2026:HHC:22390 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 276 of 2025 Reserved on: 22.04.2026 Decided on: 16.06.2026 Pankaj Thakur .…. Appellant Versus State of H.P. …. Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Piyush Rathore, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.05.2025, passed by the learned Special Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 2026:HHC:22390 against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985. It was asserted that ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2), HC Lalit Kumar and Constable Bhuvnesh Kumar were present near Police Post Shoghi on 12.02.2023 at 4:00 a.m. A bus bearing registration No. HP-72C-9527 came from Solan, H.P., which was stopped for checking. When ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) reached near seat No. 32, 33 and 34, he found the accused occupying seat No. 34 having a backpack (Ext.MO-1) on his lap. The police associated Vijay Kumar Conductor, Jagdev Singh (PW-3) and enquired about the name of the accused. The accused identified himself as Pankaj Thakur. The police checked the backpack and found one mobile charger, one lower, one shirt, one T- shirt and a polythene pouch (Ex.MO-3) containing heroine (Ext.MO-4). ASI Ambi Lal, called the second Investigating Officer from the Police Post Shoghi. HC Rajan Kumar (PW- 15) and Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) went to the spot. An entry (Ext.P39/PW-12) was recorded. ASI Ambi Lal, driver, conductor and the accused met HC Rajan inside the bus bearing registration No. HP-72C-9527. HC Rajan 3 2026:HHC:22390 (PW-15) weighed the heroin and found its weight to be 6.23 grams. He wrapped the heroin in the same manner in which it was recovered and put it in a cloth parcel. He sealed the parcel with seven seals of seal impression ‘A’. He filled the NCB-1 form (Ext.P36/PW-10) in triplicate. He put a seal impression upon the NCB-I form, seizure memo and separate pieces of cloth (Ext.P2/PW-1). The accused produced the bus tickets worth ₹250/- (Ext.P44/PW-15), which were seized by the police. The seal was handed over to conductor Vijay Kumar after its use. Parcel, sample seal and NCB-I forms were seized vide memo (Ext.P1/PW-1). Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) took the photographs of the proceedings and transferred them to the CD (Ext.P-3/PW- 1 to Ext.P-5/PW-1). He video-graphed the proceedings and transferred them to a CD (Ext.P-6/PW-1). HC Rajan (PW-15) recorded the statement of ASI Ambi Lal (Ext.P- 8/PW-2) and handed it over to Constable Dharam Pal with directions to carry it to the police station. An F.I.R. (Ext.P- 28/PW-8) was registered in the Police Station. HC Rajan (PW-15) investigated the matter. He prepared the spot map (Ext.P-47/PW-15) and arrested the accused vide Memo (Ext.P48/PW-15). HC Rajan produced the accused, 4 2026:HHC:22390 case property and case file before SI Sultan Singh (PW- 10), who verified the integrity of the case property and resealed the parcel with three seals of seal impression ‘Z’. He updated the relevant columns of the NCB-I form in triplicate (Ext.P36/PW-10) and put the seal impression on the NCB form. He also obtained a seal impression on a separate piece of cloth (Ext.P37/PW-10). He issued the re- sealing certificate (Ext.P38/PW-10) and handed over the case property to HC Anil Kumar (PW-8), who made an entry in the Malkhana Register at Sl. No. 65/23, (Ext.P31/PW-8), and deposited it in Malkhana. HC Rajan deposited a backpack containing the clothes with HC Anil Kumar (PW-8), who made an entry at Sl. No. 64/23 (Ext.P-3/PW-8), and deposited it in malkhana. HC Anil Kumar (PW-8) handed over the sealed parcel containing contraband to HC Rajan on 13.02.2023 for conducting the inventory proceedings. HC Rajan (PW-15) filed an application (Ext.P49/PW-15) and the inventory list (Ext.P-50/PW-15) before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No. V, Shimla, for certification. He also produced the case property, sample seals and case file before the learned Magistrate, who opened the parcel and 5 2026:HHC:22390 weighed the contraband. He resealed the parcel with the Court seal. Sample seal (Ext.P-54/PW-15) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. Order (Ext.P-55/PW-15) was passed, and certificate (Ext.P-56/PW-15) was issued. HC Rajan took the photographs (Ext.P-51/PW-15 and Ext.P- 52/PW-15) of the inventory proceedings. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 5, handed over the parcel, sample seal, certificate, and documents to HC Rajan (PW-15), who deposited them with HC Anil Kumar (PW-8). HC Anil Kumar deposited the case property in Malkhana and handed over the parcel and documents to Constable Inder Lal (PW-14) with the direction to carry them to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga, for analysis. Constable Inder Lal deposited all the articles at SFSL Junga vide RC (Ext.P-32/PW-8) and handed over the receipt to HC Anil Kumar (PW-8) on his return. HC Rajan prepared the Special report (Ext.P- 42/PW-13) and handed it over to Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) with the direction to carry it to the Supervisory Officer. Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) handed over the Special Report to Ramesh Sharma, Additional Superintendent of Police, Shimla, on 30.02.2023 at 10:30 6 2026:HHC:22390 p.m., who made the endorsement on the Special Report and handed it over to his Reader, HC Vaishno Pratap, who made an entry at Sl. No. 52/Spl, dated 13.02.2023 (Ext.P- 43/PW-13) and retained the Special report. HC Rajan filed an application (Ext.P-20/PW-6) and obtained the Consumer Application Form (Ext.P-21/PW-6) of accused Pankaj along with the certificate (Ext.P-23/PW-6). He obtained the documents of the bus bearing registration No. HP-72C-9527 (Ext.P24/PW-7 to Ext.P27/PW-7). The result of the analysis (Ex. P-57/PW-15) was issued, in which it was mentioned that the actual weight of the recovered substance was 5.980 grams, and it contained a sample of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7 2026:HHC:22390 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its case. Constable Dharam Pal No. 132 (PW-1) accompanied HC Rajan (PW-15) after the receipt of the information. ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) effected the recovery. Jagdev Singh (PW-3), driver of the bus, witnessed the recovery. LC Alka (PW-4), Constable Hamesh (PW-5), Constable Shiva (PW9), and Constable Ajay Kumar (PW12) proved the entries in the daily diary. Devinder Verma (PW-6) supplied the customer application form and call detail record of the mobile of the accused. Yash Paul (PW- 7) provided the documents of the bus. HC Anil Kumar (PW-8) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. SI Sultan Singh (PW-10) resealed the case property. LC Suman (PW-11) brought the case property and the result of the analysis from SFSL, Junga, to the Police Station. HC Vaishno Pratap (PW-13) was working as a Reader to the Additional S.P. to whom the Special Report was handed over. Constable Inder Lal (PW-14) carried the case property to SFSL Junga. HC Rajan (PW-15) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the 8 2026:HHC:22390 prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that witnesses had falsely deposed against him, and he was falsely implicated in the present case. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. Jagdev Singh (PW-3) also supported the testimonies of the official witnesses regarding the recovery. No major contradictions were found in the statements of official witnesses, and minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. The integrity of the case property was duly established. The substance was found to be Heroin after the analysis. Non-production of the seal in the Court was not fatal. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was found in possession of 6.23 grams of heroin. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the NDPS Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years, pay a fine of ₹25,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 9 2026:HHC:22390 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The police party was checking the vehicles, but no proof of this fact was brought on record. ASI Ambi Lal had no reason to call HC Rajan from Police Post Shoghi to carry out the investigation. The passengers of the bus were not associated as witnesses. ASI Ambi Lal did not take any photographs or conduct any videography at the time of the initial search of the accused. Seven witnesses were given up, and an adverse inference should have been drawn against the prosecution. The ticket mentioned a time of 15:28, but as per the prosecution, it was recovered at 5:30 a.m. This makes the whole case of the prosecution suspect. CCTV cameras were functioning on the spot, but their footage was not taken into possession. The Learned Trial Court had brushed aside the major contradictions by calling them minor contradictions. The police officials did not give their personal search to the accused before carrying out their search. All these infirmities make the prosecution's case doubtful. Hence, it was prayed that the 10 2026:HHC:22390 present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Piyush Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 9. Mr Piyush Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution's evidence suffers from various infirmities. The statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. No justification was provided for calling HC Rajan from the police post at Shoghi. CCTV footage was not produced before the Court. The learned Trial Court imposed a disproportionate sentence. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the contradictions pointed out by the appellant are minor 11 2026:HHC:22390 and bound to come with the passage of time because of failure of memory. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. An independent witness had also supported the prosecution's case. Non-examination of the witnesses is not material because the witnesses were given up as repetitive. The integrity of the case property was established. Heroin is adversely affecting society, and no leniency was required in the present case. Learned trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) stated that he, HC Lalit Kumar No. 42, and Constable Bhuvnesh No.1527 had gone towards Sankat Mochan, Tara Devi, Shoghi, etc. for routine patrolling, law and order and crime detection duty on 11.02.2023. They were present near Police Post Shoghi at about 4:00 a.m. on 12.02.2023. He stopped the bus 12 2026:HHC:22390 bearing registration No. HP=72C-9527 for routine checking. He boarded the bus and found the accused sitting on seat No 34 holding a green and grey backpack on his lap. He made inquiries from the accused, but the accused could not provide any satisfactory reply. He tried to associate passengers in the proceedings, but they cited various reasons for their inability. He joined the conductor, Vijay Kumar, and driver, Jagdev Singh, and ascertained the identity of the accused. The accused disclosed his name as Pankaj Thakur. He searched the backpack and recovered a white mobile charger from the first pocket, one yellow shirt, one grey lower, and one maroon T-shirt from the second pocket. He found an interlocked transparent pouch beneath the clothes. The pouch had a light brown substance. He found the substance to be heroin. He put the substance in the backpack in the same manner in which it was recovered and called the second Investigating Officer from the police Post Shoghi. HC Rajan (PW-15) and Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) came to the spot. HC Rajan again searched the backpack and weighed the contraband. The weight of contraband was found to be 6.23 grams. The substance 13 2026:HHC:22390 was repacked in the pouch and put in the cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with seven seals of impression ‘A’. Seal impression was taken on separate pieces of cloth, and the relevant columns of the NCB-I form were filled. The seal impressions were put on the NCB-I form and the recovery memo. The substance and documents were seized vide Memo (Ext. P1/Pw-1). Dharam Pal (PW-1) conducted the videography and took the photographs of the proceedings. HC Rajan (PW-15) recorded his statement and sent it to the police station for the registration of the F.I.R. 13. He stated in his cross-examination that the police party had their own I.O. kit. He reached the police post Shoghi at about 10 p.m. on 11.02. 2023. He had checked 30–40 vehicles on the spot between 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. He had not prepared any memo about the checking of the vehicles. 20–25 passengers were sitting in the bus. He had not informed the passengers about the search. The conductor was sitting in seat No.1. He started checking the bus from seat No.20. Much luggage and bags were lying in the bus. The distance between Police Post Shoghi and the spot where the bus was stopped is about 25–30 feet. He had not taken any photographs or conducted any 14 2026:HHC:22390 videography of the search of the accused. He admitted that no document was found in the backpack and that the driver, conductor and the bus remained on the spot till 9:00 a.m. 14. His statement is duly corroborated by Jagdev Singh (PW-3), who stated that he was driving the bus bearing registration number HP=72C-9527 from Mukeria to Shimla. Vijay Kumar was the conductor with him. The bus reached Police Post Shoghi at about 4-4:15 a.m. and was stopped by the police officials. One police official boarded the bus from the front door and started checking the bus. He found the accused occupying seat No. 34, having a backpack on his lap. The police called him and the conductor and searched the backpack. The police recovered some substance wrapped in polythene. One of the police officials was called from Police Post Shoghi. The police officials came from Police Post Shoghi. They searched the backpack and weighed the substance. The weight of the substance was found to be 6.23 grams. The contraband was packed in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘A’. The seal was handed over to conductor Vijay Kumar after its use. He identified his 15 2026:HHC:22390 signatures on the sample seal and the seizure memo. He also identified the case property. 15. He stated in his cross-examination that his attendance was marked on the duty register. 30–35 passengers were travelling in the bus from Chandigarh. The passengers had put their luggage on the rack of the bus. The police officials had asked him to park the bus on the roadside for checking. 20–25 passengers were present in the bus at that time. 1-2 officials were in civil dress, and 2-3 officials were in police uniform. All the police officials were checking the passengers. Some of the passengers were sitting in the bus, and some of them were standing outside the bus. He did not know the seat numbers of the passengers. The police officials had told him about the bag in the lap of the accused. The other passengers boarded another bus. He denied that no recovery was effected from the accused. He admitted that he had seen the backpack for the first time when he was called by the police. He remained on the spot till 10:00 am. 16. It was submitted that the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses contradicted each other on 16 2026:HHC:22390 material aspects. ASI Ambi Lal stated that he was alone in the bus, whereas Jagdev stated that all the police officials were checking the passengers. Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) stated in his examination-in-chief that ASI Ambi Lal, driver, conductor and two police officials were standing near seat No. 34, on which the accused was sitting. HC Rajan (PW-15) stated that ASI Ambi Lal had met him in the bus, and two SIU officials met him outside the bus. It was submitted that these contradictions made the prosecution’s case doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The incident had occurred on 11.02.2023, and the statements of witnesses were recorded on 12.11.2024 after a lapse of more than one and a half years. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the contradictions were bound to come with time because of failure to remember the facts, and cannot be used for discarding the prosecution's case. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - 17 2026:HHC:22390 “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of 18 2026:HHC:22390 context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such 19 2026:HHC:22390 matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether 20 2026:HHC:22390 it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 21 2026:HHC:22390 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30- 32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC 22 2026:HHC:22390 (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute-by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements that are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal 23 2026:HHC:22390 v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to 24 2026:HHC:22390 scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 18. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: - “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as follows: "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be 25 2026:HHC:22390 used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 19. Both ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) and Jagdev Singh (PW-3) had initially stated that one police official had boarded the bus from the front door and started checking the bus from front to back. Jagdev Singh stated in his cross-examination that all the police officials were checking the passengers. ASI Ambi Lal can board the bus alone, and thereafter, other police officers can also board the bus and check the passengers. Hence, there is no real contradiction in the statements of the witnesses. 26 2026:HHC:22390 20. It was submitted that ASI Ambi Lal did not take a photograph of the recovery of the contraband from the backpack or video record the proceedings conducted by him. This submission will not help the accused. The photograph or the video recording could have been used to corroborate the statements of the witnesses. In the present case, statements of the witnesses are found to be trustworthy, and corroboration of their testimonies is not required; hence, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted because Ambi Lal had not taken the photographs or video- recorded the incident. 21. ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) admitted that the police party headed by him had an investigation kit. It was submitted that it was not necessary to call the second Investigating Officer, and the investigation could have been conducted by ASI Ambi Lal. This submission cannot be accepted. The investigation by an independent Investigating Officer is meant to inspire confidence and to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the accused by the investigation carried out by the officer, who had effected the recovery. This was to ensure the fairness and does not make the prosecution's case doubtful. 27 2026:HHC:22390 22. HC Rajan (PW-15) admitted in his cross- examination that CCTV cameras were installed on the spot and he had not seized any CCTV footage during the investigation. It was submitted that the failure to seize the footage of the CCTV camera is fatal to the prosecution's case. This submission cannot be accepted. The question of adverse inference only arises when the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the case of the party2. The statements of the witnesses are found to be credible, and the mere failure to seize the footage from the CCTV camera is not sufficient. Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) had videographed the proceedings and taken the photographs. Therefore, the production of CCTV camera footage would have only added to what was already available on record. 23. It was submitted that HC Rajan (PW-15) and ASI Ambi Lal had not associated the passengers travelling in the vehicle, and this will adversely affect the prosecution's version. This submission cannot be accepted. ASI Ambi Lal associated the driver and 2 Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, (1981) 4 SCC 569, and Rattan Dev v. Pasam Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 441 28 2026:HHC:22390 conductor with the proceedings. Their presence on the spot was established by the record produced by Yash Paul (PW-7). There is nothing in the cross-examination of Jagdev Singh that he had any motive to depose against the accused. He is an independent witness, and once he and the conductor had been associated, there was no requirement to associate any passenger. 24. It was submitted that the learned Public Prosecutor had given up many witnesses, including the conductor of the bus, which is fatal to the prosecution's case. This submission cannot be accepted. It was held in Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 1311 that the Public Prosecutor is not obliged to examine all the witnesses. It was observed at page 495: “13….If there are too many witnesses on the same point, the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the Court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. That principle applies when there are too many witnesses cited if they all had sustained injuries at the occurrence. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the 29 2026:HHC:22390 remaining persons in that category. This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the Court considerably in lessening the workload. The time has come to make every effort possible to lessen the workload, particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pohlu v. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1496: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1393 that the intrinsic worth of the testimony of witnesses has to be assessed by the Court, and if the testimony of the witnesses appears to be truthful, the non-examination of other witnesses will not make the testimony doubtful. It was observed at page 199: “10. It was then submitted that some of the material witnesses were not examined, and in this connection, it was argued that two of the eyewitnesses named in the FIR, namely, Chander and Sita Ram, were not examined by the prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei, was also not examined by the prosecution, though he was a material witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of the eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution has to be assessed by the court. If their evidence appears 30 2026:HHC:22390 to be truthful, reliable and acceptable, the mere fact that some other witnesses have not been examined will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. We have, therefore, to examine the evidence of the two eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and to find whether their evidence is true, on the basis of which the conviction of the appellants can be sustained.” 26. This position was reiterated in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 496, and it was held that the prosecution is not bound to examine all the cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It was observed at page 442: “Whether the prosecution must examine all the witnesses 14. A common issue that may arise in such cases where some of the witnesses have not been examined, though the same may be material witnesses, is whether the prosecution is bound to examine all the listed/cited witnesses. This Court, in Abdul Gani v. State of M.P.[(1952) 1 SCC 253: AIR 1954 SC 31: 1954 Cri LJ 323], has examined the aforesaid issue and held that as a general rule, all witnesses must be called upon to testify in the course of the hearing of the prosecution, but that there is no obligation compelling the public prosecutor to call upon all the witnesses available who can depose regarding the facts that the prosecution desires to prove. Ultimately, it is a matter left to the discretion of the public prosecutor, and though a court ought to, and no doubt would take into consideration the absence of witnesses whose testimony would reasonably be 31 2026:HHC:22390 expected, it must adjudge the evidence as a whole and arrive at its conclusion accordingly, taking into consideration the persuasiveness of the testimony given in the light of such criticism, as may be levelled at the absence of possible material witnesses. 15.InSardul Singh v. State of Bombay [AIR 1957 SC 747: 1957 Cri LJ 1325], a similar view has been reiterated, observing that a court cannot normally compel the prosecution to examine a witness which the prosecution does not choose to examine, and that the duty of a fair prosecutor extends only to the extent of examination of such witnesses, who are necessary for the purpose of disclosing the story of the prosecution with all its essentials. 16. In Masalti v. State of U.P.[AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226], this Court held that it would be unsound to lay down as a general rule that every witness must be examined, even though the evidence provided by such a witness may not be very material, or even if it is a known fact that the said witness has either been won over or terrorised. In such cases, it is always open to the defence to examine such witnesses as their own witnesses, and the court itself may also call upon such a witness in the interests of justice under Section 540 CrPC. (SCC p. 209, para 12) emphasis supplied) (See also Bir Singh v. State of U.P.[(1977) 4 SCC 420: 1977 SCC (Cri) 640]) 17. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab[AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350], this Court reiterated a similar view and held that if the eyewitness(s) is deliberately kept back, the court may draw an inference against the prosecution and may, in a proper case, regard the failure of the prosecutor to examine the said witnesses as constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution case. 32 2026:HHC:22390 18. In Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P.[(1972) 3 SCC 79: 1972 SCC (Cri) 399: AIR 1971 SC 2156] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 84, para 10) “10. … Material witnesses considered necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution's story alone need to be produced without unnecessary and redundant multiplication of witnesses. The appellant's counsel has not shown how the prosecution's story is rendered less trustworthy as a result of the non-production of the witnesses mentioned by him. No material and important witness was deliberately kept back by the prosecution. Incidentally, we may point out that the accused, too, have not considered it proper to produce those persons as witnesses for controverting the prosecution version.”(emphasis added) 19. In Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh[(1997) 6 SCC 660: 1997 SCC (Cri) 981: AIR 1997 SC 2914], this Court reiterated a similar view and further observed : (SCC p. 668, para 24) “24. … Illustration (g) in Section 114 of the Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary inference. Unless there are other circumstances also to facilitate the drawing of an adverse inference, it should not be a mechanical process to draw the adverse inference merely on the strength of non- examination of a witness, even if it is a material witness.” 20. In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India [1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595: AIR 1991 SC 1346], this Court held: (SCC p. 277, para 10) “10. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the court to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left either for the prosecution or for the defence to establish its respective case by adducing the best available 33 2026:HHC:22390 evidence, and the court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their side. Nonetheless, if either of the parties withholds any evidence which could be produced and which, if produced, would be unfavourable to the party withholding such evidence, the court can draw a presumption under Illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act. … In order to enable the court to find out the truth and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of Section 540 of the Code (Section 311 of the new Code) are enacted whereunder any court by exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of enquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall and re- examine any person already examined who are expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in dispute; because if judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be defeated.” 21. In Banti v. State of M.P. [(2004) 1 SCC 414: 2004 SCC (Cri) 294: AIR 2004 SC 261], this Court held : (SCC p. 419, paras 12-14) “12. In trials before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. Section 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 … enjoins on him to open up his case by describing the charge brought against the accused. He has to state what evidence he proposes to adduce for proving the guilt of the accused. … If that version is not in support of the prosecution case, it would be unreasonable to 34 2026:HHC:22390 insist on the Public Prosecutor to examine those persons as witnesses for prosecution. 13. When the case reaches the stage as envisaged in Section 231 of the Code, the Sessions Judge is obliged ‘to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution’. It is clear from the said section that the Public Prosecutor is expected to produce evidence ‘in support of the prosecution’ and not in derogation of the prosecution case. At the said stage, the Public Prosecutor would be in a position to take a decision as to which among the persons cited are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on the same point, the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose two or some among them alone so that the time of the court can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same factual aspects. … This will help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the court considerably in lessening the workload. The time has come to make every possible effort to lessen the workload, particularly of those courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the cause of justice. 14. … It is open to the defence to cite him and examine him as a defence witness.” 22. The said issue was also considered by this Court in R. Shaji[R. Shajiv.State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266: AIR 2013 SC 651] and the Court, after placing reliance upon its judgments in Vadivelu Thevarv.State of Madras[AIR 1957 SC 614: 1957 Cri LJ 1000] and Kishan Chandv.State of Haryana[(2013) 2 SCC 502: JT (2013) 1 SC 222], held as under : (SCC pp. 281-82, para 39) “39. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but 35 2026:HHC:22390 the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement in the law of evidence stating that a particular number of witnesses must be examined in order to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible, trustworthy, or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on the value provided by each witness, as opposed to the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is thus the quality and not quantity which determines the adequacy of evidence, as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Where the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it has been held that the number of witnesses produced over and above this does not carry any weight.” 23. Thus, the prosecution is not bound to examine all the cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. The accused can also examine the cited, but not examined, witnesses, if he so desires, in his defence. It is the discretion of the prosecutor to tender the witnesses to prove the case of the prosecution, and “the court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the prosecution has been influenced by some oblique motive”. In an extraordinary situation, if the court comes to the conclusion that a material witness has been withheld, it can draw an adverse inference against the prosecution, as has been provided under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, the public prosecutor must not take the liberty to “pick and choose” his witnesses, as he must be fair to the court and, therefore, to the truth. In a given case, the court can always examine a witness as a court witness if it is so warranted in the interests of justice. In fact, the evidence of the witnesses must 36 2026:HHC:22390 be tested on the touchstone of reliability, credibility and trustworthiness. If the court finds the same to be untruthful, there is no legal bar for it to discard the same. 27. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, wherein it was observed at page 224: - Non-examination of the witness 34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation given by the prosecution, along with the adequacy of the materials sufficient to proceed with the trial and convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice. Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not screened and could well be produced by the other side in support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. The onus is on the part of the party that alleges that a witness has not been produced deliberately to prove it. 35. The aforesaid settled principle of law has been laid down in Sarwan Singh v.State of Punjab[Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369: 1976 SCC (Cri) 646]: (SCC pp. 377-78, para 13) “13. Another circumstance which appears to have weighed heavily with the Additional Sessions Judge was that no independent witness of Salabatpura had been examined by the prosecution to prove the prosecution's case of assault on the deceased, although the evidence shows that there were some persons living in that locality, like the “pakodewalla”, hotelwalla, shopkeeper and some of the passengers who had alighted at Salabatpura 37 2026:HHC:22390 with the deceased. The Additional Sessions Judge has drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for its failure to examine any of those witnesses. Mr Hardy has adopted this argument. In our opinion, the comments of the Additional Sessions Judge are based on a serious misconception of the correct legal position. The onus of proving the prosecution's case rests entirely on the prosecution, and it follows as a logical corollary that the prosecution has complete liberty to choose its witnesses if it is to prove its case. The court cannot compel the prosecution to examine one witness or the other as its witness. At most, if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse inference against the prosecution. But it is not the law that the omission to examine any and every witness, even on minor points, would undoubtedly lead to rejection of the prosecution's case or drawing of an adverse inference against the prosecution. The law is well-settled that the prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as are essential for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. In other words, before an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses who had been withheld were eyewitnesses who had actually seen the occurrence and were, therefore, material to prove the case. It is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point; it is the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence that matters. In the instant case, the evidence of the eyewitnesses does not suffer from any infirmity or any manifest defect on its intrinsic merit. Secondly, there is nothing to show that at the time when the deceased was assaulted, a large crowd had gathered, and some of the members of the crowd had actually seen the occurrence and were cited as witnesses for the prosecution and then withheld. We must not forget that in our country, there is a general 38 2026:HHC:22390 tendency amongst the witnesses in mofussil to shun giving evidence in courts because of the cumbersome and dilatory procedure of our courts, the harassment to which they are subjected by the police and the searching cross- examination which they have to face before the courts. Therefore, nobody wants to be a witness to a murder or any serious offence if he can avoid it. Although the evidence does show that four or five persons had alighted from the bus at the time when the deceased and his companions got down from the bus, there is no suggestion that any of those persons stayed on to witness the occurrence. They may have proceeded to their village homes.” (emphasis supplied) 36. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar [Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 401: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195]: (SCC pp. 410-11, para 19) “19. In the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible, trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on the value provided by each witness rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity that determines the adequacy of evidence, as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even in probate cases, where the law requires the examination of at least one attesting witness, it has been held that the production of more witnesses does not carry any weight. Thus, the conviction can 39 2026:HHC:22390 even be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness if the same inspires confidence. (Vide Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR 981: AIR 1957 SC 614], Kunju v. State of T.N.[Kunju v. State of T.N., (2008) 2 SCC 151 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.[Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150], Mahesh v. State of M.P.[Mahesh v. State of M.P., (2011) 9 SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab[Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 1 SCC 10 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana[Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807]. 28. In the present case, witnesses Constable Vijay Kumar, HC Lalit and Constable Bhuvnesh were given up as repetitive. ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) and Jagdev Singh (PW-3) had already deposed about the recovery; hence, Constable Vijay Kumar, HC Lalit and Constable Bhuvnesh would have repeated what was said by the examined witnesses, and no adverse inference can be drawn. 29. It was submitted that the ticket (Ext.P-45/PW- 15) mentions the time 15:28, which makes the prosecution's case highly doubtful. This is a total misreading of the evidence because the time has been mentioned as 00:15:28 and not 15:28. Thus, this ticket was issued at 12:15:28 a.m., four hours before the bus was 40 2026:HHC:22390 intercepted. The ticket is from Chandigarh to Shimla, and it would take some time to cover the distance between these two places. Thus, the submission that the time on the ticket makes the prosecution's case highly suspect cannot be accepted. 30. HC Rajan (PW-15) stated in his cross- examination that the complete bus number was not entered in Ext.P26/PW-7 and Ext.P27/PW-7. These documents have been issued by HRTC, and merely because HRTC had not mentioned the complete bus number cannot falsify the statements of witnesses that the bus bearing registration No. HP-72C-9527 was intercepted on the spot. Further, the photograph (Ext.P5/PW-1) clearly shows the bus bearing registration No. HP-72C-9527, having the board of Mukeria-Chandigarh- Shimla, therefore, the registration number of the bus has been duly established, and the incomplete registration number recorded by HRTC will not make the prosecution case suspect. 31. It was submitted that police officials had not offered their search to the accused, which makes the 41 2026:HHC:22390 prosecution's case suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. It was nowhere suggested to any witness, and the accused has also not claimed in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that the police had planted the heroin in his bag. Nothing was suggested to the police officials that they had any motive to do so. Thus, the failure to give the personal search is a procedural irregularity, which will not make the prosecution's case suspect. 32. It was submitted that the backpack did not have any documents to connect it to the accused, and the possession of the heroin was not established. This submission is only stated to be rejected. ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) and Jagdev Singh (PW-3) consistently stated that the accused had kept the backpack on his lap. Therefore, the accused was in a position to exercise control over the bag, which was kept by him on his lap, and nothing more was required to prove the possession of the backpack by the accused. 33. ASI Ambi Lal stated that a white mobile charger was recovered from the first pocket, clothes and a 42 2026:HHC:22390 transparent pouch were recovered from the second pocket of the backpack. He had stated in the statement (Ext.P8/PW-2) before the police that a mobile charger was found in the middle pocket of the clothes, and a pouch containing heroin was found in the last pocket. It was submitted that this was a major contradiction, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The attention of ASI Ambi Lal was not brought towards the previous statement recorded by the police, and he was not allowed to explain this discrepancy, which is an essential requirement under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Binay Kumar Singh Versus State of Bihar, 1997 (1) SCC 283, that if a witness is to be contradicted with his previous statement, his attention must be drawn towards it. It was observed: - “11. The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his evidence in Court. This principle is delineated in S. 155 (3) of the Evidence Act, and it must be borne in mind when reading S. 145, which consists of two limbs. It is provided in the first limb of S.145 that a witness may be cross- examined as to the previous statement made by him without such writing being shown to him but the second limb provides that "if it is intended to 43 2026:HHC:22390 contradict him by the writing his attention must before the writing can be provided, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him." There is thus a distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the previous statements made by him. He may at that stage succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such cross-examination, even without resorting to the procedure laid down in the second limb. But if the witness disowns having made any statement which is inconsistent with his present stand, his testimony in Court on that score would not be vitiated until the cross-examiner proceeds to comply with the procedure prescribed in the second limb of S. 145. 12. In Bhagwan Singh's case (AIR 1952 SC 214), Vivian Bose, J., pointed out in paragraph 25 that during the cross-examination of the witnesses concerned, the formalities prescribed by S. 145 are complied with. The cross-examination, in that case, indicated that every circumstance intended to be used as a contradiction was put to him point by point and passage by passage. Learned Judges were called upon to deal with an argument that witnesses' attention should have been specifically drawn to that passage in addition thereto. Their Lordships were, however, satisfied in that case that the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance with S. 145, and hence held that all that is required is that the witness must be treated fairly and must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. On the facts of that case, there is no dispute with the proposition laid therein. 13. So long as the attention of PW 32 (Sukhdev 44 2026:HHC:22390 Bhagat) was not drawn to the statement attributed to him as recorded by DW-10 (Nawal Kishore Prasad), we are not persuaded to reject the evidence of PW-32 that he gave Ex. 14 statement at the venue of occurrence and that he had not given any other statement earlier thereto.” 34. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed: “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: 45 2026:HHC:22390 “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court 46 2026:HHC:22390 must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross- examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, in confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness. 9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “155. Impeaching the credibility of the witness. — The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him— (1) ….…………………………………… 47 2026:HHC:22390 (2) ……………………………………… (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.” It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trivial omission or contradiction brought to the record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission, depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each case. 10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus: “13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section145of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514:1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at p. 819: Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that 48 2026:HHC:22390 event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts, which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court, and similar decisions were not considered the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to aprevious statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross- examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner 49 2026:HHC:22390 provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement were allowed to be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police, which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it, subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers, “Yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the 50 2026:HHC:22390 illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually said before him. In such a case, the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put, and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.” 35. It was held in Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757 that the Courts cannot suo motu take cognisance of the contradiction and the same has to be brought on record as per the law. It was observed: “64. The court cannot suo motu make use of statements to the police that have not been proved and ask questions with reference to them which are inconsistent with the testimony of the witness in the court. The words ‘if duly proved’ are used in 51 2026:HHC:22390 Section 162Cr. P.C. clearly shows that the record of the statement of witnesses cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway, nor can it be looked into, but they must be duly proved for contradiction by eliciting admission from the witness during cross- examination and also during the cross- examination of the Investigating Officer. The statement before the Investigating Officer can be used for contradiction, but only after strict compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction. 65. Section 145 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.— A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 66. Under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, when it is intended to contradict the witness by his previous statement reduced into writing, the attention of such witness must be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him, before the writing can be used. While recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross- examination. The attention of the witness is drawn to that part, and this must be reflected in his cross- examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved, and there is no need for further proof of contradiction, 52 2026:HHC:22390 and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, his attention must be drawn to that statement, and it must be mentioned in the deposition. By this process, the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. Thereafter, when the Investigating Officer is examined in the court, his attention should be drawn to the passage marked for contradiction; it will then be proved in the deposition of the Investigating Officer, who, again, by referring to the police statement, will depose about the witness having made that statement. The process again involves referring to the police statement and culling out the part with which the maker of the statement was intended to be contradicted. If the witness was not confronted with that part of the statement with which the defence wanted to contradict him, then the court cannot suo motu make use of statements to police not proved in compliance with Section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, by drawing attention to the parts intended for contradiction.” [See: V.K. Mishra v. State of Uttarakhand: (2015) 9 SCC 588] 36. Therefore, it is impermissible to discard the testimony of ASI Ambi Lal (PW-2) because of the discrepancy in his statement. 37. It was submitted that the mobile phone charger belongs to a different brand and makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. This submission is without any basis. No person has deposed about the brand of the mobile phone found in the possession of the accused. Further, there is no requirement that the mobile phone and the charger should be from the same company. 53 2026:HHC:22390 There is no evidence on record that the charger recovered by the police could not have been used to charge the mobile phone found in the possession of the accused. This submission, being without any evidence, cannot be accepted. 38. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly accepted the statements of the witnesses and held that the accused was found in possession of a plastic pouch containing 6.23 grams of substance in it. 39. The substance was sealed on the spot in a parcel. The parcel was produced before SI Sultan Singh (PW-10), who resealed the parcel with his seal impression ‘Z’. The parcel was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.5, who opened it, certified the inventory and sealed the parcel with the Court seal. The parcel was sent to the SFSL, Junga and as per the report of analysis (Ext.P57/PW-15), it was found to be sealed with seven seals of seal ‘A’, three seals of ‘Z’ and three seals of Civil Nazir Court Simla. The seals were found intact and tallied with the specimen seal sent by the forwarding authority and seal impression of A & Z 54 2026:HHC:22390 impressed on the NCB-I form. This report shows that the seals were intact when the case property was received in SFSL Junga. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, the prosecution’s case that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal was separately sent and tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 40. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held: “It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 55 2026:HHC:22390 41. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after taking samples therefrom which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 56 2026:HHC:22390 (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution’s case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 42. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it was held:- “10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana 57 2026:HHC:22390 at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non- examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 43. Therefore, the prosecution’s version is to be accepted as correct that the case property remained intact till its analysis at SFSL, Junga. 44. The report of analysis mentions that the actual weight of the exhibit is 5.980 grams, and the exhibit is a sample of Diacetylmorphine (Heroin). Therefore, the report of the analysis showed that the substance recovered from the accused was heroin. 45. It was submitted that the seal was not produced before the Court, which is fatal to the prosecution's case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Fredrick George v. State of 58 2026:HHC:22390 Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73: 2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal before the Court. It was observed at page 4614: “62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re-sealing the bulk case property, and the samples have not been produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh's case (2001 (2) Cri LJ (CCR) 74) (supra), while dealing with the effect of non-production of the seal, this Court held as under: In the absence of any mandatory provision in the law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case property, that the seal used in sealing the case property must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether, by non-production of the seal at the trial, any doubt is raised about the safe custody of the case property or not.” 63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion we have already arrived at hereinabove that there is unchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case property was not tampered with at any stage, the non-production of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the accused.” 46. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed:- 59 2026:HHC:22390 “6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on 31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy. S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At 3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar, stopped PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness, Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’. PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms. Each was taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with the seal ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the two specimen seal impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the seals were found tampered with in any manner.” 47. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the seals were produced before the Court was perverse. 48. In the present case, the sample seal ‘A’ (Ext.P2/PW-1), sample seal ‘Z’ (Ext.P2/PW-10) and sample seal of Court (Ext.P54/PW-15) were produced before the Court and the Court had the means of comparison of the seals on the parcel with the sample 60 2026:HHC:22390 seals. Learned Trial Court had noticed while recording the statement of Constable Dharam Pal (PW-1) that seals were legible and intact. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had satisfied itself regarding the correctness of the seal impression, and the failure to produce the seal is not material. 49. Thus, the learned trial Court had rightly held the accused guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the NDPS Act. The accused was found in possession of 5.98 grams of heroin as per the result of analysis (Ext.P57/PW-15). The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years and a fine of ₹25,000/-, and in case of failure to pay the fine amount, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 50. The Central Government has notified 250 grams of heroin as a commercial quantity, which means that the person possessing 250 grams of heroin can be sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uggarsain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 109: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 755 that the 61 2026:HHC:22390 Courts have to apply the principle of proportionality while imposing a sentence. It was observed at page 113: 10. This Court has, time and again, stated that the principle of proportionality should guide the sentencing process. In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat [Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368 : (2009) 8 SCR 719] it was held that the sentence should “deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the) law,” and the endeavour should be to impose an “appropriate sentence.” The Court also held that imposing “meagre sentences” merely on account of lapse of time would be counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of U.P. [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712] while advocating that sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the Court also emphasised that : (Jameel case [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712], SCC p. 535, para 15) “15. … the law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on a factual matrix. By deft modulation, the sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 : 62 2026:HHC:22390 (2012) 8 SCR 189] the Court stressed that : (SCC p. 744, para 33) “33. … It is the duty of the court to see that an appropriate sentence is imposed, regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order” (emphasis supplied) and that sentencing includes “adequate punishment”. In B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn. [B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn., (1974) 3 SCC 85: 1973 SCC (Cri) 796 : (1974) 1 SCR 222], the Court considered the issue of punishment and observed that punishment is designed to protect society by deterring potential offenders as well as prevent the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding citizen for the good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while determining the question of awarding appropriate sentences. 12. In Sham Sunder v. Puran [Sham Sunder v. Puran, (1990) 4 SCC 731: 1991 SCC (Cri) 38: 1990 Supp (1) SCR 662], the appellant-accused was convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC. The appellate court reduced the sentence to the term of imprisonment already undergone, i.e. six months. However, it enhanced the fine. This Court ruled that the sentence awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it opined that: (SCC p. 737, para 8) 8. … The court, in fixing the punishment for any particular crime, should take into consideration the nature of the offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the degree of deliberation shown by the offender. The measure of punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. The sentence imposed by the High Court appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as to involve a failure of justice. We are of the opinion that to meet the ends of justice, the 63 2026:HHC:22390 sentence has to be enhanced.” (emphasis supplied) This Court enhanced the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. This Court has emphasised, in that sentencing depends on the facts, and the adequacy is determined by factors such as “the nature of crime, the manner in which it is committed, the propensity shown and the brutality reflected” [Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P. [Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P., (2017) 4 SCC 546 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 436 : (2017) 2 SCR 379] ]. Other decisions, like: State of M.P. v. Bablu [State of M.P. v. Bablu, (2014) 9 SCC 281 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2014) 9 SCR 467]; Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar [Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 159 : (2013) 5 SCR 979] and State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi [State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : (2015) 3 SCR 590] too, have stressed on the significance and importance of imposing appropriate, “adequate” or “proportionate” punishments. 51. If the principle of proportionality is applied to the present case, a person possessing 5.980 grams of heroin cannot be held liable for imprisonment of four years and a fine of ₹25,000/-. Hence, the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is modified, and the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for the period already undergone and pay a fine of ₹10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month. Subject to this modification, the rest of the judgment and order passed by 64 2026:HHC:22390 the learned Trial Court are upheld. Modified warrants should be prepared accordingly. 52. The present appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications, if any. 53. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) 16th June, 2026. Judge (ravinder)