SHRI THEPFUSATUO RIO v. THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRL.REVN/11/2026 · 2026-07-30
Yarenjungla Longkumer
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 11443 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 11443 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
Page No.# 1/31 GAHC020001022026 2026:GAU-NL:415
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : CRL.REVN/11/2026 SHRI THEPFUSATUO RIO S/O SHRI KHRULHOU RIO, R/O 6TH MILE, A KHEL, SOVIMA VILLAGE, DIMAPUR, NAGALAND, PERMANENT RESIDENT OF CHIECHAMA VILLAGE, KOHIMA, NAGALAND, 797001 VERSUS THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION REPRESENTED BY THE HEAD OF BRANCH, ANTI-CRIME BRANCH, IMPHAL, PO/PS LAMPHEL, IMPHAL WEST DISTRICT, MANIPUR - 795004 Advocate for the Petitioner : SENTIYANGER, KONLI BUCHEM,WAPANGLEMLA,NOCKLEI M KONYAK,MAONGKALA,YUKHAKOKLA,KEVISERIENUO,IMLIMENLA IMCHEN Advocate for the Respondent : , BENDANGWABANG, Special P.P
Page No.# 2/31
BEFORE :
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER Advocates for the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sentiyanger
Advocate for the Respondent(s) : Mr. Bendangwabang, Special P.P, CBI Date on which judgment is reserved : 24.07.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 31.07.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment : Full judgment.
Whether the full judgment has been pronounced : Yes.
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER (CAV) CRL.REVN/10/2026: CRL.REVN/11/2026 and CRL.REVN/12/2026 are being disposed of by this common judgment as they pertain to the same work order, common impugned order dated 18.02.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Dimapur and a common order dated 18.02.2026 framing charge against the Petitioners in CBI Case No.01/2025.
2. Heard Learned counsel, Mr. Sentiyanger for the Petitioners. Also heard Mr. Bendangwabang, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the CBI.
3. The three Crl. revision Petitions herein have been preferred under
Page No.# 3/31 Section 442 read with 438 of the BNSS by the three Petitioners who have been named as accused persons in the CBI Case No.01/2025 in connection with RC2(A)/2019-IMP under Section 120B & 420 IPC. By filing the Crl. revision petitions, the Petitioners have prayed for quashing of the impugned common order dated 18.02.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur under Section 239 CrPC in I.A (Discharge) No. 59/60/61 of 2025, whereby, the applications praying for discharge of the Petitioners was rejected. The Petitioners have also prayed for quashing of the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 framing charge under Section 120B and 420 IPC against the petitioners by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur under Section 239 CrPC on the same day. The Petitioners have also prayed for quashing the impugned summoning
order dated 18.02.2026 passed in CBI Case No.01/2025. 4. The facts leading to the filing of the CRL.REVISION 10, 11 and 12/2026 is as under:- a) The Petitioner in CRL.REVN Petition 11/2026 is the Managing Director of the firm M/S Hexad Syndicate and the Petitioners in CRL.REVN Petition Nos. 10 & 12/2026 are the partners of the said firm M/S Hexad Syndicate. The firm of the Petitioners was awarded a Work Order NO.CE/R&B/Tender/HighCourtRoad/2007-08 dated 02- 01-2008 for the Construction of High Court Road (Double Lane-Mini Highway) 2.0 Km at Kohima. The value of the work is approximately worth Rs.581.85 lakhs (Rupees Five Crore Eighty One lakhs Eighty Five Thousand only). b) Under the said work order, there were several components to be executed such as site clearance, earthwork, construction of 2000
Page No.# 4/31 mts blacktopped road, construction of footpath and culverts. The Petitioners started to execute the work and accordingly, as per the work executed running bills were received vide 5(five) cheques dated 19.02.2008, 27.07.2010, 09.08.2010, 11.05.2011 and 16.05.2011 amounting to Rs.4,52,99,286/- (Rupees Four crore Fifty Two lakhs Ninety Nine thousand Two hundred Eighty Six only). c) The entire contract amount of Rs.581.85 lakhs was not released to the Petitioner firm since the entire work was not completed because only after the main New High Court Building was completed the remaining road encircling the main high court building measuring about 347 meters was to be constructed. The encircling road was essential because of the fact that there are two entrances, one at the back and one in front of the main High Court Building inasmuch as the front entrance is to be used by the lawyers/public whereas the back entrance is for the Judges and the Registry Staff. The completion of the construction of the entire stretch of the road and footpath depended on the completion of the main high court building due to the practical issues of the chances of the road getting damaged when building materials and machineries were dumped for the main building which would lead to big losses. Therefore, the Petitioners had claimed the running bills only for the work already executed and admittedly there was no issue of receipt of payment for work yet to be completed as the entire stretch of the road could be completed only after completion of the main building.
d) At this stage, the Gauhati High Court vide order dated 02.05.2018 passed in PIL(Suo Moto) No.05/2017 directed the CBI to
Page No.# 5/31 conduct a preliminary inquiry into allegations of misappropriation of public money and the snail pace of the construction work of the New High Court Complex at Kohima. Thereafter, the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court, Guwahati vide Letter dated 03.05.2018 wrote to the Director, CBI, New Delhi. Accordingly, preliminary inquiry was conducted by the CBI which came to a prima facie finding that there was defrauding of public funds and substandard construction on 6 (six) instances. As such, a case was registered being RC 2(A) 2019-IMP at the CBI Imphal Branch. e) The CBI conducted the preliminary enquiry and thereafter, FIR was filed by the CBI on 17.06.2019 on 6(six) allegations. However, only the sixth allegation pertains to the petitioners:
“F) Construction of Black Topped Road and Pucca Footpath Paved with Chequered Tiles from Main Highway (NH 61) i.e. Wokha Road to the Main Building of High Court:-inspection/measurement of this work by Engineers of CPWD revealed shortage in length by 300 mtrs and shortages in width by 1 mtr. The value for this shortages in length and width of the road as calculated by the Engineers of CPWD comes to Rs. 1,30,54,275/- which is an excess amount paid to the contractor Shri. Thepfusatuo (A-14), MD of M/s Hexad Syndicate as a result of criminal conspiracy with Er. Vekho Swuro (A-3), EE (Retd), Er. N.Kikheto Sumi (A-4), EE (Retd), Er. Kelechuto Pienyu (A-5), EE, Er. Scato Hutokha Sema (A-7), SDO, Er. Nimo Kath (A-8), SDO and Er. Mhasivilie Savino (A-10), JE, all of Nagaland PWD and thereby caused wrongful loss to the Govt. of Nagaland and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves”. f) The FIR was registered under Section 120B/420 of the IPC read
Page No.# 6/31 with Section 13(2)/13((1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. After investigation the CBI filed chargesheet No.07/2021 against all the 3 (three) Petitioners and the government employees/engineers.
When the chargesheet was filed, it was indicated that against Allegation VI (“F”) the excess payment was found to be Rs.29,68,345/- (Twenty Nine lakhs Sixty Eight thousand Three hundred and Forty Five) even thought in the FIR the excess amount was shown as Rs.1,30,54,275/- (Rupees One crore Thirty lakhs Fifty Four thousand Two hundred and Seventy Five). However, the Government of Nagaland did not grant prosecution sanction in respect of the Engineers. Thereafter, the Petitioners filed discharge petitions before the learned Special Judge, CBI Dimapur, Nagaland. By order dated 28.06.2024 the discharge petitions were dismissed. The Petitioners were then directed to face trial for offences under Sections 120B & 420 IPC before the learned Chief Judicial, Magistrate, Dimapur. g) Against the order dated 28.06.2024 rejecting their discharge application the Petitioners preferred Criminal Petitions No.41/2024, 42/2024 and 43/2024 before this court challenging the dismissal of their discharge petition by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Nagaland. The 3 (three) Criminal Petitions were disposed of by a common
Judgment and Order dated 08.04.2025. By passing the order dated 08.04.2025, this Court did not interfere with the CBI report dated 21.07.2021 or the dismissal order dated 28.06.2024 passed by learned Special Judge, CBI, however, liberty was given to the Petitioners to file discharge applications before the learned Chief
Page No.# 7/31 Judicial Magistrate. It was also directed that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur would not be influenced by the observation made in the order dated 08.04.2025 in the Criminal Petitions by this Court or the order of the learned Special Judge, CBI, Nagaland dated 28.06.2024 dismissing the discharge applications of the petitioners. h) The Petitioners therefore, filed discharge petitions I.A(discharge) 59/60/61 of 2025 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur. However, vide the impugned common order dated 18.02.2026 their discharge petitions were rejected and on the same day, charge under Section 420/120B IPC were framed against the Petitioners and summons were issued to the prosecution witnesses. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners are before this Court assailing the impugned orders dated 18.02.2026 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur. 5. The learned counsel for the Petitioners at the outset submits that the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 rejecting the discharge application of the Petitioners is mechanical and reflects non-application of judicial mind. The impugned order merely contains an observation that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding without analyzing how the essential ingredients of offences under Section 120B and 420 IPC are prima facie made out against the accused persons/Petitioners. There is no discussion at all co-relating the available material with the statutory requirements of cheating or Criminal Conspiracy; the impugned order reflects total non- application of judicial mind and amounts to jurisdictional error and material irregularity. The learned Trial Court failed to apply the settled
Page No.# 8/31 principles of law to the specific role attributed to the accused persons. The Court failed to examine the essential ingredients of Section 120B and 420 IPC in the context of the materials on record and also failed to identify what constitutes “grave suspicion” or whether the materials on record disclose anything beyond mere suspicion. 6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the impugned order dismissing the discharge application of the Petitioners does not show how the absence of sanction against the government Engineers effects the allegation of conspiracy.
The impugned order does not show that there was a prima facie existence of an agreement, which is the main ingredient of Section 120B IPC. The court also did not arrive at any finding that there was deception coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, which are essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC as given in the definition of cheating in Section 415 IPC. Nothing was indicated by the learned Trial Court to show that there was any material disclosing wrongful gain to one party or wrongful loss to another. 7. Therefore, the impugned order dismissing the discharge application contains no discussion of the specific acts attributed to each accused person, and there was no finding regarding dishonest intention at inception, and no analysis corelating the materials on record with the ingredients of the alleged offences. 8. Moreover, to frame charge under Section 420 IPC the prosecution must prima facie show deception at the inception, dishonest inducement, and delivery of property due to such inducement and mens rea from the beginning. Page No.# 9/31
9. Learned counsel submits that the allegations against the Petitioners even if accepted in its entirety disclosed at best alleged sub-standard execution of work, measurement disputes and contractual irregularities which are matters of contractual breach and not cheating. It is submitted that it is settled law that breach of contract does not ipso facto amount to cheating unless dishonest intention existed at inception. However, the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate this settled distinction. At the stage of discharge, it is a well-established legal principle that when two views are possible in a case, the view that favours the accused must be adopted by the court. 10.
With regard to the charge under Section 120B of the IPC, learned counsel submits that for framing a charge under Section 120B IPC, the prosecution must show agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means. However, the chargesheet filed by the CBI does not indicate any meeting of minds, any act indicating prior agreement, or any communication or material linking the petitioners with the engineers. It is stated by the learned counsel that prosecution sanction has been declined to the engineers by the government and as such it is only the petitioners who are being charged under Section 120B IPC for Criminal Conspiracy. The 3(three) Petitioners are all partners of the same firm and in the eye of law they are one and the same person and therefore, a single person cannot conspire. 11. The learned counsel for the Petitioners has also submitted that the prosecution sanction was declined against the accused NPWD Engineers. However, the Measurement Book Certification and Quality Verification were the functions of those Engineers. Without prosecuting the certifying
Page No.# 10/31 authority, alleging conspiracy only against the Petitioners/Contractors becomes legally unsustainable. The alleged excess payment was passed through official measurement books and bills certified by the six engineers. However, the learned Trial Court failed to consider this legal inconsistency. 12. The learned counsel also submits that there is no evidence at all that the Petitioners have received excess payment. It is stated that the value of the work awarded to the Petitioners firm was Rs.581.85 lakhs (Rupees Five crore Eighty One lakhs Eighty Five thousand only). The Petitioners diligently executed the work and received 3 (three) running account bills through 5 (five) cheques amounting to Rs.4,52,99,286/- (Rupees Four crore Fifty Two lakhs Ninety Nine thousand Two hundred Eighty Six). Further, the entire contract amount of Rs.
581.85 lakhs were not released to the Petitioners firm since the entire work was not completed due to the fact that it would be completed only after the construction of the main New High Court building was done, as the remaining road measuring about 347 meters was to be constructed encircling the main High Court building. Therefore, no completion certificate was issued to show that the work was completed. There is no allegation in the entire chargesheet that completion certificate was issued. Learned counsel submits that in fact the remaining portion of the road and footpath has been completed only during the pendency of the Criminal Petition No. 41, 42 & 43/2024 and completion certificate dated 18.03.2025 has been issued by the Chief Engineer, PWD(R&B), Nagaland, Kohima. The said work could be completed in 2025 as the main building of the New High Court has also been completed and therefore, the encircling road could be constructed. Page No.# 11/31
13. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the chargesheet does not contain any allegation of substandard work. On the contrary, Chargesheet No. 07/2021 merely records that the road was under wear and tear, but the learned Trial Court has stated in the charge framing order that the Petitioners are also charged with “substandard work.”
14. The learned counsel for the Petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to Paragraph-16.10, 16.11, 16.12 and 16.13 of the chargesheet where the Respondents/CBI has clearly mentioned that during the preliminary enquiry the road was inspected by a team of CBI Officers with the help of Engineers of the CPWD, Kohima. The said report of the CPWD, Engineers and the CBI Officers, stated that the total length of the road is 1.70 kilometers with an average width of 6.00 meters which was completed years back.
It is stated that in the report that no details are mentioned as to how the length and width of the road were measured and moreover, the inspection/measurement was done in the absence of the accused contractors. At Paragraph 16.13 of the Chargesheet, it is mentioned that during investigation it was informed by the 2 (two) Engineers of CPWD that the length of the road was measured with the help of milometer of vehicle and the width was measured randomly in 3(three) or 4(four) places only by measurement tape. Hence, the accuracy of the length and width of the road as mentioned in the report of the CPWD Engineers is doubtful based on the nature of the measurement. Therefore, another detailed measurement was done during investigation from 08.10.2020 to 09.10.2020 and it was found that the shortage in length of the road was 347 meters as against 2010 meter as per the
Page No.# 12/31 measurement book and accordingly, corresponding excess amount was paid to the contractor against the shortage in length which was worked out at Rs.25,89,568.75/- by the CPWD Engineers. 15. Regarding the allegation of shortage by 238 meters in length in respect of the footpath with chequered tiles, the learned counsel submits that the footpath was to start from the national highway till the area where the new High Court site starts. But they had to leave some spaces in between so as to allow for drainage and also in order to avoid trees etc and hence, it was found short by 238 meters in length and the allegation in this regard is that an excess payment of Rs.3,78,777/- has been paid to the Petitioners. 16. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the allegation regarding discrepancy in the calculation of length made in the measurement book (MB) is purely the lookout of the Engineers. The Petitioners are the contractors who are not privy to the contents of the MB and therefore, the allegation is purely regarding the wrong entry in the MB and the said allegation is against the Engineers and not against the Petitioners.
Learned counsel also states the MB and the Running Account Bills are all signed and issued by the Engineers and if there are any false entries in the MB, the Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for the same. However, the prosecution sanction has not been given in respect of the accused Engineers. 17. Learned counsel submits that subsequently, the Petitioners have taken the permission of this Court during the pendency of CRL.PETITION No. 41/42/43 of 2024 to complete the work and the same has been completed and a completion certificate has been issued by the Chief
Page No.# 13/31 Engineer, PWD (R&B), Nagaland vide Completion Certificate dated 18th Mar. 2025 which is reproduced here below:- COMPLETION CERTIFICATE This is to certify that as per inspection report by Superintending Engineer, Circle -II, Kohima and Construction Division and as per the completion report received from Executive Engineer, PWD(R&B) Construction Division, Chiephobozou for the work - "Construction of High Court Road (Double Lane-Mini Highway) at Kohima", the remaining length of (i)347 m in the construction of road and (ii) 238 m in Construction of footpath with chequered tiles has been found executed and completed
(Er. SWARAI MERU) Chief Engineer, PWD(R&B) Kohima: Nagaland. 18. Further, the Petitioners have written to the Chief Engineer, PWD (R&B) praying for release of the remaining payment amounting to Rs.1,00,91,120.50/- (Rupees One crore Ninety One thousand One hundred Twenty and Fifty paise) on 05.02.2025. The learned counsel therefore submits that the work order was for a duration of 12 months and only running bills were given to the Petitioners and they never received the full payment nor completion certificate as the work was yet to be completed. At best, the Petitioners are liable for civil action due to the late completion of the work which could be a breach of the contract between the PWD Department and the Petitioners.
It is therefore apparent that the payment was made for the work executed by the Petitioner and
Page No.# 14/31 no excess payment was made, and the remaining work was completed in
2025. The Petitioners were not able to continue with the remaining work of 347 mts in the construction of road and 238 mts in Construction of footpath due to the ongoing construction of the main building of the High Court. 19. On the basis of the submission made hereinabove, the learned counsel for the Petitioners prays that the impugned common order dated 18.02.2026 rejecting the discharge applications, the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 framing charge against the Petitioners, and the impugned summoning order dated 18.02.2026 may be quashed and set aside as there is no prima facie case against the Petitioners on the basis of the chargesheet No. 07/2021 filed by the Respondent/CBI. 20. The learned counsel for the Petitioners has relied on the following judgments in support of his submissions:- i. Fazid vs. State of Kerala (Kerala HC) in Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 666/2023 ii. Santosh Kumar vs. State of Karnataka (Karnataka HC) in CRL.P. NO.7196/2016 iii. Shyam Sundar Agrawalla vs. State of Orissa (Orissa HC) in CRLMC No. 3159 of 2024 iv. Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4 v. Sajjan Kumar vs. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 vi. Tuhin Kumar Biswas vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 2604 vii. Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab reported in
Page No.# 15/31 (2023) 5 SCC 360 viii. Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma vs. State of Bihar reported in (2000) 4 SCC 168 ix. Rikhab Birani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 823 x. Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijay Satardekar reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 xi. Nitya Dharmananda vs. Gopal Sheelum Reddy reported in (2018) 2 SCC 93 xii.
Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 441 xiii. Karan Talwar vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2024) INSC 1012 xiv. Sanjay Kumar Rai vs. State of UP reported in (2022) 15 SCC 720 xv. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke reported in (2015) 3 SCC 123 para-17 & (2024) 5 SCC 485 para-18
21. Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor, CBI, Mr. Bendangwabang submits that upon conducting preliminary investigation by the CBI many irregularities were detected in the utilization of the funds meant for the New High Court Constructions, and thus, the CBI filed the FIR in the year 2019 under Section 120B/420 IPC r/w Section 13(2), 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 2018 against 16 accused persons, including Government Employees and four other private persons. After the completion of the investigation, the chargesheet No.07/2021 was filed against the Petitioners and the Government Employees who were found
Page No.# 16/31 involved in the case of misappropriation of the funds pertaining to the construction of the New High Court. The accused Petitioners filed the I.A. NO./59/60/61 of 2025 seeking discharge under Section 239 of CrPC and the said petitions were heard by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur and rejected by the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 and on the same date charge was framed against the accused Petitioners thereby issuing summons to the witnesses for evidence. There is no bar in law that the court after rejecting the discharge petition cannot frame charge on the same date. 22. The Special Public Prosecutor submits that the accused Petitioners by filing the instant revision petitions as well as by filing the discharge application before the Special Judge, CBI and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur and also by filing the Criminal Petitions No. 41/42/43 of 2024 are only trying to delay and prolong the criminal proceedings.
If the accused Petitioners are of the view that they are innocent of the charges they should be directed to face the trial and obtain an honorable acquittal. 23. The learned Special Public Prosecutor also states that the principle of
“stare decisis” is applicable in the present case as the Special Court, CBI had already rejected the discharge applications of the Petitioners and the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate was bound by the order of the Special Court, CBI. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that the excess amount of Rs.29,68,345/- (Rupees Twenty Nine lakhs Sixty Eight thousand Three hundred Forty Five) was paid in excess by the government officials along with the accused Petitioners. The accused Petitioners as well as Engineers are bound to maintain the MB jointly with signature from the
Page No.# 17/31 contractor or its agent to maintain transparency. Against the contract value of Rs.5,81,85,000/- the contractors are liable to pay various kind of taxes such as CST, VET, TDS, CESS, FOREST ROYALTY and many other unaccounted taxes. If those taxes are accounted a minimum of 22.25% is to be borne by the contractor against the contract value. If a minimum of 22.25% against the work value is applied, the assessment comes very close to Rs.5,81,85,000/-. After the receipt of Rs.4,52,99,286/- as running bills if the accused petitioners had paid those taxes, they were supposed to receive only about Rs.3.51 Cr. It can be therefore assumed that the accused Petitioners are due to receive only about Rs.1.28 Cr from the government from the contract value. However, since the accused Petitioners have already received Rs.4,52,99,286/-, it can be assumed that the alleged remaining balance was the left over of about Rs.1.28 Cr which will cover up their taxes and hence there is no amount due to be received from the government by the accused Petitioners. 24.
The learned PP admits that during the pendency of Criminal Petitions No. 41/42/43 of 2024, the Petitioners undertook to complete the unfinished work at the New High Court Complex which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 28.11.2024. However, this should not come under the purview of the instant case and should not be taken into account by this Court. Moreover, whatever amount is yet to be received by the Petitioners after the completion of the work is not the concern of the Respondents. 25. Learned PP submits that based on the entries in the MB, the amounts were released and received. There was no proper entry in the MB and the work order was only for 2000 meters, but in the measurement
Page No.# 18/31 book it was recorded as 2010 meters which is a manipulation by the petitioner/Contractors and the Engineers beyond the work order for which the Government Officials and the accused Petitioners have entered into Criminal Conspiracy and misused the funds. Further, the entries made in the MB and payments which were released as three different running bills were made without proper entry which disclosed the criminal intent of the accused Petitioners and the Government Officials causing loss to the public exchequer. Thus, the meeting of minds between the accused Petitioners and the Government Officials are clear ingredients to prove the criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC and there was misappropriation of Rs.29,68,354/- constituting offences of cheating under Section 420 IPC. 26. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the failure to execute the contract work within the stipulated period of 12 (twelve) months amounts to breach of trust and breach of contract and though civil in nature the same has assumed a criminal color. 27.
Learned Public Prosecutor submits that there is no illegality or jurisdictional error committed by the Trial Court while disposing the I.A No. 59, 60 and 61/2025 and the Trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the Petitioners. 28. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that as far as the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 438 and 442 BNSS/Section 397 and 401 CrPC is concerned, the law is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is extremely limited and cannot be used on a routinely basis and it cannot be invoked against interim or interlocutory orders. The law is well settled that at the pre trial stage, the High Court is
Page No.# 19/31 to refrain from minutely analyzing the evidence. The Court is only required to see if there is prima facie case, strong presumption and strong suspicion based on the material produced by the prosecution. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that if the Trial Court’s order was well-reasoned and a prima facie case existed, the High Court should rarely interfere in a revision petition. The established jurisprudence dictates that the accused cannot seek discharge simply by denying the prosecution’s allegations at this preliminary stage. Revision is not an appeal and the Higher Court will generally intervene only to correct patent illegalities, severe jurisdictional errors or manifest injustice rather than re-evaluating the evidence. 29. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that a revision petition cannot be entertained at the instance of a party who had a statutory right to appeal, but failed to utilize it. Learned Public Prosecutor therefore submits that the instant petition under Section 442 & 438 of the BNSS are not maintainable in law. 30. Learned Public Prosecutor relies on the following judgments in support of his submissions:- i. Tarun Jit Tejpal vs. The State of Goa & Anr. in CRL. APPEAL NO. 1246 of 2019 Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1383/2018 ii. K. RAVI vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. in 2024 INSC 642 iii. Girish Kumar Suneja vs. CBI reported in AIR (2017) SC 3620 iv. Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460
31.
I have duly considered the submission of the learned counsel for the
Page No.# 20/31 parties and perused the pleadings as well as the Trial Court Records. 32. The discharge application I.A(discharge) No.59/60/61 of 2025 were filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur in view of the liberty given to the Petitioners by order dated 08.04.2025 in Criminal Petitioners No. 41/42/43 of 2024. It was also directed in the order dated 08.04.2025 that the Chief Judicial Magistrate would not be influenced by the observation made in the Criminal Petitions or the order of the learned Special Judge, CBI in the discharge applications. 33. An order rejecting discharge and an order framing charge are closely connected. Once the trial court rejects the discharge applications, it ordinarily proceeds to frame the charge. If the rejection of discharge is found to be legally unsustainable, the consequential order framing charge cannot survive. In the case of Amit Kapoor (Supra), the Supreme Court held that Section 397 CrPC/438 BNSS vests the High Court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well founded error. Revisional jurisdiction can be invoked when the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous and there is no compliance with the provisions of law or the finding recorded is based on no evidence or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. The Supreme Court also held that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. When the court is dealing with the question as to whether charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, the
Page No.# 21/31 court should be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories as mentioned above.
34. In Sanjay Kumar Rai (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final. And that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to
facts and circumstances of individual cases. This Court is of the view that the instant criminal revision petitions are maintainable against the impugned order rejecting discharge and also against the order framing charge because the said orders are clearly not interim orders or interlocutory orders. It is evident that the rejection of discharge and the framing of charges substantially effects the rights of the accused petitioners. Although an order framing charge has sometimes been treated as an interlocutory order, the Supreme Court has held in various cases that where there is patent jurisdictional error, legal infirmity or abuse of process, the High Court may still interfere by invoking its revisional jurisdiction. The revisional power should be exercised only in the circumstances as mentioned. 35. The other principle laid down in the case of Amit Kapoor (Supra), is that strong suspicion is sufficient to frame a charge and that if the allegations, taken at their face value do not constitute the ingredients of the offence, the proceedings may be quashed and further that when two views are possible and the material raises only a mere suspicion as opposed to strong suspicion, discharge may be justified. Further in Dilawar Balu Kurane Vrs State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135,
Page No.# 22/31 the Supreme Court held:
"12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant.
In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial (see Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal). 36. In the instance case, upon perusal of the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 rejecting the discharge applications of the Petitioners, it is seen that the learned Trial Court has recorded its reasons for its decision at Pages 18, 19 & 20 of the impugned Order. The learned Trial Court has referred to several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but has not given any findings as to how there is a strong suspicion showing
Page No.# 23/31 possibility of commission of the offence by the accused persons. This Court finds that the impugned order does not disclose any reasons for rejecting the petition for discharge. There is no mention that the grounds urged by the Petitioners to discharge them from the case were considered unacceptable.
At the stage of framing charge, the court is not required to record the reasons for framing charges. But it is a settled position of law that in a discharge petition, the court has to record its reasons for rejecting the discharge. When an application for discharge is filed, the same has to be disposed of by a reasoned order. The statutory intent in Section 239 CrPC cannot be understood in a manner that the court is to record its reasons only when allowing the petition, but not when rejecting it. In the instant case, the Petitioners had raised several grounds while seeking discharge: namely, absence of valid sanction against the government Officials, absence of necessary ingredients to constitute the offence of Section 420 IPC or 120B IPC and also the provisions of the Nagaland PWD Code which showed that maintaining the measurement book is the sole responsibility of the Engineers and not the Contractors. It was therefore, incumbent upon the Trial Court to specifically deal with each of the grounds raised by the Petitioners/Accused and to state why such grounds were not acceptable. However, the learned Trial Court has simply made a bold statement that there is a prima facie case made out against the Petitioners. It is evident that the impugned order rejecting the discharge applications falls short of the statutory requirement of Section 239 of the CrPC thereby not complying with the provisions of law. 37. With regard to the materials available in the chargesheet, this Court has observed that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not at all
Page No.# 24/31 present.
In A.M Mohan Vrs State, (2024) 12 SCC 181, the Supreme court was of the view that for attracting the provisions of Section 420 IPC, the FIR must disclose the (i)deception of any person,(ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person and (ii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. 38. The allegation is that there was wrong measurement of the road by the Engineers in connivance with the Petitioners thereby causing an excess payment to the Petitioners. However, the measurements and maintenance of the MB is the sole responsibility of the Engineers and the Contractors have no role to play. There is no material in the chargesheet showing dishonest intention on the part of the Petitioners/Accused at the very inception when the work started. The only allegation is that excess payment was released because the engineers certified an inflated measurement of the road. There is no prima facie evidence that the Petitioners/Accused fabricated documents, made false representations, manipulated measurements or otherwise acted dishonestly. In other words, the dishonest intention on the part of the Petitioners should be established at the time of entering into the transaction, otherwise the offence of cheating is not established or made out. 39. Section 415 of the IPC reads as under:-
“(415.) Cheating. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause
Page No.# 25/31 damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".” It is settled law that the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415 of the IPC has to contain the ingredient of deception at the inception of the transaction.
This is the core of the offence under Section 415 IPC. A mere subsequent failure to keep a promise or breach of contract does not amount to cheating unless the dishonest intention existed from the very beginning. The fraudulent or dishonest inducement is also an indispensable ingredient. The materials in the chargesheet have to show that the accused had the mens rea at the time when they submitted the bills for the road construction. In the context of Section 420 IPC the prosecution must show that all the ingredients of Section 415 IPC is present and also show that the deception induced the victim (allegedly public exchequer) to deliver a property or valuable security. 40. However, in the instant case, this Court in unable to find not even an iota of material in the chargesheet that there was dishonest intention on the part of the Petitioners when they started executing the work order. There is also no statement by any witness anywhere in the chargesheet that the Petitioners had made wrong entries regarding the length of the road in the MB so as to receive excess payment. As already observed, the Petitioners are not privy to the measurement book. If there was any wrong measurement of the road, it was the responsibility of the engineers and not the contractors. 41. This Court is also of the view, basing on the findings in the chargesheet that the investigation was conducted prematurely as far as the sixth allegation, “F” is concerned. It has been demonstrated through
Page No.# 26/31 records that the road was not completed and the work order was not executed in full as the main High Court building was yet to be completed and the encircling road had to await the completion of the main building of the High Court as it was practically not possible to construct the encircling road when the main High Court building was under construction. Accordingly, the remaining portion of the road was completed only in the year 2025 as shown by the completion certificate dated 18.03.2025. 42. In such circumstances, there is no prima facie case or no ‘strong suspicion’ against the Petitioners in order to sustain a charge under Section 420 IPC. When there is no ingredient of Section 420 IPC against the Petitioners/Accused, the Trial Court ought to have discharged the Petitioners/Accused. 43.
With regard to the charge under Section 120B IPC, it is settled law that a conspiracy necessarily requires an agreement between at least 2 (two) persons. In Topandas Vrs State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33, the principle was laid down that for an offence of criminal conspiracy under Sections 120A and 120B IPC, there must be an agreement between two or more persons. One person alone cannot be convicted for conspiracy. The prosecution alleges that the Government Engineers had conspired with the Petitioners in making excess payments. The Engineers are not prosecuted in the instant case as sanction has been refused. That does not by itself extinguish the allegations of conspiracy. The refusal of sanction is a procedural bar to prosecuting the government Officials. But it is not a judicial finding that no conspiracy existed. The essential ingredients of Section 120B IPC is that, there has to be an agreement
Page No.# 27/31 between two or more persons; the agreement must be to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means. When the conspiracy is to commit an offence, the agreement itself is sufficient to constitute the offence. The prosecution must show a meeting of minds between the conspirators. Mere knowledge, association, or suspicion is not enough to establish conspiracy. 44. In the instant case, the entire prosecution case against the Petitioners is inseparably founded on the alleged conspiracy with public servants and there is no independent evidence against the Petitioners. Conspiracy necessarily requires an agreement between at least 2 (two) persons. However, in the chargesheet there is no mention of any agreement between government employees and the Petitioners and there are no other alleged conspirators. 45. Therefore, the charge under Section 120B IPC lacks a factual foundation and the charge under Section 420 IPC also fails because there is no independent evidence of deception by the Petitioners. In the case of Manoj Kumar Soni Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 INSC 705, the Supreme Court held that a single individual cannot conspire with oneself. A one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal conspiracy. In the said case, the conviction of the appellant was set aside as there was no evidence of any agreement between the appellant and the co-accused. 46. In the cited case of Manoj Kumar Soni (Supra), The Supreme Court reiterated an important principle regarding criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC stating that a conviction for conspiracy requires proof of a meeting of minds or an agreement to commit the illegal act. Page No.# 28/31 And that mere suspicion, or association with the other accused is not sufficient to establish conspiracy and that the evidence should clearly point to the existence of an agreement. The mere allegation that excess payment was made to the Petitioners does not reveal prima facie case of any criminal conspiracy. As observed earlier, the denial of sanction to the government officials does not extinguish the conspiracy allegations automatically. However, in the present case, the only evidence of conspiracy shown by the prosecution is the Measurement Book prepared by the Engineers and there is no independent evidence of any meeting of minds, communication, instructions, or false claim by the Petitioners. 47. In contract matters, the MB is ordinarily maintained by the Departmental Engineers. It records the measurements of work executed and forms the basis for preparing running account bills and final bills. A contractor may sign bills or acknowledgments, but the measurement book is under the custody and control of the department concerned. The alleged excess payment is stated to arise purely from incorrect or inflated measurements recorded in the Measurement Book. There is no evidence that the Petitioners prepared the measurements or had access to the Measurement Book being contractors.
Further, there is no prima facie case whatsoever that the Petitioners had induced the Engineers, fabricated documents or knowingly claimed payment for work not executed. The prosecution also has not shown any prima facie case of an agreement between the Petitioners and the Engineers to inflate the measurement or obtain excess payment. In other words, there is no evidence whatsoever of any meetings, communications, instructions or any other material connecting the Petitioners with the false measurements. The Supreme
Page No.# 29/31 Court has repeatedly cautioned that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for the material necessary to infer an agreement. 48. Receipt of excess payment alone does not establish the ingredients of offence of cheating and conspiracy cannot be alleged merely because the Petitioners have received suspected excess payments. It is most pertinent that the investigation was taken up when the work was still going on and therefore, any reasonable person would be able to infer that, after the work was completed and completion certificate issued, calculations and measurements would be made by adjusting the running bills with the final bill by the engineers even assuming that any excess amount was paid. 49. In such circumstances, this Court finds that there is no sufficient ground to presume the commission of offences under Section 420 and 120B IPC against the petitioners. 50. No doubt there has been delay in execution of the work as the work
order was issued on 02.01.2008 and the completion period was 12 (twelve) months. However, the same was completed only in the year
2025. Such delay would perhaps amount to a breach of contract between the Nagaland PWD Department and the Petitioners but it does not attract any criminal liability.
51. Having considered the entire facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that in the instant case, there is no material at all which could be translated into evidence at the trial and it would be a miscarriage of justice to make the petitioners stand the trial. There is no prima facie evidence that the petitioners had participated in recording or manipulating
Page No.# 30/31 the Measurement Book. There is no prima facie evidence that the Petitioners knew that the measurements were false, there is also no prima facie evidence that the Petitioners had submitted claims knowing they were based on false measurement and apart from receiving the payments that were released by the government Engineers, there is no material linking the Petitioners to any conspiracy.
52. In view of the findings and conclusions arrived at in the aforementioned paragraphs, this Court is of the view that the impugned
order dated 18.02.2026 passed in I.A./59/2025, I.A./60/2025 and I.A./61/2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur is grossly erroneous, against provisions of law and material evidence has been ignored. Resultantly, the impugned order dated 18.02.2026 passed in I.A./59/2025; 60/2025; and 61/2025 by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur in CBI Case No.01/2025 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the order framing charge and summoning of witnesses dated 18.07.2026 is also quashed and set aside.
53. In the result, the Petitioners are discharged from the CBI Case No.01/2025 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur, Nagaland as the materials on record do not disclose sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused persons.
54. Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
55. The Registry shall send back the Trial Court Records.
JUDGE
Page No.# 31/31 Comparing Assistant RAZOU VONUO KHOUB VE Digitally signed by RAZOUVONUO KHOUBVE Date: 2026.07.31 13:33:38 +05'30'