1 2026:CGHC:18008 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3322 of 2021 Ramesh Jaiswal S/o Shri Kunj Bihari Jaiswal Aged About 56 Years Currently Posted As Joint Director Regional Office, Urban Administration And Development Chhattisgarh, Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1 - Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Through Its Secretary, Sector - 19, North Block, Atal Nagar, District Raipur 492002, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Public Information Officer Municipal Corporation Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Gyaneshwar Yadu (Advocate) Communication Address Civil Court, Raipur, Chhattisgarh. Mobile No. 919630823365. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Adil Minhaj, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Pragalbha Sharma, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.2 : Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. A. Sandhya Rao, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 21.04.2026 1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner assails the order dated 26.02.2021 (ANNEXURE P-1) passed by Respondent No. 1– YOGESH TIWARI Digitally signed by YOGESH TIWARI Date: 2026.04.21 17:00:35 +0530 2 Commission, whereby the petitioner has been held to be the Public Information Officer responsible for not providing the requisite information within the prescribed period and for the delay in submitting a reply before the Commission, and consequently, a penalty of Rs. 10,000/- has been imposed upon the petitioner.. The petitioner has prayed for following relief(s) :- “10.1 Call for the entire records of Second Appeal Case No. A/239/2017. 10.2 Set-aside / quash the order dated 26.02.2021 passed by the Respondent No. 01 Second Appeal Case No. A/239/2017. 10.3 Pass such other order or orders that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 26.02.2021 is wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, ‘Act of 2005’). It is contended that the petitioner was never designated as the Public Information Officer at the relevant point of time, nor was the original application dated 20.10.2016 submitted before him. The said application was admittedly filed before and dealt with by the duly appointed Public Information Officer, who had further forwarded the same to the concerned department. In such circumstances, fastening liability upon the petitioner by treating him as a deemed Public Information Officer is misconceived and unsustainable in law. 3 3. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner, in fact, had furnished the information vide letter dated 04.01.2017 upon communication received from the concerned authority, thereby demonstrating his bona fide conduct and due diligence. It is argued that the essential ingredients for imposition of penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005, namely mala fide denial of information or unreasonable delay attributable to the concerned officer, are completely absent in the present case. Moreover, the petitioner was neither impleaded as a party before the First Appellate Authority nor was he afforded a proper and effective opportunity of hearing before the Respondent Commission, thus vitiating the impugned order on account of violation of principles of natural justice. 4. It is also submitted that the Respondent Commission has failed to appreciate the factual matrix in its correct perspective and has mechanically imposed the penalty without recording any finding as to deliberate or intentional lapse on the part of the petitioner. In absence of any cogent material to establish that the petitioner was responsible for withholding the information or causing delay, the imposition of penalty is wholly unjustified and liable to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the Corporation submits that the information as sought by respondent No. 3 has already been supplied to him. It is further submitted that insofar as 4 the delay is concerned, the relevant period coincided with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which there was a complete lockdown and normal functioning of offices was severely disrupted. In such extraordinary circumstances, the delay, if any, in furnishing the information cannot be attributed to any deliberate or intentional lapse on the part of the petitioner. It is contended that there was no mala fide intention to withhold the information and, therefore, the essential conditions for imposition of penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005 are not satisfied. Hence, the petitioner cannot be saddled with the penalty. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with due care. 7. From a perusal of the material available on record, it is evident that the application under the Act of 2005 was not originally filed before the petitioner, nor was he the designated Public Information Officer at the relevant point of time. It also appears that the information, as sought by respondent No. 3, was ultimately furnished, though with some delay. The explanation offered regarding such delay, particularly in light of the unprecedented situation arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant nationwide lockdown, which severely affected the normal functioning of governmental offices, cannot be brushed aside and deserves due consideration. 8. It is well settled that for invoking the provisions relating to penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005, the authority concerned must 5 record a clear and specific finding of mala fide denial of information or an unreasonable and unexplained delay directly attributable to the concerned officer. In the present case, no such categorical finding has been recorded by the Respondent Commission. Moreover, the record does not prima facie indicate any intentional or deliberate inaction on the part of the petitioner so as to attract penal consequences. In absence of any cogent material demonstrating mala fide conduct, the imposition of penalty appears to be unjustified and not in consonance with the statutory scheme of the Act of 2005. 9. A further perusal of the record would reveal that there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner had acted with any ulterior motive or deliberate intent to withhold the information sought by respondent No. 3. On the contrary, the material on record suggests that the information was ultimately supplied, and the delay, if any, stands reasonably explained. The justification put forth by learned senior counsel for the Corporation, attributing the delay to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 lockdown, appears to be plausible and acceptable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the essential ingredients for imposition of penalty under Section 20 of the Act of 2005 are conspicuously absent in the present case. There is no material to demonstrate that the petitioner committed any mala fide or intentional act in not furnishing the information 6 within the prescribed period. Consequently, the impugned order imposing penalty cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 11. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, this Court finds it to be a fit case to exercise its jurisdiction for interference. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26.02.2021, insofar as it imposes a penalty of Rs. 10,000/- upon the petitioner, deserves to be and is hereby set aside. 12. Resultantly, the present writ petition stands allowed. No order as to costs. Sd/-- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh