2026:HHC:22832 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.100 of 2026 Date of Decision: 17.06.2026 __________________________________________________________________________ Sh. Jagjiwan Singh ……...Petitioner Versus Rohit Sharma …....Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? _____________________________________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Bodh Raj Thakur, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Mukul Sood, Advocate. __________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays challenge to judgment dated 04.12.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.95 of 2022, titled Jagjiwan Singh Vs. Rohit Sharma, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.08.2022, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Amb, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, in Complaint RBT No.76-I-16/2014, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, “accused”) guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay compensation to the tune of ₹2,00,000/- to the respondent-complainant. 2026:HHC:22832 -2- 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that he is running business under the name and style of Jai Maa Kali Enterprises Gagret, District Una, H.P., from where accused purchased EPE sheets for sum of ₹1,00,800/- on credit basis, with the assurance to make payment within one week. After expiry of one month, complainant demanded afore amount, but accused with a view to discharge his lawful liability, issued Cheque bearing No.840854 for sum of ₹1,00,000/- on 20.05.2015, drawn at PNB Branch Chail Chowk, Mandi. However, fact remains that aforesaid Cheque on its presentation to the Bank concerned was dishonoured with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. After receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with a legal notice calling upon him to make the payment good well within stipulated time. However, since accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice, complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Amb, District Una, Himachal Pradesh. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 29.08.2022, held the accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act 2026:HHC:22832 -3- and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove. 4. At the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment dated 04.12.2025. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the Courts below. 5. Vide order dated 13.02.2026, Coordinate Bench of this Court stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below, subject to petitioner/accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/-, however, fact remains that despite repeated opportunities, aforesaid order was never complied with. Repeatedly, matter was adjourned on the request of learned counsel representing the petitioner enabling petitioner to do the needful, but in vain. In the aforesaid background, this Court has no option but to decide the petition on its own merits. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Mr. Bodh Raj Thakur, learned counsel representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that 2026:HHC:22832 -4- both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and there is no scope left for interference. 7. There is no specific denial, if any, with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon. Though, in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused denied the case of the complainant in toto, but despite opportunity, he failed to lead any evidence. Pattern of cross-examination conducted upon complainant, clearly establishes factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as his signatures thereupon. If it is so, no illegality, otherwise, can be said to have been committed by the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the case at hand, accused was unable to point out from the documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant that Cheque issued by him was not issued towards discharge of lawful liability. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the 2026:HHC:22832 -5- existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the 2026:HHC:22832 -6- prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 9. In the case at hand, complainant while examining himself as CW-1, tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW1/A, reiterating therein averments contained in the complaint. Besides above, he also tendered evidence return memo Ex.CW1/B, Cheque Ex.CW1/D, legal notice 2026:HHC:22832 -7- Ex.CW1/E, postal receipt Ex.CW1/F, acknowledgment Ex.CW1/G and bill Ex.CW1/H. He also deposed that at the time of purchasing the articles from him, accused disclosed his name as Jaswant Singh, whereas complainant subsequently came to know that real name of accused is Jagjiwan Singh. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract anything contrary, to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief. He specifically denied suggestion put to him that Cheque in question was issued by the accused to someone else and complainant procured it for ulterior motive. Though he admitted that he is not acquainted with the accused, but self-stated that he knows him by his face. While putting suggestion with regard to use of Cheque allegedly given by accused to someone, accused virtually admitted factum with regard to issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon. Though accused attempted to put up a defence that Cheque in question was actually issued to some other person and the same has been misused by the complainant, however, no evidence ever came to be led on record by accused to probabilise afore defence. 10. To the contrary, complainant while placing on record Bill Ex.CW1/H, successfully proved on record that accused had purchased some articles from his shop and with a view to discharge his liability, accused issued Cheque Ex.CW1/D. While placing on record return memo Ex.CW1/A, complainant also proved that Cheque issued by accused 2026:HHC:22832 -8- towards discharge of lawful liability was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds in his bank account. He also proved on record that before initiating proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, he served accused with legal notice Ex.CW1/E, which was duly served upon accused, but yet he failed to make the payment. 11. Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by the respective parties. 12. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- 2026:HHC:22832 -9- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 13. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 14. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as 2026:HHC:22832 -10- such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the Courts below. 15. Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 16. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of thirty days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 13.02.2026 stands vacated. Amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner- accused with the learned trial Court as well as Registry of this Court is ordered to be released in favour of complainant by remitting the same in his bank account, detail whereof, shall be furnished by his counsel within a period of one week. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge June 17, 2026 Rajeev Raturi