1 2026:CGHC:1825 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 30 of 2014 1. Vidya Shanker (Died) S/o Through Legal Heirs- 1.1 - Dulaurin Wd/o Late Vidya Shanker, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Hadhapara, Kasdol, P.S. And Tahsil Kaldol, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) 1.2 - Rameshwari W/do Late Vidya Shankar Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Hadhapara, Kasdol, P.S. And Tahsil Kaldol, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) 1.3 - Garima Sahu D/o Late Vidya Shanker, Aged About 10 Years Minor Through Legal Guardian Mother Smt. Dulaurin Wd/o Late Vidya Shanker, R/o Village Hadhapara, Kasdol, P.S. And Tahsil Kaldol, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.)] 1.4 - Varsha Sahu D/o Late Vidya Shanker, Aged About 5 Years Minor Through Legal Guardian Mother Smt. Dulaurin Wd/o Late Vidya Shanker, R/o Village Hadhapara, Kasdol, P.S. And Tahsil Kaldol, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) 1.5 - Durgesh Sahu, S/o Vidya Shanker, Aged About 3 Years Minor Through Legal Guardian Mother Smt. Dulaurin Wd/o Late Vidya Shanker, R/o Village Hadhapara, Kasdol, P.S. And Tahsil Kaldol, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) 2 - Ramnath S/o Duleshwar Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o Hadhapara Kasdol, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt. Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara C.G., District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 3 - Jagdish S/o Duleshwar Sahu Aged About 34 Years R/o Hadhapara Kasdol, P.S. And Tah. Kasdol, Distt. Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara C.G., District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh ... Appellants AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.01.27 17:47:32 +0530 2 versus 1 - Khikhram (Died) S/o Through Legal Heirs- 1.1 - Shyama Bai Wd/o Khikhram, Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Hadhapara Kasdol, Police Station And Tahsil Kasdol, Civil And Revenue Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhathapara (C.G.) 1.2 - Mahadeo S/o Late Khikhram, Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Hadhapara Kasdol, Police Station And Tahsil Kasdol, Civil And Revenue Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhathapara (C.G.) 1.3 - Harishanker S/o Late Khikhram, Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Hadhapara Kasdol, Police Station And Tahsil Kasdol, Civil And Revenue Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhathapara (C.G.) 1.4 - Harganga S/o Late Khikhram, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Hadhapara Kasdol, Police Station And Tahsil Kasdol, Civil And Revenue Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhathapara (C.G.) 1.5 - Haridwarika S/o Late Khikhram, Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Hadhapara Kasdol, Police Station And Tahsil Kasdol, Civil And Revenue Distt. Baloda Bazar Bhathapara (C.G.) 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Thru- Collector, Raipur, Distt. Raipur C.G. (Now District Baloda Bazar) ---- Respondents For Appellants : Mr. A.D. Kuldeep, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 27.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/defendants challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 25/11/2013 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Balodabazar, District Raipur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.29-A/2013 (Vidya Shankar & Ors Vs. Khikhram & Anr) arising 3 out of the judgment dated 11/08/2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-II, Kasdol, District Raipur, C.G. in Civil Suit No.57A/2008 ( Khikhram Vs. Vidya Shankar & Ors). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. (a) The plaintiff preferred a suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the suit land bearing Plot No. 134/7, Khasra No. 2571, admeasuring 0.016 hectares, situated at village Hadhapara, Kasdol, is the self-acquired and possessed property of the plaintiff. The said suit land was given to the plaintiff by his father during his lifetime for cultivation and livelihood purposes. On the said land, the plaintiff dug a well, constructed an embankment and fencing, and used to grow vegetables. Due to the occurrence of dearth, the plaintiff went outside to earn his livelihood, and returned after a period of about 15–20 years. During this period, he had entrusted the suit land to his father. When the plaintiff returned, he found that the defendants were cultivating vegetables on the suit land. Upon questioning the defendants as to how they were cultivating the land, the defendants stated that they had purchased the said well and garden from the plaintiff’s father, Rambharose, through their father, Duleshwar Prasad. For this reason, they were cultivating vegetables on the said land. (b) As per the plaint, in the year 1985, upon partition among the 4 plaintiff and his brothers, the said well and garden came to the share of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff went to ascertain the land falling to his share, the Patwari kept postponing the matter on one `pretext or another. Thereafter, the plaintiff obtained the land map and Khasra B-1 and submitted an application for demarcation. Accordingly, as per the demarcation report dated 14-03-2002 prepared by the Patwari and the Revenue Inspector, the plaintiff’s land was duly demarcated and identified. Subsequently, the plaintiff placed two stone markers on the disputed garden land. Thereupon, the defendants called village elders and produced a forged sale deed. Upon replying to the said sale deed and on inquiry from the person who allegedly drafted the sale deed, no one stated that the land had been sold by Rambharose or purchased by Duleshwar. After demarcation, when the plaintiff took possession of the disputed land, the defendants showed the sale deed and started creating a dispute, due to which preventive proceedings were initiated against both the parties by the Executive Magistrate. The defendants filed applications before the Court of the Tahsildar, Kasdol, under Sections 115 and 116 of the CG Land Revenue Code for recording possession, and under Sections 109 and 110 of the Land Revenue Code for mutation of name. The Tahsildar, Kasdol, while cancelling the proceedings under Sections 109 and 110 of the Land Revenue Code, passed an order for recording one year’s possession in favour of the defendants on the ground 5 of their possession, in Case No. 6-A/2001-02. After the said order, the plaintiff filed an application before the Court of the Tahsildar for recovery of possession under Section 250 of the Land Revenue Code, which was dismissed for default on 23-01- 2000. 3. In the said Civil Suit, the defendants submitted their written statement and denied the plaint averments. They submitted that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 2571, admeasuring 0.016 hectares, stands recorded in the name of the plaintiff Khikhram; however, the title and possession of the said suit land vest with Defendant Nos. 1 to 3. During his lifetime, the plaintiff’s father, Rambharose, son of Thanuram, sold the suit land for a consideration of Rs. 835/- to Duleshwar Prasad, son of Malikram Sahu, resident of Hadhapara, Kasdol, for meeting necessary household expenses. The said sale was made voluntarily, after due consideration, in the presence of four witnesses, on 21-07- 1979, whereby ownership and possession of the suit land were transferred to the purchaser, Duleshwar Prasad Sahu. Since then, Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 have been in possession of the suit land. They submitted that at no point earlier did the plaintiff raise any objection regarding the said possession. After getting the suit land demarcated, the plaintiff attempted to take possession thereof, whereupon Defendant Vidyashankar lodged a report at Police Station Kasdol, as a result of which preventive proceedings were initiated against both the parties. The plaintiff’s 6 father had sold the suit land in the year 1979 and handed over ownership and possession to the defendants, and since then the defendants have been in continuous possession of the suit land. The said continuous possession stands confirmed by the order dated 17-03-2003 passed by the Tahsildar, Kasdol, in Revenue Case No. 6-A/2001-2002. 4. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the evidence adduced by both the parties as well as the material available on record, allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff holding therein that even if it is assumed that the defendants were in possession of the suit land during the period when the plaintiff had gone outside to earn his livelihood, such possession is not legally valid and, not being within the knowledge of the true owner, does not fall within the category of adverse possession. 5. Against the said judgment and decree, the defendants filed the Civil Appeal before the learned appellate Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/defendants. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would submit that though the suit land stands recorded in the name of the plaintiff, the title and continuous possession of the land have lawfully vested with the defendants since 21-07-1979, when the plaintiff’s 7 father, Rambharose, voluntarily sold the suit land to Duleshwar Prasad Sahu for valid consideration in the presence of witnesses and delivered possession thereof. The defendants have remained in peaceful possession of the suit land for more than two decades without any objection from the plaintiff, who had full knowledge of such possession 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record. 8. Though even if it is assumed that the defendants were in possession of the suit land during the period when the plaintiff had gone outside to earn his livelihood, such possession is not legally valid and, not being within the knowledge of the true owner, does not fall within the category of adverse possession. Therefore, the plaintiff, being the lawful owner of the suit land, is entitled to recover possession thereof. Similarly, upon gaining knowledge of the defendants’ possession over the suit land, the plaintiff had filed an application under Section 250 of the Land Revenue Code before the Tahsildar, Kasdol, which was dismissed on 23-01-2004. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present civil suit for possession and permanent injunction on 11- 02-2004, which is entirely within the prescribed period of limitation. Both the Courts after appreciating the entire facts and circumstances of the case have rightly passed the judgment and decree. 8 9. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 10. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/defendants failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 11. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 13. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the 9 settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 14. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 15. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/Amardeep