2026:HHC:22390 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 815 of 2025 Reserved on: 28.04.2026 Date of Decision: 16.05.2026 Lilly Goyal ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondents _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Petitioner : Mr Karan Sharma, Advocate For the respondent s : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1. Mr. Virender Thakur, Advocate, for the respondent No.2. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of Kalendra No. 4 of 2021, for the commission of 182 of Indian Penal Code (IPC), pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant – Arushi Saini, made a complainant Superintendent of Police, District Sirmour, Nahan asserting that 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:22390 she had filed an F.I.R. No. 27 of 2020 dated 7.09.2020 in Women Police Station, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. The police arrested the accused and they were released on bail on 17.06.2020. The accused started harassing the informant and her family members and asked them to withdraw the complaint filed by them. The accused also filed multiple complaints against the informant and the witnesses cited in the F.I.R. They threatened to upload the private photos and videos of the informant. The police investigated the matter after seeking permission from the Court. It was found that the accused had filed complaints against Aditya Saini, Kunal Saini and the informant, which were found to be false. Similarly, the complaints were made to the Department of Higher Education, Regional Transport Office, Naha and Tourism department, Weight and Measurement department, Ministry of Health and Welfare, M.C.office Nahan, Food & Civil Supplies, Nahan and Water Resources department, Nahan and Electricity department, Nahan. All these complaints are investigated and after investigation there were found to be false. These complaints were filed with an intention to pressurise the informant and the witnesses to withdraw the F.I.R. lodged by her. Hence, the police filed a complaint before the learned trial Court. 3 2026:HHC:22390 3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint, the petitioners have filed the present petition for seeking quashing of the complaint based on a compromise between the parties. It was asserted that parties had had it into a compromise voluntarily without there being any external pressure. The main F.I.R. has been withdrawn by filing a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., which was registered as Cr.MMO No.367 of 2020. The complaint filed before learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. has become infructuous and is liable to be quashed after the quashing of the main case. The informant had agreed to withdraw all the cases filed by her and the continuation of the complaint before learned judicial Magistrate would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, the present petition. 4. The petition is opposed by respondents No. 1 to 3 by filing a reply making preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the complaint was filed before the Court for providing false and misleading information to the Police and various public servants. It has nothing to do with the F.I. R lodged by the informant. The petitioner’s conduct falls within the purview of Section 182 of the IPC. The police conducted the proper enquiry after obtaining the permission from the Court and 4 2026:HHC:22390 found sufficient material to file the complaint. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr Karan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Virender Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 6. Mr Karan Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise. The continuation of the proceedings after the compromise would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. be quashed. He relied upon following judgments in support of his submissions:-  Maninder Sharma vs. State of Punjab 2023:PHHC:055143;  Shivani Seth vs. State of Punjab & another: 2023:PHHC:089810;  Gian Singh vs State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303;  Ganesh vs. Sudhir Kumar Shrivastava (2020) 20 SCC 787;  Jasmair Singh and another vs. State of Haryana (2022) 9 SCC 73 and  Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P. 2025 4 SCC 78 5 2026:HHC:22390 7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State submitted that the complaint has been filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 182 of IPC, which is an offence against the public justice and is not dependent upon the compromise between the parties. The complaint filed by the informant has been withdrawn on the basis of a compromise, but it is impermissible to quash the complaint against the public justice based on a compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. Mr. Virender Thakur, learned, counsel for the respondent No.2 submitted that he has no objection in case the present petition is allowed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 that the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings under section 482 based on the compromise is different from the jurisdiction of compounding under section 320 of CrPC. It was observed: 6 2026:HHC:22390 “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320. The court is guided solely and squarely thereby. On the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence, criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power. However, the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of the indictment. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which 7 2026:HHC:22390 overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist a distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different, although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment. 8 2026:HHC:22390 60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override an express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471 IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC 9 2026:HHC:22390 and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash- credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding, FIR or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation, but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such power, viz., (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before the exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity 10 2026:HHC:22390 or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or the victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide a basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 11 2026:HHC:22390 11. It was held in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 that the offences punishable under the Arms Act fall within the definition of serious offences and cannot be quashed based on the compromise. It was observed: “15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non- compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised, having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of a compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact 12 2026:HHC:22390 on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied) 13 2026:HHC:22390 12. Section 182 of IPC, provides for the punishment to a person, who gives any information, which he knows or believes to be false intended to cause such public servant to do something, which he would not have done and to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or an annoyance of any person. This offence falls within Chapter 10 of contempt of lawful authority public servants. Thus, it is apparent that the offence is primarily committed against the public servant to whom a false information is provided. It was laid down by the Punjab & Haryana, High Court in Kulwant Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 43 that an offence punishable under Section 182 of IPC is a matter between public servant and the offender and any writing at the instance of a private person cannot debar the initiation of such proceedings. It was observed:- 18. An offence under Section 182 IPC read with the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. (which lays down the procedure) is a matter between the “public servant” and the “offender”, who has committed the offence. Any writing at the instance of a private person cannot debar initiation of such proceedings. 19. The tendency to file false complaints so as to settle personal vendetta is required to be curbed. While FIR is required to be lodged on a complaint showing prima facie commission of offence, surely a person cannot be encouraged to approach a public servant by way of giving any information that he knows or believes to be false intending 14 2026:HHC:22390 thereby to cause such public servant to use the lawful power of the public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person. 20. The allegations against the petitioner are that she was in the know of the fact that Surjit Singh had died of natural causes and yet she approached the police agencies to initiate criminal proceedings against as many as six persons. On so doing, FIR was lodged and investigation was carried, surely to the annoyance of the persons accused in the complaint filed by the petitioner. This matter having come to the notice of the public servant/police officials, though at the instance of respondent No. 3, Kalandra for commission of offence under Section 182 IPC has been filed. No ground for quashing the same is made out while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The petition is dismissed. 13. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the complaint filed for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 182 of the IPC for the based on a compromise. 14. In Maninder Sharma (supra) and Shivani Seth (supra)., the Punjab and Haryana High Court had not noticed the judgment of Kulwant Kuar(supra). In Jasmair Singh (supra), the offence was committed for the commission of offences punishable and Section 498-A, 323, 406 and cited judgment does not apply to the present case. In Naushey Ali (supra) deals with commission of an offence under Section 307 of IPC, which was not made out on the facts of 15 2026:HHC:22390 the case and therefore advantage can be derived from the cited judgments. Ganesh (supra) deals with Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, hence, the citied judgment will not assist the scope in determining the controversy pending before this Court. 15. In view of the above, it is impermissible to quash the failure complaint based on a compromise between the parties hence the present petition fails and it is dismissed. 16. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 16th June, 2026 (ravinder)