IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA [ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** CRM(SB)/2/2026 In Re:- An application for bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 filed on 27.01.2026 in connection with FIR No. 14 of 2025 dated 15.05.2025 in connection with Crime and Economic Offences Police station Case No. 12 of 2025 dated 15.05.2025 under Section 406/ 409/ 420/ 463/ 467/ 468/471 /120 B of the IPC. And In the matter of Sanjay Lal Vs Directorate of Enforcement Mr. Deep Chaim Kabir, Sr. Adv. Mr. S. Ajith Prasad … for the petitioner Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Sr. Adv. (through virtual mode) Mr. V. D. Sivabalan Mr. Arun S. Kumar … for the respondent February 10, 2026 [AKB] Item No.9 Read order dated February 09, 2026. The said order records the submission of the learned counsel for the parties. The said order is quoted here in below:- “The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was initially not arrested in connection with FIR No. 14 of 2025 dated 15.05.2025 under Section 406/409/420/463/467/468/471/120 B of the IPC. Subsequently, ECIR/KLZO-II/11/2025 dated 21.07.2025 was chalked out against him and he cooperated with the Investigating Officer for six or seven months and subsequently he was arrested in connection with ECIR/KLZO-II/11/2025 dated 21.07.2025 and since then he is in custody for about 138 days. One adjudicating process was started but he was not given the documents relating to such original application and RUD and after much difficulty he was able to obtain the same. The learned counsel has further submitted that the ED did not comply with mandatory legal requirements imposed under Section 19 (1) or 19 (2) of the PMLA Act as the petitioner was never informed of the grounds of arrest in accordance with law as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The arresting authority did not comply with the requirement of forwarding copies of order and materials in his possession to the adjudicating authority in the manner laid down by law. 2 Mr. Deep Chaim Kabir, learned senior counsel has relied upon the following judgments: 1) Directorate of Enforcement vs Subhash Sharma, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1136/2023, (Neutral Citation 2025 INSC 141). 2) Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India, reported in 2023/INSC/866 3) Prem Prakash vs. Union of India reported in AIR 2024 SC 4286 4) Joseph Stalin vs State of West Bengal reported in MANU/WB/2232/2025 5) V.Senthil Balaji vs The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, reported in MANU/SC/1065/2024 Mr. Zoheb Hussain, learned senior counsel for the Directorate of Enforcement has submitted that the petitioner has tampered with the evidence and he is under an obligation to show before this Court that he is not guilty of the charged offences as required under Section 45 of the PMLA Act. He has also submitted it is true that an accused cannot be incarcerated for an indefinite period but the judicial decisions of Monish Sisodia and Senthil Balaji’s case, hold that 120 days of incarceration cannot be said to be an incarceration for an indefinite period. In reply, Mr. Deep Chaim Kabir, learned counsel has submitted that when Section 19 of the PMLA Act was not complied with in letter and spirit, the bail prayer of the petitioner cannot be refused. The constitutional violation, as contended by the petitioner, overrides all other consideration and these points are subject matter of the trial of the predicate offences. The petitioner cannot be allowed to suffer double jeopardy. There is no chance of an early conclusion of the trial.” It is established law right now that to obtain a bail order in PMLA Act, the accused is under a duty to convince the Court that there are reasons to believe that the accused did not commit the offences alleged to have been committed by him. It is also laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in several reported judgments that compliance of Section 19 (1) and 19 (2) of PMLA Act is mandatory and compulsory. The allegation against the present petitioner, Sanjay Lal is that the petitioner floated 12 shell companies with the sole intention of fraudulently availing loans in the names of these shell entities, in connivance with Kuldeep Rai Sharma and K. Murugan, for the mutual benefit of all three of them. From the list of 23 shell companies through which loans of substantial amounts were fraudulently availed by bypassing the established 3 norms and regulations of A&N State Cooperative Bank Ltd. the funds disbursed in the names of the 12 entities were under the direct control and management of the petitioner Sanjay Lal and by which Rs. 153 Crores were misutilised. It is also alleged that apart from the loans availed by floating shell companies, the petitioner Sanjay Lal also availed loans from the said bank in the name of his regular companies in a fraudulent manner by bypassing the norms and regulations of the said bank. The loan amount of Rs. 15 crores availed in the name of his regular company M/s. De-Foret Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. has turned into NPA. While other two accounts in the name of M/s. S.L. Projects Pvt. Ltd., have been closed after diverting the Proceeds of Crime from loans borrowed from the shell companies. There are statements of several witnesses recorded under Section 50 of PMLA Act and it is also settled that by virtue of Section 50 (4) statements recorded under Sub-section (2) and (3) has been given status of judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of Indian Penal Code. In this case statements of several witnesses who were the dummy directors of the shell companies were recorded. The statement of Bani Halder is that she was appointed as a Director of M/s Craftopia Traders Pvt Ltd., on the instructions of her brother-in-law, Babul Halder, and under the direction of Mr. Sanjay Lal. She has further stated that she herself and her husband did not own any moveable or immovable property. She has specifically stated that she did not have any knowledge regarding the financial matters, or business operations of M/s 4 Craftopia Trades Pvt Ltd. and Sanjay Lal and Babul Halder, were the appropriate persons to provide accurate information. She did not receive any financial favour for being appointed as Director of the said company. She has categorically stated that she did not take any loan from any bank in her name. Similarly one Biswajit Dutta has stated that he works as a land broker and also used to repair gas stoves, pressure cookers and mixers and his monthly income is approximately Rs. 20,000 to 25,000/-. During CID investigation he came to know that he had been made a Director in M/S Blue Kite Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. by Babul Halder on the instruction of one Sanjay Lal. He signed several bank documents and only once he received Rs. 2000/- for signing such bank documents. He did not avail any loan from ANCB in his personal name. Similar was the statement of one Chandana Roy. She also submitted that she was made one of the Directors of M/s Craftopia Traders Pvt Ltd without her knowledge and being pressurized by her husband on the instruction of Sanjay Lal and Bablu Halder. There are several other witnesses whose statements were recorded by the Directorate of Enforcement showing that shell companies were floated under the guidance of the present petitioner, Sanjay Lal. Apart from the above statements there are other materials on record from which it transpires that a term loan of Rs. 6 crores was sanctioned on 29.02.2016 by executing equitable mortgage of landed property at survey No. 1573 of area 4392 sq.mtrs. and survey No. 157/1 of area 1992 Sq.mtrs. which was 5 valued at Rs. 3.5 crores and Rs.1.79 crores. Additional term loan of completion of petitioner’s hotel project were availed on two occasions of Rs. 3.50 crores each which were respectively sanctioned on 20.03.2017 and 06.10.2017. It is also alleged that another one crore in the name of M/S Hotel S.L. International was approved and the petitioner is one of its Directors. It further transpires that the said loan was sanctioned by inflating the value of the property mortgaged to the bank. It is true that a property can be mortgaged for first time, second time, third time and so on under Transfer of Property Act, but so far as this case is concerned it appears that not only a term loan of Rs. 6 crores was sanctioned on 29.02.2016 but additional term loan on two occasions at 3.5 crores each were obtained within a very short span of time. Therefore, I cannot say at this stage the materials on the record inspire me to say that the present petitioner is not guilty of the offences alleged to have been committed by him. From the argument of Mr. Kabir, learned Senior Advocate it appears that he has hammered on the point of informing grounds of arrest to the petitioner. Section 19 of the Act 2002 makes it mandatory upon the arresting authority to inform the grounds of arrest and also to forward the copy of order along with materials in his possession to the adjudicating authority in a sealed cover. For the purpose of proper understanding Section 19 of Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 is quoted herein below: “19. Power to arrest.-(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central 6 Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer shall immediately after arrest of such person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period as may be prescribed. (3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a [Special Court or] Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction: Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the [Special Court or] Magistrate's Court.” The learned counsel has relied upon several judicial decisions as mentioned above. In Criminal appeal of Subhash Sharma it is observed that continuation of the respondent in custody without producing him before the nearest Magistrate within the stipulated time of twenty four hours is completely illegal and it infringes fundamental rights under Clause 2 of Article 22 of the Constitution. It is also observed that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of PMLA and Section 57 of Cr.P.C. Hence by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 57 Cr.P.C applies to the proceeding under PMLA Act. In Pankaj Bansel vs. Union of India reported in 2023/INSC/866 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe as hereunder: “29. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 of the Act of 2002 enables the person arrested Under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that be entitled to grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the 7 provision are that, firstly the Court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the authorized officer arrested him/her Under Section 19 and the basis for the officer's 'reason to believe' that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the Act of 2002. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail. Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19 of the Act of 2002, is meant to serve this higher purpose and must be given due importance.” In Joseph Stalin vs. The State of West Bengal and others reported in MANU/WB/2232/2025 the Hon’ble High Court has been pleased to deal with Section 45, 19 of the PMLA Act. They are quoted herein below: “25. True, the twin conditions laid down in Section 45 of the PMLA are the guiding factors for grant of bail to an accused under the said Act and the accused is to satisfy the said conditions to obtain bail. However the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA envisages that in a case of money laundering of a sum of less than one crore rupees, the accused may be released on bail. In the present case, the predicate offence which is the foundation of the ECIR pertains to Rs. 21,69,079/-. 26. Violation of Section 19 of the Act has been alleged by the petitioner. Though the petitioner appears to have been informed of the grounds of arrest in compliance with Section 19(1) of the Act, there is nothing on record to suggest compliance of Section 19(2). 27. In dealing with the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again emphasised that the constitutional Court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused of account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. However stringent a penal statute may be, a constitutional Court has to lean in favour constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. It cannot be said that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. In addition thereto, in the present case, since the money allegedly laundered is far below rupees one crore in so far as the predicate offence is concerned, the rigours of Section 45 of the Act is diluted.” In V.Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement reported in MANU/SC/1065/2024 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe in paragraph 21 which is quoted here under: 8 “21. Hence, the existence of a scheduled offence is sine qua non for alleging the existence of proceeds of crime. A property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by a person as a result of the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence constitutes proceeds of crime. The existence of proceeds of crime at the time of the trial of the offence Under Section 3 of PMLA can be proved only if the scheduled offence is established in the prosecution of the scheduled offence. Therefore, even if the trial of the case under the PMLA proceeds, it cannot be finally decided unless the trial of scheduled offences concludes. In the facts of the case, there is no possibility of the trial of the scheduled offences commencing in the near future. Therefore, we see no possibility of both trials concluding within a few years.” In Prem Praksah vs. Union of India through the Directorate of Enforcement reported in (2024) 9 SCC 787 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the co-accused’s statements against another accused would not partake the character of substantive evidence. The investigating agency will have to first marshal the other evidence and can at best look at the statements for lending assurance. In this case it appears that grounds of arrest in Annexure F at page 286 to 292 of the affidavit-in-opposition is filed by the Directorate of Enforcement. The said Annexure F shows that written grounds of arrest has been supplied to the petitioner, Sanjay Lal, and Sanjay Lal has himself given the endorsement ‘read and understood the same. I have received the grounds for my arrest from page Nos. 1 to 7 in writing’. One Sudeep Kumar Lakra was present at the time of informing the grounds of arrest in writing to the petitioner. Therefore it cannot be said at this stage that the constitutional norms as reflected in the aforesaid judgements have not been complied with. Moreover, admittedly, adjudication process is started soon after his arrest. Further, the case against the present petitioner is not based on the co-accused statement only. There are statements 9 of other witnesses which prima facie show that shell companies were floated at the instance of the present petitioner. Further loans taken in the name of his regular property i.e. hotel business became NPA. It is not clearly answered. The petitioner as to why an action under SARFAESI Act was not taken against his company, and such non-action supports ED’s allegation that he used to influence the decision of Managing committee of the Bank through Kuldeep Rai Sharma and K.Murugan, and, therefore, it certainly comes under money laundering offence. There are other materials which do not allow me to say at this stage that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence alleged to have been committed by him. Further, judicial custody for 138 days cannot be said to be a long incarceration in view of the nature of offences alleged to have been committed by him in the league with other influential person. In view of the above the prayer for bail stands rejected. CRM(SB)/2/2026 is, thus, dismissed. (Apurba Sinha Ray, J.)