( 2026:HHC:23538 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 9556/2026 Decided on: 18.06.2026 State of H.P. & Anr. …..Petitioners Versus Hanso ......Respondent ……………………………………………………………………………… Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner: Mr. L.N. Sharma, Additional Advocate General For the respondents: Nemo. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. The petitioners-State has instituted this writ petition against the award dated 16.12.2024 passed by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala. In terms of the award, learned Labour Court had adjudicated the following reference sent to it by the appropriate Government: - “Whether the time to time termination of services/giving fictional breaks in the services of Shri Hanso S/o Late Shri Shambhu R/o Village Kihar (Trigluni), P.O. Kihar, Tehsil Salooni, District Chamba, H.P. by the Divisional Forest Offier, Churah Forest Division, Salooni, District Chamba, H.P. during year, 1994-1995 to year, 2018 without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as alleged by the workman, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to from the above employer?” Under the award, the claim preferred by the respondent- workman was partly allowed. The breaks given by the petitioner-State 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) to the workman from time to time between 1995 to 2018 were condoned. He was held entitled to seniority and continuity in service along with consequential benefits from the year 1995. He was also allowed compensation in the sum of Rs.50,000/- in lieu of back wages. 2. Heard learned Additional Advocate General & considered the case file. 3. The award was passed on 16.12.2024. This writ petition assailing the aforesaid award was filed on 25.02.2026. Objections raised in the writ petition were removed and the petition was re-filed on 11.06.2026. There has been undue long delay on part of the petitioner in assailing the award dated 16.12.2024. The explanation for the delay has been furnished in para-11 of the writ petition. The summary thereof is as under:- (i) A copy of the award dated 16.12.2024 was sent by the learned Deputy District Attorney, Labour Court, Dharamshala, on 18.01.2025. The petition does not disclose as to when the copy of the award was ready for delivery and/or obtained by the learned Deputy District Attorney Labour Court, Dharamshala. (ii) Copy of the award was received in the office of the petitioner on 11.02.2025. Thus, according to the petitioner-State, it took almost one month for the award to reach the office of the petitioner at Salooni, 3 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) Chamba, from the office of the learned Deputy District Attorney, Labour Court, Dharamshala. (iii) The matter had already been sent to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, on 27.01.2025 for seeking legal opinion as to whether the award was to be implemented or assailed. The Conservator of Forests forwarded the matter to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Head of Forest Force), [Pr. CCF (HoFF)], H.P., Shimla, vide letter dated 07.03.2025. The period of more than one month taken by the Conservator of Forests, merely to forward the matter to the Pr. CCF (HoFF) has not been explained. (iv) The Pr. CCF (HoFF), vide letter dated 31.03.2025, returned the case file to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, with certain observations for compliance. Thus, the Pr. CCF (HoFF) also consumed almost three weeks in returning the case file to the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, for complying some undisclosed observations. (v) The Conservator of Forests, Chamba, in order to comply with the observations, sent the case file to the office of the petitioner vide letter dated 01.04.2025. The same was received in the office of the petitioner on 18.04.2025. The requisite information was collected by the petitioner from the field offices, and the matter was again 4 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) forwarded to the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba, on 23.09.2025. Thus, almost five months were consumed by the field offices in collecting the requisite information and complying with the observations raised by the office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF), all this when the entire matter had already been adjudicated by the learned Labour Court. (vi) The office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF) further forwarded the matter to the Government on 17.10.2025 for obtaining legal advice in the matter. Thus, almost one month was consumed in the office of the Pr. CCF (HoFF) in forwarding the file to the Government for obtaining legal advice. (vii) The Pr. CCF (HoFF) also forwarded the case to the ACS (Forest) on 22.11.2025 for examination of the matter in consultation with the Law Department, i.e., almost two months after receiving the file back from the office of the Conservator of Forests, Chamba. The paragraph further states that thereafter the file, along with the requisite documents, was collected and, on the basis of the legal advice received, further time was consumed in preparing and filing the writ petition for assailing the award. In view of the above process, the writ petition could be filed only on 25.02.2026. The objections raised therein were removed on 11.06.2026. 5 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) As is apparent from the above, at each and every stage of the processing of the case, the respondents dealt with the matter in a casual & negligent manner and consumed an unduly long period of time. No cogent reasons are discernable from the writ petition as to what prevented the petitioner-State from assailing the awarded within a reasonable period. In Mrinmoy Maity versus Chhanda Koley and others2, the Hon’ble Apex Court inter alia re-iterated that for filing of a writ petition though no fixed period of limitation is prescribed, however, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the case of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the applicant ought to be non-suited. The writ courts are not to indulge in permitting indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. Though there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. Relevant paras from the decision are as under: - “11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has 2 (2024) 15 SCC 215 6 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. 12. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B .3, has held to the following effect: (SCCp.784,paras 56-58) “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai4 , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court5 and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India6. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right 3 (2009) 1 SCC 768:(2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 4 AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261) 5 AIR 1967 SC 1450 6 (1992)3 SCC 136 7 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi7 , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports8 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India9. 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan and another10, whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports11. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd12 (LR PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court13 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service14.Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum case12, LR pp.239-40) “Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the 7 (1969) 1 SCC 110: (1970) 25 STC 289 8 (1969) 1 SCC 185 9 (1970)1 SCC 84 10 (2006) 4 SCC 322: 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 11 (1969) 1 SCC 185 12 (1874) LR 5 PC 221: 22 WR 492 13 AIR 1967 SC 1450 14 AIR 1969 SC 329 8 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India15 that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal16 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy 15 (1970) 1 SCC 84 16 (1986) 4 SCC 566 9 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third- party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 14. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu17, has held: (SCC p.117, para 16) “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” Petitioners’ (State) not assailing the award within a reasonable period and offering lame explanation for having not done so, would mean acceptance of such award rendering conclusiveness 17 (2014) 4 SCC 108: (2014) 1 SCC (L& S) 38 10 ( 2026:HHC:23538 ) to the impugned order. Efflux of time, in turn would create rights in and corresponding liabilities upon the parties. Petitioners had been grossly negligent. The delay on their part, in proceeding casually & negligently in the matter has not been explained with justifiable reasons. Sufficient cause has not been shown by the petitioners for exercise of discretion in their favour. In view of above, no case is made out by the petitioner for interference with the impugned award dated 16.12.2024 at this belated stage. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly. Jyotsna Rewal Dua Judge 18th June, 2026 (rohit)