2026:HHC:23174 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 265 of 2012 Reserved on: 30.05.2026 Date of Decision: 19.06.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Gulat Ram & Ors ...Respondents _______________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Appellant : Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr H.K.S. Thakur, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31.10.2011 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 16.11.2006 and order of sentence dated 16.12.2006 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur, District at Reckong Peo (camp at Rampur Bushahr) (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:23174 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for committing offences punishable under Sections 353, 147, 149, 447 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Ravinder Singh Jaswal (PW1), and other forest officials had gone to DPF C-112, Punan, and DPF C-105, Nankhari, to remove the sheds constructed in the forest area. Accused Diwan, Jagdish and 200-250 people gathered and obstructed the forest officials from carrying out their work. The informant filed an application (Ext.PW1/A), and the police registered an FIR (Ext.PW10/A). ASI Hari Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/A). He seized the informant’s appointment and posting order, the demarcation report (Ext.PW6/C), tatima (Ext.PW6/A), a copy of the jamabandi (Ext.PW6/B), notification (Ext.PW11/C) and damage reports regarding the construction of the sheds in the forest area. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their versions, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notices of 3 2026:HHC:23174 accusation were put to them for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 147 and 506 read with Section 149 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be filed. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Ravinder Singh Jaswal (PW1) is the informant. Duni Chand (PW2), Ram Swaroop (PW3), Madan Lal (PW4), Ishwar Lal (PW8) and Sukh Dev (PW9) had visited the forest to remove the sheds. HC Devi Singh (PW5) obtained the documents from the revenue officials. Birbal (PW6) went to the spot and found the encroachment in the demarcated protected forest. Hitesh Bhardwaj (PW7) produced the informant’s appointment and posting orders. Inspector Sangat Ram (PW10) signed the FIR. ASI Hari Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent. They did not produce any evidence in their defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the forest officials corroborated each other. The report of Patwari proved that some unauthorised construction was being carried out 4 2026:HHC:23174 in the demarcated protected forest. The forest officials had asked the accused not to raise the construction in the demarcated protected forest, but the accused threatened and obstructed the forest officials from discharging their duties. However, it was not proved that a notification was published, and the offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act was not made out. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused Gulat Ram, Dev Raj, Maheshwar, Santosh Kumar and Diwan Chand of committing an offence punishable under Section 506 read with Section 149 of the IPC and Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, but convicted them of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 353, read with Section 149 of the IPC and sentenced them as under: Sections Sentences 147 of the Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each. 353 read with Section 149 of IPC The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two months each. Both the substantive substances of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 5 2026:HHC:23174 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that there was no recital in the FIR that the accused had manhandled the informant. Therefore, the version in the Court regarding the manhandling could not be accepted. The forest officials had not joined any independent witness. No order of the competent authority directing the forest officials to remove the unauthorised construction was brought on record. The encroachment could not have been removed by using force but by taking recourse to the law. The prosecution had failed to prove that the forest officials were discharging any official duty at the time of the incident, and the learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 353 read with Section 149 of the IPC. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting 6 2026:HHC:23174 that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The testimonies of Forest Officials corroborated each other in material particulars. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were deposing falsely. The accused had formed an unlawful assembly and obstructed the forest officials from discharging their duties. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding that the forest officials were not discharging their duties. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr H.K.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 10. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. It was duly proved on record that the informant, Ravinder Singh Jaswal, was a public official and he was discharging his official duties. He and other officials were restrained from discharging their official duties and were manhandled. All the ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 353, 147 and 149 of the IPC were duly 7 2026:HHC:23174 satisfied. Learned Appellate court erred in holding that the forest officials were not discharging their duties, and there were material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion to acquit the accused. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr H.K.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove that the forest officials were authorised to remove the obstruction. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that forest officials had no jurisdiction to remove the structure without an order from the competent authority. The forest officials materially improved upon the initial version by stating that they were manhandled, which version was missing from the FIR. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8 2026:HHC:23174 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the 9 2026:HHC:23174 acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 10 2026:HHC:23174 (f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The informant, Ravinder Singh Jaswal, stated in his cross-examination that more than 100 shops had been constructed on Nankhari, DPF Chowk. These were old. He had not served any notice upon the accused to remove the construction. He admitted that he had no powers of a Collector. These admissions in the cross-examination show that the shops were old, the persons were in settled possession, and the informant and other forest officials had no order to remove the construction. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu, (2004) 1 SCC 769, that a person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and he may even use reasonable force to protect his possession. A rightful owner can take possession by taking recourse to the law. It was observed: “8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned, the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession, and in order to protect such possession, he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful 11 2026:HHC:23174 owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law into his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking the law into his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course, subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of a better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent, even by using reasonable force, a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into, would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.” 18. In the present case, the accused were in settled possession as per the admission made by the informant and were entitled to resist an attempt at their dispossession except as per the law. The act of the informant and forest officials of damaging their structure constituted the offence of mischief, and the accused had a right to private defence against the act of mischief. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Nathu Pandey, (1969) 2 SCC 207: 1969 SCC OnLine SC 207 that when the 12 2026:HHC:23174 accused were acting in exercise of their right to private defence, they cannot be held liable for forming an unlawful assembly. It was observed at page 210: “8. In order to attract the provisions of Section 149, the prosecution must establish that there was an unlawful assembly and that the crime was committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. Under the fourth clause of Section 141, an assembly of five or more persons is an unlawful assembly if the common object of its members is to enforce any right or supposed right by means of criminal force or show of criminal force to any person. Section 141 must be read with Sections 96 to 106 dealing with the right of private defence. Under Section 96, nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The assertion of a right of private defence within the limits prescribed by law cannot fall within the expression “to enforce any right or supposed right” in the fourth clause of Section 141. In Kapildeo Singh v. R. [1950 SCC OnLine FC 5: 1949-50 FCR 834], the High Court had affirmed the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 147 and Section 304, read with Section 149, without considering the question as to who was actually in possession of the plot at the time of the occurrence. The High Court observed that the question of possession was immaterial and that the appellant’s party were members of an unlawful assembly, “as both sides were determined to vindicate their rights by show of force or use of force”. The Federal Court set aside the conviction and sentence. It held that the High Court Judge stated the law too loosely, “if by the use of the word ‘vindicate’ he meant to include even cases in which a party is forced to maintain or defend his rights”. The assembly could not be designated as an unlawful assembly if its object was to defend property by the use of force within the limits prescribed by law. 9. The charges against the respondents were that they “were members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the 13 2026:HHC:23174 common object of which, viz., in forcibly preventing Ramdhari Singh and Ramswarup Singh from collecting mahua from Barmania field of Village Phatpani and if necessary in causing the murder of the said two persons, for the purpose, “that some of them caused the murders of Ramdhari and Ramswarup and that thereby all of them committed offences under Section 302, read with Section 149. We have found that respondent Chandradeo was in possession of Plot No. 1311 and the mahua trees standing thereon. The object of the respondent's party was to prevent the commission of theft of the mahua fruits in exercise of their right of private defence of property. This object was not unlawful. Nor is it possible to say that their common object was to kill Ramdhari and Ramswarup. Those who killed them exceeded the right of private defence and may be individually held responsible for the murders. But the murders were not committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or were such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. The accused respondents cannot be made constructively responsible for the murders under Section 302, read with Section 149. 10. In Kishori Prasad v. State of Bihar [ Criminal Appeal No. 191 of 1966, decided on 5-12-1968 (Pat)], the High Court convicted the appellants under Sections 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code, though the appellant Hirdaynarain was in lawful possession of the western portion of Plot No. 67, and the attempt by the prosecution party to cultivate the same was high-handed. This Court set aside the conviction and sentence. Ramaswami, J. observed: “In a case where the accused person could invoke the right of private defence it is manifest that no charge of rioting under Section 147 or Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, can be established for the common object to commit an offence attributed in the charge under Section 147 or Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code, is not made out. If any accused person had exceeded the right of private defence in causing the death of Chitanu Rai or in injuring Gorakh Prasad, it is open to the prosecution to 14 2026:HHC:23174 prove the individual assault, and the particular accused person concerned may be convicted for the individual assault either under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, or of the lesser offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The difficulty in the present case is that the High Court has not analysed the evidence given by the parties and given a finding whether any or which of the appellants is guilty of causing the death of Chitanu Rai or of assaulting Gorakh Prasad. As we have already said, none of the appellants can be convicted of the charge of rioting under Section 148 or of the constructive offence under Sections 326/149 of the Indian Penal Code.” We accordingly hold that the respondents cannot be convicted under Section 302, read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Nor is it possible to convict them under Section 302, read with Section 34. The High Court rightly found that the respondents wanted to prevent the collection of mahua fruits and that a common intention of all of them to murder Ramadhari and Ramswarup was not established.” 19. This position was reiterated in Bhanwar Singh v. State of M.P., (2008) 16 SCC 657: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 378: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 956, wherein it was observed at page 677: “54. By extension, the above rationale may be applied while trying to reconcile the right to private defence with Section 149 IPC and the common object required thereunder. Section 149 also postulates a principle of constructive liability, attaching liability to members of an unlawful assembly where an offence is committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of such unlawful assembly, or where members of such assembly knew that such offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. However, this provision would quite clearly not apply if the act constituting the offence was done in exercise of the right to private defence. As stated in the aforementioned extract —“What would be an offence by reason of constructive liability would cease to be one if the act constituting the offence was 15 2026:HHC:23174 done in exercise of the right of private defence”. Moreover, by a similar extension of the above judgment, having established the common object, entering into separate individual liability based on private defence would be out of place. Hence, the task of the court would be to ascertain whether, on the one hand, there would be constructive liability for culpable homicide or murder on the basis that this was committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or was known to be a likelihood in prosecuting such common object, or whether this shared objective of the said group of persons was merely to protect body or property (even if the finding is that such right has been exceeded). The logical deduction from the above line of logic would be that a finding regarding the former would necessarily preclude the existence of the latter situation. In other words, if the object of an assembly is to exercise the right of private defence, and if the alleged offence has been committed in exercise or in excess of such right, it would mean that the “common object” element of Section 149 would be absent. Similarly, a finding that there exists a common object as described under Section 141, and that an offence was committed in pursuance of such object or was known to be likely to be committed in pursuance of such object, would mean that “private defence” cannot be applied, as the common object would no longer be the exercise of the right of private defence. 20. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 147 of the IPC. 21. Learned Trial Court had held that an offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act was not made out. The State has not filed any appeal assailing the acquittal of the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act. Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act punishes a 16 2026:HHC:23174 person who carries out the specified activities in the protected forest. The acquittal of the accused under Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act means that they had not carried out any prohibited activity in the protected forest; hence, the informant and other forest officials could not have removed the construction from the protected forest. 22. The prosecution relied upon the reports (Ext.PW6/C and Ext.PW6/F) prepared by Patwari, Birbal (PW6), to prove that the encroachment was carried out in the reserve forest. These reports will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by this Court in Ajudhia Lal vs. Smt. Sandhya Devi 2006(2) Shimla Law Cases 108 that Patwari is not competent to give demarcation and any tatima prepared by him cannot be relied upon. It was observed: “9. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the first appellate court was not justified in rejecting the Tatima prepared by the Patwari on the spot when the Presiding Officer of the trial Court went to the spot and that the said Tatima proves that a portion of khasra No. 237, shown by min khasra No. 237/1, had been encroached upon after the institution of the suit. Spot inspections are carried out by the court with a view to appreciating the evidence. In the present case, the Presiding Officer of the trial court went to the spot to appreciate the contentions (not the evidence) of the parties with regard to the application for a temporary injunction, much before the commencement of the trial, and, therefore, the spot inspection note and the Tatima were got prepared from the Patwari on the spot cannot be looked into for the purpose of appreciation of 17 2026:HHC:23174 the evidence. In any case, there is nothing on the record that the Patwari, namely PW 2 Sh. Jagan Nath carried out the demarcation on the spot, as per instructions. In any case, Patwari was not competent to give demarcation. Therefore, the Tatima prepared by the Patwari cannot be used as a piece of evidence for granting the relief of mandatory injunction asked for by the appellant-plaintiff in the amended plaint.” 23. Therefore, it is impermissible to rely upon the reports of Patwari to conclude that the accused had encroached upon the forest land. 24. The complaint (Ext.PW1/A) mentions that Gulat Ram and other persons had stopped the informant and asked them to go away, otherwise he would kill the informant. Learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC, which means that the accused had not criminally intimidated the informant and other forest officials, which would make the rest of the prosecution’s version doubtful. 25. Sukh Dev (PW9) stated that Gulat Ram came to the spot along with 200-250 people. They obstructed the forest official and asked them to go away. He stated that the accused had pushed the informant. The informant admitted in his cross-examination that he had not mentioned in the complaint (Ext.PW1/A) that the accused had pushed him, which clearly shows that the statement 18 2026:HHC:23174 made in the Court to this effect was made for the first time and was rightly held to be an improvement. Similarly, Ishwar Lal, Duni Chand (PW2), Ram Swroop (PW3), and Madan Lal (PW4) stated that the accused Gulat Ram had pushed the informant. The complaint (Ex. PW1/A) nowhere mentions that the accused had pushed the informant. Hence, the statements on oath are clear improvements upon the initial version and were rightly disbelieved by the learned Appellate Court. 26. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before it, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible. 27. No other point was urged. 28. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 29. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish bail 19 2026:HHC:23174 bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th June, 2026 (Nikita)