Page No.# 1/9 GAHC040010632026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : BA/63/2026 Md Shabuddin Son of Sainul Nessa, resident of Village Gochi, PO and PS Kesariya, East Champaran District, Bihar 845401 VERSUS The State of AP represented by the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : N Dubey, A Dutta,N Dubey Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN ORDER 05.08.2026 Heard Mr. N. Dubey, learned counsel for the accused and Ms. L. Hage, learned APP, for the State respondent. 2. This application, under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, is preferred by accused, namely, Ramzan Ali, who has been languishing in jail hajot since 06.04.2022, in connection with Session Case No. 31/2022, arising out of Chimpu Page No.# 2/9 P.S. Case No. 18/2022, under Sections 302/201/379/120B/34 IPC, for grant of bail. 3. It is to be noted here that the above-noted case has been registered on the basis of one FIR lodged by one Subhagan, SO/PA to DGP, PHQ Itanagar, on 01.04.2022. The essence of allegation in the aforementioned FIR is that on 01.04.2022, at about 6:59 AM, he got a telephonic call from Constable Raj Thapa, that S.I. Shibu George is found lying in his quarter, located at SEPL Colony, with blood stains. He then reported the matter to the SDPO, Itanagar, and to other senior police officials. 4. Mr. Dubey, learned counsel for the accused submits that the accused was arrested on 06.04.2022, and since then, he has been languishing in jail hajot for the last 4 years 4 months and 16 days. Mr. Dubey further submits that after completion of investigation, the I.O. has laid charge-sheet against the accused and charges have been framed against him and the trial is going on and in the last 4 years 4 months and 16 days, the learned Trial Court has failed to complete the trial. 4.1 Mr. Dubey, further submits that the accused has approached this Court for grant of bail on earlier occasions also, i.e., on 12.08.2022, in B.A. No. 64/2022 and on 29.09.2023, in B.A. No. 72/2023. And this Court, vide Order dated 29.09.2023, in B.A. No. 72/2023, was pleased to direct the learned Trial Court to complete the trial as soon as practicable and also to take recourse to Section 309(1) Cr.P.C. But, the learned Trial Court has failed to complete the trial till date, and as such, the accused has again approached this Court by filing the present petition. Page No.# 3/9 4.2 It is the further submission of Mr. Dubey that 7 witnesses have been examined till date and only 4 witnesses remain to be examined. He also submits that the I.O. is yet to be examined and despite service of summon, the I.O. has failed to turn up and the learned Trial Court has failed to take any coercive measure against the said I.O. for failing to appear before the Court. 4.3 Mr. Dubey also submits that the accused is ready to face the trial and he will appears before the learned Trial Court on each and every date and he is also ready to abide by any condition imposed by this Court, and he is even ready to appear before the concerned police station, either weekly or fortnightly, if such a direction is issued, while enlarging him on bail. Referring to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Liakat Ali Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 99/2026; Mr. Dubey submits that the accused has been languishing in jail hajot for the last 4 years 4 months and 16 days, and the trial is getting delayed for no fault of his and under such circumstances, he has contended to allow this petition. 5. Per contra, Ms. Hage, learned APP for the State respondent has vehemently opposed the petition. She submits that the trial is at the fag end and 7 witnesses have already been examined and sufficient incriminating circumstances have been brought on record against the accused, and that within the next 2-3 months, the entire trial will be completed. 5.1 Ms. Hage further submits that the accused, after commission of the offence, absconded and he was later arrested at West Bengal and if he is enlarged on bail at the fag end of trial, then there is every possibility of jumping the bail and in that case, it will cause further delay in the trial. Ms. Hage also Page No.# 4/9 submits that the offences are grievous in nature and the punishment prescribed for the same is death or life imprisonment, and under such circumstances, she has contended to dismiss the petition. 6. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also perused the scanned copy of the records received from the learned Trial Court and also the Orders passed by this Court in B.A. No. 64/2022, dated 12.08.2022, and in B.A. No. 72/2023, dated 29.09.2023. 7. Indisputedly, the accused is behind the bars for the last 4 years 4 months and 16 days and it appears that 7 witnesses have been examined so far and there remains to examine only 4 witnesses, as submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It also appears that the prosecution side has also brought on record some incriminating substances, by examining the witnesses. 8. It is well settled in the case of Gurcharan Singh & Ors. Vs. State (Delhi Administration), reported in (1978) 1 SCC 118, that even if charge-sheet was filed by police, depending on the merit of the case and largely upon the nature and gravity of the offence, the bail may be granted, considering the position of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses and the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice or repeating the offence, or jeopardizing his own life, being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case of tempering the witnesses. 9. These propositions are reiterated in the case of Mahipal Vs. Rajesh Kumar, reported in (2020) 2SCC 118, Ajwar Vs. Waseem (2024), and Page No.# 5/9 others, as under – (i) Whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe the accused committed the offence; (ii) Nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) Severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iii) Danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (iv) Character, behaviour, means, position, and standing of the accused; (v) Likelihood of the offence being repeated; and (vi) Reasonable apprehension of witnesses being influenced or evidence being tampered with. 10. In the case of Ram Govind Upadhyay Vs. Sudarshan Singh, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 598, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail Page No.# 6/9 and the same should and ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail-- more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter. 4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture, though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither there can be any. The considerations being: (a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations. (b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant of bail. (c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail." 11. In the case of Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, Page No.# 7/9 reported in (2010) 14 SCC 496, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: i. whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; ii. nature and gravity of the accusation; iii. severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; iv. danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; v. character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; vi. likelihood of the offence being repeated; vii. reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and viii. danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. Page No.# 8/9 10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it to be illegal." 12. In the instant case, though the accused is behind the bars for 4 years 4 months and 16 days, yet, trial is going on and nothing is demonstrated before this Court to show that because of the lapse of the prosecution side, the trial is getting delayed, so as to form an opinion that the right to speedy trial of the accused is violated; as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 13. It is the categorical submission of Ms. Hage, learned APP that within a period of 2-3 months, the entire trial will be completed. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that at the fag end of the trial, it would not be proper to release him on bail. 14. Further, it is also the categorical submission of Ms. Hage, learned APP that after commission of the offence, the accused absconded from the place of occurrence and he was apprehended at Calcutta. In view of the given antecedent of the accused, if he is enlarged on bail at this stage, then there is every chance of absconding again and in that event, the disposal of the case will be delayed even further. As held in the case of Mahipal (Supra), danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail, is a core factor, which is to be reckoned with at the time of granting bail. 15. Taking note of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, and also considering the nature and gravity of the offence, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case where the privilege of bail can be granted to the accused and Page No.# 9/9 accordingly, this petition stands dismissed. However, the learned Trial Court is requested to expedite the trial and to complete the same, as soon as practicable. JUDGE Comparing Assistant