[2026:RJ-JP:31648] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6502/1993 CNR: RJHC020001601993 | URN: CW / 7673U / 1993 1. Bhambal Ram S/o Shri Mooliya Meena (Since Deceased), Through his legal heirs 1/1. Smt. Sampati Devi Wd/o Bhambal Ram 1/2. Yugal Kishore S/o Bhambal Ram 1/3. Surednra S/o Bhambal Ram 1/4. Smt. Sureshi D/o Bhambal Ram 1/5. Smt. Babli D/o Bhambal Ram 1/6. Smt. Nisha D/o Bhambal Ram, All R/o Shahar, Tehsil Nadauti, District Karauli. 2. Smt. Sampati Wd/o Late Shri Laxman Meena, (Since Deceased) 3. Neemod, S/o Late Shri Laxman Meena 4. Inder S/o Late Shri Laxman Meena, No. 2 And 3 Both R/o Shahar, Tehsil Nadauti, District Karauli. ----Petitioners Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary Revenue Department, Secretariat Jaipur 2. The Board Of Revenue, Ajmer. 3. The Additional Collector, Sawaimadhopur. ...Performa Respondents 4. Smt. Geeta D/o Laxman Meena W/o Lakhy Meena, R/o Koleta, Tehsil Bamanwas District Sawai Madhopur At Present Farm Bachchu Lekhi, At Present Gangapur City, District Sawaimadhopur. 5. Smt. Sita D/o Laxman Meena W/o Shri Sher Singh Meena, R/o Sanwar, Tehsil Gangapur, District Sawaimadhopur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Virendra Dangi, Senior Counsel (through VC) with Mr. Pawan Pareek, Adv., Mr. Raghvendra Singh Khichi, Adv. & [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (2 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] Mr. Rajesh Kumar Sain, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. V. D. Gathala, AGC with Ms. Vijay Laxmi, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment 11/08/2026 1. By way of filing the present writ petition, the petitioners have assailed the legality and validity of order dated 21.07.1987 passed by the Additional District Collector, Sawai Madhopur, whereby, pursuant to the direction issued by the State Government for re-opening of the ceiling proceedings, the holding of late Shri Mooliya was reassessed and 36 standard acres of land was declared surplus. They have also challenged the judgment dated 09.10.1991 passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (for short 'the Board of Revenue') in Appeal Ceiling No.243/1987, as well as the order dated 12.04.1993 passed in the review petition. 2. Facts, in brief, as pleaded in the writ petition are that petitioner No.1's father, late Shri Mooliya, was a cultivator of village Shahar and, according to the Settlement Khatoni of Samvat year 2009-20, he was recorded in possession and cultivation of substantial agricultural land. 3. According to the petitioners, in the subsequent Jamabandi, the land stood recorded in the name of Mooliya and, during consolidation operations, the ancestral/Hindu undivided family property was partitioned and separate holdings were recorded in the names of Mooliya, petitioner No.1 Bhambhal and [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (3 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] his deceased brother Laxman. It is further pleaded that an area measuring 16 bighas 4 biswas was transferred by Mooliya in favour of Ratanlal son of Johri Meena by a registered sale deed dated 27.03.1968, and the transaction was followed by mutation No.179 dated 22.09.1968. 4. It is contended that Ceiling proceedings were initially initiated against Mooliya under the then applicable ceiling law and the proceedings were culminated vide order dated 25.03.1971, whereby 10 bighas of land was declared surplus. According to the petitioners, no appeal was preferred against the said order by anyone, hence, the order dated 25.03.1971 attained finality. 5. The petitioners' principal grievance is that notwithstanding the finality attained by the order dated 25.03.1971, the State Government vide order dated 30.03.1983, purported to exercise power under Section 15(2) of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973, and directed re-opening of the concluded ceiling proceedings. Pursuant thereto, the Additional District Collector passed the order dated 21.07.1987, computing the total holding at 96 standard acres and declaring 36 standard acres as surplus. 6. The petitioners unsuccessfully challenged the said order before the Board of Revenue and vide order dated 09.10.1991, the Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal. The petitioners thereafter preferred a review petition, which too came to be dismissed on 12.04.1993. Aggrieved thereby the petitioners have invoked writ jurisdiction of this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (4 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] 7. The respondents filed reply to the writ petition contending therein that father of petitioner No.1 had filed a return and was represented by an Advocate in the original ceiling proceedings. The matter was initially decided on 28.02.1970 and thereafter reheard and redecided on 25.03.1971. It has also been contended that the petitioners failed to produce before the Additional District Collector or the Board of Revenue any satisfactory documentary or oral evidence establishing that the property was ancestral or HUF property. 8. The respondents have further asserted that the alleged partition and subsequent transfers were undertaken with a view to defeat the ceiling provisions. According to them, the land transferred to Ratanlal after the appointed date i.e. after 01.04.1966 could not have been recognised for the purpose of determining the ceiling holding. It is also contended that the land transferred in favour of petitioner No.1 and his deceased brother during consolidation operations was likewise not liable to be recognised as a genuine partition. The respondents further contended that the findings recorded by the Additional Disrict Collector and the Board of Revenue are findings of fact, and no perversity or jurisdictional error is made out, hence, the petitioners cannot seek reconsideration of factual issues in the present writ petition. 9. Shri Virendra Dangi, Learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Pawan Pareek, for the petitioners submitted that irrespective of the merits of the dispute concerning the holding, partition or transfers, the entire subsequent proceedings stand vitiated [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (5 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] because the State Government exercised its power under Section 15(2) after the expiry of the statutory period. It was submitted that admittedly the original proceedings culminated in the final order dated 25.03.1971. Under the second proviso to Section 15(2), no notice for re-opening could be issued after expiry of seven years from the date of the final order or after 30.06.1979, whichever was later. Thus, the outer limit expired on 30.06.1979, whereas the State Government first time initiated to re-open the case only on 30.03.1983. The re-opening was, therefore, ex facie without jurisdiction, resultantly all proceedings based thereupon are not at all sustainable in the eye of law. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied upon judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dhanraj & Ors. Vs State of Rajasthan, 1995 RRD 115 in support of his arguments. 10. Per contra, Shri V. D. Gathala, learned Additional Government Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the ceiling law is intended to prevent concentration of agricultural land and evasion of the ceiling provisions. It was contended that the original assessment was erroneous, where illegal transfers and an alleged partition had been relied upon to defeat the ceiling law. It was further submitted that the findings recorded by the revenue authorities and Board of Revenue on the merits do not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the material placed on record, the principal issue arising before this Court is to examine the question of jurisdiction of the State [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (6 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] Government to re-open the concluded proceedings, which goes to the root of the matter. 12. Section 15 of the Act of 1973 deals with the power to re-open the decided ceiling cases. Section 15(2) of the Act of 1973 lays down as under: "(2) Without prejudice to any other remedy that may be available to it under Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955), if the State Government, after calling for the record or otherwise, is satisfied that any final order passed in any matter arising under the provisions repealed by section 40, is in contravention of such repealed provisions and that such order is prejudicial to the State Government or that on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to its notice, such order is required to be re-opened, it may direct any officer subordinate to it to re-open such decided matter and to decide it afresh in accordance with such repealed provisions: Provided that no such direction shall be issued unless a notice to show cause against the proposed action has been served upon he person concerned. 10{Provided further that no notice referred to in the foregoing proviso shall be issued after the expiry of seven years from the date of the final order sought to be reopened or after the expiry of 30th day of June, 1979, whichever is later: Provided that no final order passed by the Board in the matter referred to in subsection (1) or in sub-section (2) shall be directed to be re-opened and decided afresh under the said subsections unless the State Government is satisfied that such order is required to be reopened on account of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which has since come to its notice or due to some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.} 13. The above provision contemplated re-opening of a final order passed under the repealed ceiling provisions where the statutory conditions were satisfied. However, the legislature consciously imposed a limitation upon the exercise of such extraordinary power. The second proviso to Section 15(2) specifically provides that no notice referred to in the preceding proviso shall be issued after the expiry of seven years from the date of the final order sought to be re-opened or after the expiry of 30th June, 1979, whichever is later. [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (7 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] 14. This Court finds that the Legislature although conferred power to re-open the old concluded proceedings under Section 15, however, the provision simultaneously prescribed the outer limitation period within which such power must be exercised. The existence of a statutory power to re-open, therefore, cannot be separated from the limitation expressly incorporated in the same provision. 15. In the present case, the respondents themselves admitted that the original ceiling proceedings were finally decided on 25.03.1971. The respondents have relied upon the said order in their reply and have not disputed its existence or finality. Admittedly, no appeal was preferred against the said order. Consequently, for the purpose of Section 15(2), the order dated 25.03.1971 was the final order sought to be re-opened. 16. Even if the period of seven years prescribed under Section 15(2) is computed from 25.03.1971, the same would expire on 25.03.1978. Since the statute provides the alternative terminal date of 30.06.1979 and requires the later of the two dates to be taken, the maximum permissible period for issuance of notice for re-opening, in the present case, could extend only up to 30.06.1979. 17. Thus, undoubtedly order passed by the State Government on 30.03.1983 was made nearly four years after the expiry of the outer statutory period. The State Government, thus, purported to exercise the power of re-opening at a point of time when the statute had already withdrawn that power by efflux of the prescribed period. [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (8 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] 18. It is also relevant that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gurbax Singh & Atumal alias Atma Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1992) Supp 3 SCC 24 upheld the constitutional validity of Section 15 and recognised the legislative competence to confer upon the State Government the power to re-open concluded ceiling cases in appropriate circumstances. At the same time, the Supreme Court expressly held that the power conferred by Section 15 is not blanket and unfettered power, and the decision to re-open is subject to judicial scrutiny and would be liable to be struck down if it is not founded upon the relevant considerations specified in the statutory provision and where such power has not been exercised in consonance with the provisions of the Act. 19. Division Bench of this court at principal seat Jodhpur, in Raghvendra Singh & Ors. v. Board of Revenue & Ors., D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.21/2020, decided on 16.01.2025, examined the question of effect of limitation in ceiling proceedings and ratio laid down thereunder assumes considerable significance in this regard. In that case also, the Court was examining the exercise of power under Section 15 of the Rajasthan Ceiling Act after the prescribed period had expired. After examining the legislative history and the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the amendment, the Division Bench held that the limitation prescribed under Section 15 is not extendable, and once the prescribed period expires, the State Government loses the power and jurisdiction vested in it under Section 15 to re-open the concluded ceiling proceedings. The Division Bench further held [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (9 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] that the fact that the State may have a substantive interest in preventing evasion of the ceiling law cannot authorise it to exercise the power of re-opening after the expiry of the statutory period. The Division Bench further observed, that although the object of the ceiling law is to protect the State's interest in surplus land, such interest cannot be enforced by exercising the power under Section 15 after the limitation prescribed by the legislature has elapsed. Similar view was earlier taken by another Division Bench of this court in Dhanraj (supra). 20. The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Indeed, the case at hand stands on an even stronger footing. The final order sought to be re-opened was passed as far back as on 25.03.1971, whereas the State Government purported to re-open the proceedings only on 30.03.1983. Thus, the State Government's action was not merely marginally beyond the statutory period but was taken several years after the statutory power had ceased to be available. 21. The respondents have attempted to justify the re- opening by asserting that the alleged partition and transfers were intended to frustrate the ceiling law, and therefore, the original determination was erroneous. Such submissions may have been relevant had the State Government acted within the period prescribed under Section 15. They cannot, however, confer jurisdiction upon an authority which the statute itself has taken away after expiry of the prescribed period. Such power to re-open the already concluded matters, however, cannot be used to disregard an express statutory limitation. The State is bound by [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (10 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] the law enacted by the legislature in the same manner as any other litigant or authority. 22. This Court, therefore, is not required at this stage to determine whether the property was ancestral, whether the partition was genuine, whether the registered sale deed dated 27.03.1968 was liable to be recognised, whether the computation of standard acres was correct, or whether the land allegedly belonging to the temple was liable to be excluded. Those are matters which could have been examined only in a proceeding validly re-opened within the period prescribed by law. The State Government having failed to exercise the statutory power within time, therefore, subsequent adjudication on those questions is rendered legally unsustainable. 23. In the facts of the present case, since the direction to re-open the proceedings was issued after the expiry of the period during which the statutory power could lawfully be exercised, consequently, the order dated 30.03.1983 suffers from an inherent lack of jurisdiction. Once the order dated 30.03.1983 is found to be without jurisdiction, the order dated 21.07.1987 passed by the Additional Collector pursuant thereto cannot survive. Likewise, the appellate order dated 09.10.1991 and the review order dated 12.04.1993 passed by the Board of Revenue, being consequential orders arising from a proceeding which itself had been re-opened without jurisdiction, are also liable to be set aside. 24. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by the petitioners is hereby allowed. The order dated 21.07.1987 passed by the [2026:RJ-JP:31648] (11 of 11) [CW-6502/1993] Additional District Collector, Sawai Madhopur, and the orders dated 09.10.1991 and 12.04.1993 passed by the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, are also hereby quashed and set aside. The ceiling proceedings which had culminated in the final order dated 25.03.1971 shall stand restored to the position in which they stood prior to the impermissible re-opening. 25. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (ANAND SHARMA),J 2/Jatin