2026:HHC:21873 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No. 378 of 2026 Date of Decision: 4.6.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Sunil and Ors. ……... Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. ….... Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Petitioners: Mr. Maan Singh, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General. _________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, prayer has been made by the petitioners­ accused for quashing of FIR No. 15 dated 6.5.2010 under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, Sections 379, 201 & 20B of IPC, Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 14 of prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act, 1983, registered at SV & ACB, Shimla­2, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, qua them. 2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Maan Singh, Advocate, is that in afore FIR, petitioners were not made accused, rather were kept in column No.12 of the Charge Sheet, but yet after acquittal of the accused by the competent court of law, petitioners herein are shown to be involved in the case registered in FIR No. 15, as a result of which, character certificate is not being issued to them by the competent authority. 2 2026:HHC:21873 3. Precisely, facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties are that FIR sought to be quashed under the relevant provisions of law came to be instituted against one Rattan Chand. During pendency of the investigation, two other persons namely Giteshwar Singh and Jagat Ram (since deceased) were also arrayed, whereas petitioners, who have no connection whatsoever in the case also came to be kept as suspects in column No. 12 of the charge sheet. Police after having investigated FIR detailed herein above, presented challan in the competent court of law, but did not array the petitioners as accused. Learned Additional Sessions Judge (CBI), Shimla vide judgment dated 24.5.2023, passed in Session Trial No. 2­S/7 of 2020/14 acquitted all the three accused namely Rattan Chand, Giteshwar Singh and Jagat Ram. Respondent­State being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment of acquittal has filed appeal bearing Cr.A. No. 142 of 2024, in this Court, which is pending adjudication. 4. Immediately after passing of the aforesaid judgment of acquittal, petitioners herein, who were not accused, filed an application (Annexure P­4) for issuance of character certificates to the competent authority, but same was not issued for want of verification by the police. Police Station Kotkhai vide communication dated 26.2.2026 (Annexure P­ 5), has stated that FIR No. 15 of 2010 dated 6.5.2010 under the relevant provisions of law, is pending consideration, as a result of which, prayer of the petitioners for issuance of character certificates cannot be accepted. In the afore background, petitioners have approached this court in the instant 3 2026:HHC:21873 proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings, pending in the competent court of law. 5. Pursuant to notices issued in the instant proceedings, respondent­State has filed reply, wherein facts as taken note herein above, have not been disputed. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, fairly states that once petitioners were kept in column of suspect coupled with the fact that main accused, named in the FIR, already stand acquitted, character certificates asked by the petitioners, could not have been denied for want of police verification. He further submits that with the acquittal of three accused in FIR sought to be quashed coupled with the fact that petitioners were not made a 6. s accused, nothing remains to be adjudicated in the FIR sought to be quashed. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that at no point of time, petitioners herein ever came to be arrayed as accused in the FIR sought to be quashed, rather they were kept in Column No. 12 of the Charge Sheet. No doubt, during trial, learned trial Court after having found evidence, if any, against the petitioners, could have arrayed them as accused, but in the instant case, what to talk of inclusion of the petitioners as accused, learned court below in totality of evidence led on record by the respective parties has even acquitted three accused as named in the FIR. With the recording of acquittal of the accused in the afore FIR coupled with the fact that petitioners were never made accused in the aforesaid FIR, no criminal case can be said to be pending trial/adjudication before the 4 2026:HHC:21873 police/competent court of law. If it is so, there was no requirement, if any, for the police officials of Police Station Kotkhai to send communication dated 26.2.2026, thereby stating that criminal case lodged against the petitioner vide FIR No. 15 of 2010 is still pending consideration. 8. Since all the accused in the afore FIR stand acquitted and petitioners herein were never made accused, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that FIR, wherein names of the petitioners have been kept in column of suspect, deserves to be quashed and set aside qua the petitioners. 9. Coordinate Bench of this Court in CrMMO No. 224 of 2022, titled as Neeraj Gulati v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr., decided on 5.9.2022, had an occasion to deal with similar proposition of law, wherein court having taken note of the various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as other courts, specifically held that there is no provision, which provides for referring the same in the report submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC as a suspect. Relevant paras of the afore judgment read as under: “9. A careful perusal of Section 173 of Cr.P.C., ‘in general’ and Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C., ‘in particular’, demonstrates that what has to be provided in the report by the Investigating Officer, are the names of the parties, nature of the information, names of the persons who appeared to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, whether any offence appears to have been committed and if so, by whom, whether the accused has been arrested, whether he has been released on bail, whether he has been forwarded in custody and whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached, where investigation relates to an offence under Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB or Section 376E of the Indian Penal Code. The statute nowhere requires or mandates that any reference of any ‘Suspect’ is to be there in the report. This Court 5 2026:HHC:21873 reiterates that the Investigating Officer has to mention the name of the accused as also the names of the persons who appeared to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, but there is no provision that the same has to refer to someone in this report as a ‘Suspect’. 10. In this background, the Court will now refer to the judgments of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. In Criminal Writ Petition No.3143 of 2009, titled Gyanchand Verma Versus Sudhakar B. Pujari & others, decided on 24.01.2011, there was a difference of opinion between the two Hon’ble Judges therein, on the question whether naming any person as a ‘suspect’ in the Police Report/Charge Sheet, filed under Section 173 (2) of Cr.P.C. and more so, under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. was just, fair, proper and in consonance with the procedure established by law? The view, which was taken by one of the Judges, Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, as he then was, was as under:­ “14. Thus, the report under Section 173(2) is an intimation cum opinion of the Investigating Officer submitted to the Magistrate. The Magistrate is apprised of the fact that investigation into a cognizable offence has been undertaken. Further, during such investigation he (the Investigating Officer) has been able to procure "sufficient material" referred to therein for the trial of the named accused by the Court. Besides, the stated evidence was sufficient for the Court to take cognizance of the offence. Nothing more need be stated in the said report. To put it differently, the purpose of the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) and more so the final report is to present the opinion of the Investigating Officer that as far as he is concerned, he has completed the investigation and has nothing more to contribute; and that the material gathered by him is "sufficient material for the trial of the named accused" by the Court. The Court takes cognizance of the offence on the basis of this report and proceeds against the persons so named as accused by the Investigating Officer. Notably, the trial can be of the accused and not of any suspect. A priori, in my view, since the purpose of the report under Section 173(2) is to ignite a trial only against the accused­against whom sufficient material has been gathered during the investigation to show his involvement in the crime, in the scheme of things, naming any one as suspect, is neither postulated by Section 173(2) or 173(8) nor would be just and fair. ……. …………. 6 2026:HHC:21873 If the answer is no, as I am inclined to hold, it will be naive to suggest that the person should be still named as suspect in the police report submitted to the Court. Take a case where the sole accused named in the police report were to be discharged by the trial Court. Can, in such a case, the Court continue with the trial (in absence of any named accused) on the assumption that it has already taken cognizance of the offence and the Investigating Officer, in his police report filed under Section 173(2) or 173(8), has additionally mentioned the name of a person as suspect? Indubitably, there can be no trial against a suspect. The trial is only against the persons named as "accused" in the police report or against whom charges have been framed by the Court after taking cognizance of the offence. ……………. 33. For the aforestated reasons, the relief claimed in the Petition ought to succeed. That, however, does not mean that the Petitioner cannot be proceeded against at the appropriate stage if the fact situation so warrants, including by resorting to further investigation under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. or to proceed against him under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., if it appears from the evidence during the course of inquiry into or trial that even though he is not already named as accused has committed offence for which he could be tried together with the named accused. Those aspects will have to be considered at the appropriate stage. The same are left open.” 11. The other Hon’ble Judge held as under:­ “The trial Court has option to proceed further if there is ground to presume that the accused has committed the offence; in that case it can decide to frame the charge in the trial even on the basis of suspicion, if it is strong and grave enough to lead the court to believe involvement of the accused before it. In my opinion, therefore, without suppressing any material fact from the Court the name of suspect by whom the offence in question appears to have been committed must be mentioned in the final report, with reasons for such final opinion of the investigating officer and material supporting it must be disclosed to the trial Court by the investigating officer in his final police report to the Court (Special Court in this case) giving all the particulars and vital information under section 173 of the Cr.P.Code. In the result no fault can be found with the investigating 7 2026:HHC:21873 officer if he names the person as suspect pending the investigation against him, who in his opinion appears to have committed the offence but could not be charge sheeted for want of an opportunity to arrest and interrogate him. At this stage when investigation is still pending against the Petitioner it would be premature to exonerate the Petitioner on the pretext of infringement of his reputation. The question which is raised of Personal liberty or fundamental right of the Petitioner is to be examined on the basis of finding as to whether due process of law and procedure has been followed as against him. It would amount to pre­ judging the question, bearing in mind that the petitioner has continued to dodge the investigating officer, by his ingenuity to file the writ petitions and deprived the investigating officer from arresting and investigating against him for prolonged period, while petitioner was armed with interim order 'not to arrest him'. The answer to the question raised above therefore has to be in the negative. But, to have a speedy trial is implicit in Art. 21. as fundamental right of any accused in a serious criminal case and therefore the trial court shall proceed, to hear, try and decide the case efficiently in accordance with law and on its own merits. As the trial is pending since long, the learned special Judge in seisin of the trial shall make endeavour to dispose of the case expeditiously, as early as possible from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner has alternative efficacious remedy to plead for his discharge from the case. The trial Court can always consider such a plea. The petition shall stand dismissed accordingly. Rule is discharged. Certified copies of the affidavits filed in this petition along with copy of this order shall be sent to the Special Court for its information and action as it may deem fit under the circumstances.” 12. In view of the difference of opinion between the two Hon’ble Judges, the matter was referred to Hon’ble 3rd Judge. The view, which was taken by Hon’ble 3rd Judge, as is reported in Gyanchand Verma Versus Sudhakar B. Pujari and others, 2011 (6) Mh.L.J. 904, was as under:­ “7. Section 173 of Cr. P. C. empowers the Officer in charge of Police Station to file a final report before to a Magistrate. The particulars which are to be mentioned in the said report are provided under Section 173(2)(ii) Cr.P.C. The particulars, 8 2026:HHC:21873 therefore, which have been mentioned in the charge­sheet have to be in consonance with the statutory provisions or rules framed thereunder. The State Government or the Central Government do not have the right to prescribe the particulars which are not in consonance with the provisions of Section 173(2)(i). It is an admitted position that the present petitioner has not been mentioned as an accused either in FIR or at any stage during the investigation or further investigation which was carried out till the final charge­sheet was filed. After filing of the first charge sheet, nine chargesheets have been filed. In none of these charge­sheets, the petitioner has been mentioned as an accused. It is also an admitted position that the petitioner was not arrested at any time. Though it is stated by respondent No.1 that he wanted to arrest the petitioner, fact remains that the interim order was in force. The short question which fell for consideration was ? whether petitioner can be continued to be shown as a suspect after conclusion of the investigation? The learned Single Judge Mr. Justice A. M. Khanwilkar, in my view, has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Veeraswami (supra) as well as judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajni Patil (supra). In K. Veeraswami (supra) Apex Court has clearly held that charge sheet should contain the particulars, which are mentioned in Section 173(2)(i) Cr. P.C. and in the case of Smt. Rajni Patil (supra), a fine distinction in law between a suspect and an accused has been made. The learned Single Judge, Mr. Justice A. P. Bhangale has not taken into consideration the paragraphs on which the reliance was placed by the petitioner in support of his case and therefore, in my humble view, the learned Single Judge appears to have misconstrued the ratio of two judgments on which reliance was placed by the petitioner. Be that as it may. I am fully in agreement with the conclusion which is drawn by Mr. Justice A. M. Khanwilkar. ………….. 9. It is apparent that these Forms were amended for the purpose of internal administration of the Police Officers so that whenever there is any change in the Investigating Officer, the new incumbent would be in a position to understand the stage of investigation and the steps which have been taken by the Investigating Officer or in cases where initial charge­sheet is filed under Section 173(2)(i), an application is filed for further 9 2026:HHC:21873 investigation under Section 173(8), so that new Officer would know what was in the mind of the earlier Investigating Officer. It appears that the persons were to be shown as suspects so that a further investigation in that direction can be carried out by the subsequent newly appointed Investigating Officer. These Forms, in my view, do not have statutory force. The submissions made by respondent No.1 that these Forms have statutory force in view of Section 173(2)(ii) Cr. P. C., cannot be accepted. 10. Apart from that, it is always open for the trial Court after trial begins to issue summons to any person as an accused if it comes to the conclusion that the evidence which is brought on record clearly shows that he is involved in the commission of the offence on the basis of material which is placed before him and the said summons can be issued under section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code and he can be added as an accused at any stage, in accordance with the law. The apprehension expressed by respondent No.1 is, therefore, misconceived. In the result, there is no material at this stage, since the petitioner has not been mentioned as an accused in the charge­sheet, he cannot be continued to be shown as a suspect act after final investigation report has been tendered. In this view of the matter, respectfully, I am in agreement with the view taken by the Single Judge, Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and disagree with the opinion expressed by the Single Judge, Mr. Justice A.P. Bhangala.” 13. This Court concurs fully with the findings which have been returned by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay referred to hereinabove, in terms whereof, it has been held that no one can be referred to as a ‘suspect’ in the Final Report, which is to be so filed by the Investigating Officer, in terms of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. This Court is of the considered view that in terms of the scheme of statute, the Investigating Officer has to disclose the name of the persons who are acquainted with the facts of the case in the report, as also the names of the parties and he also has to clearly spell out the name or names of the accused in light of the investigation, which stands carried out. However, there is no provision in the statute of referring to someone connected with the matter against whom no evidence is there that he has been involved in the commission of the offence as an accused, as a ‘suspect. When in the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer has not found anything incriminating against someone, then reflecting him or her as a ‘suspect’ in the Investigation Report, is not acceptable in law, as the word ‘suspect’ undoubtedly casts a 10 2026:HHC:21873 stigma on such a person. Of course, in the course of trial, if the Court comes to the conclusion that someone other than those named as accused in the report, may also be guilty of the commission of offence, then the procedure as is prescribed in Section 319 of Cr.P.C., can be resorted to. However, in the Final Report prepared under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., none can be reflected as a ‘suspect’. 14. Accordingly, in view of the findings returned hereinabove, this petition succeeds and it is ordered that the word ‘suspect’, as it finds mentioned in Column­12 of the Investigation Report, is ordered to be expunged wherever appearing and the Investigating Officer shall file a fresh report after carrying out necessary corrections in the same. The respondent­State shall also be well advised to issue necessary directions that the Form, in which the Investigation Report is submitted to the learned Magistrate, is in consonance with the provisions of Section 173 of Cr.P.C. and the word ‘suspect’ should not be used therein with reference to someone who has not been found to be an accused in the course of investigation. The petition stands disposed of in above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.” 10. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the present petition and as such, same is allowed. Accordingly, FIR No. 15 dated 6.5.2010 under Sections 41 and 42 of the Indian Forest Act, Sections 379, 201 & 20B of IPC, Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 14 of prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act, 1983, registered at SV & ACB, Shimla­2, District Shimla, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings arising therefrom are quash and set aside qua the petitioners. In the afore terms, present petition is disposed of along with pending applications, if any. June 4, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge