2026:HHC:21908 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 418 of 2014 Reserved on: 23.04.2026 Date of Decision: 04.06.2026. State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant Versus Krishan Chand ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr G.R. Palsra, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.05.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (II), Mandi, Camp at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 31.03.20211, passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Chachiot at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly set aside. (The parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:21908 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under section 354, 504 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant had boarded the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-65-1724 on 29.08.2009 for going to her village. Bhadru and the accused (Krishan Chand) were sitting on the front seat of the vehicle. The accused touched the informant inappropriately; however, the informant could not say anything due to shame. When the vehicle reached Olani Nala at 9:30 p.m., accused (Krishan Chand) caught the informant’s breasts. The informant tried to push the accused away. The accused kissed the informant. Bhadru told the driver to stop the vehicle. The accused abused the informant and gave her beatings. The driver asked the accused to get out of the vehicle, but the accused refused to do so. The informant got out of the vehicle at her village, where the accused again gave her beatings. The informant reported the matter to the police. The police recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the police 3 2026:HHC:21908 station, where an F.I.R. (Ext.PW-5/B was registered. HC Dina Nath (PW-5) investigated the matter. He filed an application (Ext.PW- 4/A) for the medical examination of the victim. Dr Anamika (PW- 4) examined the victim and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which were simple in nature and could have been caused within 24 hours of the examination. She issued MLC (Ext.PW- 4/B). HC Dina Nath (PW-5) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-5/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per the version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared before the Court, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under sections 354, 323 and 504 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Victim (PW-1) narrated the incident. Bhadru alias Devi Singh (PW-2) did not support the prosecution's case. Constable Duni Chand proved the entry in the daily diary. Dr Anamika (PW-4) 4 2026:HHC:21908 conducted the medical examination of the victim. Dina Nath (PW- 5) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that the face of the victim was already burned, and he had not caused any injury to her. Devi Singh had deposed truthfully, but the victim had falsely deposed. He had no enmity with the victim, but he could not say why she had filed the present case against him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant’s statement was corroborated by the medical evidence. Minor contradictions in the informant’s statement were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Generally, a woman will not falsely accuse a person of outraging her modesty, and her testimony was believable; therefore, the Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him as follows:- Sl. No. Section(s) Sentence i. 354 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo two years ( i.e. six months of rigorous imprisonment, while remaining term of 5 2026:HHC:21908 one year and six months of simple imprisonment as per Section 60 of IPC) and a fine of ₹5000/- ii. 323 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of one month and a fine of ₹1000/- iii. 504 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment of three months and a fine of ₹1000/-. It was clarified that in default of payment of the fine, the accused shall be liable to undergo further simple imprisonment for 15 days each. It was ordered that all the sentences shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Mandi, Camp at Gohar, District Mandi, H.P (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court held that the prosecution's version was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had caused simple hurt to the victim. However, the prosecution's case that the accused had outraged the informant’s modesty or had intentionally insulted her to provoke her to commit breach of peace was not proved. The accused was sitting adjacent to the window. Four people were occupying the front seat, and the 6 2026:HHC:21908 possibility of innocent touching could not be ruled out. There were variations in the informant’s statements before the police and the Court regarding the sequence of events. The accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt due to these variations. Hence, the learned Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354 and 504 of the IPC. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. The informant’s testimony was discarded without any cogent reason. The informant specifically stated that the accused had outraged her modesty and insulted her by calling her characterless. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that no woman would make a false allegation involving her modesty. The Appellate Court failed to consider this aspect. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7 2026:HHC:21908 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State and Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had properly appreciated the evidence. The Appellate Court reversed the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court without assigning cogent reasons. The learned Appellate Court had found the part of the informant’s statement to be correct and maintained the conviction recorded under Section 323 of the IPC. Learned Appellate Court erred in holding the same statement to be deficient regarding outraging the informant’s modesty. This was impermissible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr G.R Palsra, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly noticed that there were variations in the prosecution version in the FIR and the one narrated in the Court. This variation in the prosecution's version made the prosecution's case suspect. 8 2026:HHC:21908 The Appellate Court had noticed the inherent improbabilities in the informant’s testimony and rightly acquitted the accused. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed on page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on 9 2026:HHC:21908 record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed: “29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal: (a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 10 2026:HHC:21908 (b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record; (c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’ (d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; (e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and (f) The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The informant/victim stated that she had boarded a vehicle on 29.08.2009 to go to her village. Duni Chand was driving the vehicle. Bhadru was sitting in the front seat. As soon as the victim boarded the vehicle, the accused (Krishan Chand) caught her breasts at about 9;30 p.m. She tried to rescue herself, and the accused kissed her. The accused abused and gave her beatings. She sustained injuries in the incident. 11 2026:HHC:21908 18. Learned Appellate Court had rightly pointed out that the informant’s statement in the Court materially differed from the statement made to the police. The victim had told the police in her statement (ExtPW1/A) that the accused touched her inappropriately, but she remained silent due to shame. The accused caught hold of her breasts at Olani Nala at 9:30 p.m. She stated before the Court that as soon as she boarded the vehicle, the accused caught hold of her breasts. The variation relates to the core of the prosecution's case regarding the molestation and would adversely affect the informant’s credibility. 19. The victim stated in her cross-examination that Bhadru and the accused had boarded the vehicle after her. She specifically denied that they had boarded the vehicle before her. It was specifically mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW-1/A) that Bhadru and the accused (Krishan Chand) were already travelling in the vehicle. 20. The victim stated that the accused had kept his left hand outside the window. She stated that the accused touched her breast with his right hand. The Learned Appellate Court had 12 2026:HHC:21908 rightly pointed out that the accused could not have touched the victim’s breasts with both his hands in such a situation. 21. Dr Anamika (PW-4) examined the victim, and she found abrasion on her right nasal orifice and a contusion on the left cheek. She had also examined the breasts of the victim but did not find any injury. The absence of injuries on the breasts of the victim does not corroborate her version that the accused had touched her breasts. 22. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the medical evidence does not corroborate the victim’s version regarding outraging the informant’s modesty. 23. Bhadru (PW-2) stated that he was travelling in the vehicle. The accused was standing on the roadside at some distance. He also boarded the vehicle. Nothing happened in his presence. He denied that the accused had outraged the modesty of the victim or had abused her. He specifically stated in his cross- examination that no incident had taken place in the vehicle. 24. Thus, this witness has also not supported the prosecution's case that the accused had outraged the victim’s modesty. 13 2026:HHC:21908 25. There is no other evidence to support the prosecution's version. Hence, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence, and this Court will not interfere with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 28. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) 04th June, 2026 Judge (ravinder)