1 2026:CGHC:2173 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1361 of 2023 1- Deepak Khes S/o Late Nakul Khes Aged About 28 Years R/o Vill. Kunjemura, P.S. And Tehsil Tamnar, District Raigarh (C.G.) 2- Smt. Agustina D/o Late Nakul Khes Aged About 33 Years W/o Suresh Bhagat, R/o Vill. Jambahar, Lailunga, P.S. And Tehsil Lailunga, District Raigarh (C.G.) 3- Smt. Vandana Tirki D/o Late Nakul Khes Aged About 30 Years W/o Lagan Sai, R/o Vill. Jatara, P.S. And Tehsil Lailunga, District Raigarh (C.G.) 4- Miss Jyoti Khes D/o Late Nakul Aged About 24 Years R/o Vill. Kunjemura, P.S. And Tehsil Tamnar, District Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellants versus 1- Dukaloo Ram Yadav S/o Parmeshwar Yadav Aged About 33 Years Occupation Vehicle Owner And Driver R/o Vill. Kunjemura, P.S. And Tehsil Tamnar, District Raigarh (C.G.) 2- Branch Manager The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Office, Raigarh, Rahul Complex, Near Axis Bank Dhimrapur Chowk Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.). ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. Ravi Kumar, Advocate For Respondent No.1 Respondent No.2 : : Mr. Shrawan Agrawal, Advocate Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 14/01/2026 1. The appellants/claimants have filed this appeal for enhancement of compensation, assailing the award passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gharghoda, District Raigarh in Claim Case No.07/2019, whereby the learned Tribunal has granted compensation to the tune of Rs.15,32,000.00 with interest @ 9 % per annum on account of death of death of Nakul Khes in motor accident. 2. Heard on I.A. No.1, application for condonation of delay. 3. The claimants have filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 147 days in preferring the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the award was passed on 24.12.2022, whereas the appeal has been preferred on 24.07.2023. He would further submit that the claimants were not aware of the law of limitation and therefore, could not prefer the appeal within the prescribed period. He would also submit that the claimants collected the necessary documents and approached the counsel for filing the appeal; thus, he submits that the delay caused in filing the instant appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate, but bona fide. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would oppose the submission made by counsel for the appellant and submit that the appellants have failed to explain the delay by assigning any sufficient or cogent reasons. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. On perusal of the application for condonation of delay, it is evident that the claimants have not assigned any justifiable or satisfactory reasons for the delay. In paragraph 2 of the application, it is stated that they were not aware of the law of limitation. It is further pleaded that they collected the documents and thereafter approached the counsel. Such general averments, without any material particulars or explanation 3 covering the entire period of delay, cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. 8. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 9.The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to 4 Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone 5 the delay on equitable grounds.” 10. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and 6 (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 11. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 13. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case 7 and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the appellants could not explain the inordinate delay of 147 days properly in the application moved in this regard. 14. Accordingly, I.A. No.1, the application for condonation of delay, is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim