APHC010193802024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI I.A. No.3 of 2026 IN/AND WRIT APPEAL NOs:40 and 250 of 2026 Bench Sr.No:-7 [3584] K M Shakeel Shafi ...Appellant Vs. T Vijay Kumar and Others ...Respondent(s) ********** CORAM : THE CHIEF JUSTICE LISA GILL SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN DATE : 29th September 2026 Present: Advocate for Appellant: K KOUTILYA, rep. by Sri V.Venugopal Rao, Senior Counsel Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): POTHAM VENGALA REDDY SC For M.Corporation in Rayalaseema region, M R S SRINIVAS, GP FOR MUNCIPAL ADMN URBAN DEV COMMON JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan) Since appellant in both these appeals is one and the same and issues raised are intrinsically connected, with the consent of counsels appearing for parties, both appeals are taken up for consideration and disposed by common order. 2 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 2. Writ Appeal No.40 of 2026 is preferred assailing the order dated 16.04.2024 in W.P. No.18284 of 2017, whereby learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in favour of 1st respondent herein. I.A. No.3 of 2026 is filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 511 days in re-presenting the appeal. 3. Writ Appeal No.250 of 2026 is directed against order dated 21.01.2013 in W.P. No.14998 of 2005, whereby learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in favour of 1st respondent herein. I.A. No.3 of 2026 is filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 4,758 days in preferring the appeal. 4. Heard Sri V.Venugopal Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri K.Koutilya, learned counsel for appellant, Sri M.R.S.Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and learned Government Pleader for Municipalities & Sri P.Vengala Reddy, learned standing counsel appearing for official respondents. 5. (a) As there is considerable delay in either re-presentation or presentation of respective appeals, learned Senior Counsel for appellant advanced arguments on the aspect of limitation. The learned Senior Counsel submits that after passing of impugned order dated 16.04.2024 allowing the writ petition, 3 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 appellant immediately took steps to challenge the same by filing appeal, however, due to objections raised by Registry, the same was returned on 23.04.2024. As appellant had to take care of his father suffering from old-age ailments, and that he had to engage with municipal authorities by submitting representation dated 14.04.2025 requesting to protect 30-feet existing road, being used by school children for ingress and egress, he could not approach the counsel. However, only after subject road portion was handed over to 1st respondent on 19.05.2025, having come to know about the same, he approached the counsel in last week of December 2025, and necessary steps were taken to re-present the appeal, thus, delay of 511 days occurred in re-presenting, which is neither willful nor wanton. (b) Further, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in so far as Writ Appeal No.250 of 2026 is concerned, the appellant had been pursuing legal remedies in W.P. No.18284 of 2017 by filing application seeking impleadment, thus, till the said writ petition was disposed, appellant was under bona fide belief and impression that continuing with latter writ petition would suffice, thus, appeal was preferred with a delay of 4,758 days. He also submitted that as the reasons in the initial affidavit dated 21.02.2026 were not properly 4 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 explained, better affidavit has been filed on 07.08.2026. By referring to paragraphs 13 and 14, it is stated that appellant was prosecuting legal remedies in a bona fide manner and the delay caused in preferring the appeal was unintentional and not an act of negligent omission. (c) He further submitted that given the merits of the matter, the Court should take a lenient view in condoning the delay as significant amount of public interest is involved, inasmuch as portion of road is affected by virtue of judgments in challenge. Thus, it is urged to condone the delay in both appeals. 6. (a) Opposing the same, learned counsel for 1st respondent/ writ petitioner submitted that explanation given by appellant in the respective applications does not constitute sufficient cause to condone inordinate delay. Though the appellant was very much aware of the order dated 21.01.2013 in W.P. No.14998 of 2005, and later suffered dismissal of review application vide order dated 11.11.2016, chose to file intra-court appeal only on 05.03.2026, with a delay of 4,758 days, which is completely unexplainable besides showing sheer negligence, thus, the plea of appellant that he acquired knowledge later and preferred appeal is unfounded. 5 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 (b) It is also submitted that even in Writ Appeal No.40 of 2026, delay in re-presentation stand unexplained. For all purposes, even such delay in re-presentation also tantamount delay for which appellant owes proper explanation, thus, pleaded for dismissal of both appeals. 7. We accorded our painstaking deliberation to the arguments advanced hinc inde and closely examined the record in its entirety. 8. W.P. No.14998 of 2005 was preferred by respondents 1 and 2, challenging the action of respondents 3 to 5 herein in encroaching their property consisting of plots 23 and 24 in Survey Nos.59-2A and 59-2C in Ward No.6 of Anantapur Municipality as illegal and arbitrary. The said writ petition was allowed by order dated 21.01.2013, directing respondents to restore plot numbers 23 and 24 with specific boundaries mentioned therein, keeping intact the original extent of area. Appellant preferred W.P.M.P. No. 25405 of 2015 seeking leave for filing review of the aforesaid order. The same was dismissed vide order dated 11.11.2016. Meaning thereby, appellant was very much aware of the outcome of writ petition by then and the consequences to follow. 9. As the said order was not being implemented, respondents 1 and 2 later filed W.P. No.18284 of 2017, which came to be 6 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 allowed by order dated 16.04.2024, which is under challenge in Writ Appeal No.40 of 2026. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, directed municipal authorities to restore the land in terms of the earlier order in W.P. No.14998 of 2005. The appellant indeed filed W.P.M.P. No.42516 of 2017 seeking impleadment as party-respondent, however, the same was also dismissed simultaneously while disposing the writ petition. 10. As the orders were not being complied, respondents 1 and 2 filed C.C. No.3769 of 2024. Thereafter, as the orders came to be implemented on 10.03.2025, recording the same, contempt was closed vide orders dated 10.04.2025. The appellant preferred Writ Appeal No.40 of 2026 on 23.04.2024 assailing the judgment in W.P. No.18284 of 2017. Thereafter, appellant further preferred Writ Appeal No.250 of 2026 on 09.03.2026, assailing the order dated 21.01.2013 in W.P. No.14998 of 2005. Both appeals are thus preferred with delay, one in re-presentation and the other in presentation respectively. 11. The explanation given for delay as pleaded in I.A. No.3 of 2026 in Writ Appeal No.40 of 2026 reads as under: “4. It is further respectfully submit that since the impugned order dated 16-04-2024 in W.P. No.18284 of 2017 suffers 7 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 from several infirmities and illegalities and is gravely erroneous either on law or on facts immediately after uploading the final orders passed in W.P. No.18284 of 2017 in online, I am constrained to take immediate steps to challenge the same in the form of an appeal, but due to objections raised in the filling section my Appeal was returned on 23-04-2024. As I am the sole care taker of my old age father of 83 years suffering with severe old age aliments, instead of pursuing my appeal, I was forced to approach the Municipal authorities and submitted representation dated 14-04-2025 and requested to protect the 30 feet existing road using by the school children for ingress and egress for approaching the school by placing all the relevant documents before the authorities. But the authorities without considering the documents placed before them, contrary to the layout plan demolished the 30 feet existing public road in terms of the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court in W.P. No.18284 of 2017 handed over the said road portion to the writ Petitioners and communicated the same to the Appellant herein on 19-05-2025. Upon coming to know the about the steps been taken by the authorities, I approach my counsel in the last week of December, 2025 and choose to filed the present Writ Appeal. Due to the reasons stated above in the accompanying affidavit, there has been a re-presentation delay of 511 days in filing this Writ Appeal. The re-presentation delay caused in the present Writ 8 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 Appeal is neither willful nor wanton but only due to the above said reasons.” 12. Likewise, the reasons pleaded in better affidavit in I.A. No.3 of 2026 in Writ Appeal No.250 of 2026, reads as under: “13. It is further submitted that the period consumed from the date of knowledge in between the impugned judgment and the filing of the present appeal represents the time during which I was bona fide prosecuting successive legal remedies arising from the same subject matter before this Hon'ble Court and the lis pertaining to the present subject property is a continuous cause of action. 14. The present appeal has therefore been instituted immediately upon obtaining proper legal advice that the original judgment itself required to be challenged in appellate jurisdiction. The delay is thus the consequence of bona fide prosecution of connected proceedings and not of any intentional or negligent omission. 15. The accompanying appeal raises substantial questions concerning the effect of the impugned judgment upon the rights of a directly affected adjoining owner. Unless the delay is condoned, I will be deprived of an opportunity to have those issues examined on merits, resulting in grave and irreparable loss and prejudice. On the other hand, no irreparable prejudice will be caused to the respondents if the delay is condoned and the appeal is heard on merits. The respondents will have full opportunity to contest the appeal in accordance with law.” 9 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 13. Though learned counsel for appellant tried to impress upon us that merits of the matter warrant condoning the delay by adopting lenient view, we are unable to persuade ourselves of the said submission. It is well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the Court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation, rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay are satisfactory and balance the stands of both parties to the lis, the Court then may consider the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning delay. 14. As can be seen from the relevant paragraphs reproduced above, we do not find the explanation given by the appellant to be convincing. The only reason assigned to condone the delay in re-presentation is that the appellant had to take care of his old-aged father suffering from old-age ailments, except that nothing has been brought on record to suggest that appellant's father was undergoing medical treatment. Further, it is also to be noted that appellant, claiming to be correspondent of CRESCENT English Medium High School, preferred the appeal. Thus, if really, he had to attend to medical needs and necessities of his father, 10 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 nothing prevented either the principal or other administrative managerial staff in pursuing the appeal. Thus, explanation given is unconvincing and lack bona fides. Further, it is also stated that appellant was engaging with municipal authorities by representation dated 14.04.2025, the details of the same have neither been pleaded nor copy of such representation produced. 15. At any rate, from the date of order till appeal is re-presented, there is inordinate delay of 511 days, which clearly is unexplained, even the explanation given by appellant do not inspire confidence of this Court and clearly lacks bona fides. 16. Insofar as the other appeal is concerned, the appellant, having suffered dismissal of review on 11.11.2016, kept quiet without resorting to further legal remedies. The same clearly indicates that appellant exhibited sheer negligence and absolutely there are no bona fides in pursuing the appeal at this length of time by seeking to condone delay of 4,758 days. 17. The law regarding condonation of delay is fairly well-settled. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the aspect of limitation in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA)1, held as under: 1 (2024) 12 SCC 336 11 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 “28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: 28.1. Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; 28.2. A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; 28.3. The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; 28.4. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; 28.5. Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; 28.6. Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; 12 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 28.7. Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and 28.8. Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 18. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary2, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraph Nos.6 and 7 held as under: “6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility 2 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 13 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But 14 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See : Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733).” 19. In Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran and another3, the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.31 and 32 held as under: “31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.” 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093 15 HCJ & CGR, J W.A. Nos.40 and 250 of 2026 20. In the light of above legal principles, given the facts and circumstances, the explanation given by appellant in both applications is insufficient and does not meet the test of demonstrating sufficient cause to invoke this Court's discretionary jurisdiction in favour of condonation. 21. Thus, applications seeking condonation of delay in both appeals are devoid of merit and accordingly, are dismissed; consequently, both appeals also stand dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed. LISA GILL, CJ CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J SS