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2026 DAILYLAW 1161 (HP)

STATE OF HP AND OTHERS v. Ramesh Chand

CMP.M/347/2026 · 2026-03-31

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, Jiya Lal Bhardwaj

body2026

Judgment text

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( 2026:HHC:10181 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. CMP(M) No.347 of 2026 & LPA No.175 of 2026 Decided on: 31st March, 2026 State of H.P and others .......Applicants versus Ramesh Chand ...Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S.Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr.Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicants: Mr.Varun Chandel, Additional Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice (Oral) The present appeal is barred by one year and 337 days, arising out of the judgment in CWPOA No.7627 of 2020, titled Ramesh Chand vs. State of H.P and others, decided on 04.04.2024. 2. The learned Single Judge has directed regularization of the writ-petitioner, who had 30 years of service as Cook in the hostel of the college and in such circumstances, directions have been issued that he was entitled for regularization after completion of 10 years of service. 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. ( 2026:HHC:10181 ) 2 3. We have only referred to the facts, keeping in view the law laid down in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through LRs and others vs. Union of India and another (2023) 10 SCC 531 and are of the considered opinion that the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of any sufficient cause having been made out. 4. The copy of the judgment dated 04.04.2024 was received on 13.08.2024 and sent to the Government College Dharamshala District Kangra, H.P. on 18.09.2024 to take necessary action in the matter and had been received back on 30.10.2024. The LPA was drafted on 16.07.2025 and sent for vetting on 21.07.2025, but the same was returned back as the certified copy of the judgment was not appended, which would be clear that the same was applied then on 15.11.2025. Thereafter, the matter was again sent for vetting on 05.01.2026 and received back on 14.01.2026 and ultimately the appeal was filed on 07.03.2026. 5. The above facts would go on to show that the State has been lackadaisical in going ahead in pursuing the appeal, as it took them over a year to take remedial steps. 6. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another ( 2026:HHC:10181 ) 3 (2010) 5 SCC 459, wherein it has been held that in absence of any plausible and tangible explanation for long delay, there was no valid reason to condone the delay. 7. In Chief Postmaster General and others versus Living Media India Limited and another (2012) 3 SCC 563, it has been held that liberal concession may have to be adopted, but the department cannot take advantage of its own impersonal machinery and they have to perform the duty with diligence and commitment and condonation of delay is an exception. 8. In Esha Bhattacharjee versus Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649, the principles of limitation were culled out as under: “i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. ( 2026:HHC:10181 ) 4 iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in 7 respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” ( 2026:HHC:10181 ) 5 9. Therefore, for the reasons given above, we dismiss the application for condonation of delay in the absence of sufficient cause. Resultantly, the appeal is also dismissed. ( G.S. Sandhawalia ) Chief Justice ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) March 31, 2026 Judge (naveen)