Page No.# 1/11 GAHC010042692017 2026:GAU-AS:12048 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/6114/2017 PRANAB DOLEY AND ANR S/O- LATE LAMBUDAR DOLEY, R/O- VILL- BAHPHALA, P.O- BAHPHALA, P.S- PULIBAR, DIST- JORHAT, ASSAM 2: AMRIT BORAH S/O- SRI GOLAP BORAH R/O- VILL- BHAGANIACHUK P.O- NAMDEORI P.S- PULIBAR DIST- JORHAT ASSA VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 6 ORS REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM, PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GHY-6 2:THE COMMISSIONER PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT ASSAM JURIPAR PANJABRI GHY- 37 3:THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER JORHAT JORHAT ASSAM 4:THE PROJECT DIRECTOR DRDA JORHAT ASSAM ALSO THE MEMBER SECRETARY OF THE SELECTION BOARD OF Page No.# 2/11 JORHAT DIST 5:THE BLOCK DEVELOPMENT OFFICER-CUM PROGRAMME OFFICER NORTH WEST JORHAT DEVELOPMENT BLOCK DEKARGAON JORHAT 6:THE SECRETARY NO.40 UTTAR PORBOTIA JANAJATI GAON PANCHAYAT DEKARGAON JORHAT ASSAM 7:THE SECRETARY NO. 41 MADHYA PORBOTIA GAON PANCHAYAT DHEKARGAON JORHAT ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR J PAYENG, MR.T DOLEY Advocate for the Respondent : MR S DUTTA, SC, P AND R.D., GA, ASSAM BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER Date : 20.08.2026 Heard Mr. J. Payeng, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. A.K. Ghose, learned Standing Counsel, Panchayat & Rural Development Department, appearing for the State Respondents. 2. The petitioners in the present writ petition has prayed for a direction upon the Respondent Authorities to re-engage them as Gram Rozgar Sahayak, on contractual basis. Page No.# 3/11 3. As projected in the writ petition, the petitioners, herein, in pursuance to an advertisement issued in the month of September 2013, were appointed as Gram Rozgar Sahayak, on 12.03.2014. The petitioners project that they had, thereafter, proceeded to discharge their duties with utmost sincerity and efficiency. However, the salaries of the petitioners were not paid for 3/4 months and on enquiry they came to learn that as the Efficiency Certificates in their cases were not submitted by the concerned Gaon Panchayats, the further extension of the services of the petitioners was not considered. 4. Poised thus, it is projected by the petitioners, that subsequently the respective Gaon Panchayat Secretaries, had submitted the Efficiency Certificates, in respect of the petitioners, herein. It is further projected by the petitioners that although, such Efficiency Certificates, were so issued in respect of the petitioners, their cases for further extension in their services was not considered and accordingly, such non-consideration had the effect of discharging the petitioners from their contractual appointments. The petitioners further project that the respondents, had issued a fresh advertisement on 14.08.2017, and therein, had included the posts held by the petitioners. Being aggrieved, the petitioners had instituted the present writ petition. Page No.# 4/11 5. Mr. J. Payeng, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that although, it is projected by the respondents, that the services of the petitioners, were terminated vide issuance of communications both dated 09.03.2015, the copies of the said communications were not served upon the petitioners. Mr. Payeng, further submits that a fresh contract agreement with the petitioners were not executed and their services were not extended only on the ground that the Efficiency Certificates in their respect, were not received from the concerned Gaon Panchayats. Mr. Payeng, submits that the said Efficiency Certificates, having being subsequently provided to the Respondent Authorities by the respective Gaon Panchayats, the Respondent Authorities ought to have reckoned the same and arrived at a decision with regard to the continuation of the petitioners, herein, as Gram Rozgar Sahayak on contractual basis. Mr. Payeng, submits that the petitioners are agreeable to again resume their services as Gram Rozgar Sahayak, and in the event, they are so engaged, they would not claim any back wages for the period they had not rendered such services. 6. Mr. A. K. Ghose, learned Standing Counsel, Panchayat & Rural Development Department, submits that the services of the petitioners as Gram Rozgar Sahayak, not being found to be satisfactory, their services were not renewed after March, 2015, and the said aspect of the matter Page No.# 5/11 was communicated to the petitioners vide communications dated 09.03.2015. He submits that the services of the petitioners being contractual in nature, there being no subsisting contract, on the date, the petitioners had instituted the present writ petition, the prayers of the petitioners for continuation in their services, would not mandate a consideration by this Court. Accordingly, he submits that the present writ petition would mandate to be dismissed. 7. Mr. A. K. Ghose, submits that the Secretaries of the Gaon Panchayats, have no authority to issue any Efficiency Certificate, to the Gram Rozgar Sahayaks. He further submits that such certificates were also issued by the Gaon Panchayat Secretaries, after the petitioners were discharged from their respective services. 8. Mr. A.K. Ghose, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali Vs. State of Assam, reported in (2024) SCC Online Gau 1499. Mr. Ghose, submits that the said decision was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali Vs. State of Assam [Judgment and Order dated 19.05.2026, in WA No. 416/2024]. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. Page No.# 6/11 10. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were so engaged on contractual basis. The engagement of the petitioners were being extended from time to time. From the materials brought on record, this Court finds that the contractual engagement of the petitioners was last extended till March, 2015. Thereafter, there is no extension of such contractual engagement in respect of the petitioners, herein. Accordingly, on the date, when the present writ petition was so instituted, the petitioners did not have a subsisting contract in their favour. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali (supra) with regard to the issues arising in the present proceedings had drawn the following conclusions: “11. At the outset, it should be noted that the appellant/petitioner was a contractual employee and did not hold a civil post. His engagement was governed entirely by the terms of the contract. 12. Upon expiry of the contractual tenure on 30-11-2022, no vested or enforceable right accrued in favour of the appellant/petitioner to seek continuation or renewal of the contract. The employer was legally entitled to release the appellant/petitioner upon completion of the contractual period. 13. Law is well settled that judicial review in matters of contractual employment is limited and confined to examining whether the action complained of is vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, malafides, or colourable exercise of power. Courts cannot compel the renewal of a contract, nor can Page No.# 7/11 they confer continuity contrary to the expressed terms of engagement. 14. Coming to the argument on the foundation of the impugned order, the distinction between motive and foundation in service jurisprudence is well settled. 15. Motive refers to the background or inducing factors which may have prompted the employer to act, such as suspicion or pending allegation, but which are not themselves adjudicated or made the basis of the decision. 16. Foundation, on the other hand, denotes the substantive basis of the action, in which allegations of misconduct have been examined and culminated in a finding, expressed or implicit, leading to the adverse order. 17. If misconduct is merely the motive, the action remains innocuous. If it constitutes the foundation, the action assumes a punitive character, attracting the requirement of due process. 18. Equally well settled is the distinction between the motive for an administrative action and the foundation of the impugned order. 19. The Allegations of misconduct, the pendency of a criminal case, or the issuance of notices may constitute the background or motive. Unless such allegations form the foundation of the order and are reflected therein, either expressly or by necessary implication, the order cannot be characterised as punitive or stigmatic. 20. Tested on the above principle, the impugned action cannot be construed as punitive. The order of discontinuation is ex facie innocuous and does not impose any civil consequences on the appellant/petitioner beyond those inherent in the contractual stipulation itself. 21. Mere existence of an FIR or the issuance of a show cause notice, Page No.# 8/11 which did not fructify into any proceeding or culminated in any finding, remains in the realm of motive and does not elevate the action to one founded on misconduct. To hold otherwise would be to read into the order what it does not state and treat an unproven allegation as determinative. 22. In these circumstances, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the impugned action constitutes a simpliciter non-renewal of a contractual engagement calls for no interference. 23. In the present case, a plain reading of the order dated 19.06.2023 makes it evident that the appellant/petitioner was released solely on the ground that the contractual engagement had expired. The order does not refer to the FIR, does not advert to the alleged misappropriation, does not record any findings of misconduct, and does not cast any stigma upon the petitioner. 24. The order is expressly innocuous and referable only to the contractual terms. The submission that the issuance of a notice and the submission of a reply obligate the employer to hold a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry cannot be accepted. 25. The plea of colourable exercise of power or camouflage termination also deserves rejection. If the employer intended to terminate the petitioner on the basis of alleged misappropriation, nothing prevented them from expressly invoking such allegations and initiating disciplinary proceedings. The employer consciously refrained from doing so and confined the order strictly to the expiry of the contractual tenure. Judicial review does not permit the court to speculate on hidden motives. 26. We also find no merit in the claim for reinstatement. Reinstatement after expiry of a contractual tenure is legally impermissible. Even otherwise, reinstatement is not a natural or automatic consequence in cases of contractual employment. Page No.# 9/11 27. The arguments of the appellants regarding non-adherence to the procedure for discontinuation prescribed under the Service Regulation and the Financial Regulation 2003 of the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission also do not find favour with us. 28. The relevant regulation provides that any person engaged on contract service for a specific period under an agreement shall be liable to be discharged or released if he/she fails to discharge his/her duties satisfactorily and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Such a prescription thus cannot support the case of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant is not discharged for any unsatisfactory performance but for the reason that the terms of the contract were over. 29. The other regulation relied on relates to the continuance of an employee on deputation and attachment, and to the further engagement of employees on contract, and prescribes that any deviation from the prescribed process of continuation, in any form, is to be reported to the Executive Committee. Therefore, in the face of such regulation, the same is relatable to continuance beyond the contract period dehors the prescription, and not to an action for release of an employee after expiry of the contract period.” 12. Applying the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali (supra), to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the petitioners for continuance as Gram Rozgar Sahayak, would not mandate an acceptance from this Court. The contract of the petitioners not being subsisting on the date, when the present writ petition was so instituted in the year 2017, it would not be Page No.# 10/11 permissible for this Court, to direct for the continuation of the services of the petitioners, herein. 13. Having drawn the said conclusion, this Court finds that in the present writ petition, this Court while issuing notices, had directed that 02 posts of Gram Rozgar Sahayak, which were so advertised vide an advertisement dated 14.08.2017, shall not be filled up. The said interim order was being extended from time to time and is subsisting as on date. 14. Mr. J. Payeng, learned counsel for the petitioners had submitted that the petitioners are desirous to continue as Gram Rozgar Sahayak and in the event, they are so re-engaged they would not claim any back wages. This Court having already concluded, hereinabove, that no direction can be passed by this Court for continuation of the petitioners in their contractual service, no direction would also be permissible to be passed by this Court for re-engagement of the petitioners. However, it will be open to the petitioners to approach the Commissioner, Panchayat & Rural Development, Assam, by way of a representation, seeking engagement as a Gram Rozgar Sahayak. Accordingly, the petitioners are granted liberty to file appropriate application before the Commissioner, Panchayat & Rural Development Department, seeking an engagement as Gram Rozgar Sahayak. Page No.# 11/11 15. In the event, the petitioners submit such representation within a period of 01 (one) month from today, the Commissioner, Panchayat & Rural Development Department, may consider the same sympathetically and in the event, the petitioners are found eligible for such engagement and vacancies for the purpose exist, the petitioners may be engaged afresh as Gram Rozgar Sahayak. The petitioners on such engagement, however, would not be entitled to claim any back wages. 16. With the above observations and directions, the present writ petition stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant