HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - B No. - 4370 of 2026 Court No. - 51 HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondent nos. 1 to 4. 1. The present petition has been filed challenging the orders passed by Board of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow dated 09.04.2012, respondents nos. 3 and 4 dated 27.09.2007 and 12.12.2005, respectively, arising out of proceeding under Section 34 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. 2. Learned Standing Counsel has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, challenging the order passed in the year 2012, after more than 14 years. It is contended that no explanation has been furnished on behalf of the petitioner regarding inordinate delay and laches in filing the present petition. 3. In reply to the preliminary objection raised by learned Standing Counsel, the counsel for the petitioner could not point out any averment in the writ petition, regarding explanation for the inordinate delay. He only contended that the name of the respondent no.5 has been recorded on the basis of a sale deed executed on his behalf during his minority, without appointment of any guardian as contemplated under law, therefore, the sale deed is void. The entry on the basis of void sale deed in the revenue records are non-est and liable to be set aside. 4. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties on the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability 5. Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Prabhat Kumar Pandey Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. Bharathraj .....Petitioner(s) State Of U.P. And 5 Others .....Respondent(s) of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. At the outset, it is well settled that there is no prescribed period of limitation, in the strict sense, for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the absence of a statutory period of limitation does not confer upon a litigant an unrestricted right to approach the writ Court at any point of time. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and equitable in nature, and a person seeking such discretionary relief is required to approach the Court with reasonable expedition. Where a petitioner sleeps over his rights and approaches the Court after an inordinate and unexplained lapse of time, the Court is ordinarily justified in declining to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. 6. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, the Supreme Court held that although the Limitation Act does not, as such, apply to proceedings under Article 226, the maximum period prescribed by the legislature for instituting a civil action may ordinarily furnish a reasonable standard for determining whether the delay in invoking writ jurisdiction is unreasonable. It was further held that the High Court may decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction where there has been unreasonable delay in seeking relief. 7. The principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, wherein it was observed that, although there is no period of limitation for exercise of power under Article 226, it is a sound and wise exercise of judicial discretion to refuse relief to a person who does not approach the Court expeditiously and thereafter seeks to unsettle matters which have attained finality. The Court specifically deprecated the practice of allowing a litigant to remain inactive for years and thereafter invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction to reopen a stale claim. 8. The same principle has consistently been followed in subsequent decisions. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, does not ordinarily assist the tardy, the 9. WRIB No. 4370 of 2026 2 indolent, the acquiescent or the lethargic. Where there is inordinate delay which has not been satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene, particularly where entertaining the belated petition is likely to cause prejudice, inconvenience or injustice to the opposite party or to third parties who may have altered their position in the meantime. Likewise, in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322, the Supreme Court reiterated that delay or laches is a relevant consideration while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226. Where negligence or omission on the part of the applicant, coupled with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party, the Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction. 10. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274, the Supreme Court again emphasized that a belated writ petition ordinarily deserves dismissal. The Court held that delay and laches are matters which the High Court is required to take into consideration while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 and that, where negligence in asserting a right is coupled with lapse of time and consequent prejudice, the extraordinary jurisdiction may legitimately be declined. 11. More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the doctrine of laches is not a rigid statutory bar but constitutes an important principle governing the exercise of equitable and discretionary jurisdiction. The Court has emphasized that the length of the delay, the conduct of the parties during the intervening period, the circumstances in which the delay occurred and the prejudice that may result from reopening a settled matter are all relevant considerations. Thus, while each case has to be examined on its own facts, an unexplained and extraordinary delay cannot ordinarily be overlooked merely because the petitioner seeks to assert a legal or statutory right. 12. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the explanation furnished by the petitioner in the present case is wholly inadequate. The petitioner seeks to challenge, inter alia, the order dated 09.04.2012 after a lapse 13. WRIB No. 4370 of 2026 3 of approximately fourteen years. No explanation has been offered in the writ petition for the inordinate delay of fourteen years. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why, after attaining majority in 1998, and moving a recall application in 2004, he contested the matter till the Board of Revenue but did not approach the Court immediately or within a reasonable period, after passing of the order dated 09.04.2012. 14. The law does not permit a litigant to remain silent for years together and, upon the implementation or enforcement of an adverse order, seek to reopen a concluded proceeding by asserting a belated discovery of the order. The writ jurisdiction cannot be converted into a mechanism for reviving stale claims. As observed by the Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy (supra), a litigant cannot sleep over his rights and thereafter approach the Court to unsettle matters which have remained undisturbed for a considerable length of time. 15. There is yet another significant aspect of the matter. The challenge in the present writ petition is not directed against a recent order giving rise to a fresh cause of action. The foundational orders arise from proceedings which commenced several decades ago. The order dated 27.09.2007 passed by the Additional Commissioner was itself subjected to challenge by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue. Thus, the petitioner was not stranger to the proceedings. The order dated 09.04.2012, even if treated as the order finally giving rise to the present challenge, was required to be questioned within a reasonable time. 16. In Shiv Dass (supra), the Supreme Court has recognized that delay and laches acquire particular significance where the belated approach of the litigant may cause prejudice to the opposite party or disturb a position which has remained settled for a considerable period. In the present case, the passage of approximately fourteen years after the order sought to be challenged is by itself a circumstance of considerable weight. The revenue proceedings, the rights claimed under the Will and the position of the parties have remained undisturbed for a very long period. Entertaining the petition at this stage would necessarily require reopening matters 17. WRIB No. 4370 of 2026 4 which have long since attained a degree of finality. It is also significant that the petitioner has not pleaded any circumstance of such exceptional nature as would justify overlooking the extraordinary delay. There is no allegation supported by particulars that the impugned order was fraudulently concealed from them, that they were prevented by any act of the respondents from approaching the Court, or that any other circumstance beyond their control disabled them from seeking an appropriate remedy within a reasonable time. The explanation pleaded is, therefore, neither specific nor sufficient. 18. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal (supra) has held that the rule against entertaining stale claims is founded, inter alia, upon the need to prevent confusion, public inconvenience and injustice which may result from the exercise of writ jurisdiction after an unreasonable lapse of time. The same consideration assumes greater significance in the present case, where the dispute pertains to land and revenue records and the impugned proceedings are decades old. 19. It is, therefore, not necessary for this Court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to examine the merits of the petitioner's challenge to the impugned orders. Even assuming that the petitioner may have an arguable case on merits, the extraordinary and unexplained delay disentitles them to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. The existence of a possible legal grievance does not, by itself, confer an indefeasible right to obtain relief under Article 226 after an unreasonable and unexplained lapse of time. 20. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition suffers from gross delay and laches. The petitioner has failed to furnish any cogent, specific or legally acceptable explanation for approaching this Court after approximately fourteen years. Their own participation in the earlier proceedings negatives the plea of want of knowledge, while the subsequent allegation of attempted dispossession does not furnish a fresh cause of action so as to revive the stale challenge. 21. WRIB No. 4370 of 2026 5 The preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel, therefore, deserves to be accepted. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised in favour of persons who, despite having knowledge of the proceedings and having themselves pursued the statutory remedies, have allowed the matter to remain dormant for decades and have thereafter sought to reopen it at a highly belated stage. 22. Consequently, without entering into the merits of the challenge to the impugned orders, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 23. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. The petitioner is not entitled for any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. There shall be no order as to costs. 24. September 30, 2026 Anil WRIB No. 4370 of 2026 6 (Arun Kumar,J.) Digitally signed by :- ANIL KUMAR PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad