2026:HHC:23175 THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.230 of 2014 Reserved on: 21.4.2026 Date of Decision: 19.6.2026. Rashid Mohammad ...Petitioner Versus The State of H.P. ..Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr B.S. Chauhan, Senior Advocate with M/s Aditi Rana and Yoginder, Advocates. For the Respondent/ State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 04.08.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:23175 Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 21.03.2014, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 279, 337 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the police received information on 5.08.2007 that a tempo and truck had met with an accident, and the injured were being taken to Civil Hospital Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. ASI Pritam Singh, ASI Kishori Lal (PW-10), Constable Kamal Dev and Constable Raj Kumar were sent for verification. ASI Kishori Lal (PW-10) found that a truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5912 was going from Ghumarwin towards Bilaspur, and a tempo bearing registration No. HP-24A-1172 was going from Bilaspur towards Ghumarwin. They had met with an accident. The breadth of the mettled road was 20 feet, with 8 feet and 10 feet of the Kachha portion. The 3 2026:HHC:23175 truck driver had crossed the central line and hit the tempo bearing registration No. HP-24A-1172. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the truck driver. Rukka (Ext.PW10/B) was prepared and sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. Kishori Lal (PW-10) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/A). He seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5912 and the tempo bearing registration No. HP-24A-1172, along with its documents vide memos (Ext.PW-1/A and Ext.PW1/B). He took the photographs (Ext.P1 to Ext.P7) whose negatives are Ext.P8 to Ext.P14. He went to the Hospital and filed the applications (Ext.PW10/C and Ext.PW10/D) for examination of the injured. Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW-11) examined Rashid Mohammad and Rajiv Mohammed (PW-3) and found that they had sustained simple injuries, which could have been caused within six hours of examination. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW11/A and Ext. PW11/B). Ashwani Kumar succumbed to his injuries. ASI Kishori Lal (PW- 10) conducted the inquest and prepared the report (Ext.PW10/F). He filed an application (Ext.PW10/E) for the post-mortem examination of Ashwani Kumar. Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW-11) conducted the post-mortem examination and found that 4 2026:HHC:23175 Ashwani Kumar had died due to hemorrhagic shock from the chest injury. He issued the post-mortem report (Ext.PW11/C). The documents of the truck were seized vide memo (Ext.PW- 2/A). Kashmir Singh (PW-5) mechanically examined the tempo bearing registration HP-24A-1172 and found that the vehicle was damaged after the accident, but it had no defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW-5/A). Shyam Lal (PW-9) examined the truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5912 and found that the truck had no mechanical defect in it that could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW9/A). Laldeen (PW-2) issued a certificate (Ext.PW2/B) stating that he had employed the accused as a driver of the truck. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279,337 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5 2026:HHC:23175 4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. Roshan Lal (PW-1) and Rajiv Mohammad (PW-3) did not support the prosecution's case. Laldeen (PW-2) is the owner of the truck, who proved that he had employed the accused as the driver. Amarnath (PW-4) witnessed the recovery. Kashmir Singh (PW-5) mechanically examined the tempo bearing registration No. HP-24A-1172. Vinod Kumar (PW-6) accompanied the police party to the spot. Puran Chand (PW-7) prepared the challan. Constable Raj Kumar (PW-8) carried the rukka to the Police Station. Shyam Lal (PW-9) examined the truck bearing registration No.HP-22-5912. SI Kishori Lal (PW-10) investigated the matter. Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW-11) conducted the medical examination of the injured and the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Krishan Kumar (PW-12) is the owner of the tempo bearing registration No. HP-24A-1172. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6 2026:HHC:23175 6. Learned Trial Court held that the site plan, photographs and the statements of the witnesses proved that the truck was being driven towards its right side in violation of Rule 2 of the Rules of the Road Regulation, 1989, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Simple injuries were caused to Rajiv Mohammad in the accident, and Ashwani Kumar died in the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as under: - Under Section 279 of the IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. Under Section 337 of the IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. Under Section 304-A of the IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹5000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days. All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was 7 2026:HHC:23175 decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumwarin, District Bilaspur (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. The mere fact that Ashwani Kumar did not have a valid driving license with him will not absolve the accused of his liability. Rajiv Mohmmad (PW-3) did not support the prosecution's case, and he was cross-examined with reference to his previous testimony. His credit was impeached under Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act, and no reliance could be placed on his testimony. The truck had left the central line and hit the tempo towards the other side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident. Rajiv Mohammad sustained injuries in the accident, and Ashwani Kumar died in the accident. Learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The offences of rash driving were on an increase, and a deterrent view had to be taken. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be excessive; therefore, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present 8 2026:HHC:23175 revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. There were no skid marks of the truck, which falsifies the prosecution's version that the truck was being driven at a high-speed. Rajiv Mohammad (PW-3) has not supported the prosecution's case, and the accused was entitled to an acquittal. The photographs differed from the site plan. The entry in the daily diary showed that information was provided by Mr. Z.A.Bhutto. His statement was not recorded by the police, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr B.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by M/s Aditi Rana and Yoginder, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr B.S. Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. Rajiv Mohammad (PW-3) has not supported the prosecution's case, and this was sufficient to make the prosecution's case suspect. The learned courts below erred in 9 2026:HHC:23175 rejecting his testimony. The site plan and the photographs differed from each other, and no reliance could have been placed upon them. The investigating officer had not noticed the skid marks, which falsifies the prosecution's case that the accused was driving the truck at a high speed. Even otherwise, the high speed does not amount to any negligence. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He submitted in the alternative that the learned Trial Court has imposed an excessive sentence. The accused has undergone the agony of trial, appeal and revision, and the sentence should be reduced. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions:  Jagdish Narain v. State of U.P., (1996) 8 SCC 199: 1996 SCC (Cri) 565:  Suruvu Parshaiah vs State of A.P. 2006 CRI.L.J.824; and  Ashraf vs State of Karnataka 2025 INSC 1394; 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the site plan and the photographs show that the truck, being driven by the accused, had left the central line and hit the tempo on the right 10 2026:HHC:23175 side. The learned courts below had rightly held that driving the truck towards the right side of the road constitutes negligence. Rajiv Mohammad (PW-3) was contradicted with reference to his previous statement, and his credibility was impeached. The learned courts below had rightly discarded his testimony. This Court should not re-appreciate the evidence while deciding the revision petition. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests 11 2026:HHC:23175 jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15.It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v.Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance 12 2026:HHC:23175 with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the 13 2026:HHC:23175 revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any 14 2026:HHC:23175 relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 15 2026:HHC:23175 17. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Rajiv Mohammad (PW-3) stated that he was the conductor and the accused was the driver of the truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5912. The truck was being driven at a normal speed. A tempo came from the opposite side at high speed. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the truck being driven by the accused had hit the tempo towards the right side of the road. He denied that the accident occurred because of the high speed of the truck and the negligence of the 16 2026:HHC:23175 accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He stated in his cross-examination by the learned counsel for the defence that there was no negligence on the part of the accused, and the tempo was being driven towards the wrong side and at a high speed. 20. This witness has denied the previous statement recorded by the police. Kishori Lal (PW-10) stated that he had recorded the portions A to A and B to B of the statement of Rajiv Mohammad (Ext.PW10/B), as per his version. This was not challenged in the cross-examination and is deemed to be accepted. Therefore, Rajiv Mohammad is shown to have made two inconsistent statements: one before the police that the accused drove the truck at a high speed towards the wrong side of the road, and another before the Court that the accused was driving the truck at a slow speed and the tempo had hit the truck towards the wrong side of the road. Both statements cannot stand together, and his credit has been impeached under Section 155 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied 17 2026:HHC:23175 upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed: “52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross- examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 21. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: “12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross- examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court observed: "It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be 18 2026:HHC:23175 cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony. 22. Therefore, the testimony of Rajiv Mohammad could not have been used to discard the prosecution's case. 23. SI Kishori Lal (PW-10) stated that the width of the mettled road was 20 feet, and the unmettled road was 8 to 10 feet towards both sides of the road. The road had a white dividing line. The truck left the dividing line and hit the tempo towards the other side of the road. Constable Raj Kumar No. 232 (PW-8) also stated that the vehicles were parked towards the right side of the road in damaged condition. He stated in his cross-examination that the traffic was still moving. His statement shows that the truck had left its side and was towards the right side. Sufficient road was available towards the left side of the truck to move the traffic. The site plan (Ext.PW10/A) shows that the truck had left the central line and hit the tempo by moving three feet towards the right side. The photographs also show that the front wheels of the truck are towards the right side of the central line, and there is little space available towards the right side of the truck. It is trite to say that man may lie, but circumstances do not. The circumstances show that 19 2026:HHC:23175 the truck had left the central line and moved towards its right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the right side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 24. In Shakila Khader v. Nausheer Cama, (1975) 4 SCC 122: 1975 SCC (Cri) 379: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 103, the car went to the right side of the road, hit the parapet and turned turtle. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver was negligent. It was observed at page 126: “6. The facts in the case speak eloquently about what should have happened. The main criterion for deciding whether the driving that led to the accident was rash and negligent is not only the speed but also the width of the road, the density of the traffic, and the attempt, as in this case, to overtake the other vehicles, resulting in going to the wrong side of the road and being responsible for the accident. Even if the accident took place in the twinkling of an eye, it is not difficult for the eyewitness to notice a car overtaking other vehicles and going to the wrong side of the road and hitting a vehicle travelling on that side of the road. The criterion adopted by the learned Judge for 20 2026:HHC:23175 assessing the evidence of PWs 3 and 4 and rejecting them is thoroughly unjustifiable. There may be cases where it is difficult to be clear or specific in giving details as to the cause of the accident, but this is not one such case. The reference by the learned Judge about the slight damage to the electric post and the conclusion drawn therefrom that the car could not have been going at a high speed is not correct, as we shall show later. His further observation that the fact that the car travelled another 45 feet and hit against the parapet wall and turned turtle showed that the car must have been travelling at an extremely high speed but there is a little blue paint on the pole and a faint gray stain on the parapet wall is self-contradictory unless we are to infer that the learned Judge implied that the one or the other is not true. He does not so hold. There can be no doubt about the car having hit the electric post and the parapet wall. That and the fact of its overturning would establish the rash and negligent driving. A car driven normally and travelling behind a bus does not go to the opposite side of the road, hit an electric post and parapet wall, and turn turtle. The car apparently stopped only because it turned turtle. It did not hit the electric post or the parapet wall full tilt; if it did, it would have stopped at one of those points. We should remember that the collision with the scooter and pushing it back would have considerably reduced the speed of the car. Even so, it travelled farther. The slight damage to the electric post and the parapet wall is because the car hit them sideways. Nobody has suggested that they were brought into existence for this case. The car would probably not have stopped but for turning turtle, and it should have been travelling quite fast before it could overturn, as the learned Judge himself realises. There is only one conclusion possible on the facts of this case, and that is that the accused came over to the wrong side of the road and was responsible for the accident, and that is clearly a rash and negligent act in the condition of the road and the condition of the traffic.” 21 2026:HHC:23175 25. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured and by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 22 2026:HHC:23175 27. Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, provides that a driver shall drive the vehicle towards the left side or as close to the left as is possible. In the present case, the accused had breached the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, which was the proximate cause of the accident. 28. It was submitted that the Panchnama is not sufficient evidence. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Andhra Pradesh Suruve Parshaiah (supra) in support of this submission. In the present case, the prosecution is not relying upon the Panchnama, but the site plan and the photographs, as well as oral statements, which depict that the truck had left its side and was being driven towards the right side of the road; therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case. 29. It was submitted that the site plan does not show any skid marks, which falsifies the prosecution's case that the truck was being driven at a high-speed. In the present case, the prosecution is not relying upon the high speed, but the fact that the truck had left its side and was being driven towards the right side. Thus, the absence of the skid marks will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 23 2026:HHC:23175 30. It was submitted that the site plan is not admissible in evidence. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Narain (supra). This submission cannot be accepted because the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held in Jagdish Narain (supra) that the site plan is admissible to prove what was seen by the Investing Officer himself. It was observed: - “9…While preparing a site plan, an Investigating Police Officer can certainly record what he sees and observes, for that will be direct and substantive evidence, being based on his personal knowledge; but as he was not obviously present when the incident took place, he has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it happened from persons who had seen the incident.”(emphasis supplied) 30. Therefore, the cited judgment will not help the petitioner. 31. It was submitted that Ashwani Kumar had a license for driving LMV non-transport, which was not sufficient to drive the tempo. This submission cannot be accepted. The learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that the vehicle bearing registration HP24A-1172 was registered as a light commercial vehicle having a laden weight of 2800 kilograms. Therefore, it will fall within the definition of the LMV Transport. It was laid down by the constitutional bench of the Hon’ble 24 2026:HHC:23175 Supreme Court in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, (2025) 3 SCC 95: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3183 that a person possessing a driving license authorising him to drive LMV is authorised to drive LMV Transport Vehicle without any additional endorsement. It was observed at page 178: 181.1. A driver holding a licence for light motor vehicle (LMV) class, under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7500 kg, is permitted to operate a “transport vehicle” without needing additional authorisation under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the “transport vehicle” class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and transport vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will, however, continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods. *** 181.3. The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and the MV Rules generally for driving “transport vehicles” would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7500 kg, i.e. “medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger vehicle”, “heavy goods vehicle” and “heavy passenger vehicle”. 32. Thus, the learned appellate Court had rightly held that Ashwani Kumar had a valid driving license. 33. In any case, the absence of a driving licence does not mean that a person is negligent. It was laid down in State Government v. Bhawanesh Kumar, 1957 SCC OnLine MP 102, that 25 2026:HHC:23175 the absence of a driving licence does not constitute rashness or negligence. It was observed: “15. We are equally clear that from the mere fact that the accused-respondent did not possess a driving licence, it cannot be positively inferred that he was guilty of rashness or negligence in driving a heavy vehicle like a truck. There is evidence of Jabbar (D. W. 1), which shows that the accused is in charge of the Sarodha Head Workshop, and he has been testing and driving motor vehicles for 1½ years. According to him, he is an experienced motor driver, and consequently, there is nothing to show that in undertaking to drive a heavy motor vehicle like a truck, he was undertaking a risk for which there was no justification whatsoever. Whether he drives a vehicle with a licence or without a licence, the law expects him to be neither rash nor negligent in the performance of his task, and we will judge his conduct in the matter as if he were the most qualified driver who brings to his task the ordinary reasonable competency of persons driving heavy motor vehicles.” 34. This position was reiterated in Suleman Rehiman Mulani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 337: (1968) 2 SCR 515: AIR 1968 SC 829, wherein it was observed: 12…. There is no presumption in law that a person who possesses only a learner's licence or possesses no licence at all does not know how to drive. For various reasons, not excluding sheer indifference, he might not have taken a regular licence. The prosecution’s evidence that Appellant 1 had driven the jeep to various places on the day previous to the occurrence is proof of the fact that he knew how to drive. There was no basis for the conclusion that it was a sheer stroke of good fortune that he did not meet with any accident on that day. xxxxx 26 2026:HHC:23175 14….In the present case, we do not know what the proximate cause of the accident was. We cannot rule out the possibility of the accident having been caused by the fault of the deceased. The question of whether Appellant 1 was proficient in driving a Jeep or not resolves the issue. His proficiency in driving might furnish a defence, which a learner could not have, but the absence of proficiency did not make him guilty. The only question was whether, in point of fact, he was not competent to drive and his incompetence was the cause of the death of the person concerned. 35. Therefore, the accused cannot take any advantage of the fact that Ashwani Kumar had a driving licence authorising him to drive an LMV. 36. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the truck, which caused the accident. 37. Dr N.K. Bhardwaj (PW-11) stated that Rajiv Mohammed had sustained simple injuries in the accident, and Ashwani Kumar had died in the accident. Thus, the Learned Courts below had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of offences punishable under section 279, 337 and 304-A of the IPC. 38. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble 27 2026:HHC:23175 Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving, and a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to him. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538, this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the 28 2026:HHC:23175 victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs, it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues, he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted, he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 39. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182, wherein it was held: - “13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the 29 2026:HHC:23175 view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 40. Similar is the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, wherein it was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 41. Therefore, it is not permissible to grant a benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, and a deterrent view has to be taken. 42. It was submitted that the accused is ready to pay the compensation. Hence, the compensation be enhanced, and the sentence be reduced. The Hon’ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of enhancing the compensation and reducing the sentence in Parameshwari v. State of T.N., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 209 and observed: 30 2026:HHC:23175 “31. The practice of enhancing the compensation payable to the victim and reducing the sentence, especially in cases of grave offence, is dangerous as it might send a wrong message to society that the offenders/accused persons can absolve themselves from their liability by merely paying a monetary consideration. 32. Compensation payable to the victim is only restitutory in nature, and it cannot be considered as equivalent to or a substitute for punishment. Punishment is punitive in nature, and its object is to create an adequate deterrence against the said crime and to send a social message to the miscreants that any violation of the moral turpitude of society would come with consequences, which cannot merely be “purchased by money”. 43. It was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had reduced the imprisonment till the rising of the Court and enhanced the fine amount in Ashraf (supra). This submission will not help the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is not available to this Court. Further, the judgment was passed in the peculiar circumstances of the case, which are lacking in the present case, and it is impermissible to reduce the sentence. 44. Learned trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo the punishment for two years for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC. This was the maximum sentence that could have been awarded. The Learned 31 2026:HHC:23175 Trial Court has not provided any reason for imposing the maximum sentence except that a deterrent view has to be taken, which is no reason, as the legislature has provided for graded punishment considering the nature of the offence. The accused has undergone the agony of the Trial, appeal and revision, and the imposition of the maximum sentence is not justified. Therefore, the sentence is reduced from two years to one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304- A of the IPC. 45. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, these were ordered to run concurrently. Again, these are the maximum sentences, and no reason has been assigned for imposing the maximum sentence; hence, these are reduced to three months each. The fine amount imposed by the learned Trial Court is adequate, and no further reduction is required. 46. In view of the above, the present revision is partly allowed, and the sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court are modified as under: - Sentence awarded by the Sentence modified by this 32 2026:HHC:23175 learned Trial Court Court. To suffer simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹1000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/- , and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 337 of IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for three months. pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 337 of the IPC To suffer simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹5000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. To suffer simple imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹5000/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 10 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. All the modified substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 47. Subject to the modification of the sentences awarded by the learned Trial Court, the rest of the judgments and order 33 2026:HHC:23175 passed by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, are upheld. Modified jail warrant to be prepared accordingly. 48. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 49. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 19th June, 2026 (ravinder)