1 2026:CGHC:18127 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 301 of 2025 1 - Sonai Bai W/o Late Rampyari Sahu Aged About 70 Years R/o Village- Kapisda A, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ishwar Prasad S/o Late Rampyari Aged About 43 Years R/o Village- Kapisda A, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Jagdish S/o Late Rampyari Aged About 38 Years R/o Village- Kapisda A, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Bahartin D/o Ramppyari Aged About 50 Years R/o Village- Silyari, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Narmda S/o Late Rampyari Aged About 48 Years R/o Village- Limgaon, Post- Khokhsipali, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Janki Bai D/o Late Rampyari Aged About 39 Years R/o Village- Gharjara, Post- Gatadih, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.04.24 17:59:25 +0530 2 ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Badri Prasad S/o Late Mohanlal Aged About 37 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Lalpila S/o Late Mohanlal Aged About 48 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Balkrishna S/o Late Gorelal Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Gopal S/o Late Gorelal Aged About 28 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Laxmikant S/o Late Gorelal Aged About 26 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Chaitan S/o Late Gorelal Aged About 22 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 7 - Smt. Khembai W/o Late Gorelal Aged About 60 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 8 - Dwarika Prasad S/o Late Mohanlal Aged About 40 Years R/o Village- 3 Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 9 - Gokul Prasad S/o Late Mohanlal Aged About 40 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 10 - Chhedilal S/o Late Mohanlal Aged About 40 Years R/o Village- Bilaspur, Post- Manapsar, Tahsil- Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 11 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District Sarangarh, Chhattisgarh. 12 - Smt. Jamuna Bai W/o Kunjbihari Aged About 39 Years R/o Village- Kudhari, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 13 - Badri Prasad S/o Maheshram Aged About 22 Years R/o Village- Kapisda, Post- Uchchabhitti, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh- Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. 14 - Karun Dayal S/o Baratu Aged About 20 Years R/o Village- Kapisda, Post- Uchchabhitti, Tahsil- Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh, Chhattisgarh. …. Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ratnesh Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Yogendra Chaturvedi, Advocate alongwith Ms. Najmi Begam, Advocate For State : Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 21/04/2026 4 1. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the LRs of defendant No. 1 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 09.05.2025 passed by the learned Additional Judge, Sarangarh to the Court of District Judge, Sarangarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 13/2017 {Rampyari (dead) through LRs vs. Badri Prasad & Ors.}, affirming the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Sarangarh, District Raigarh (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 118-A/2002 (Mohan Lal Sidar & Anr. vs. Rampyari & Ors.), whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/ LRs of defendant No.1 was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking declaration that the properties described in Schedules ‘A’ and ‘B’ are joint family properties, partition and separate possession of 1/8th share each of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.1 to 6, permanent injunction protecting possession of plaintiff No.2 over the lands described in Schedule ‘C’ Part-I, and declaration that the sale deeds executed by defendant No.1 are not binding upon their rights pleading inter alia that plaintiff No.1 Mohanlal is the father of plaintiff No.2 Badriprasad and defendant Nos.1 to 6, and the parties constitute a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law. According to the 5 plaintiffs, the ancestral agricultural land situated at Village Bilaspur, Tahsil Bilaigarh, District Baloda Bazar, described in Schedule ‘A’, though recorded in the name of plaintiff No.1, was the joint family property of all coparceners. It is further pleaded that out of the income derived from the said ancestral property, additional lands situated at Village Kapisda, Tahsil Sarangarh, District Raigarh, described in Schedule ‘B’, were purchased in the names of defendant No.1 Rampyari and plaintiff No.2 Badriprasad in the years 1969 and 1972, and therefore such properties also formed part of the joint family estate. It is averred that about 20-22 years prior to institution of the suit, plaintiff No.1, considering the expansion of the family, made a family arrangement whereby certain portions of the lands at Village Kapisda were allotted for maintenance and cultivation to plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1, while the remaining defendants were given lands situated at Village Bilaspur. However, no partition by metes and bounds was ever effected and the properties continued to remain joint. The plaintiffs further alleged that defendant No.2 had illegally got certain names mutated in the revenue records without consent of the other co-sharers, which led to proceedings before the revenue authorities. It is also pleaded that defendant Nos.1 to 3 started interfering with the peaceful possession of plaintiff No.2 over the lands allotted to him under the family arrangement, resulting in police complaints and proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein possession of plaintiff 6 No.2 was recognized. During pendency of the dispute, defendant No.1 is stated to have executed sale deeds dated 22.07.2004 and 01.02.2005 in favour of subsequent purchasers with respect to portions of the suit property. The plaintiffs contended that such alienations were not binding upon them. 3. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 denied the claim of the plaintiffs and also filed a counter-claim. Their case, in brief, is that an amicable partition had already taken place between the parties about 48-49 years prior, whereby the lands situated at Villages Bilaspur and Kapisda were orally divided amongst the family members. It was specifically contended that the suit property was not joint Hindu family agricultural property. According to the said defendants, the agricultural land situated at Village Kapisda was the self-acquired property of defendant No.1 Rampyari, having been purchased from his own earnings and the independent income of his wife by a registered sale deed dated 07.07.1969 executed by Anant, son of Guju Sahu, resident of Village Kapisda. Since the date of purchase, defendant No.1 is stated to have remained in exclusive possession thereof to the knowledge of all parties. It was further pleaded that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that the suit was barred by limitation, and that the suit suffered from misjoinder of parties. It was also alleged that plaintiff No.2, in collusion with defendant Nos.4 and 5, instituted the suit only to grab the agricultural land of defendant No.1 and to harass him. 7 4. Defendant Nos.4 and 5 filed their written statement/counter-claim and supported the case of the plaintiffs. 5. Defendant Nos.9 and 10, however, denied the claim of the plaintiffs and filed their written statement/counter-claim. Their case, in brief, is that defendant No.1 Rampyari had sold the land, which according to them was his self-acquired property, to meet family household expenses. It was contended that the said land stood recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and was in his possession and enjoyment, and that defendant Nos.9 and 10 had purchased the same bona fide for valuable consideration. They further pleaded that since the date of purchase they have remained in possession and enjoyment of the purchased land. It was also averred that they had been unnecessarily impleaded in the suit with an intention to harass them, and therefore, the suit deserved to be dismissed. 6. The learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, partly decreed the suit. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the properties described in Schedule ‘A’ situated at Village Bilaspur and Schedule ‘B’ situated at Village Kapisda continued to be joint family properties liable to partition in equal shares. It was found that the plea of defendant No.1 Rampyari that the Kapisda land was his self-acquired property purchased from his own income was not proved by reliable evidence. The Trial Court 8 further held that the evidence on record clearly established that Mohanlal, father of the parties, had made a family arrangement among his sons by allotting different portions of the family properties for their separate enjoyment and possession. It was observed that such family arrangement had, by long and continuous possession of the respective parties, attained the character of a partition. The Court found that under the said arrangement, the land described in Schedule ‘C’ Part-I, comprising Khasra No.8 admeasuring 1.429 hectares situated at Village Kapisda, had fallen to the share of plaintiff No.2 Badriprasad, who was in exclusive possession thereof. The Trial Court also held that the plea of an earlier partition 48-49 years prior, as raised by defendant Nos.1 to 3, was not proved in the manner pleaded. However, it accepted that a valid family settlement effected by Mohanlal subsequently operated as partition between the parties. Since the properties had already been divided and were separately possessed by the parties, the plaintiffs were held not entitled to seek fresh partition of Schedule ‘A’ and Schedule ‘B’ properties on the basis of 1/7th or 1/8th shares. The Court further held that the suit was within limitation, properly valued, and not bad for misjoinder of parties. It also found that the sale deeds executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.9 and 10 pertained to lands that had fallen to his share under the family arrangement and, therefore, no illegality was found in such transfers. Consequently, the suit was partly 9 decreed by declaring that the land described in Schedule ‘C’ Part- I was the exclusive property of plaintiff No.2 Badriprasad and that the remaining lands standing in the name of defendant No.1, excluding the said Schedule ‘C’ Part-I land, belonged to defendant No.1 Rampyari. The remaining reliefs for declaration of joint ownership, partition and injunction were rejected, with parties directed to bear their own costs. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 31.01.2017 the LR’s of defendant No. 1 preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the Courts committed error in law and on facts in deciding the matter on erroneous assumptions regarding the age of deceased Rampyari. It is contended that the Trial Court merely on probabilities presumed his age and, on that basis, wrongly disbelieved his title over the property purchased under the registered sale deed dated 06.06.1969 (Ex.P/5). Learned counsel submits that the age mentioned in the plaint was incorrect and could not have been relied upon against the appellant. In order to establish his correct age, an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC was filed 10 seeking to bring on record the mutation/dakhil-kharij certificate as additional evidence; however, the same was not properly considered by the First Appellate Court, thereby causing serious prejudice to the appellants. It is further submitted that the Courts also erred in relying upon the agreement dated 27.03.2003 (Ex.D/2) to treat the family arrangement as partition and in holding plaintiff No.2 to be the owner and possession holder of the property purchased under sale deed dated 12.01.1972 (Ex.P/6). 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 10. This Court finds no substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants regarding erroneous determination of the age of appellant Rampyari. The Courts have recorded the said finding on the basis of material available on record. It is evident that Rampyari did not disclose his age in the written statement/ counter-claim. In the suit instituted in the year 2002, his age was shown as 42 years, which was never specifically denied by him. Further, in the affidavit filed by him on 29.09.2013 under Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC, he himself stated his age to be 54 years. 11. On the basis of the aforesaid admitted facts, the Courts below rightly inferred that on the date of the alleged purchase i.e. 07.07.1969, Rampyari would have been approximately 9 years of 11 age. In such circumstances, the plea that he had purchased the land situated at Village Kapisda from his own earnings and with money given by his wife was rightly held to be improbable and not worthy of acceptance. The said finding is based on appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from perversity warranting interference in second appeal. 12. In the present case, both the Courts, upon due appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that though the parties belonged to a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, the suit properties were no longer available for fresh partition, as a family arrangement had already been acted upon by the parties long prior to institution of the suit. The First Appellate Court affirmed the finding of the Trial Court that defendant No.1 failed to prove that the lands situated at Village Kapisda were his self-acquired properties purchased exclusively from his own income under the sale deed of the year 1969, there being no reliable evidence to establish any independent source of income at the relevant time. Both the Courts further recorded a concurrent finding that Mohanlal, father of the parties, had distributed the family properties amongst his sons under a family arrangement, whereunder different portions of land were allotted for separate possession and enjoyment. Such arrangement was acted upon for several years, and the parties remained in separate possession of their respective portions, thereby giving the arrangement the character and effect of an oral 12 partition. 13. It was also concurrently held that the land described in Schedule ‘C’ Part-I, measuring 1.429 hectares, had fallen to the share of plaintiff No.2 Badriprasad under the said arrangement, and he was in exclusive possession thereof. Consequently, plaintiff No.2 was rightly declared to be the exclusive title holder and possession holder of the said property. The Courts below further held that the suit was within limitation, properly valued, and not bad for misjoinder of parties. Since the remaining lands standing in the name of defendant No.1 were found to have fallen to his share under the family arrangement, the transfers made by him in favour of subsequent purchasers were not found illegal. Accordingly, both the Courts below concurrently concluded that no ground existed for granting a fresh decree of partition in respect of Schedule ‘A’ and Schedule ‘B’ properties, and the suit was rightly decreed in part by recognizing the separate shares and possession already crystallized under the family arrangement. 14. Thus, the concurrent findings recorded by both the learned Courts are based on proper appreciation of evidence, including the oral testimonies and surrounding circumstances, and the same do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal 13 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 16. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ defendant failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 17. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 19. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of 14 fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 20. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 15 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.” 21. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not 16 involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 22. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 23. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar