2026:HHC:22396 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1078 of 2025 Reserved on: 29.4.2026 Date of Decision: 16.6.2026. Vishal Dharwal and others …. Petitioners Versus Raman Kumari …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Rahul Mahajan, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Devender Sharma, Advocate, vice Mr Dheeraj K. Vashisht, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing and setting aside the complaint filed under Sections 12, 15, 17 to 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una, District Una, H.P. (the learned Trial Court) and the summoning orders dated 11.9.2023 and 24.11.2023, passed by the learned Trial Court. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:22396 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent /aggrieved person filed a complaint under Sections 12, 15, 17 to 22 of the DV Act, asserting that the marriage between her and petitioner No.1 was solemnised on 21.7.2003 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. One daughter was born to them on 14.11.2007. The petitioner No.1 and her parents (petitioners Nos 2 and 3) started making false allegations against the aggrieved person for not bringing sufficient dowry. They threatened to obtain a divorce because of a lack of sufficient dowry. The respondent/aggrieved person tolerated the petitioner’s behaviour with the hope that the situation would improve; however, the situation deteriorated. The petitioners demanded a car, Air Conditioner and ornaments. The respondent/aggrieved person obtained a car loan from the Government and purchased a Maruti Zen LXE bearing registration No. HP-06-3346. The respondent/aggrieved person was in Government Service and was unable to leave her place of posting. However, she visited her matrimonial home at regular intervals. The petitioner No.1 used to say that the respondent is of short stature, having broken teeth. He had married the respondent for the sake of money, and he would not recognise 3 2026:HHC:22396 her as his wife. She was forced to leave her matrimonial home to deliver the child. The respondent/aggrieved person gave birth to a child, and the petitioner No.1’s brother told her that she had given birth to a female child, which is a bad omen for the family. The petitioner No.1 tendered his resignation on 31.7.2006. Subsequently, he met with an accident, and the aggrieved person had to remain on leave to take care of the petitioner no. 1. The aggrieved person was transferred to PHC, Delha, and she used to her matrimonial home at Talwara. She used to bring new clothes and gift items to the petitioners, but the petitioners continued to harass and abuse her. The petitioner No.1 filed a divorce petition. The respondent/aggrieved person took her daughter with her to her matrimonial home as part of reconciliation efforts; however, the petitioners did not allow her and her daughter to enter the house. The respondent/aggrieved person tried to contact the petitioner No.1 but found that the mobile number had been changed. Hence, the petition was filed to seek various reliefs. 3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the petitioners. 4 2026:HHC:22396 4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint under the DV Act and the summoning order, the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the complaint and the summoning order. It has been asserted that the learned Trial Court had passed the summoning order mechanically without applying its mind. The petitioner No.1 and the respondent have been residing separately since the year 2007. The respondent/aggrieved person made false allegations, and no domestic violence was committed by the petitioners. Respondent/aggrieved person is a doctor who is drawing a handsome salary. She had also filed a complaint under Section 498A, 506, read with Section 34 of IPC, in which the petitioners were acquitted. She had also filed an application for the enhancement of maintenance for her daughter. The petitioners have already given an offer of providing land and money to the respondent’s daughter. The continuation of the proceedings amount to an abuse of the process of the law. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. 5. The petition is opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objection regarding lack of maintainability, 5 2026:HHC:22396 petitioners having not come to the Court with clean hands and the petitioners being estopped from filing the petition by their act and conduct. The contents of the reply were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the matter was referred for reconciliation, and the reconciliation failed due to the conduct of the petitioner No.1. The petitioners did not allow the respondent and her daughter to enter the matrimonial home. The petitioner No.1 left the company of the respondent and her daughter without any reasonable cause. The respondent wants to save her marriage by making every effort. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. 7. I have heard Mr Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Devender Sharma, learned vice counsel representing the respondents. 8. Mr. Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the complaint are false. The parties have been residing separately from each other since 2007. The petitioners never indulged in domestic violence. 6 2026:HHC:22396 The respondent did not share the household with petitioners No.2 and 3. The FIR registered by the respondent/aggrieved person resulted in the acquittal of the petitioners. The petitioner No.1 has divorced the respondent, and the matrimonial relationship has come to an end. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the judgments titled Narayan Biswas and others Vs. State of West Bengal and another 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 1926, Dhananjay Rathi Vs. Ruchika Rathi 2026 SCC OnLine SC 587 and D. Sudheer Vs. Anusha R. Nair and another 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 154 in support of his submissions. 9. Mr Devender Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of domestic violence upon the respondent/aggrieved person. This Court should not adjudge the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations at this stage. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, and this Court should leave the learned Trial Court to adjudicate the matter. He relied upon the judgments titled Mookandi Bose and others Vs. N. Ranjini 7 2026:HHC:22396 Crl. OP (MD) No. 4951 of 2017 and Crl. MP (MD) Nos. 3500 and 3501 of 2017, decided on 24.4.2017, Rocky and others Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2024:AHC:46850 and Vishal Dharam Vs. Raman Kumari, FAO-M-375-2010, decided on 30.8.2024 in support of his submission. 10. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, that the High Court should have a hands-off approach under the DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross illegality or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and to prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 8 2026:HHC:22396 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.” 12. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 13. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - 9 2026:HHC:22396 “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the 10 2026:HHC:22396 complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not. 14. It was submitted that the relationship between the parties has come to an end and the complaint under DV Act is not maintainable. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori, (2014) 10 SCC 736, that the divorced wife can seek relief regarding the acts of domestic violence committed before the divorce. It was further held that the mere fact that husband and wife are residing separately was not sufficient to disentitle the wife from the remedies under the DV Act. It was observed: - 27. In V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot [(2012) 3 SCC 183: (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 53: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 102], this Court held that the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. The wife who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer residing with her husband, can file a petition under Section 12 if subjected to any act of domestic violence. In V.D. Bhanot [(2012) 3 SCC 183: (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 53: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 102] this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 186-87, para 12) 11 2026:HHC:22396 “12. We agree with the view expressed by the High Court that, in looking into a complaint under Section 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the conduct of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the PWD Act could be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 thereof. In our view, the Delhi High Court has also rightly held that even if a wife, who had shared a household in the past, but was no longer doing so when the Act came into force, would still be entitled to the protection of the PWD Act, 2005.” 28. In Inderjit Singh Grewal [Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588: (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 742: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 614] the appellant Inderjit Singh and Respondent 2 of the said case got married on 23-9-1998. The parties to the marriage could not pull on well together and decided to get a divorce and, therefore, filed a case for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. After recording the statement in the said case, the proceedings were adjourned for a period of more than six months to enable them to ponder over the issue. The parties again appeared before the Court on second motion and on the basis of their statement, the District Judge, Ludhiana vide judgment and order dated 20-3-2008 allowed the petition and dissolved their marriage. After the dissolution of marriage, the wife filed a complaint before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ludhiana, against Inderjit Singh under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, alleging that the decree of divorce obtained by them was a sham transaction. It was further alleged that even after getting a divorce, both of them had been living together as husband and wife. In the said case, the Superintendent of Police, City I, conducted a full- fledged inquiry and reported that the parties had been living separately after the dissolution of the marriage. Hence, no case was made out against Inderjit Singh. In this context, this Court held that Section 12 “application to 12 2026:HHC:22396 Magistrate” under the Domestic Violence Act challenging the said divorce was not maintainable and in the interest of justice and to stop the abuse of process of court, the petition under Section 482 CrPC was allowed. The law laid down in the said case is not applicable to the determination of the present case 30. An act of domestic violence once committed, subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability of the respondent from the offence committed or to deny the benefit to which the aggrieved person is entitled under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 including monetary relief under Section 20, child custody under Section 21, compensation under Section 22 and interim or ex parte order under Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 15. Therefore, in view of this binding precedent, the plea taken by the petitioners that since the respondent/aggrieved person has been divorced, she is not competent to file the petition under the DV Act cannot be accepted. 16. The complaint specifically mentioned that the respondent was harassed and taunted for dowry. She was called to be of a short stature having broken teeth. Her daughter was called a bad omen for the family. These averments prima facie show the domestic violence. It was submitted that the details of the domestic violence have not been provided in the complaint is vague. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi 13 2026:HHC:22396 (supra) that the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature. It was observed: “28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.” 17. Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) requires that only facts are required to be pleaded. In the present case, the aggrieved person has pleaded the facts regarding the harassment and the demand of dowry. The evidence by means of which the facts are to be proved is not required to be pleaded. Therefore, the complaint cannot be said to be bad simply because the details of the incident with supporting evidence have not been given. 18. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, 14 2026:HHC:22396 the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 19. Narain Jaswal (supra) deals with the maintainability of the petition under Section 482 of Cr.PC in the proceedings under the DV Act, which are undisputed. In Dhananjay Rathi (supra), the matter was mediated through a settlement and the proceedings were quashed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the main case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th June, 2026 (Chander)