1 2026:CGHC:1825 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 340 of 2025 1 - Mu. Hemo Bai D/o Late Upendro, W/o Shri Bhuneshwar Aged About 65 Years R/o Palidih, Tahsil - Patthalgaon, District Jashpur Chhattisgarh 2 - Mu. Sharda Bai D/o Late Upendro, W/o Late Shri Bhagwat Aged About 63 Years R/o Village Singibahar, Tahsil - Farsabahar, District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Kaushilya Bai D/o Upendro, W/o Shri Bhimraj Aged About 60 Years R/o Village Bildegi, Tahsil - Patthalgaon, District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh 2 - Lukeshwar S/o Shri Bhimraj Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Bildegi, Tahsil - Patthalgaon, District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh 3 - Umesh Chandra S/o Shri Bhimraj Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Bildegi, Tahsil - Patthalgaon, District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh 4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Jashpur, District - Jashpur Chhattisgarh (Wrongly Mentioned In The Cause Title As Si. No. 2 And 5 Of The Impugned Judgment And Decree) ---- Respondents For Appellants : Mr. R.K. Agrawal, Advocate For Respondents No.1,2&3: Mr. Arham Siddiqui, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Ritesh Giri, Panel Lawyer 2 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 13.01.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/plaintiffs challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 02/05/2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Patthalgaon, District Jashpur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.1-A/2024 (Mu. Hemu Bai & Anr Vs. Kaushilya Bai & Ors) arising out of the judgment dated 19/12/2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-II, Patthalgaon, District Jashpur, C.G. in Civil Suit No.7-A/2015 [Mu. Hemu Bai & Anr Vs. Upendro Ram(died) through Lrs Kaushilya Bai & Ors]. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs preferred a suit seeking declaration, partition and permanent injunction in respect of suit land bearing Khasra No.7 (Schedule A) rakba 16.20 acres situated at P.H. No.23, Tehsil Patthalgaon, Jashpur pleading inter alia that the suit property obtained by the father of the plaintiffs namely Upendro Ram by the family partition amongst his brothers and thereafter the name of the Upendro Ram recorded in the revenue record in respect of the suit land. Upendro Ram executed the registered sale deeds dated 01.04.1981, 04.02.2013, 01.05.2013 in the favour of the defendant no. 2 & 3, who are the grandson and the son of the defendant no. 1 by defeating the rights of plaintiffs. 3 The plaintiffs demanded the partition of the suit land from her father, but they denied hence suit for declaration of 1/3 shares of each plaintiff and sale deeds declared as null and void and permanent injunction has been preferred before the learned Trial Court. 3. In the said Civil Suit, the defendants submitted their written statement and denied the plaint averments. They stated that the plaintiffs are not the daughters of Upendro Ram. They specifically stated that the plaintiffs are the daughter of Laxmi Bai and Chintamani Mahkul, therefore, plaintiffs have no rights in the suit property and sought for dismissal of the suit. 4. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the evidence adduced by both the parties as well as the material available on record, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs holding therein that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are the daughters of Upendra Ram. Therefore, it is not established that the plaintiffs have any right or title to Upendra Ram's property or his ancestral land. Since the plaintiffs have no right or share in Upendra Ram's land, they are not entitled to a share in the suit property or a permanent injunction. Similarly, since the suit property does not belong to the plaintiffs, they are not affected in any way by the sale deeds executed by Upendra Ram during his lifetime. 5. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs filed the Civil 4 Appeal before the learned appellate Court who by order impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellants/plaintiffs. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record. 7. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5 10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at 6 all. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep