2026:HHC:22040 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 226 of 2014 Reserved on: 30.4.2026 Date of Decision: 15.6.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Amar Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr V.S. Rathour, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.3.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.10.2011, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:22040 referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181, 184 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Chuhru Ram (since deceased) was fetching water from the roadside on 16.7.2005, at about 10.00 p.m., after answering a call of the nature. A Maruti Car bearing registration no. PB-11-5767 hit him at high speed. The informant fell and shouted for help. His nephew, Des Raj (PW1), reached the spot. The driver stopped the car and identified himself as Amar Singh. The informant had sustained injuries. He was taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Mark-A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Yashpal Gautam was sent for verification. He recorded the statement of Chuhru Ram (Ex.PW1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW4/A) was registered. ASI Yash Pal Gautam investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan. He seized the vehicle 3 2026:HHC:22040 bearing registration No. PB-11-5767, along with the documents vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He found the pieces of indicator on the spot, and he seized them vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). He filed an application for the medical examination of the injured. Dr Mangal Dass (PW9) examined the injured and found multiple injuries. He advised the X-ray. A fracture of the femur and left foot was detected after the X-ray. The nature of the injury was stated to be grievous. MLC (Ex.PW9/A) was issued. Chuhru Ram succumbed to his injuries. An inquest (Ex.PW5/A) on the dead body was conducted. Chuhru Ram’s postmortem examination was conducted, and it was found that the cause of death was blood loss leading to haemorrhage and fat embolism in the pulmonary blood vessels. Postmortem report (Ex.PX) was issued. Constable Narender Sood (PW3) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found that it had no defect that could have led to the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of 4 2026:HHC:22040 accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304-A of the IPC and Sections 181 and 196 of the MV Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Des Raj (PW1) is an eyewitness. Pramod Kumar (PW2) came to the spot after hearing about the accident. Narender Sood (PW3) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Ambia Ram (PW4) signed the FIR. HC Bir Singh (PW5) partly investigated the matter. Joginder Singh (PW6) did not support the prosecution's case. Roshan Lal (PW7) took the photographs. Budhi Chand (PW8) conducted the X-rays. Dr Mangal Dass (PW9) medically examined the injured. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the statement made by Chuhru Ram to the police related to the circumstances surrounding the death of the maker and is admissible as a dying 5 2026:HHC:22040 declaration. Des Raj (PW1) proved that the vehicle being driven by the accused was involved in the accident. Non-examination of the Investigating Officer was not material. The postmortem report proved that the cause of death was a motor vehicle accident. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Conviction Sentence Section 279 of IPC To pay a fine of ₹500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo imprisonment for one month. Section 304-A of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹3,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Section 181 of the MV Act To pay a fine of ₹500/-. Section 196 of the MV Act To pay a fine of ₹1,000/-. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). 6 2026:HHC:22040 Learned Appellate Court held that Des Raj (PW1) and Pramod Kumar (PW2) had reached the spot after the accident. The postmortem report could not be relied upon without examining the Doctor. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdeo Singh & ors. Vs. State, 1979 Crl. L.J. 236 in support of its conclusion. The prosecution was required to prove the rashness or negligence, and there was no evidence of the rashness or negligence of the accused. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. Hence, the appeal filed by the accused was allowed, and he was acquitted of the charged offences. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Des Raj (PW1) specifically stated that his uncle was taking water from the pit, and the car being driven by the accused had hit the deceased. The accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the accused. Mangal Dass examined the injured and found the grievous injuries. The postmortem examination was admitted and there was no necessity to examine the Medical Officer who had conducted the 7 2026:HHC:22040 postmortem examination. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State, and Mr V.S. Rathour, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was wrongly held that the postmortem report could not have been admitted in evidence without examining the Doctor. The document was admitted by the defence and could not have been ignored by the learned Appellate Court. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused, and the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr V.S. Rathour, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that there was no evidence of 8 2026:HHC:22040 the rashness or negligence of the accused, and the accused cannot be held liable merely because of the accident. The opinion expressed by a witness that the person was negligent is not sufficient to convict him. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the judgments titled Braham Dass Vs. State of H.P. (2009) 7 SCC 353, Ravi Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2024: HHC:2734 and Sunil Kumar Vs. State of H.P. 2025: HHC:21724 in support of his submissions. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal 9 2026:HHC:22040 recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. A similar view was taken in Ravi Kumar (supra) and Sunil Kumar (supra). 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10 2026:HHC:22040 17. Learned Appellate Court held that the statement of the Medical Officer was required to be recorded to prove the postmortem report issued by him. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of Jagdeo Singh (supra). The Allahabad High Court overruled the judgment of Jagdeo Singh (supra) in Saddiq v. State, 1980 SCC OnLine All 614 and held that the author of a document is not required to be examined where the defence admits the genuineness of the document under Section 294 of Cr.PC. It was observed:- “7. In our opinion, if the prosecution or the accused does not dispute the genuineness of a document filed by the opposite party under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C., it amounts to an admission that the entire document is true or correct. It means that the document has been signed by the person by whom it purports to be signed, and its contents are correct. It does not only amount to the admission of it being signed by the person by whom it purports to be signed, but also implies the admission of the correctness of its contents. Such a document may be read in evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. Neither the signature nor the correctness of the contents need be proved by the prosecution or the accused by examining its signatory, as it is admitted to be true or correct. The phrase ‘read’ in evidence means read as substantive evidence, which is the evidence adduced to prove a fact in issue as opposed to the evidence used to discredit a witness or to corroborate his testimony. It may be mentioned that phrase ‘used in evidence’ has been used in sub-section (1) of Section 293 Cr. P.C. with respect to the reports of Government scientific experts 11 2026:HHC:22040 mentioned in sub-section (4) of Section 293 Criminal P.C. and the phrase ‘read in evidence’ has been used in sub- section (1) of Section 296 Cr. P.C. with respect to the affidavits of persons whose evidence is of a formal character. The phrases ‘used in evidence’ and ‘read in evidence’, in our opinion, have the same meaning, namely, read as substantive evidence. 8. It is open to the prosecution or the accused to dispute the genuineness of a document filed by the opposite party under sub-section (1) of Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In such a case, the signatory of the document must be examined by the party filing the document to prove his signature, and also the correctness of its contents and the evidence of the signatory will be the substantive evidence, and the document may be used to corroborate or discredit his testimony. But where the genuineness of a document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is not disputed by the opposite party, sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is applicable, and a document may be read as substantive evidence. Section 294 Cr. P.C. is a new section as it had no equivalent in the Cr. P.C. of 1898. It is based on the rule of evidence that facts admitted need not be proved, contained in Sec 58 of the Evidence Act. The object of enacting this section appears to be to avoid the time of the Court being wasted by examining the signatory of the document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. to prove his signature and the correctness of its contents if its genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party. If the signature and the correctness of the contents of a document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section Cr. P.C., whose genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, are still required to be proved by examining the signatory of the document; the object of enacting Section 294 Cr. P.C. will be defeated. We are therefore of the opinion that all documents filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of 12 2026:HHC:22040 Section 294 Cr. P.C., whose genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, may be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. 9. An injury report filed by the prosecution is obviously a document as defined in Section 29 I.P.C. Before the Cr. P.C. 1973 came into force an injury report could not be read in evidence as it was only a writing of the doctor made at the time of the examination of the injuries of the injured person. It contained his observations regarding the nature, dimension and location of the injuries and also his opinion regarding their duration and the instrument with which they were caused. The doctor who prepared the injury report was required to enter the witness box during the inquiry or trial to prove the injuries of the injured person. He could refresh his memory under Section 159 Evidence Act by referring to the injury report prepared by him, and the injury report was proved by him under Section 67 Evidence Act, and it corroborated his deposition in Court under Section 157 Evidence Act. Under sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C., an injury report filed by the prosecution under sub- section 294 Cr. P.C. may be read as substantive evidence in place of the deposition of the doctor who prepared it if its genuineness is not disputed by the ??? accused. If its genuineness is disputed, then the doctor who examined the injured person must appear in the witness box to prove his injuries and also to prove the injury report, and in such a case, the statement of the doctor would be the substantive evidence, and the injury report may be used to corroborate or discredit his testimony. 10. In Jagdeo Singh v. State [1979 Cr. L.J. 236.] A Division Bench of this Court held “it was not permissible to exhibit the postmortem report under Section 294 Cr. P.C. and even if it was done, the report could not be used as a substantive piece of evidence until and unless the doctor concerned was examined in Court. Documents that Section 294 Cr. P.C. contemplates reading in evidence upon admission about genuineness by the opposite party 13 2026:HHC:22040 are only such documents which, when formally proved, speak for themselves. It does not refer to any document, which, even if exhibited, cannot be read in evidence as substantive evidence”. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by this Court in the abovementioned case. As mentioned earlier, there is no restriction placed on documents in sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C., and it applies to all documents filed by the prosecution or the accused. If the genuineness of any document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is not disputed by the opposite party, sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is applicable, and it may be read as substantive evidence. Is it true that prior to the coming into force of the Cr. P.C. 1973 the post-mortem report after it was proved was not substantive evidence but only corroborated the statement of the doctor made in Court and even now if the genuineness of the post-mortem report is disputed by the accused, tr doctor must be examined to prove the injuries found on the body of the deceased and also the post-mortem report and the post- mortem report may only be used to corroborate or discredit his testimony which is the substantive evidence. This, however, cannot lead to the conclusion that the post-mortem report cannot be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. if its genuineness is not disputed by the accused. As already mentioned, the very object of enacting Section 294 Cr. P.C. would be defeated if the signature and the correctness of the contents of the post-mortem report are still required to be proved by the doctor concerned, even if its genuineness is not disputed by the accused. Section 294 Cr. P.C. is clear and unambiguous. It is only when the genuineness of the post-mortem report filed by the prosecution is not disputed by the accused that sub- section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is applicable, and the post-mortem report may be read as substantive evidence, and the signature and the correctness of its contents need not be proved by the doctor concerned. We are, therefore, 14 2026:HHC:22040 clearly of the opinion that if the genuineness of the post- mortem report filed by the prosecution under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is not disputed by the accused, it may be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. 11. In Ganpat Raoji Suryavanshi v. State of Maharashtra [1980 Cr. L.J. 853.] It was also held that the post-mortem report, even if admitted to be genuine by the accused, cannot be read as substantive evidence under Section 294 Cr. P.C. For the reasons already given, we are, with great respect, unable to agree with the view taken in that case. 12. It may be mentioned that even if the genuineness of a document filed by the prosecution or the accused under sub-section (1) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. is not disputed by the opposite party, the Court may require the proof of the signature of the person by whom it purports to be signed under the Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 294 Cr. P.C. In such a case, the signatory of the document must appear in Court and prove his signature, and the document will thereafter be read as substantive evidence. 13. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to point out that the medical evidence in a criminal case is of the utmost importance, as the correctness of both ocular and circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution is tested on this basis. Even if the genuineness of the injury report or the postmortem report is not disputed by the accused and the reports are read as substantive evidence, it may still be necessary to examine the doctor concerned to clarify his opinion mentioned in the reports or to obtain his opinion on questions of a medical nature that may be involved in the case.” 18. It was laid down by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1223: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 725 that a post- 15 2026:HHC:22040 mortem report admitted by the accused can be read in evidence. It was observed at page 727: “21. It has been argued that non-examination of the medical officers concerned is fatal for the prosecution. However, there is no denial of the fact that the defence admitted the genuineness of the injury reports and the post-mortem examination reports before the trial court. So the genuineness and authenticity of the documents stands proved and shall be treated as valid evidence under Section 294 CrPC. It is a settled position of law that if the genuineness of any document filed by a party is not disputed by the opposite party, it can be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 CrPC. Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, the said post-mortem report can be read as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents without the doctor concerned being examined.” 19. This position was reiterated in Shyam Narayan Ram v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2988, wherein it was observed: “15. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision, in particular, sub-section (3), provides that where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed. That is to say that if the authors of such documents do not enter the witness box to prove their signatures, the said documents could still be read in evidence. Further, under the proviso, the Court has the jurisdiction in its discretion to require such signature to be proved. In the present case, the documents filed by the investigating agency were all public documents duly signed by public servants in their respective capacities, either as Investigating 16 2026:HHC:22040 Officer or the doctor conducting the autopsy or other police officials preparing the memo of recoveries, etc. As such, the Trial Court had rightly relied upon the same and exhibited them in view of the specific repeated stand taken by the defence in admitting the genuineness of the said documents. Insofar as the police papers, which had been signed by private persons like the informant, the same had been duly proved.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 683: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1242 that the admission can be made by counsel for the defence by making an endorsement. It was observed at page 489: “14. In view of the definition of “document” in the Evidence Act, and the law laid down by this Court, as discussed above, we hold that the compact disc is also a document. It is not necessary for the court to obtain admission or denial on a document under sub-section (1) of Section 294 CrPC personally from the accused or complainant, or the witness. The endorsement of admission or denial made by the counsel for defence, on the document filed by the prosecution or on the application/report with which the same is filed, is sufficient compliance with Section 294 CrPC. Similarly, on a document filed by the defence, endorsement of admission or denial by the Public Prosecutor is sufficient, and the defence will have to prove the document if not admitted by the prosecution. In case it is admitted, it need not be formally proved, and can be read in evidence. In a complaint case, such an endorsement can be made by the counsel for the complainant in respect of a document filed by the defence. 17 2026:HHC:22040 21. Thus, the learned Trial Court erred in holding that the postmortem report, even though admitted by the accused, could not have been read in evidence. 22. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that the statement made by Chuhru Ram to the police narrating the circumstances relating to his death would be admissible as a dying declaration. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dayaram v. State of M.P., (2020) 13 SCC 382, that a report made by a person related to the circumstances of his death to the police and registered as and F.I.R. is admissible as a dying declaration. It was observed: - 10.9. As per Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the FIR should be treated as a dying declaration. This Court in Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. [Dharam Pal v. State of U.P., (2008) 17 SCC 337: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 534] held that: (SCC p. 345, paras 17-18 & 20) “17. … the report dictated by the deceased fully satisfied all the ingredients for being made admissible as a dying declaration. To ascertain this aspect, we may refer to some of the general propositions relating to a dying declaration. Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act deals with dying declarations and lays down that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, such a statement is relevant in every case or proceeding in which the cause of the person's death comes into question. Further, such statements are 18 2026:HHC:22040 relevant whether the person who made them was or was not at the time when they were made under the expectation of death and whatever may be the nature of the proceedings in which the cause of his death comes into question. 18. The principle on which a dying declaration is admissible in evidence is indicated in the maxim “nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire”, which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. Thus, it is clear that a dying declaration may be relating to— (a) as to the cause of death of the deceased; (b) as to “any of the circumstances of the transaction” which resulted in the death of the deceased. *** 20. If we look at the report dictated by the deceased in the light of the aforesaid propositions, it emerges that the names of the accused and the important features of the case have been clearly mentioned in the report. It contains a narrative by the deceased as to the cause of his death, which finds complete corroboration from the testimony of eyewitnesses and the medical evidence on record.” (emphasis supplied) 23. The statement (Ex.PW1/A) reads that the informant was taking water from the roadside, when a Maruti car hit him at high speed, and he fell. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the driver and high speed of the vehicle. This statement shows that the accused was driving the car at a high speed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of 19 2026:HHC:22040 the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 24. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and 20 2026:HHC:22040 there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 25. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 27. Thus, the accused could not have been convicted because of the use of the term high-speed. 21 2026:HHC:22040 28. The statement that the accident occurred because of the negligence is also not sufficient because it is an inference drawn from the fact. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 29. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn based on evidence led before the Court.” 22 2026:HHC:22040 30. Therefore, not much advantage can be derived from the statement that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 31. Des Raj (PW1) stated that a Maruti car hit his uncle when he was taking water from the spot. His uncle shouted and fell. The car stopped at some distance, and the driver identified himself as Amar Singh. The Investigating Officer was not examined to prove the spot position. The site plan placed on record shows that the accident had occurred on the left side of the road for a vehicle coming from Badukhar. The informant had sustained injuries on the right side, which means that he was facing the road, and this falsifies the statement of Des Raj (PW1) that he was taking water from the pit. The site plan does not show any such pit. Thus, the statement of Des Raj (PW1) was not reliable. 32. Pramodh Kumar (PW2) stated that he reached the spot after he was informed of the accident. He saw Chuhru Ram in an injured condition. His testimony shows that he is not an eyewitness and had reached the spot after hearing about the accident. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held 23 2026:HHC:22040 that his testimony cannot be used to support the prosecution's version. 33. There is no other evidence to prove the rashness or negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before the Court. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court, even if any other view is possible. 34. No other point was urged. 35. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 36. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on 24 2026:HHC:22040 receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 37. Records be sent back to the learned Courts below forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th June, 2026 (Chander)