' of Patwar Circle Lohara for the years 1967-68 and is duly certified by the Patwari. The short question involved is whether 9 2026:HHC:23163 this document can be treated as a certified copy of the public document, which is, per se, admissible, or it was required to be proved by summoning the original record. 14. Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines a public document as under: "74. Public documents.-The following documents are public documents: (1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts- (1) of the sovereign authority, (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country; (2) public records kept in any State of private documents". 15. It is clear on a bare reading of the above provisions that the documents forming the acts or records of acts of the State and the public functionaries and the transactions which such functionaries are required to enter in books/ registers in the course of their public duties and which occur within the circle of their own personal knowledge and observations as such functionaries are the public documents. 16. Section 168 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act (hereafter referred to as 'the Act) empowers the Financial Commissioner, inter alia, to make rules consistent with the Act for: (i) regulating the procedure in cases where persons are entitled to inspect records of Revenue Officers or records or papers in the custody of village officers, or to obtain copies of the same and prescribing the fees payable for searches and copies; (ii) prescribing forms for such books, entries, statistics and accounts necessary to be kept, made 10 2026:HHC:23163 or compiled in revenue offices, or submitted to any authority; and (iii) generally for carrying out the purposes of this Act. The rules so made by the Financial Commissioner shall be effective when sanctioned by the State Government. 17. The Himachal Pradesh Land Records Manual, 1992, contains, inter alia, the rules made/instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner in the exercise of the aforesaid powers. The said Manual came into force in Himachal Pradesh with effect from 15th of December, 1992 vide Government of H.P. Revenue Department Notification dated 3.12.1992 as approved by the Governor of the State. Thus, the Himachal Pradesh Land Records Manual contains the statutory rules/instructions as issued by the Financial Commissioner after approval of the State Government. The said Manual repealed the Himachal Pradesh Land Records Manual, 1951, which also contained almost similar provisions. Clause 59 of Chapter III of the said Manual provides that the Patwari, inter alia, will maintain a diary (Rojnamcha) of his whole Circle. Clause 75 further provides that the Patwari is required to keep a diary (Rojnamcha), Clause 77 provides that the various occurrences as specified therein must be noted in the diary (Rojnamcha) on the day when they came to the notice of the Patwari along with the manner in which he came to know about such occurrences which include the execution of any decree of Court affecting the land, its rent or its produce. Clause 52 of Chapter III provides for the inspection of records and grant of certified extracts thereof by the Patwari and permits him to supply copies of extracts from the diary (Rojnamcha) on payment of a prescribed fee by the applicant. 18. It is thus clear that Ext. P 5 is the copy of a document which consists of the acts of an official of the Revenue Department who is required to maintain a diary in the 11 2026:HHC:23163 course of his public duties, and which contains an occurrence that occurs within the knowledge and observation of the Patwari or is his own act as an official of the Revenue Department. Thus, 'Rojnamcha' as maintained by the Patwari is a public document as defined in Section 74 of the Evidence Act. 19. Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that every public officer having custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of a legal fee. 20. Section 77 of the Evidence Act, which provides for proof of public documents, reads as follows: "77. Proof of documents by production of certified copies. Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies." 21. It is evident from a bare reading of the aforesaid provisions that where the custodian of the public document, which any person has a right to inspect, has given a certified copy on demand, such certified copy may be produced in proof of the contents of the public document or its parts. Thus, a duly certified copy of 'Rapat Rojnamcha' as maintained by the Patwari is per se admissible in evidence in view of Section 77 of the Evidence Act. 22. In view of the above position in law, it cannot be said that the copy of 'Rapat Rojnamcha Wakiati' Ext. P 5 could not and should not have been read in evidence by the Courts below. 17. A similar view was taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State of Punjab vs. Bakshish Singh, 2003 (2) Shim. L.J. 1540, wherein it was observed that:- 12 2026:HHC:23163 “….It cannot be said by a stretch of the imagination that the entry made in the roznamha of the Patwari is not genuine. There is no reason to disbelieve the Patwari also in this regard. The entry was made in the original roznamcha by an official concerned in the course of the performance of his official duties and is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned lower Appellate Court has entered into a detailed discussion in this regard, and I have no reason to disagree with the same. Hence, it is hardly open to the State to call its records as of doubtful character.” 18. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon the copy of the rapat roznamacha. 19. The defendant was recorded to be in possession in the copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1966-67 (Ex.D3). It was mentioned in Column No.9 that the possession was due to the sale. This entry was repeated in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1971-72 (Ex.D4), for the year 1976-77 (Ex.D5), for the year 1981-82 (Ex.D6) for the year 1986-87 (Ex.D7), for the year 1991- 92 (Ex.D8), for the year 1996-97 (Ex.D9), and for the year 2000- 2001 (Ex.D10). It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 242: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 228 that an entry in the jamabandi carries with it a presumption of correctness u/s 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, and the burden is upon the person who alleges to the contrary. The burden can be discharged by leading evidence of incapable 13 2026:HHC:23163 integrity. Oral evidence is not sufficient to hold that the presumption stands rebutted. It was observed: 16. As per Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 Act, record-of- rights, i.e. jamabandi, shall include the name of persons who are landowners, tenants or assignees of land revenue and also the rent, land revenue, rates, cesses or other payments due from and to each of those persons and the Government. On the other hand, the periodical record, i.e. khasra girdawari, as mentioned in Section 34 of the 1954 Act, is to be prepared every year as proof of the statements, as mentioned in sub-section (2) clause (a) of Section 32, which includes the name of the landowners, tenants and the rent and land revenue payable. In terms of Section 45 of the 1954 Act, the record of rights as prepared in terms of Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act carries a presumption of truth. Still further, any person who is aggrieved by any entry in the record of rights or a periodical record has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court for correction of the entries in terms of Section 46 of the 1954 Act. 17. The detailed procedure for recording periodical records of rights, as well as the record-of-rights, in terms of Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act, has been prescribed. The record of rights contains entries of the revenue record for the four years. Such a record of rights carries the presumption of correctness in terms of Section 45 of the 1954 Act and also Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short “the Evidence Act”). Section 109 of the Evidence Act further contemplates whether there exists a relationship of landowner and tenant, and the burden of proving such a relationship is on the person who affirms it. 18. The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act read as under: “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty.—An entry in any 14 2026:HHC:23163 public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact. *** 109. Burden of proof as to relationship in the cases of partners, landlord and tenant, principal and agent.— When the question is whether persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other in those relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.” 19. In the State of Himachal Pradesh, jamabandi, under Section 32 of the 1954 Act, as well as Khasra Girdawari, under Section 34 of the 1954 Act, both are record-of- rights in terms of Section 32 of the 1954 Act and have a statutory presumption of truth. How that presumption can be inferred has come up for consideration before this Court in Harish Chander v. Ghisa Ram, (1981) 1 SCC 431. This Court held that the entries in the jamabandi carry a presumption of truth, but such presumption is rebuttable. Once that presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of Respondent 1 [therein] [Ed.: The facts of Harish Chander, (1981) 1 SCC 431, are that the name of Respondent 1 therein was recorded as a tenant in the jamabandi for the year 1959-60 (Ext. P-1) and consistently thereafter till the year 1968 (Khasra- girdawaris Exts. P-2 to P-7). Thus, it was held that the statutory presumption of truth of these entries was attracted to the benefit of Respondent 1 tenant, and so also the reversal of the burden of proof under Section 109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, was held to be to his benefit. The facts of the present case are exactly the opposite— see para 20 below—there is no entry at all in the record of 15 2026:HHC:23163 rights of the tenancy claimed by the respondent- defendant herein. Thus, the presumption of the truth of the record-of-rights has been held to enure to the benefit of the appellants whose names were found to be recorded in the record-of-rights.] by reason of the rule contained in Section 109 of the Evidence Act, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving that such relationship has ceased, is on the party who so asserts. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 431-433, paras 2 & 6) “2. … Apart from the oral evidence, there is no material on the record which may indicate the falsity of any of the entries in the revenue records, and we are of the opinion that the lower courts were fully justified in relying on them. *** 6. No suspicion can attach to the entries in the jamabandi for the year 1959-60, nor have the contents of that document been assailed before us. A presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view of the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act. That presumption is no doubt rebuttable, but no attempt has been made to displace it. Further, once that presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of Respondent 1 by reason of the rule contained in Section 109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, namely, that when two persons have been shown to stand to each other in the relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving that such relationship has ceased is on the party who so asserts. It may therefore be legitimately presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the land as a tenant till the institution of the suit.” 20. The present is a case where no relationship of landlord and tenant is mentioned in the revenue record, though required in terms of Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 16 2026:HHC:23163 Act. In the absence of an entry in the revenue record, which is also expected to contain the entry of rent and possession, the tenancy cannot be treated as in existence only on the basis of oral evidence of the witnesses examined by the defendant. The burden of proving the relationship was on the defendant. Such a burden cannot be said to be rebutted only by oral evidence. The witnesses may lie, but the documents do not, is a golden rule. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted only on the basis of evidence of impeccable integrity and reliability. The oral evidence can always be adduced contrary to the revenue record, but such oral testimony will not be sufficient to hold that the statutory presumption stands rebutted. 21. This Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, held that the entries in the revenue record ought to be generally accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. This Court held as under: (Fakhrul Hassan case [Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642], SCC p. 645, para 14) “14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value, and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine, but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry in the revenue record states, but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot be found a claim to the possessory title.” 22. This Court in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227 was examining a dispute of the relationship of landlord and tenant. A copy of a 17 2026:HHC:23163 more than thirty-year-old lease deed was produced to prove the relationship between the landowner and tenant. However, the revenue record did not show any payment of rent, but only the existence of terms of the lease to pay rent. This Court held that non-production of the receipts of payment of rent clearly indicates that there was no relationship between the landlord and tenants. 23. In Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P., (1986) 2 SCC 486: 1986 SCC (Tax) 410], this Court was considering Section 28-B of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, which raises a presumption of sale of goods in a manner prescribed therein. This Court considered Section 4 of the Evidence Act and also the previous judgments and held as under: (SCC p. 496, para 14) “14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a prima facie case for a party in whose favour it exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom the burden of proof lies. When the presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is rebuttable, it only points out the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed, and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts and circumstances.” 24. In another judgment in Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823, this Court examined the presumption of fact in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was held that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently, would not serve the purpose of the accused. 18 2026:HHC:23163 Something, which is probable, has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. It was held as under: (SCC p. 521, para 21) “21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or, in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue.” 25. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted if such an entry was made fraudulently or surreptitiously (Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642) or where such an entry has not been made by following the prescribed procedure (Bhimappa Channappa Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda, (2012) 13 SCC 759: (2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 419). Even in  Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227, where thirty years old lease deed was produced, this Court had not accepted the proof of the relationship between landowner and tenant in the absence of receipt of payment of rent. 26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth attached to the record of rights can be rebutted only if there is fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made, or the prescribed procedure was not followed. It will not be proper to rely on the oral evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, as the credibility of oral evidence vis-à-vis documentary evidence is at a much weaker level.” 19 2026:HHC:23163 20. In the present case, the plaintiff had only examined himself and not any other person. He claimed that the whole land is cultivable and no structure has been raised on it. This claim was falsified by the demarcation conducted by Ramesh Chand, Field Kanungo, who issued the report (Ex.DW5/A) mentioning that a house, courtyard and cowshed existed on the suit land, which were in possession of defendant No.1. 21. It was submitted that the report of demarcation was not admissible in evidence because it was not filed with the plaint. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the demarcation was conducted on 15.11.2007, whereas the suit was filed on 27.9.1999. Thus, the demarcation was conducted during the pendency of the suit, and its report could not have been filed along with the plaint or before the settlement of issues. Learned Trial Court had rightly exercised the discretion to admit the evidence, and learned Appellate Court had rightly affirmed the exercise of discretion, and there is no infirmity in the procedure adopted by the learned Courts below. 22. It was submitted that an application for additional evidence should have been filed and an opportunity should have 20 2026:HHC:23163 been afforded to the plaintiff to oppose it. This submission will not help the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted in his cross- examination that he had issued a notice to the Public Works Department, which had obtained the demarcation on 15.10.2007. Thus, the plaintiff never disputed the demarcation. Further, a prayer can always be made orally, and it is not essential that the prayer be made in writing. Hence, the learned Courts below were justified in admitting the report of the demarcation without a written application. 23. Therefore, it cannot be said that learned Courts below had returned a perverse finding while appreciating the material on record. The change in the revenue entry was authorised, and the presumption attached to the revenue record was not rebutted. The Court could have accepted the evidence which came into existence during the pendency of the suit. Hence, these substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Final order: 24. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. 21 2026:HHC:23163 25. The appeal stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any. 26. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th June, 2026 (Chander)