1 2026:CGHC:11300-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR ACQA No. 57 of 2024  X ... Appellant versus 1. State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Station House Officer, Police Station – Balco Nagar, Korba, District Korba (C.G.). 2. Sacchidanand Vashnav @ Sanju, S/o Narshing Das Vashnav, aged about 23 years, R/o Ward No.34, Checkpost Near Old Durga Mandir Bhadrapara, Police Station Balco Nagar, District Korba (C.G.) ... Respondents For Appellant : Mr. Kishore Narayan, Advocate For Res. No.1/State : Mr. Ramnarayan Sahu, Dy. G.A. For Res. No.2 : Mr. Vikash Kumar Pandey, Advocate DB : Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey & Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal Judgment on Board (10.03.2026) 2 Per Rajani Dubey, J 1. The present acquittal appeal has been filed by the victim/appellant against the judgment dated 01.12.2023 passed in Sessions Case No. 78/2023 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Korba (C.G.), whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 herein from the charge punishable under Sections 376(2)(n) of IPC. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that victim/appellant herein had filed a written complaint (Ex.P-1) in police station to the effect that she was in talkative terms with accused/respondent No.2 being acquaintance. On 01.03.2022 at around 12.00 at night, the accused/respondent No.2, in the absence of parents of victim/appellant and on the pretext of love and marriage, established physical relation with her and thereafter, on several occasions the accused/respondent No.2 established physical relation with victim/appellant herein in his and her house. It was also alleged in the complaint that the accused/respondent No.2 used to say that he would perform marriage with victim/appellant but later he refused to marry her. On the basis of said complaint (Ex.P-1), an FIR (Ex.P-2) for the offence punishable under Section 376 3 of IPC was registered against the accused/respondent No.2 and the case was taken up for investigation. The prosecution story further states that during the course of investigation, after obtaining the consent from victim/appellant vide Ex.P-3, her medical examination was done vide Ex.P-7, according to which, the victim was habitual for sexual intercourse. The spot map was also prepared vide Ex.P-11. Statements of the victim/appellant and witnesses were recorded; statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. vide Ex.P-4 and seizure proceedings were carried out. The accused/respondent No.2 was arrested and information regarding his arrest was given to his family members. 3. After completing due investigation, charge sheet under Section 376 of IPC was filed against the accused/respondent No.2 before the jurisdictional Court followed by charge under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. The accused/respondent No.2 however denied the charge and pleaded for trial. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 08 witnesses. Statement of the accused/respondent No.2 was also recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein the accused/respondent pleaded 4 innocence and false implication in the crime. In defence, no witness has been examined before the learned Trial Court. 5. The learned Trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 of the charge under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. Hence, this appeal by the victim/appellant. 6. Mr. Kishore Narayan, learned counsel for the victim/appellant submits that even though there is emphatic and uncontroverted evidence of the Prosecutrix (PW/1), the learned trial Court wrongly acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 herein. He further submits that the Prosecutrix (PW/1) has categorically stated about the incident but the learned trial Court by ignoring the material piece of evidence and by disbelieving the evidence of Prosecutrix (PW/1), acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 herein on the ground that the prosecutrix was consenting party, however, the accused/respondent No.2 enticed the prosecutrix by giving false promise of marriage, therefore it was not a free consent but a consent obtained by fraud. He also submits that the learned trial Court committed grave error in discarding the entire case of the prosecution merely on the minor contradictions in the statements of prosecution 5 witnesses. As such, the instant acquittal appeal deserves to be admitted. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Avinash Singh, learned Dy. Govt. Advocate/respondent No.1 assisted the Court. 8. Mr. Vikash Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for accused/respondent No.2 supporting the impugned judgment of acquittal submits that the learned Trial Court has not committed any error of law while acquitting the accused/respondent No.2. The impugned judgment is well merited and does not call for any interference. Therefore, the acquittal appeal is liable to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 10. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the learned Trial Court framed charges under Section 376 IPC, and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No.2 of the charge under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC on this ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 11. The prosecutrix (PW-1) has stated in her examination-in- chief that on 01.03.2022 the accused/respondent 6 established physical relations with her forcibly on the pretext of marriage and thereafter continued to establish physical relations with her on several occasions in the absence of her parents. She further deposed that when she asked the accused/respondent No.2 to marry her, he refused. Thereafter, she lodged a written complaint (Ex.P-1), on the basis of which an FIR (Ex.P-2) was registered against the accused. She has also stated that her statement under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded before the Magistrate vide Ex.P-4. However, during her cross- examination, several material admissions have emerged. In paragraph 13 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that she had her first face-to-face conversation with the accused on 23.02.2022. She also admitted that she did not possess a mobile phone of her own and used her father’s mobile phone whenever required. 12. In paragraph 17 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix denied the suggestion that on 01.03.2022 she had called the accused before 03:00 AM from her phone; however, she admitted that the call detail record shows an outgoing call from her phone to the accused’s phone before 03:00 AM. When specifically asked whether she had made the said call, she denied the same. 7 13. Further, in paragraph 18 of her evidence, the prosecutrix admitted that on 01.03.2022 at about 03:00 AM she left her house and went to the house of the accused, where the accused was standing outside. In paragraph 21, she admitted that she came out of the accused’s house at about 04:00 AM and returned to her house when her parents were sleeping. She also admitted that she did not inform her parents that she had gone to the house of the accused at about 03:00 AM and had returned at about 04:00 AM. 14. In paragraph 25 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix further admitted that in October 2022 she had gone with the accused for a picnic to Futhamuda Balco. They left for the picnic at about 01:30 PM and returned at about 05:00 PM. Though she denied the suggestion that she had not informed her parents about the said picnic, the fact remains that she had voluntarily accompanied the accused for the outing. 15. In paragraph 33 of her cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that her father had scolded her after coming to know about her relationship with the accused. She also admitted that both she and the accused belong to different castes and that if she married the accused, the society might punish them and ostracize them from the community. 8 16. From the above testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1), particularly the admissions made by her during cross- examination, it appears that she had voluntarily gone to the house of the accused at about 03:00 AM and returned at about 04:00 AM without informing her parents. The evidence further indicates that the prosecutrix and the accused were in a relationship and had continued to meet each other even after the alleged incident, as reflected from the picnic visit in October 2022. Her own admissions regarding the social objection due to inter-caste relationship and the scolding by her father also suggest that the dispute may have arisen after the relationship became known to her family. Therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix, when read as a whole, creates serious doubt regarding the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse made against the accused. 17. The mother of the prosecutrix (PW-2) has not supported the prosecution case and was declared hostile by the prosecution. The prosecution cross-examined this witness; however, she denied the suggestions put to her by the prosecution. During her evidence, she admitted that the prosecutrix (PW-1) had informed her that on 01.03.2022 at about 12:00 midnight, in the absence of her (this witness) 9 and her husband, the accused had established physical relations with the prosecutrix. She further admitted that the prosecutrix had told her that during the absence of her parents, the accused had established physical relations with her on several occasions. 18. In paragraph 5 of her cross-examination, this witness admitted that her daughter (the prosecutrix) and the accused were in love with each other and that they used to talk frequently. She also admitted that the prosecutrix used to tell her about her intention to marry the accused. Further, in paragraph 6 of her cross-examination, this witness admitted that the accused and their family belong to different castes and that there was social apprehension regarding such an inter-caste marriage. She also admitted that she used to advise and persuade the prosecutrix not to marry the accused on account of the difference in their castes. 19. From the testimony of the mother of the prosecutrix (PW-2), it is evident that she has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. Her admissions during cross-examination indicate that the prosecutrix and the accused were in a love relationship and intended to marry each other. She has also acknowledged the social objection 10 due to the difference in caste between the parties. Thus, her evidence lends support to the defence version regarding the existence of a consensual relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused and weakens the prosecution case. 20. Apart from the above, it is also evident from the written complaint (Ex.P-1) that the date of alleged incident is 01.03.2022 and FIR (Ex.P-2) was lodged on 08.01.2023 i.e. after about 10 months. The prosecution has failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation for such an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, which further weakens the prosecution case. 21. Further, the medical evidence also does not support the prosecution case as is evident from the evidence of Dr. Ananya Shrivastav (PW-4), who examined the prosecutrix and gave her report vide Ex.P-7 noticing no internal or external injuries on her body, her secondary sexual characters were fully developed and opined that the prosecutrix (PW-1) was habitual for sexual intercourse, which castes serious doubt and weakens the allegation of rape. 22. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra reported in 11 (2019) 9 SCC 608, that a mere breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape. To attract the offence under Section 376 IPC, it must be established that the promise to marry was false from the very inception and was made only with the intention of deceiving the prosecutrix and obtaining her consent for sexual intercourse. In Pramod (supra) arising out of an application under Section 482 CrPC in similar circumstances where the relationship originated in a love affair, developed over a period of time accompanied by physical relations, consensual in nature, but the marriage could not fructify because the parties belonged to different castes and communities, quashed the proceedings. 23. In the present case, the evidence on record does not indicate that the alleged promise of marriage made by the accused was false from the inception. On the contrary, the material brought on record during the cross-examination of the prosecutrix (PW-1) shows circumstances suggesting that the parties were in a consensual relationship for long time and their marriage could not be fructify because they were belonging to different castes. 24. In view of the serious inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, admissions supporting the defence case, lack of medical 12 corroboration, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court has not committed any error of law or fact while acquitting the accused/respondent No.2 of the charges under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC. The judgment of acquittal is based on a proper evaluation of evidence and does not suffer from perversity or misapplication of legal principles. 25. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, reported in (2024) 3 SCC 544 has held in para 42 as under:- 36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- "(I) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; 13 (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re- appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court." 26. Thus from the discussion aforesaid and judicial pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mallappa (supra) and Pramod (supra) & the view taken by the learned Trial Court in acquitting the accused/respondent No.2 of the charge under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC, this Court finds no illegality in the order impugned acquitting the accused/respondent No.2 particularly when there is a settled legal position that if on the basis of record two conclusions can be arrived at, the one favouring the accused has to be preferred. Even otherwise, the prosecution thus has utterly failed in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the Trial Court has been fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal which is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record. Furthermore, in case of appeal against the acquittal the scope is very limited and interference can only be made if 14 finding recorded by the trial Court is highly perverse or arrived at by ignoring the relevant material and considering the irrelevant ones. In the present case, no such circumstance is there warranting interference by this Court. 27. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE JUDGE pekde Digitally signed by VIJAY BHARATRAO PEKDE Date: 2026.03.11 16:44:27 +0530