wp 5428-2026.odt 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR. WRIT PETITION NO. 5428 OF 2026 PETITIONER : Shri. Praful Manohar Gharpure Aged: 38 years, Occ. Agricultural R/o Gram Panchayat Murti, Tahsil: Katol, District: Nagpur. ..VERSUS.. RESPONDENTS : 1. State of Maharashtra, through its Hon'ble Minister, Rural Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai - 400032. 2. Additional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Civil Lines, Nagpur. 3. Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur 4. Superintendent of Police Anti-Corruption Department. Nagpur. 5. Shri. Mohan Jagannath Munne Aged: Yrs, Occ. Agriculturist Res/of Gram Panchayat Murti, Tahsil: Katol, District: Nagpur. 6. Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Katol, District: Nagpur. 7. Gram Panchayat, Murti, through its secretary Tahsil: Katol, District: Nagpur. 2026:BHC-NAG:12770 wp 5428-2026.odt 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. V.G. Dhage, Advocate for petitioner. Ms M.S. Naik, AGP for respondent/State. Mr. Akshay Duragkar, Advocate for respondent Nos. 3 & 6. Mr. A.A. Sambre, Advocate for respondent No.5. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J. DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT : 16.08.2026. DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT : 24.09. 2026. JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 3. The present petition is filed praying for the following reliefs: “1. Quash and set aside the impugned order dated 10/06/2026(Annexure- 1) passed by respondent no. 1, the Hon'ble Minister of Rural Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai, in appeal No. V.P.M- 2025 case no. 126/P.R-6; 2. Restore the order dated 19/08/2025(Annexure-7) passed by Respondent No. 2 Additional Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur, in Case No. 39(1)/24/2024- 2025, whereby Respondent No. 5 was removed from the office of Sarpanch under Section 39(1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959;” 4. The factual aspect as can be seen from the petition are as under: wp 5428-2026.odt 3 The petition avers that the respondent No. 5, i.e. Mohan Jagannath Munne, allegedly demanded a bribe of Rs.5,00,000/- from one Praful Yograj Deshbratar for tax assessment and construction premises. However, since the said Praful Deshbratar was not ready to shell out the bribe, he made a complaint to the Anti-Corruption Department, which prepared a trap against the respondent No. 5 and his associate. Accordingly, an offence was registered vide Crime No. 653 of 2024 for offence punishable under Section 7, 7A, 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent No. 5 was arrested on 07.08.2024. 5. In the backdrop of these facts, the present petitioner filed a complaint against the said respondent No. 5 before the respondent No. 2 under Section 39(1) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’). On receipt of the said complaint, the respondent No.2 directed the respondent No. 3 to conduct an inquiry against the respondent No. 5 as contemplated under Section 39(1) of the said Act. 6. Pursuant thereto, the respondent No. 3 i.e. the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, conducted an inquiry into the allegations leveled against the respondent No. 5. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 submitted its report to the respondent No. 2. In the said inquiry, it was held that the wp 5428-2026.odt 4 respondent No. 5 is liable for action under Section 39(1) of the said Act. 7. After receipt of the said report as aforesaid, the respondent No. 2 issued notices to the parties, pursuant to which the respondent No. 5 filed his reply and prayed for dismissal/rejection of the proceedings initiated against him. Petitioner also filed his written submissions and requested for initiating action against the respondent No.5 under the provisions of the said Act. 8. After considering the entire material on record, including the report submitted by the respondent No. 3, the respondent No. 2 passed an order on 19.08.2025 under Section 39(1) of the said Act, thereby removing the respondent No. 5 from the Office of Sarpanch of the said Gram Panchayat for the remainder of his term. 9. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 19.08.2025, the respondent No. 5 preferred an appeal before the respondent No.1 under Sub-section (3) of Section 39 of the Act. Initially, the respondent No.1 granted a stay to the impugned order of 19.08.2025. The said order of stay was challenged by the petitioner before this Court by filing a writ petition bearing W.P. No. 5668/2025. This Court, vide its order dated 19.11.2025, wp 5428-2026.odt 5 directed the respondent No. 1 to decide the aforesaid appeal within a period of one month from the date of appearance of the parties before it. The respondent No. 1 then again issued notices and fixed the hearing on 08.12.2025. However, the respondent No.1 failed to comply with the order of this Court, as stated supra, the petitioner was constrained to file a Contempt Petition No. 135/2026. In the backdrop of these facts, the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order on 10.06.2026 allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of 19.08.2025 passed by the respondent No. 2. It is this order which is impugned in the present petition on the various grounds as stated in the petition. 10. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Counsel for respondent No. 5, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 3 & 6 and learned AGP for respondent/State. 11. Mr. Dhage, learned Counsel for the petitioner, points me out the order of the respondent No. 1 stating that the said respondent has committed a manifest error in law in holding that, since a Criminal Case is pending before a competent Criminal Court, respondent No. 5 cannot be held liable for action under Section 39(1) of the said Act. He further submits that the respondent No.1 failed to appreciate that the proceedings under Section 39(1) of the Act are independent statutory proceedings wp 5428-2026.odt 6 intended to examine whether the conduct of an elected office bearer renders him unfit to continue in office, and such proceedings are not dependent upon the outcome of the criminal prosecution. 12. He further submits that the pendency of a criminal case does not ipso facto bar the competent authority from considering the material placed on record, including allegations of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification in relation to official functions. For this purpose, he places reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in 2019 (3) Mh.L.J. 368, Dr. Narendra Purushottam Ingole v. Hon’ble State Minister, Village Development Department, Mumbai and Others, and more particularly paragraph No. 13 thereof. He also places reliance on a judgment of this Court reported in 2026 (2) Mh.L.J. 159, Priti Manoj Bundile v. Hon'ble Minister, Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mumbai and others, and lastly on a judgment of this Court reported in 2025 (2) MH.L.J. 594, Rajashree Ramdas Sapkal v. Hon'ble Minister, Ministry of Rural Development, Mumbai, to support his submissions. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Sambre, learned Counsel for the contesting respondent, i.e. respondent No. 5, while countering the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, states that wp 5428-2026.odt 7 the order is perfectly legal and valid, and therefore, cannot be faulted with. 14. I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the respective parties and with their able assistance, also gone through the record. 15. The respondent No. 3, while inquiring in the matter, has recorded a finding that the respondent No. 5 herein is prima facie guilty of misconduct as contemplated under the provisions of Section 39 of the said Act. However, it is noteworthy to observe that there are no reasons recorded in the said inquiry report by the authority while recording such a finding. 16. Mr. Sambre, learned Counsel, argues that the said inquiry being a fact finding inquiry ought to have been preceded with reasons since the repercussions or the effect of the inquiry are grave enough to unseat an elected representative from a public office. However, I do not agree with this submission. Inquiry under Section 39 of the said Act is a fact finding inquiry which is essentially based on facts and therefore, it is not an inquiry as contemplated by a quasi-judicial authority where recording of reasons is imperative. 17. Mr. Sambre, learned Counsel however, stretching this argument further, states that absence of reasons is also wp 5428-2026.odt 8 conspicuous in the order of the Additional Commissioner, i.e. the respondent No. 2. By taking me through the entire order passed on 19.08.2025, it is his submission that the said order only records the contentions canvassed by the parties as also reproduces the opinion of the respondent No. 3. He, therefore, submits that the said order of the Additional Commissioner and the inquiry contemplated thereunder lacks reasons. 18. In support of his submission, he places reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kushuma Devi v. Sheopati Devi, reported in 2019 (4) JT 163. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court, by taking into consideration the importance of reasons as stated in paragraph Nos. 8 and 9, that every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/authority concerned which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusions. It is also held that the parties to the lis, and so also the Appellate or Revisionary Court, while examining the correctness of the order, are entitled to know as to on which basis a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. 19. The Hon'ble Apex Court has relied upon various cases in that regard to record such a finding. Reliance is also placed on judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Anil Kumar versus wp 5428-2026.odt 9 Presiding Officer and others, reported in 1985 (3) SCC 378. Therein, it is stated that the inquiry report of a disciplinary authority that affects livelihood or casts a stigma should also be a reasoned one. It is thus submitted that the order of the Additional Commissioner, i.e. the respondent No. 2, being an unreasoned one, is rightly been set aside and the matter is remanded back by the respondent No. 1. 20. As far as judgment of Dr. Narendra Ingole reported supra is concerned, Mr. Sambre places reliance on a judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 899 of 2023, Rupali Dinesh Kale v. State of Maharashtra, where this Court in paragraph No. 9, has stated that the said judgment was on factual premise that the trap laid by the Anti-Corruption Bureau was successful and the petitioner therein was caught red-handed, which was held amounting to be a disgraceful conduct. In the said matter, the appeal was rejected on merits, but here the Appellate Authority has only remanded the matter. 21. As can be seen from the impugned order, the respondent No. 1 has remanded the matter to the respondent No. 2 on a premise that a criminal case pends before the Competent Court of law. Even though the order of the respondent No. 1 does not mention absence of reasons to be a ground, the said fact is wp 5428-2026.odt 10 conspicuous enough by the perusal of the order of the respondent No. 3, which is entirely based on the inquiry report of the respondent No. 2. As has been stated by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra, reasons in an order of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority is the lifeline of the said order and in absence of reasons, the correctness or otherwise of the said order cannot be gauged by the Appellate or Revisional Authority. 22. In that view of the matter, in my considered opinion, even though the premise on which the impugned order is passed by the respondent No. 1 may not be correct in its entirety, however, the remand order is perfectly legal and valid. The petition therefore lacks merits and is liable to be rejected. However, it is clarified that the respondent No. 2 will decide the matter on its own merits and in accordance with law within two months from the date on which the parties make their appearance before the said authority. 23. The parties are directed to make an appearance on 05.10.2026 before the authority. (NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) Jayashree.. Signed by: Mrs. Jayashree Pethe Designation: PA To Honourable Judge Date: 28/09/2026 18:09:44