- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1069 OF 2020 (MON) C/W REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 548 OF 2021(RES) IN RFA No. 1069/2020 BETWEEN: M/S S V GLOBAL MILL LTD NO. 106, ARMENIAN STREET, ERRABALU CHETTY ST. PARRYS CORNER, GEORGE TOWN, CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU STATE – 600 001. PRESENTLY AT NEW NO. 5/1, (OLD NO. 3/1), 6TH CROSS STREET, CIT COLONY, MYLAPORE, CHENNAI – 600 004. REP BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY, MR. JOHNSON K. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. JOSEPH ANTHONY, AND SRI. SHIRISH KRISHNA, ADVOCATES) AND: 1. SMT PUTTAMMA ALIAS PUTTATHAYAMMA W/O. LATE. PUTTAPPA, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS. 2. MASTER. GIRISH S/O. LATE. PUTTAPPA, AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS. 3. KUMARI SHASHIKALA D/O. LATE. PUTTAPPA, AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS. Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 4. MASTER. HARSHAVARDHANA S/O. LATE. PUTTAPPA, AGED ABOUT 17 YEARS. DEFENDANTS NOS. 1 TO 4 ARE R/AT NO. 8, 6TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD, KP AGRAHARA, MAGADI ROAD, BANGALORE – 560 023. DEFENDANT NO.4 IS MINOR AND AND HENCE R-4 IS BEING REPRESENTED BY THEIR NATURAL GUARDIAN NEXT FRIEND-DEFENDANT NO.1. 5. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BESCOM BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY, A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, WHOLLY OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA HAVING ITS REGISTERED AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE AT KRISHNA RAJA WODEYAR CIRCLE, BANGALORE 560 001, REP BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. 6. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, BINNY PRIVATE LIMITED, BINNY MILL ROAD, BANGALORE – 560 053. ALSO AT M/S. BINNY LIMITED, NO. 1, COOKS ROAD, PERAMBUR, CHENNAI – 600 012. 7. THE MANAGER, BINNY SHOW ROOM BINNY PRIVATE LIMITED, BINNY MILL ROAD, BANGALORE. 8. M/S. BINNY MILLS LIMITED TCP, SAPTHAGIRI BHAVAN, NO. 4, KARPAGAMBAL NAGAR, MYLAPORE, CHANNAI, TAMIL NADU – 600 004. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. KASHINATH J D.,ADVOCATE FOR R-1 TO R-4 (R-4 IS MINOR REPRESENTED BY R-1) SRI. H.V.DEVARAJU, ADVOCATE FOR R-5 SRI. J. PRADEEP KUMAR, AND SMT. K. SUBHA ANANTHI, ADVOCATES FOR R-6 SRI. D.L.SURESH, ADVOCATE FOR R-8 NOTICE TO R-7 IS D/W ON 16.12.2024) - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC.96 OF THE CPC., 1908 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 18.03.2020 PASSED IN OS NO.7567/2014 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH-15) AT BENGALURU DECREEING THE SUIT FOR MONEY. IN RFA NO. 548/2021 BETWEEN: M/S BINNY MILLS LIMITED TCP, SAPTHAGIRI BHAVAN, NO.4, KARPAGAMBAL NAGAR MYLAPORE , CHENNAI, TAMILNADU – 600 004. ...APPELLANT (BY SRI. D L SURESH.,ADVOCATE) AND: 1. MRS PUTTAMMA WIFE OF LATE PUTTAPPA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS 2. SRI. GIRISH SON OF LATE PUTTAPPA AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS 3. KUMARI SHASHIKALA D/O LATE PUTTAPPA AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS 4. MASTER HARSHAVARDHANA SON OF LATE PUTTAPPA AGED ABOUT 17 YEARS RESPONDENT NO.4 BEING MINOR REPRESENTED BY HIS NATURAL GUARDIAN HIS MOTHER SMT. PUTTAMMA-RESPONDENT NO.1 ALL RESIDING AT NO.8 6TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN ROAD K.P.AGRAHARA, MAGADI ROAD BENGALURU – 560 023. - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 5. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY, A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT WHOLLY OWNED BY THE GOVT OF KARNATAKA HAVING ITS REGISTERED AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE AT KRISHNA RAJA WODEYAR CIRCLE BANGALORE – 560 001. 6. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR BINNY PRIVATE LIMITED BINNY MILL ROAD, BANGALORE 560 053. 7. THE MANAGER BINNY SHOWROOM BINNY PRIVATE LIMITED BINNY MILL ROAD, BANGALORE – 560 053. 8. M/S S V GLOBAL MILL LIMITED NO. 106, ARMENINAN STREET ERRABALY CHETTY ST. PARRY S CORNER GEORGE TOWN, CHENNAI TAMIL NADU 600 001. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. KASHINATH.J.D, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 TO R-4 SRI. H.V.DEVARAJU, ADVOCATE FOR R-5 SRI. J. PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-6 SMT. K. SUBHA ANANTHI, ADVOCATE FOR R-8 VIDE ORDER DATED: 26.11.2024, NOTICE TO R-7 IS D/W) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC.96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 18.03.2020 PASSED IN OS.NO.7567/2014 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE AND SESSIONS JUDGE BENGALURU, DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DAMAGES/COMPENSATION. THESE APPEALS ARE BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 02.12.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:- - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CAV JUDGMENT Both these appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and decree dated 18.03.2020 passed in O.S.no.7567/2014 by the VIII Addl.City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to by their respective rankings before the trial court. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeals are as under:- The plaintiffs are the widow and children of late Puttappa who died due to electrocution / electric accident on 13.07.2007 at 11.45 p.m. next to the wall of Binny Mills show room, Binny Mills Road, Bangalore. The plaintiffs instituted the aforesaid suit seeking compensation of Rs.7 lakhs from the defendants towards the demise of the aforesaid Puttappa on various grounds alleging that he expired due to negligence on the part of the defendants. In the suit, the BESCOM was arrayed as 1st defendant, while Binny Mills Pvt. Ltd., and Binny Mills show room were arrayed as defendants 2 and 3. So also, M/s. S.V. Global Mill and M/s. Binny Mills Ltd., were arrayed as defendants 4 and 5 and defendants 1, 4 and 5 - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 contested the suit by filing their written statement, pursuant to which, the trial court framed the following issues:- I S S U E S 1. Whether plaintiff proves alleged accident caused due to negligence on the part of defendants? 2. Whether defendant No.1 proves accident took place due to negligence on the part of defendant Nos.2 and 3? 3. Whether suit is not tenable before this Court? 4. Whether suit is barred by law of limitation? 5. Whether defendant No.4 proves it is not authority to control, regulate electric wires in public places as alleged? 6. Whether plaintiffs are entitled for relief of damages/compensation as sought? 7. What decree or order?” 4. The plaintiffs examined plaintiff No.1 as PW-1 and two witnesses as PWs 2 and 3 and documentary evidence at Exs.P1 to P17 were marked on their behalf. The authorised representatives of defendants 1, 4 and 5 were examined as DWs 1 to 3 respectively and Exs.D1 to D13 were marked on their behalf. 5. After hearing the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that the demise of late Puttappa was on account of negligence on the part of defendants 2 to 5 and defendants 4 and 5 - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 who had taken over the assets and liabilities of defendants 2 and 3 were liable to pay compensation in favour of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit of plaintiffs by directing the defendants 4 and 5 to jointly and severally pay compensation in a sum of Rs.7 lakhs together with interest at 8% p.a. from the date of the suit till payment in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree, the 4th defendant has preferred RFA No.1069/2020, while the 5th defendant has preferred the connected appeal in RFA No.548/2021 and since both the appeals arise out of the common judgment and decree, they are taken up together and disposed of by this common order. 7. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record. 8. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial court was committed an error in absolving the BESCOM from its liability to pay compensation and fastening the liability upon defendants 4 and 5 by improper and - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 erroneous appreciation of the material on record and as such, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court deserves to be set aside. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places reliance upon the following judgments:- 1. M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari & Ors., - (2002) 2 SCC 162; 2. Managing Director, Gulbarga Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Yankanagouda, - 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 6474; 3. KPTCL v. Mrs. N. Rekha & Ors., - Writ Appeal No. 861/2022 (GM-KEB); 4. Chhattisgarh Rajya Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., - 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 11976; 5. Mrs. Rekha vs. KPTCL - MANU/KA/3546/2022; 6. Rita Sharma vs. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam & Anr. - CWP No. 4715/2016. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the 5th respondent – BESCOM submits that there is no merit in the appeals and the same are liable to be dismissed. 10. The following points arise for consideration in the present appeals are as under:- - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (i) Whether the trial court was justified in holding that late Puttappa expired on account of the negligence on the part of defendants 2 to 5 and not the 1st defendant-BESCOM? (ii) Whether the trial court was justified in fastening the liability to pay compensation upon the defendants 4 and 5 by exonerating / absolving the 1st defendant from any liability? (iii) Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court warrants interference by this Court in the present appeals? Re-Point Nos. 1 to 3: 12. Since all these points are interlinked with each other, they are taken up together for consideration. 13. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is an undisputed fact that late Puttappa expired due to electrocution on 13.07.2007 next to the wall of the Binny Mill Show Room. According to the 1st defendant, defendants 2 to 5 had altered the internal wiring of the Binny Mill Show Room resulting in the electricity accident, while defendants 2 to 5 contend that the accident was on account of Energisation of GI Pipes and grounding wire which clearly indicated the failure in maintenance and - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 inspection of the electrical wiring and system by BESCOM, which was solely responsible and liable for the same. In this context, it is pertinent to notice that as per the undisputed sketch of the scene of occurrence, photographs, spot mahazar etc., the aforesaid deceased Puttappa got electrocuted outside the outer wall of Binny Mills Show Room and was not within the Show room or its premises; the said documents also established that the electrical pipe, GI pipe, wires, etc., in the location of the accident were situated outside the Binny Mills show room premises and not within the said premises. 14. The trial court took note of the fact that the accident took place outside the Binny Mills show room; however, the sole reason assigned by the trial court in fastening the liability upon defendants 2 to 5 is by holding that the defendants 2 and 3 had failed to maintain the electricity supply wires in good condition and except for the said reasoning contained in paragraph-14 of the impugned judgment and decree, absolutely no other reasons are assigned by the trial court to arrive at the said conclusion as hereunder:- “14. Since there is no dispute about death of Puttappa due to electrocution, since plaintiffs are the wife and children of deceased Puttappa and the said accident - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 has taken place while Puttappa was returning home, the burden lies on the defendants 1 to 5 to show about the manner in which the said accident has taken place and because of whose negligence the said accident has taken place. With regard to manner of accident is concerned, D.W.1, who is the Assistant Executive Engineer of BESCOM, has deposed in detail about the manner in which the said accident has taken place. In his examination-in- chief, he has deposed that the phase wire connected to the G.I. grounding resulting in energistation of both the G.I. ground wire and G.I. pipe, the said accident has taken place. Even in the cross-examination also, he has deposed in detail about the manner in which the said accident has taken place. In addition to the evidence of D.W.1, by looking to the documents marked at Exs.P.1 to P.6, it appears that after detailed investigation, the investigating police officers have filed charge sheet against the Managing Director of the Binny Mill Private Limited. Therefore, it appears that though plaintiffs have contended that the said accident has taken place due to negligence of defendants 1 to 3, by looking to the evidence of D.W.1 and the documents produced by the plaintiffs and also by defendant No.1, it appears that deceased Puttappa has died not from the electricity accident occurred near the electric pole belonging to the BESCOM. In fact, the said accident has taken place in the place where the power supply wire enters into the Binny Mill Showroom and hence, though the accident has taken place outside the Binny Mill Showroom building, as rightly deposed by D.W.1, it was the liability of the - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 consumer to maintain the electric supply wires from the electric pole to the consumer's premises in good condition. But, here in this case, as defendants 2 and 3 have failed to maintain the electricity supply wires in good condition, the said accident has taken place.” 15. As stated supra, except stating that the defendants 2 to 5 had not established that they had maintained the electricity wires in good condition and it was the liability of the consumer to maintain the electricity supply wires from the electricity pole to the Binny Mills show room, the trial court has rendered the said finding based on surmises and conjectures without proper reasoning; it is needless to state that so long as the electric pole and the wires from the pole up to the show room belongs to the BESCOM, the responsibility for maintenance and safety for all electrical installations, GI pipes, wires, etc., is that of the BESCOM alone and cannot be attributed to the Binny Mills show room and the said findings recorded by the trial court deserve to be set aside. 16. In Shailkumari’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F) “[The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: “Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply.” (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. [(1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)] The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482] had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . By referring to the above two decisions a two- Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 268] 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37] this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] . 13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] ) being “an act of stranger”. The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. [1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT 89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage. 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [1920 AC 662 : 89 LJPC 99 : 123 LT 1] that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high-tension current found its way through the low-tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road.” 17. In Managing Director, Gulbarga Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “8. Insofar as the contention of the appellants that the writ petition cannot be entertained as there are disputed facts involved in the case and the factum of negligence is concerned, the same is required to be proved. The learned Single Judge has recorded a clear finding that the appellants have not filed any objections disputing the plea of the respondent in the writ petition. It is further observed that there is no dispute with regard to the incident and injury suffered by the respondent, when he came in contact with the naked electric high tension wire and held that the writ petition is maintainable. The said view of the learned Single Judge is based on the enunciation of law laid down by this Court in the case of Rekha referred supra, which has been affirmed by the Co-ordinate Bench in the case Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. Rekha referred supra. It would be useful to refer to the decision of the Co- ordinate Bench in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. Rekha referred supra, wherein at para 65 to 78, the Co-ordinate Bench has held as under: 65. Insofar as maintainability of the writ petitions is concerned, the learned Single Judge has, in paragraphs No. 7 to 19, dealt with the said issue and in - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 paragraph No. 20, has dealt with the issue of relegating respondents No. 1 to a Civil Court. 66. According to learned Single Judge, once the liability of State entity is established by virtue of principle of absolute liability, the quantification is also made by the Courts in exercise of writ jurisdiction by relying upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagyabai (supra) and Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra), he held that the writ petitions are maintainable. On the issue of maintainability of writ petition, the issue need to be looked from the perspective that the Constitution provides for procedure to seek protection of fundamental rights as guaranteed under part-III of the Constitution. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row [(1952) 1 SCC 410], the Supreme Court recognized itself as a guardian of fundamental rights. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [(1993) 2 SCC 746], the Supreme Court evolved the concept of invoking public law remedy in cases of violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court held, the State cannot plead the defence of sovereign immunity available to it in private law. It held that, the Constitutional Courts while exercising powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, are justified and are obligated to pass orders directing compensation in case of proven violation of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court in the case of MCD v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. [(2011) 14 SCC 481] after considering the judgment in the case of D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416] held that, a claim made for compensation in public law is for compensating the claimants for deprivation of life and personal liberty which has nothing to do with claim in talk in an ordinary Civil Court. In Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Ananta Bhattacharjee [(2004) 6 SCC 213], the Supreme Court held that public law remedy for the purpose of grant of compensation can be resorted to only when the fundamental rights of citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated and not otherwise. The contuse of the above constitutional guarantees expounded to not only to the protection against arbitrary deprivation of life, but also to ensure a minimum threshold standard of living. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that public law remedy can be resorted to and a monetary compensation can also be awarded in cases of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 67. The connected question would be, what should be the standard of proof seeking compensation under public law remedy? The Supreme Court in the case of Sukamani Das (supra) on which reliance has been placed by Sri. Sriranga was considering the issue whether the High Court was justified in awarding compensation in a case of death on account of electrocution. It was held, where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 is not the appropriate remedy. 68. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has, on the maintainability of the writ petitions, in paragraphs No. 7 to 10, stated as under: “7. There are instances also where the State Entities commit torts giving rise to claims for compensation which is sought to be asserted by way of a Writ Petition. Liability for torts committed by the agents of the State being an accepted principle, question whether a litigant is to be driven to avail of the remedy before the Civil Court is not a necessity. Once the liability of the State Entity is established as in the present case in light of discussion, by virtue of principle of absolute liability the quantification is also an aspect that has been made by the courts even in exercise of writ jurisdiction by resort to settled principles to monetarily quantify loss of life or injury to a person as is applied in motor vehicle accidents which is the methodology adopted by the Division Bench of this court in Baahyabhai (supra). The Co-ordinate Bench of this court has also adopted similar principles to calculate compensation and grant relief in case of death or injury due to electrocution in Shri Naaappa Manneppa Naik (supra). 8. Accordingly, even in case of concurrent remedies being available for claim of compensation by tortious acts committed by State Entities, the invocation of writ jurisdiction cannot be objected to as the tort-feasor being State under Article 12 of Constitution of India, remedy against such tort-feasor is open to be asserted by invoking such jurisdiction. 9. In the present case it must be noticed that there is absolute liability as regards the activity of the corporation as accordingly under common law liability, State being liable, remedy to enforce compensation as a result of consequences following from such tortious acts is being asserted by the petitioners. That apart claim of compensation would also be construed to be - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 consequences of breach of statutory obligation. 10. In an action for compensation arising out of wrongs by the State and if on available facts there is clarity regarding liability and quantification though partial, then to such extent, there is no reason for denial of remedy to claim compensation in writ proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) 69. We agree with the aforesaid conclusion of the learned Single Judge on the maintainability of the writ petitions. Sri. Sriranga has, in support of his submission that a writ petition in respect of prayer for compensation shall not be maintainable, had relied upon the judgments in the cases of Sukamani Das (supra) and Timudu Oram (supra). The said judgments have been distinguished by the learned Single Judge by holding that, as there were disputed questions of fact, the same were not entertained. But, in H.S.E.B. v. Ram Nath [(2004) 5 SCC 793], the Supreme Court has distinguished the judgment in the case of Sukamani Das (supra) and has granted compensation. 70. Even the judgments in the cases of Satish Kumar (supra), Dharampal (supra), Abdul Haque (supra), P. Malappa (supra) and Basavaraj (supra) will not help the case of the appellants, as the Courts in the said judgments have held, there being disputed facts, the parties need to be relegated to the Civil Court. Whereas in the cases in hand, the learned Single Judge has held that there are no disputed facts. In this regard, we have already reproduced the relevant paragraphs of the impugned order above. Similarly insofar as the cases of Smt. Irudaya Mary (supra), Smt. Lakshmidevamma (supra) and Smt. Annapurna (supra) are concerned, there this Court relegated the parties to the Civil Court on the ground that it would not be appropriate to invoke the writ jurisdiction in such cases and arbitrarily determine compensation without any yardsticks or parameters. Whereas in the present cases, the learned Single Judge by relying upon the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bhagyabai (supra) which judgment has been upheld by the Supreme Court, held that the Court can calculate compensation adopting parameters applied under the Motor Vehicles Act. So, by stating compensation can be determined on defined - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 parameters/yardsticks, the learned Single judge entertained the writ petition. 71. The issue which now arises is, whether the appellant was negligent for it to be liable for compensation to respondents No. 1 in the appeals? The issue has been answered by the learned Single Judge by drawing a distinction between strict liability and absolute liability by holding, the exceptions to strict liability as propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) like Act of God; petitioners' own default; and interference of third-party shall not be applicable when accidents are attributable to supply and distribution of electricity. 72. The submission of Sri. Sriranga was, the principle of absolute liability has no applicability to the facts in as much as the owner of the building was negligent against whom the proceedings have been initiated; even the BBMP was clearly negligent in its action. The aforesaid submission of Sri. Sriranga is unmerited because, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge more particularly paragraph No. 31 which is reproduced as under, is very clear that the principles of absolute liability shall be applicable in as much as any enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and the accident is caused, then such enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions: “31. We must also deal with one other question which was seriously debated before us and that question is as to what is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [[L.R.] 3 H.L. 330 : 19 LT 220 : [1861-73] All ER 1] apply or is there any other principle on which the liability can be determined. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [[L.R.] 3 H.L. 330 : 19 LT 220 : [1861-73] All ER 1] was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purposes brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person's wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 45, para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is non-natural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters of this rule because in a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry as part of the developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in the context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 or inherently dangerous activities or the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher [[L.R.] 3 H.L. 330 : 19 LT 220 : [1861-73] All ER 1] as developed in England recognises certain limitations and exceptions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts have not done so. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost of carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 or not. This principle is also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. We would therefore hold that where in enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [[L.R.] 3 H.L. 330 : 19 LT 220 : [1861-73] All ER 1].” (emphasis supplied) 73. We are also of the view that the learned Single Judge is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shail Kumari (supra) wherein in paragraph No. 7, 8 and 13, the Court held as under: “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. xx xx xx xx xx 13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [[L.R.] 3 H.L. 330 : [1861-73] All ER 1]) being “an act of stranger”. The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. [[1936] A.C. 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT 89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.” (emphasis supplied) - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 74. Similarly, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment in the case of H.S.E.B. (supra), wherein in paragraph No. 6, it is held as under: “6. The appellants are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous. If a person were to come into contact with a high-tension wire, he is bound to receive serious injury and/or die. As they are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous, the appellants would have to ensure that no injury results from their activities. If they find that unauthorised constructions have been put up close to their wires it is their duty to ensure that that construction is got demolished by moving the appropriate authorities and if necessary, by moving a court of law. Otherwise, they would take the consequences of their inaction. If there are complaints that these wires are drooping and almost touching houses, they have to ensure that the required distance is kept between the houses and the wires, even though the houses be unauthorised. In this case we do not find any disputed question of fact.” (emphasis supplied) 75. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) has, in paragraphs No. 39, 40, 47 and 49, held as under: “39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related to a concern working for private profit. However, in our opinion the same principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or local bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private profit. 40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher against public bodies have not on the whole succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of the idea that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the benefit of the community should not be liable. However, in our opinion, this idea is based on a misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral censure. It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it is unfair to leave the result of a nonnegligent accident to lie fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to spread it among the community generally. - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 xx xx xx xx xx 47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086]. In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one. xx xx xx xx xx 49. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT (1994) 3 SC 492] the Supreme Court observed : (SCC p. 10, para 8) “8. … law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded.”” (emphasis supplied) 76. In the case of Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra) in paragraphs No. 32 to 34 referred by the learned Single Judge, it is held as under: “C) Nature of liability of Power Supply Company 32. The Power Supply Companies have sought to repudiate liability on the ground that the claimant by his/her acts of negligence was responsible for the accident and hence the company was not liable, that there were intervening acts by strangers/third parties which were responsible for the accident. All such contentions raised are no longer available for being canvassed in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (supra). The facts of the case was that the deceased who was riding a bicycle rode over a live wire, lying on the road which was inundated with water and the victim died of electrocution. The defence taken was that one Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line to pilfer power and the line got unfastened from the hook and it fell over the road which caused the accident. While the court reiterated the applicability of - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 strict liability but explicitly ruled the inapplicability of the defences available to ‘strict liability’ including that of an “an act of stranger”. 33. The Court while approving the law laid down in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCR 819 has in effect declared that there would be absolute liability i.e., strict liability as per the rule of Rylands and Fetcher without any of the exceptions. 34. This position of law has been reiterated by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagyabai v. Principal Secretary, Department of Energy in W.A. No. 3249/2010 and W.A. No. 3540-43/2010 dated 25.10.2010. Accordingly, the contention of the Power Supply Companies regarding absence of liability while raising defences is liable to be rejected.” (emphasis supplied) 77. We may also, at this stage, deal with the submission of Sri. Sriranga that the judgments in the cases of Shail Kumari (supra) and Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra), the Courts have not considered the aspect of contravention of Rules 80 and 82 of the Electricity Rules, 1956 and also in Shail Kumari (supra), the accident occurred due to snapping of electrical wires and leakage of electricity, which is not the case in these appeals. We are not in agreement with this submission of Sri. Sriranga for the reason the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra), has clearly held that the defendant is always liable for injuries regardless of fault. In strict liability, the defendants are only liable if they are negligent. So in that sense, an entity is liable in view of the usage of the dangerous substance which is not the case in strict liability. In this case, we find that the learned Single Judge has noted the statutory obligations of an electric company to ensure during transmission and distribution irrespective of the duties of the consumers. So in that sense, the plea that facts are disputed and cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction would be without merit and inconsequential when the liability is absolute. At this stage, we may reproduce the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta (supra), more specifically at paragraphs No. 32, wherein the Supreme Court has held as under on the liability of an entity to pay compensation: - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 “32. We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.” (emphasis supplied) 78. The aforesaid position of law has been reiterated in Parvati Devi's case (supra), wherein in paragraph No. 2, the Supreme Court has held as under: “2. The appellants moved the High Court of Delhi claiming compensation as the husband of Appellant 1 died on account of electrocution while walking on the road. That the death was on account of electric shock is established in view of the CFSL report from Calcutta. But as the appellants could not produce relevant materials indicating the negligence of any particular officer of the authority, the High Court refused to award compensation. It is against this order, the present appeal has been filed. Once it is established that the death occurred on account of electrocution while walking on the road, necessarily the authorities concerned must be held to be negligent, and therefore, in the case in hand, it would be NDMC who would be responsible for the death in question. It is found from the records that the appellant was serving as a machineman in The Statesman and was aged 54 years on the date of death, and the age of retirement is 60 years. Taking these factors into consideration, we direct that the appellants, who are the legal heirs of the deceased, be awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000 and NDMC should pay the same within 3 months from today failing which it will carry interest at the rate of 12 %. This should be in total satisfaction of the compensation for the legal heirs of the deceased.”” 18. In Chhattisgarh Rajya Vidyut Vitran Co. Ltd.’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under: “15. In the case of M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, (2002) 2 SCC 162, the Supreme Court applied the - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 principle of strict liability, which holds that a person or organization engaged in a hazardous activity is liable for any harm caused, regardless of fault or negligence. In para 8 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.” 16. Keeping in view the above decision, the admitted facts in this case and the overall evidence on record, as discussed above, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned trial court holding that the appellants/defendants No. 1 & 2 liable for paying compensation to respondents No. 2 to 10/plaintiffs against death of Smt. Pancho Bai due to electrocution.” - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 19. In Rekha’s case supra, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court held as under: “6. The nature of liability is as follows: a) Liability under Common Law (i) The Power Supply Company in these matters have sought to repudiate liability on the ground that the acts of negligence by the victims was the cause or contribution for the accident or that the intervening acts by strangers/third parties were responsible for the accident. (ii) The principle of strict liability was evolved in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1, which provides that when a person who for his own purpose brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief and if it escapes he keeps it is at his peril and he is prima-facie liable for the damage caused to the natural consequence of its escape. Though this principle admits of exception which includes act of strangers, the courts have negatived the applicability of defence of strict liability in case of consequences of accidents attributed to supply and distribution of electricity. It is a settled position that electricity has been treated to be a hazardous substance for the purpose of applicability of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra). (iii) The Apex Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) where claims for compensation were sought on behalf of persons who had suffered consequent to escape of oleum gas from the units of Sriram Foods & Fertilizers Industries - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 has laid down the law as regards consequences of accidents where inherently dangerous activities are carried on. The principle of absolute liability was laid down whereby liability was made absolute i.e., strict liability sans defences. The observations of the Apex Court at Para 31 is self- explanatory and reads as follows: "....We would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher." This principle propounded by the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta has been extended to be applicable in the case of electrical accidents also in the case of Shail Kumari (supra). (iv) In Shail Kumari, a workman in a factory, while riding on a bicycle returning from his factory rode over a live electric wire and was electrocuted instantaneously and while considering the defence of the Power Companies, the Apex Court has observed at Para 7 and 8 as follows: "7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." Further, the Apex Court while approving the law laid down in M.C. Mehta (supra), wherein the principle of absolute liability was laid down, at Para 13 has concluded as follows: "13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [MANU/UKHL/0001/1868 : (1868) 3 HL 330: MANU/UKHL/0001/1868 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1]) being "an act of stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board...." The Apex Court has specifically declined to entertain the defence of 'Act of God' and 'Acts of Strangers' while referring to other judgments as per the observations made in Para 14 which reads as follows: "14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [1920 AC 662: 89 LJPC 99 : 123 LT 1] that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high-tension current found its way through the low-tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road." (v) In another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of H.S.E.B. and Others v. Ram Nath and Others MANU/SC/1156/2004 : (2004) 5 SCC 793 the same principle was extended where liability was sought to be disowned by the Power Supply Company by contending that the unauthorised structure near the electric line had contributed to the accident, the Apex Court overruled such objection in the following words: "6. The appellants are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous. If a person were to come into contact with a high-tension wire, he is bound to receive serious injury and/or die. As they are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous, the appellants would have to ensure that no injury results from their activities. If they find that unauthorised constructions have been put up close to their wires it is their duty to ensure that that construction is got demolished by moving the appropriate authorities and if necessary, by - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 moving a court of law. Otherwise, they would take the consequences of their inaction. If there are complaints that these wires are drooping and almost touching houses, they have to ensure that the required distance is kept between the houses and the wires, even though the houses be unauthorised. In this case we do not find any disputed question of fact." (vi) The same legal position has been reiterated by a Co-ordinate Bench at Dharwad in the case of The Managing Director, HESCOM and others v. Shri Nagappa Manneppa Naik and Others2 at Paras 32 to 34. (vii) All doubts regarding imposition of strict liability without defences on the power companies which are in fact statutory corporations have been removed by virtue of the clarification regarding the applicability of strict liability principles by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Others MANU/SC/7608/2008 : (2008) 9 SCC 527 in the following words- "39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case [MANU/SC/0092/1986 : (1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related to a concern working for private profit. However, in our opinion the same principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or local bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private profit. 40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher against public bodies have not on the whole succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of the idea that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the benefit of the community should not be liable. However, in our opinion, this idea is based on a misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral censure. It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it is unfair to leave the result of a non- - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 negligent accident to lie fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to spread it among the community generally. 47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case [MANU/SC/0092/1986 : (1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086]. In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one. 49. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [MANU/SC/0692/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT (1994) 3 SC 492] the Supreme Court observed : (SCC p. 10, para 8) "8.... law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded." 50. In Ashby v. White [MANU/INOT/0001/1703 : (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938 : MANU/INOT/0001/1703 : 92 ER 126] it was observed (vide Pratt, C.J.): "Torts are infinitely various, not limited or confined." 51. In Donoghue v. Stevenson [MANU/UKHL/0001/1932 : 1932 AC 562 : MANU/UKHL/0001/1932 : 1932 All ER Rep 1 (HL)], it was observed by the House of Lords (per Macmillan, L.J.) : (All ER p. 30 A) "... the conception of legal responsibility may develop in adaptation to altering social conditions and standards. The criterion of judgment must adjust and adapt itself to the changing circumstances of life." The above view was followed in Rookes v. Barnard [MANU/UKHL/0007/1964 : 1964 AC 1129 : MANU/UKHL/0007/1964 : (1964) 2 WLR 269 : MANU/UKHL/0007/1964 : (1964) 1 All ER 367 (HL)] and Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [MANU/UKHL/0014/1970 : 1970 AC 1004 : MANU/UKHL/0014/1970 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : MANU/UKHL/0014/1970 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 52. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there was no fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was contributory negligence, is based on a total misconception and hence has to be rejected." (viii) Accordingly, in light of the principle ubi jus ibi remedium the remedy will have to be worked out in light of the consequences of injury to the person arising out of changing nature of the activities of the State. (ix) The trend of the state instrumentalities in attempting to unsettle the settled questions after having suffered orders and having accepted the same, requires to be frowned upon. The question of liability under common law was explained and applied in a detailed order of the Co- ordinate bench at Dharwad in Shri Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra) at para 32 to 34 which is extracted as follows: "C) Nature of liability of Power Supply Company 32. The Power Supply Companies have sought to repudiate liability on the ground that the claimant by his/her acts of negligence was responsible for the accident and hence the company was not liable, that there were intervening acts by strangers/third parties which were responsible for the accident. All such contentions raised are no longer available for being canvassed in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (supra). The facts of the case was that the deceased who was riding a bicycle rode over a live wire, lying on the road which was inundated with water and the victim died of electrocution. The defence taken was that one Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line to pilfer power and the line got unfastened from the hook and it fell over the road which caused the accident. While the court reiterated the applicability of strict liability but explicitly ruled the inapplicability of the defences available to 'strict liability' including that of an "an act of stranger". - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 33. The Court while approving the law laid down in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India reported in MANU/SC/0092/1986 : 1987 1 SCR 819 has in effect declared that there would be absolute liability i.e., strict liability as per the rule of Rylands and Fetcher without any of the exceptions. 34. This position of law has been reiterated by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagyabai v. Principal Secretary, Department of Energy and Others in W.A. No. 3249/2010 and W.A. No. 3540-43/2010 dated 25.10.2010. Accordingly, the contention of the Power Supply Companies regarding absence of liability while raising defences is liable to be rejected." x. Despite having accepted such order and not having challenged the same, the petitioner before the Dharwad bench in Shri Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra) being KPTCL and Electricity Distribution Companies and the same entities are before this court as respondents, the statement of objection however filed seeking to unsettle the very legal position that is binding upon them, reflects upon a tendency that would only contribute to increased pendency of litigation and it is time that the State entities ought to keep in mind the larger picture and having suffered orders which have attained finality, ought not to seek for re- opening the same before other benches which in effect amounts to forum shopping. b) Liability under Statutory Framework imposing duty to ensure safety during transmission and distribution: (i) Having discussed the liability of the Power Transmission and Distribution Companies under the Common Law, what also requires to be noticed is the duty to ensure safety as imposed by statutes upon the Companies. - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (ii) The following provisions under the Electricity Act, 2003 throw light on such duty: • Section 53 (Provisions relating to safety and electricity supply): The Authority may, in consultation with the State Government, specify suitable measures for - (a) protecting the public (including the persons engaged in the generation, transmission or distribution or trading) from dangers arising from the generation, transmission or distribution or trading of electricity, or use of electricity supplied or installation, maintenance or use of any electric line or electrical plant; (b) eliminating or reducing the risks of personal injury to any person, or damage to property of any person or interference with use of such property; (c) prohibiting the supply or transmission of electricity except by means of a system which conforms to the specification as may be specified; (d) giving notice in the specified form to the Appropriate Commission and the Electrical Inspector, of accidents and failures of supplies or transmissions of electricity; (e) xxx (f) xxx (g) specifying action to be taken in relation to any electric line or electrical plant, or any electrical appliance under the control of a consumer for the purpose of eliminating or reducing the risk of personal injury or damage to property or interference with its use. • Section 68. Overhead lines (1) An overhead line shall, with prior approval of the Appropriate Government, be installed or kept installed above ground in accordance with the provisions of sub- section (2). (2) The provisions contained in sub-section (1) shall not apply- - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (a) in relation to an electric line which has a nominal voltage not exceeding 11 kilovolts and is used or intended to be used for supplying to a single consumer; (b) in relation to so much of an electric line as is or will be within premises in the occupation or control of the person responsible for its installation; or (c) in such other cases, as may be prescribed. (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) Where any tree standing or lying near an overhead line or where any structure or other object which has been placed or has fallen near an overhead line subsequent to the placing of such line, interrupts or interferes with, or is likely to interrupt or interfere with, the conveyance or transmission of electricity or the accessibility of any works, an Executive Magistrate or authority specified by the Appropriate Government may, on the application of the licensee, cause the tree, structure or object to be removed or otherwise dealt with as he or it thinks fit. (6) When disposing of an application under subsection (5), an Executive Magistrate or authority specified under that subsection shall, in the case of any tree in existence before the placing of the overhead line, award to the person interested in the tree such compensation as he thinks reasonable, and such person may recover the same from the licensee. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, the expression "tree" shall be deemed to include any shrub, hedge, jungle growth or other plant. • Section 161. Notice of accidents and injuries: (1) If any accident occurs in connection with the generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity in or in connection with, any part of the electric lines or electrical plant of any person and the accident results or is likely to have resulted in loss of human or animal life or in any injury to a human being or an animal, such person shall give notice of the - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 occurrence and of any such loss or injury actually caused by the accident, in such form and within such time as may be prescribed, to the Electrical Inspector or such other person as aforesaid and to such other authorities as the Appropriate Government may by general or special order, direct. (2) The Appropriate Government may, if it thinks fit, require any Electrical Inspector, or any other person appointed by it in this behalf, to inquire and report - (a) as to the cause of any accident affecting the safety of the public, which may have been occasioned by or in connection with, the generation, transmission, distribution, supply or use of electricity, or (b) as to the manner in, and extent to, which the provisions of this Act or rules and regulations made thereunder or of any licence, so far as those provisions affect the safety of any person, have been complied with. (3) Every Electrical Inspector or other person holding an inquiry under subsection (2) shall have all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects, and every person required by an Electrical Inspector be legally bound to do so within the meaning of section 176 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860)." (iii) Provision under Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 are as follows: • Rule 30 - Service lines and apparatus on consumer's premises- (1) The supplier shall ensure that all electric supply lines, wires, fittings and apparatus belonging to him or under his control, which are on a consumer's premises, are in a safe condition and in all respects fit for supplying energy and the supplier shall take due precautions to avoid danger arising on such premises from such supply lines, wires, fittings and apparatus. - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (2) Service-lines placed by the supplier on the premises of a consumer which are underground or which are accessible shall be so insulated and protected by the supplier as to be secured under all ordinary conditions against electrical, mechanical, chemical or other injury to the insulation. (3) The consumer shall, as far as circumstances permit, take precautions for the safe custody of the equipment on his premises belonging to the supplier. (4) The consumer shall also ensure that the installation under his control is maintained in a safe condition." iv) Provisions of Central Electricity Authority (Measures relating to Safety and Electric Supply) Regulations, 2010 are as follows: • Section 12. General safety requirements, pertaining to construction, installation, protection, operation and maintenance of electric supply lines apparatus:- (1) All electric supply lines and apparatus shall be of sufficient rating for power, insulation and estimated fault current and of sufficient mechanical strength, for the duty cycle which they may be required to perform under the environmental conditions of installation, and shall be constructed, installed, protected, worked and maintained in such a manner as to ensure safety of human beings, animals and property. (2) xxx (3) xxx • Section 13. (2) xxx (3) xxx • Section 13. Service lines and apparatus on consumer's premises: - (1) The supplier shall ensure that all electric supply lines, wires, fittings and apparatus belonging to him or under his control, which are on a consumer's premises, are in a safe-condition and in all respects fit for supplying electricity and the supplier shall take precautions to avoid danger arising on such premises from such supply' lines, wires, fittings and apparatus. - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (2) Service lines placed by the supplier on the premises of a consumer which are underground or which are accessible shall be so insulated and protected by the supplier as to be secured under all ordinary conditions against electrical, mechanical, chemical or other injury to the insulation. (3) The consumer shall, as far as circumstances permit, take precautions for the safe custody of the equipment on his premises belonging to the supplier. (4) The consumer shall also ensure that the installation under his control is, maintained in a safe condition. • Section 35. Supply and use of electricity:- (1) xxx (2) The following controls of requisite capacity to carry and break the current shall be placed as near as possible after the point of commencement of supply so as to be readily accessible and capable of being easily operated to completely isolate the supply to the installation, such equipment being in addition to any equipment installed for controlling individual circuits or apparatus, namely: - (i) a linked switch with fuse or a circuit breaker by consumers of voltage which does not exceed 650 V;. (ii) a linked switch with fuse or a circuit breaker by a consumer of voltage exceeding 650V but not exceeding 33 KV having aggregate installed transformer or apparatus capacity up to 1000KVA to be supplied at voltage up to 11 KV and 2500KVA at higher voltages (above 11 KV and not exceeding 33 KV); (iii) a circuit breaker by consumers at voltage exceeding 650 V but not exceeding 33 KV having an aggregate installed transformer and apparatus capacity above 1000KVA and supplied at voltage up to 11 KV and above 2500 KVA at higher voltages (above 11 KV and not exceeding 33 KV); (iv) a circuit breaker by a consumer of voltage exceeding 33 KV. - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 Provided that where the point of commencement of supply and the consumer apparatus are near each other, one linked switch with fuse or circuit breaker near the point of commencement of supply shall be considered sufficient. (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) xxx (6) All insulating materials shall be chosen with special regard to the circumstances of their proposed use and their mechanical strength shall be sufficient for their purpose and so far as is practicable of such a character or so protected as to maintain adequately their insulating property under all working conditions in respect of temperature and moisture; and (7) Adequate precautions shall be taken to ensure that no live parts are so exposed as to cause danger. (8) xxx v) Accordingly, it is to be noticed that it is the duty of the Transmission Utility and Distribution Company to ensure safety of the equipment used for transmission and supply which extends to ensuring the safety of the equipments in the consumer's premises. This duty to ensure safety is irrespective of the duties imposed on the consumers and accordingly, in the event of any accident, liability as discussed above emanating from Common Law is reinforced by the duty imposed under the existing statutory framework resulting in the Power Companies being made liable for consequences of an electric accident. vi) It is made clear that even in the absence of liability imposed through the statutory framework, the companies cannot wish away liability under the Common Law.” - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 20. In Rita Sharma’s case supra, the High Court held as under: “The petitioner in this case is a girl, aged about 13 years, who was studying in 8th class. She was playing on the roof of her uncle's house when she came in contact with the live electricity wires of 11 KV and suffered massive burn injuries resulting in amputation of her hand and other injuries. The Permanent Lok Adalat has observed that there is no evidence as to how the petitioner got electrocuted but at the same time, the finding has been recorded that the injuries has been suffered by the petitioner due to electrocution. The petitioner had stated that she was playing on the roof with her friends and felt attracted towards the wire and got electrocuted. She had also stated that there was an iron grill where she was standing but her statement has been rejected on the ground that there were Other children also but nobody else got attracted towards the high voltage Wires. 7. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner has been electrocuted and as stated by her, there was an iron grill above which the electric wires were passing and she suffered an electric shock. In Raman's case (supra), this Court has held that so long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the Wires is potentially of dangerous dimensions, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy which causes electrocution. - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 8. Similarly, in Sharmita's case (supra), while referring to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, it has been held that even if the respondents are not absolutely negligent, still they are liable to pay compensation.” 21. In the instant case, as stated supra, the material on record discloses that the accident occurred outside the Binny Mills show room and the GI Pipes wires etc., were situated outside near the wall of the Binny Mills premises; further, the plaintiff No.1 - widow of Puttappa, who was examined as PW-1 as well as the two independent witnesses have categorically stated that the accident took place near electricity cable next to wall of Binny Mills show room; so also, all the three witnesses i.e., PWs 1 to 3 have admitted in their cross-examination that the accident occurred at a public place where members of the general public had access and that it was outside the compound of the Binny Mills show room. 22. The evidence of BESCOM representative, DW-1 will also indicate that he has admitted in his cross-examination that the accident occurred outside the Binny Mills premises and that the defendants 2 to 5 had not authority over electrical lines in public areas and that the supply and maintenance of electrical lines up to - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 the meter point are the responsibility of the electrical authority, BESCOM. It was further admitted by DW-1 that such inspection and handling of electrical lines require technical expertise which is available only with BESCOM and cannot be undertaken by private persons especially when the installation and wiring was done by contractors hired and engaged by BESCOM without any nexus or connection whatsoever with the defendants 2 to 5. 23. The evidence of DW-1 also discloses that the supply line in question was laid prior to establishment of the Binny Mills show room and that the defendants 2 to 5 had no role in its installation or maintenance and the point of accident being outside the premises, they had no ownership, possession or control over the said area nor any legal right to maintain or alter the electrical infrastructure; the entire supply from the main line up to the meter including maintenance and inspection is carried out exclusively by BESCOM and the accident occurred due to energisation of GI pipe and grounding wire which clearly indicates failure in maintenance and inspection of the electrical system. 24. The contention of BESCOM that the accident occurred due to internal wiring changes is not only unsupported by any - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 evidence but also contrary to the admitted position that the accident occurred outside the premises and there was no material to show any defect in internal wiring or violation of statutory requirements; in this context, it is relevant to state that under the provisions of Electricity Act and the Rules, there is a statutory obligation cast upon BESCOM to ensure safe transmission and supply of electricity and the accident in question being a result of energisation of GI pipe and grounding wire situated / located outside the Binny Mills show room clearly indicates a failure on the part of BESCOM to maintain the system in a safe condition amounting to breach of its statutory duty, particularly when supply from the main line upto the meter is provided and controlled exclusively by BESCOM which was duty bound to take all care for inspection, maintenance and repair of such lines which require technical expertise which can be carried out only by BESCOM in the light of the doctrine of “control and supervision” which renders BESCOM alone liable for the accident. 25. 25. The material on record also discloses that the 1st defendant – BESCOM owed a statutory duty to maintain safe electrical infrastructure and its failure to detect and rectify - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 energisation of the GI pipe constitutes breach which directly resulted in the fatal accident thereby leading to the sole conclusion that all ingredients of negligence viz., existence of duty, breach of such duty and resulting damage had been satisfied as against 1st defendant – BESCOM and not defendants 2 to 5. It is well settled that electricity is an inherently dangerous substance and authorities dealing with electricity are liable under the principle of strict liability for harm caused due to escape or leakage of electricity and when hazardous activity results in injury liability would arise irrespective of negligence particularly when the instrumentality is under the control of the authority which is the 1st defendant – BESCOM in the instant case. 26. As stated earlier, the admitted position that emerges in the facts of the instant case is that the accident occurred outside the premises of Binny Mills is crucial and the appellants had no control or possession over the location, as a result of which, no duty can be imposed on the appellants who lack control over the site or instrumentality since the public electrical infrastructure falls within the domain of the 1st defendant – BESCOM making it responsible and liable for the accident. In other words, having - 50 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 regard to the material on record which clearly establishes that the appellants had no role, control or responsibility in respect of the electrical lines or the place of occurrence coupled with the fact that the accident occurred due to failure in maintenance of electrical infrastructure which falls within the exclusive domain of 1st defendant – BESCOM, I am of the considered opinion that the trial court clearly fell in error in absolving / exonerating the 1st defendant – BESCOM of its liability / responsibility and by incorrectly / erroneously fastening the liability upon the defendants 2 to 5 and consequently, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court in this regard deserves to be set aside. 27. 27. The appellants have examined DW-2 and DW-3 whose evidence has remained unimpeached, uncontroverted and unchallenged in the cross-examination inasmuch as nothing is elicited in their testimonies so as to discredit their evidence. Under these circumstances, the cumulative effect of the entire material on record is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the accident in question was on account of the negligence of 1st defendant – BESCOM and not the appellants – defendants 4 and 5 or the defendants 2 and 3 and consequently, I am of the considered - 51 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 opinion that the trial court clearly fell in error in exonerating / absolving BESCOM of its liability and fastening the same upon the appellants by erroneous and improper appreciation of the material on record warranting interference by this Court in the present appeals, which deserve to be allowed by modifying the impugned judgment and decree and by shifting the responsibility / liability to pay compensation from the appellants – defendants 4 and 5 to the 1st defendant – BESCOM by holding it liable to pay compensation in favour of the plaintiffs as directed by the trial court. Point Nos. 1 to 3 are answered in favour of the appellants and against the 1st defendant / 5th respondent – BESCOM. 28. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Both the appeals are hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment and decree dated 18.03.2020 passed in O.S.No.7567/2014 by the trial court is set aside to the limited / restricted extent of fastening the liability upon the appellants – defendants 4 and 5 directing them to pay compensation and exonerating / absolving the 1st defendant – BESCOM from paying compensation; - 52 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:18204 RFA No. 1069 of 2020 C/W RFA No. 548 of 2021 (iii) Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree is hereby modified by holding that the 1st defendant – BESCOM is liable to pay compensation in favour of the plaintiffs. (iv) The suit of the plaintiffs shall stand decreed in their favour with costs throughout only as against the 1st defendant – BESCOM by directing the 1st defendant – BESCOM to pay compensation in favour of the plaintiffs in a sum of Rs.7 lakhs together with interest at 8% p.a. from the date of the suit till payment. (v) The suit of the plaintiffs shall stand dismissed as against defendants 2 to 5. (vi) The apportionment of the compensation among the plaintiffs shall be as per the directions of the trial court. Sd/- (S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl.