1 2026:CGHC:788 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR (Order Reserved on 27/10/2025) (Order Delivered on 06 /01/2026) (Order Uploaded on 07/01/2026) WPC No. 5337 of 2025 Late Pushpa Jagwani Through Lrs. A Ashok Jagwani, S/o Late K.L. Jagwani, Aged About 73 Years Local Address- J096, Gulshan Vivante, Sector 137, Noida UP 201301, Permanent Address- 107, New Civic Center, Bhilai C.G. 490006 B. Prashant Jagwani, S/o Ashok Jagwani, Aged About 45 Years Address- N701, Logix Blossom County, Sector 137, Noida UP 201301 C. Vishant Jagwani, S/o Ashok Jagwani, Aged About 43 Years Address- J096, Gulshan Vivante, Sector 137, Noida UP 201301 ... Petitioner versus 1 - Steel Authority of India Through Its Chairman, Having Its Corporate Office At Ispat Bhavan, 3rd Floor, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003 2 - Bhilai Steel Plant (Sail) Through Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 3 - Assistant General Manager (Shop, Lease And Licence) Sail Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 4 - Manager (Estate), Town Administration Department, Sail Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 5 - Additional Town Administrator (Admn.), Sail Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2026.01.07 18:26:34 +0530 2 6 - Assistant Manager Estate (Shops) Sail Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 7 - Chief General Manager (TA & CSR) Sail Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.) 8 - Chief General Manager (Personnel), Corporate Office At Ispat Bhavan, 3rd Floor, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003. 9 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur (C.G.) 10 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur (C.G.) 11 - Union of India Through Ministry of Steel, Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi, 110011 ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Anmol Varma, Advocate For Respondent/UOI : Miss Anmol Sharma, CGC For Respondent/State: Mr. Satish Gupta, GA Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge C A V Order 1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner is praying for the following reliefs: “10.1 To declare the resolution passed in the 340th Meeting of the Board of Directors held on 21st and 25th July, 2008 along with approved terms and condition(s) of the allotment (leasing/sub-leasing) as unconstitutional, bad in law and void ab 3 initio and as a consequence quash/set-aside Annexure “P/1”(Colly). 10.2 To set aside the offer letter/demand letter dated 01.06.2013 issued to the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid resolution(s). 10.3 To direct the concerned respondent(s) to re-consider the case of the petitioner for renewal of lease deed dated 24.06.1982 as per Clause-4 sub clause (1) of the aforesaid deeds and as sequitur re-calculate the amount to be paid by the petitioner for renewal of lease deeds dated 24.06.1982 as per Clause- 4 sub clause (1) of the aforesaid deeds. 10.4 As sequitur to preceding clauses 10.1- 10.3 issue a writ of mandamus directing the concerned respondent(s) to issue a fresh offer letter/demand letter to the Petitioner. 10.5 To direct the concerned answering respondent(s) not to dispossess and/or evict the petitioner from land bearing plot Shop No. 107, Sector CC situated in New Civic Centre, Bhilai, District- Durg/ subject leased property. 4 10.6 To pass an appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is aggrieved by the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Steel Authority of India Limited in its 340th Meeting held on 21st and 25th July, 2008, and the offer letter issued pursuant thereto. It is submitted that pursuant to the said resolution, arbitrary charges have been levied, and the lease rent has been increased exponentially, in violation of the original terms of lease and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 3. Learned State counsel submits that the present petition is filed by the petitioner after a delay of 17 years, therefore, the present petition is not maintainable. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection. 5. Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 provides as under: 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 5 Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. 6. On perusal of record, this Court found that the Board of Directors of the Steel Authority of India Limited in its 340th Meeting held on 21st and 25th July, 2008 have levied the charges and increased the lease rent. Then on 01.06.2013 the respondents issued an offer letter to the petitioner and the petitioner has approached the Court by way of this writ petition on 11.09.2025, i.e. after lapse of 17 years and has prayed for quashment of the 340th Meeting of the Board of Directors held on 21st and 25th July, 2008, and has also prayed for setting aside the offer letter/demand letter dated 01.06.2013 (Annexure P/1B) after lapse of more than 7 years. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the petitioner was sleeping over his right. 7. It is a well-settled proposition of law that although the Limitation Act, 1963 does not, in terms, apply to writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ petition may nevertheless be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and equitable in nature, and a person who sleeps over his rights cannot claim relief as a matter of course. The Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, authoritatively held that even though no statutory period of limitation is prescribed for writs, the High Court may refuse relief when the petitioner approaches the Court after an unreasonable delay. This principle has been reiterated in 6 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329, where the Court observed that stale claims ought not to be entertained in writ jurisdiction. Further the Supreme Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768, the Supreme Court emphasized that unexplained delay and laches defeat equity, and therefore disentitle the petitioner to discretionary relief. Recently, in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Court reaffirmed that a writ court must decline to exercise its jurisdiction when the petitioner is guilty of gross negligence or inordinate delay. Thus, even in the absence of a statutory bar, the equitable doctrine of delay and laches operates as a substantive ground for dismissing a writ petition where the petitioner has failed to approach the Court within a reasonable time.” 8. Therefore, there is no good ground to entertain this petition. 9. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE ashu