1 2026:CGHC:13682-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 768 of 2024 1 - Balvindar Singh S/o Jogindar Singh, Aged About 46 Years, R/o Village Jhander, P.S.- Tarantaran, Dist. Tarantaran (Panjab), At Present R/o Beside Gurudwara Near Bangali Hotel, P.S. Tatibandh, Dist. Raipur, C.G. ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through , District Magistrate Sukma, C.G. ... Respondent (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Ms. Rajni Soren, Advocate. For State : Mr. N.K. Jaiswal, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 23-03-2026 1. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. against the the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16-01-2024 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, (FTC) South Bastar Dantewada (C.G.), in Special Sessions (Atrocities Act) Case No. 56/2021 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction Digitally signed by MOHAMMED AADIL KHAN Date: 2026.03.27 17:13:04 +0530 2 to run all the jail sentences concurrently:- Conviction Sentence U/s 363 of the IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, U/s 377 of the IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.500/-, U/s 506 Part II of the IPC R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.500/-, U/s 6 of POCSO Act R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.500/-, In default of payment of each fine amount, additional R.I. for 1 year for each default in payment of fine amount. 2. The brief facts of the case are that on 23-07-2021 the victim PW-1 went missing from his house. He accompanied when the appellant who was trailer driver. The appellant caught him on his request that he went to to to her maternal aunt’s house, however, instead of leaving him to his maternal aunt’s house he committed carnal intercourse with the victim PW-1 and while proceeding towards Balodabazar he left the victim on the way. He asked for help with bypassers and then he was sent to the office of Home Guards, Balodabazar. After preliminary enquiry he was sent to Child Welfare Committee, Balodbabazar where counseling was done and his counseling report Ex.-P/4. The victim was sent for his medical examination there and his MLC report Ex.-P/15 and P/16 were obtained which was given by Doctor Sourabh Verma PW-5. While medically examining the victim no external injury has been found on his body. The said counseling report along with the MLC report of the victim and report of the Child Welfare Officer have been seized by police vide seizure memo Ex.-P/12. Two slides of his anal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for its chemical examination from 3 FSL. On the report made by PW-3, the FIR Ex.-P/10 was registered for the offence under Section 323, 363, 377 of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’) against the driver of the truck. The T-shirt and half pant of the victim was seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/1. Spot map Ex.-P/27 was prepared. The social status certificate of the victim Ex.-P/14 has also been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/13. With respect to the age and date of birth of the victim the school register Ex.-P/21C has been seized vide seizure memo Ex.-P/20 and according to the school register his date of birth is08-06-2008. The certificate Ex.-P/23 was also seized by police which was issued by the Principal of the school. The appellant was arrested on 19-08-2021 and from the appellant one trailer truck bearing registration No.CG04 JD 5525 and its registration papers and one mobile phone have been seized from him vide seizure memo Ex.- P/26. The appellant was also sent for his medical examination to District Hospital Sukama where he was medically examined by Doctor Sourabh Verma PW-5 and gave his report Ex.-P/18. While medically examining the appellant the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on his body and found him physically well capable of sexual assault. The appellant was put to Test Identification Parade which was conducted by the Executive Magistrate on 19-08-2021 at Sub-Tahsil Office Dornapal. The victim has duly identified the appellant in the said Test Identification Parade and the Test Identification Parade memo Ex.-P/7 was prepared. The anal swab of the victim was sent for its chemical examination to regional FSL Jagdalpur from where report Ex.-P/31 was received and 4 according to the FSL report, semen and sperms were absent in the anal swab of the victim. 3. The statement of the witnesses under Section 161 CrPC have also been recorded and after completion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed before the learned trial Court for the offence under Section 323, 506, 363 and 377 of the IPC and Section 4 and 6 of POCSO Act. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the for the offence under Section 323, 506, 363 and 377 of the IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4. To prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses. The statement of appellant under Section 313 CrPC has also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances that appears against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence in question. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the evidence are not sufficient to hold the 5 appellant guilty for the offence in question. The victim had accompanied the appellant and he visited various places, but had not made any complaint to anyone to whom they met on the way. Had the victim been subjected to sexual assault by the appellant, he would have fled away from the place where they stayed either for easing or for taking food. He would further submit that there are allegation of carnal intercourse with the victim, but as per the MLC report of the victim, there is no injury found on his body and even anal swab report has been found negative. In absence of any injury it cannot be said that he was subjected to unnatural intercourse by the appellant. There is no evidence on record that while going with the appellant he raised his alarm or shouted for help. A totally improbable story has been developed by the prosecution. She would further submit that the age of the victim has also not been proved by producing sufficient and cogent evidence and there are material discrepancies in the evidence with respect to the age of the victim. Therefore, in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence, the appellant cannot be convicted and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, the counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and has submitted that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions and contradictions the evidence of the victim as well as other prosecution witnesses are reliable and sufficient to hold the appellant guilty for the alleged offence. He would further submit that absence of injury alone is not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of the victim who has duly supported the prosecution case and 6 identified him in the Test Identification Parade. The Test Identification Parade has also been proved by the prosecution be examining the Executive Magistrate who conducted the same. The age of the victim has also been proved by leading cogent evidence and document obtained from the school of the victim which has been duly proved by the prosecution. As per the date of birth mentioned in the school register and the certificate issued by the Principal of the school, the victim is found to be minor and less than 16 years of age. There are sufficient and overwhelming evidence against the appellant that he committed the alleged offence with the victim and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced him and his appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case. 9. The first and foremost question arose by learned counsel for the appellant is regarding the age of the victim. 10. As per the prosecution case, the victim is aged about 13 years and 1 month. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register Ex.-P/21C and the certificate Ex.-P/24 issued by the Principal of the school which has been proved by PW-11. PW-11 has stated in his evidence that he is Principal of the school, police has seized the school register vide seizure memo Ex.-P/20 with respect to the date of birth of the victim. The original register was returned back to the school and he brought it today with him. As per the school register the date of birth of the victim is 08-06-2008 and the attested true copy of the school 7 register is Ex.-P/21C. In cross-examination he admitted that the entries have not been made by him in the school register. On the basis of transfer certificate the victim got admission in his school at Class VIth. The certificate issued by the Principal of the school has been proved by PW-12 who is the Investigating Officer of the case that the Principal of the school has issued the certificate which is Ex.-P/24. 11. Admissibility and the evidentiary value of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 385, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under in paragraphs 40, and 48 that : “40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584] held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under 8 the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 12. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima 9 facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as 10 any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 13. Further, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of 11 documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [2022 (8) SCC 602] this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [2019] 9 SCR 735] that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over 12 the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal [(2012) 9 SCR 224], this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, PW-11 has clearly stated that he is not the author of the school register. The said school register is of Class VI. There is no transfer certificate annexed in the school register as has been stated by PW-11 that the victim has admitted in Class VI on the basis of his transfer certificate obtained from other school. There is no record of intial schooling of the victim. Further, PW-11 has not stated anything about the document Ex.-P/24 which is a certificate issued by him and the Ex.-P/24 is proved by the Investigating Officer not by the person who issued it. There is no birth certificate, Kotwari register or occisification test report of the victim to prove his age that he was minor. There is lack of sufficient evidence with respect to the age of the victim, yet the learned trial Court hold him minor. 15. So far as the involvement of the appellant in offence in question is concerned, we again carefully examine the evidence of the victim PW-1. 13 16. PW-1 has stated in his evidence that he left his house and went to his friends house, after staying there for a day he came towards roadside and thinking about where to go, at that time the appellant came there in a truck and asked about his destination. He boarded in the said truck and went for sleep. He disclosed to the appellant that he has to go upto Chhindgarh. The appellant stopped his truck for taking food and he also provided him food. They again proceeded forward in the truck, however, the appellant did not permit him to deboard from the truck at Chhindgarh and he went ahead towards jungle where he committed carnal intercourse with him. He threatened him also that he will kill him if he shouted. The appellant again proceeded forward. On the way in a tole plaza some hot talk occurred with the persons of tole plaza as the appellant was not having sufficient document in the truck. In the night the appellant again committed carnal intercourse with him. The appellant committed marpeet with him also, yet he went for sleep in the truck. He tried to flee from the place, but he could not succeeded as the door of the truck was locked. At about 4:00 a.m. the appellant went for diesel and they again proceeded. At about 12 in noon he took him in a dhaba where his two other friends came, he took lunch there and the appellant and his two friends were drinking liquor in cabin of the vehicle. When he came there the appellant locked in the truck and went for food. He again accompanied the appellant uptill night and they again took food in the night. The appellant sent him for taking dinner with instruction that not to disclose the incident to anyone, otherwise he will kill him. When he came back after having his dinner he again committed 14 carnal intercourse with him. In the morning when they proceeded ahead their vehicle got break down and they made telephonic call to the owner of the vehicle and the appellant again threatened him not to disclose the incident to his owner. On the way the truck got punctured and they again took their meals in dhaba and stayed there in the night. In the next morning they further proceeded and then the appellant informed him that they reached to Raipur. Thereafter, they proceeded towards Balod. When the appellant again tried to commit carnal intercourse he started shouting and the appellant could not succeed in his act, then the appellant deboarded him from the vehicle. When he asked help from the persons who were present, they asked him to go to the Home Guard office. They took him to Police Station Palari. On the next day the persons from CWC came and then the proceedings have been started. In his further examination he stated that the appellant has committed carnal intercourse with him for 4-5 times. He identified the accused at Dornapal office and signed the document Ex.-P/7. In cross-examination he stated that he left his house for the reason that the bracelet of his grand-mother is lost from him and he was afraid that his grand-mother will beat him. On the instance of the appellant he boarded in the vehicle. In cross-examination he further stated that when he tried to stop the appellant from carnal intercourse, the appellant assaulted him by danda and rod and he received injuries. He admitted that he regularly deboarded from the vehicle and went for food more than one time on every day. He also went for answering the call of nature. He met with a number of persons at dhaba and petrol pump, however, he has not 15 disclosed the incident to anyone who present there. The appellant allured him that he will employed him a mechanic shop, but he could not provide him the job. He further admitted that at the time of identification of the accused police persons were also there. From the evidence of this witness it reveals that though the victim has alleged that he boarded in the truck to go to Chhindgarh and instead of dropping him at Chhindgarh the appellant took ahead and committed carnal intercourse with him, but as per his evidence itself despite the allegation of carnal intercourse at first time, he further proceeded with him without making any objection or without any complaint. He met with number of persons at dhaba and petrol pump and there was no restriction to get deboarded from the truck and to answer the call of nature or for any other work and in that situation he could flee from the truck, but he did not do so and continued to remain with the appellant. Had he suffered to carnal intercourse from the appellant, he would not have remained with him. In the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence produced by him the victim do not appear to be sterling witness and his evidence suffers from suspicious circumstance. 17. PW-2 is grand-mother of the victim. She turned hostile and not supported the prosecution’s case. When she was cross-examined after declaring hostile by the prosecution, she stated that the victim disclosed about the incident to her. However, in her cross-examination she denied that the victim informed about the incident. 16 18. PW-3 is a member of CWC. She deposed about the incident on the basis of information disclosed by the victim. She stated in her evidence that the victim accompanied with the appellant from his village and on the way the appellant committed carnal intercourse with him. She lodged a written complaint to Police Station Dornapal which is Ex.- P/9 and the FIR is Ex.-P/10. In cross-examination she admitted that on 29-07-2021 and 30-07-2021 she has not made any complaint to police. She voluntarily stated that the victim was kept at CCI Chhindgarh for two days. She also did not know what was there in document Ex.-P/11 and P/12. The said articles was handed over to her by the Childline Balodabazar. 19. PW-4 is uncle of the victim. He has stated in his evidence that his nephew went missing in the last year and he gathered information about him through whatsapp. He also came to know that the victim was sexually molested by the appellant. After receiving information they took the victim back with them. In cross-examination he admitted that he disclosed about the incident on the basis of the information given by the Child and Women Development Department. 20. PW-6 is counselor, PW-7 is coordinator and PW-8 is volunteer at Childline, Balodabazar, who conducted counseling of the victim. They also deposed about the incident on the basis of the information given by the victim. 21. PW-13 is a labour working at the dhaba. He identified the appellant through video conferencing and stated that the victim was 17 boarded by the appellant in the dhaba and after having their meals he went for sleep in the dhaba. Nothing incriminating have been stated by him that the victim disclosed about any incident to him. 22. PW-14 is the Nayab Tahsildar who conducted the Test Identification Parade and prepared the memo Ex.-P/7. In cross- examination he stated that the persons who were mixed with the accused were brought by police persons and he did not know about them. Though, the defence have given suggestion that police have shown the appellant to the victim and on that basis he identified the appellant, which this witness has denied. However, it is the victim’s evidence that he has identified the accused in presence of police persons, therefore, the evidence of the Nayab Tahsildar with respect to the identification of the appellant loses its significance. 23. One important fact of this case is that, there is no injuryy found on the body of the victim. PW-5 the doctor who examined the victim has not found any external or internal injuries on his body. He gave his MLC report Ex.-P/15 and opined that on external examination no tear or visible injury over anus and it may confirm by FSL report. Two slides of the anal swab of the victim was prepared and handed over to police for its chemical examination. In his cross-examination he admitted that if any person forcefully inserted any hard object in anus such person would get injury on the same part of body by its abrasion or laceration. He also admitted that if a child would be subjected to carnal intercourse for continuously 3-4 days, injury could have caused in his anus. On the 18 question asked by the Court this witness has replied that in a slight penetration of penis into onus injury might not be possible. When the victim was allegedly suffered carnal intercourse for 3-4 days continuously that too 2-3 times in a day, absence of any injury on his anus would make his evidence doubtful. Having carnal intercourse for about 3-4 days without there being any injury to a person makes the prosecution’s case doubtful as to whether the victim was actually suffered with carnal intercourse by the appellant or not. 24. As has already been held that the evidence of the victim suffers from infirmity and he could not be leveled as sterling witness, no injury has been found on him, despite having opportunity he did not chose to flee from the truck and remained accompanied with the appellant without making any complaint or objection to the persons who met them at dhaba, petrol pump or during entire travel makes the appellant entitled for benefit of doubt. 25. It is settled principles of law that prosecution has Burden to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and where two views are possible, arising based on the same evidence, the view which is favoruable to the accused should be taken into consideration and the accused should be given benefit of doubt. In the matter of Digambar Vaishnav and Another Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 (4) SCC 522, it has been held as under : “19. It is also well-settled principle that in criminal cases, if two views are possible on evidence adduced in the case, one binding to the guilt 19 of the accused and the other is to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence [See Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808]. 26. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, we found force in the appeal filed by the appellant and therefore, by giving benefit of doubt, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The appellant is acquitted from all the alleged offences. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside. 27. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant- Balvindar Singh is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Aadil